Balochistan received only thirty scholarships or 1 per cent of the total scholarships granted by the HEC for PhDs.
Under the category of Foreign and Indigenous Scholarships, Balochistan and FATA combined got twelve out of 8,317 scholarships offered to university students, i.e., a joint share of 0.14 per cent.
Under a programme that provides financial grants to scientific projects of university teachers to promote scientific research and innovation in higher education institutes, Balochistan only got 2.62 per cent of the grants for 2012-13.
Only one out of 130 symposiums/training workshops/seminars and conferences to disseminate their scientific works was supported by the HEC in Balochistan while forty-six such events were sponsored by HEC in Islamabad alone.
In 2012-13, Balochistan got only 4.09 per cent of Rs 12.014 billion development grants released by the HEC for establishment or expansion of universities.45
The National Research Programme for Universities (NRPU) is the highest awarded fund for research and capacity development for research and researchers of the HEC. It funds up to Rs 20 million for each project. In the three-year period 2015-16 to 2017-18, the HEC approved 2,109 projects. The province-wise distribution was more than 70 per cent to Punjab and the Federal area while Balochistan’s share was less than 1 per cent and even a low of 0.4 per cent in 2015-16.46
Article 37(A) of Pakistan’s Constitution enjoins the state to ‘… promote, with special care, the educational and economic interests of backward classes or areas.’ The purpose clearly is that the backward areas of Pakistan, which includes Balochistan, should get more than their share till the time they reach the same level as other areas in terms of socio-economic development. The HEC has clearly been violating the Constitution by providing Balochistan with even less than its constitutionally mandated 6 per cent quota.47
The first university in Balochistan was set up in 1970. Almost fifty years later there are only five universities in Balochistan, and even these are not provided with the same opportunities in terms of receiving donor money, exchange programmes and other benefits of foreign aid, as universities in other provinces. This puts the students in Balochistan at a greater disadvantage, practically stunting the ability of the Baloch people to fully develop themselves, compete and work for their province.48 There were a total of 3,200 students at Balochistan University. Of these, fewer than 500 were Baloch; of a total of 180 faculty members, only thirty were Baloch.49
Apathy of the Rest of Pakistan
The apathy of the rest of Pakistan to developments in Balochistan also contributes to the alienation of the Baloch. Addressing a seminar on ‘Stability in Balochistan: Challenges and Possibilities’ at the Punjab University, Lahore, the chief minister of Balochistan, Dr Abdul Malik Baloch, issued a timely warning that in order ‘to resolve the issues of the province once and for all, we need to change the present mindset. Otherwise, no one would be able to control the next, sixth rebellion in the province.’50
Filmmaker Sharjil Baloch interviewed several people in Lahore about Balochistan. His questions mostly drew a blank. Lahoris were blissfully unaware of the developments in Balochistan and most could not name even a single city or town of the province. Commented Zohra Yusuf, ‘… the rest of the country is not losing any sleep over Balochistan.’51
In 2010, when the incidents of kill-and-dump52 of abducted persons in Balochistan started to reach their peak, the BBC Urdu service carried out a survey in Lahore in which they asked people questions about the province. The absolute ignorance became a national joke for a few days.
Hashim bin Rashid, a lecturer in Lahore, writes that in 2015 he asked all his students, ‘“Who is Mama Qadeer?”53 Not one of them had a clue. The only answer I got was, “The activist jailed in Gilgit-Baltistan.” [That activist was Baba Jan.] Yes, they knew about the missing persons, but not much. The separatists were all foreign paid, which meant that the only way to deal with them is to crush them. Punjab remained aloof to the Mama Qadeer-led long march that ended in early 2014.’54
Hussain Nadeem, teaching at a top university in Pakistan in 2011, asked his students a simple question: name three cities in Balochistan. ‘The struggle that students faced in naming cities other than Quetta and Gwadar exposed how depressingly little the highly educated lot of Pakistan knew about Balochistan. It also revealed how little the largest province of Pakistan mattered in national discourse, academia, and at the individual level.’55
In 2003, the HRCP noted ‘… discontent almost everywhere in Balochistan because of the widely shared perception of the people’s exclusion from public affairs. They felt deprived and ignored. The political activists only articulated, often in bitter terms, the feelings of nearly all sections of the civil society.’56 In 2009 it noted, ‘In this crisis, a section of the people of Balochistan has been driven to the conclusion that they are being viewed as enemies of the state. They feel abandoned by the people as well as political forces in the rest of the country. There is a sense of isolation, rejection and dejection.’ Further, ‘The Baloch feel that security agencies treat them like enemies and as if they are not the citizens of Pakistan. It was a common complaint that the security personnel have adopted the same attitude and the same hatred towards the Baloch as they had for the Bengalis.’57
Another example of apathy is the appalling case of the description of Baloch as ‘uncivilized people who remain busy in fighting and killing’ and they are ‘the people who lived in the desert and looting caravans’ that came to light in a sociology textbook taught at intermediate level in Punjab. The book, written by Abdul Hamid Taga and Abdul Aziz Taga, was also one of the most highly recommended textbooks for the competitive Central Superior Services (CSS) exams.58 What made matters worse was that the book had been in use for over two decades, colouring the minds of thousands of students during this period in the most dominant province of the country about the least developed province. Not a feather was ruffled, no controversy was generated and it was accepted as true.59
The government’s apathy was also seen in the woefully inadequate relief efforts following the cyclone and floods in June–July 2007 that also ravaged Sindh. In July, the death toll was 180, climbing to 420 by September. According to National Party (NP) leader Dr Abdul Hayee Baloch, ‘This cyclone was several times more devastating than the earthquake of 2005 [in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir—POK], yet, it has received several times less attention from the government.’ He lamented that the government was ‘… totally apathetic to the plight of the Baloch people’.60 Describing Islamabad’s response a month after the calamity as ineffective, insufficient and slow, the Rural Development Policy Institute (RDPI), using the National Disaster Management Authority’s data, reported that only seven relief camps were set up in Balochistan in June and July compared to 108 in Sindh, though Balochistan was harder hit. Over 5,000 villages in Balochistan (and 1,400 in Sindh) were affected. Losses in Balochistan amounted to $417 million (Rs 24 billion). The agricultural sector was almost completely wiped out, with more than 320,000 hectares of crops and orchards destroyed; most people lost their livestock, while 5,000 km (worth $43 million or Rs 2.6 billion) of roads were washed away in the province.61
This state of affairs was confirmed by noted human rights activist I.A. Rehman who, speaking at a book release function in Karachi, stated: ‘When a flood strikes Punjab, the roads get repaired quickly. I saw this myself that it took eleven years to repair a road after floods destroyed parts of Balochistan.’ He added: ‘When we would not assure them [the Baloch] that they are equally important as anyone in Lahore or Islamabad, then we can never prosper.’62
Census
Baloch nationalists had opposed a population census in the province for years, fearing that the millions of illegal Afghan refugees living there would get included. According to a rough estimate, over three million Afghan nationals had entered Balochistan since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Though they lived largely in the seven Pashtun-dominated districts, the Baloch fe
ared that their inclusion in the census would lead to Pashtun claims of equal or even majority population in Balochistan leading to the Baloch becoming a minority in their homeland.
The disquiet among the Baloch over the census was well articulated by the then federal minister for ports and shipping and president of the National Party, Senator Mir Hasil Khan Bizenjo, who said that if results of the census were not in favour of the interests of the Baloch people, they will not accept it. Former chief minister Dr Abdul Malik said that the Baloch people were facing two challenges: one was the CPEC and the other was the census. ‘If the establishment converts the Baloch into minority, I and my party will not accept the census,’ Dr Malik declared.63
At a gathering of Baloch political parties held in Quetta on 27 January 2017, serious concerns were expressed about the census, and in particular about its ramifications for the province. Three demands emerged from this gathering: that the census not be held until the repatriation of Afghan refugees; that it be delayed in areas where the Baloch had been internally displaced as a result of Baloch militancy; and that tribal elders be involved in conducting the census. The participation of tribal elders was felt to be a huge help since the province was a largely tribal society where people knew one another and were wary of outsiders.
Such fears were compounded by the confession and subsequent conviction of a number of senior National Database and Registration Authority officials on charges that they had issued thousands of Computerised National Identity Cards (CNICs) to illegal Afghan immigrants in exchange for bribes. This was especially so due to the sudden spike in population in Pashtun–dominated districts like Qila Abdullah, Qila Saifullah and Zhob—areas where the population has risen by more than 100 per cent.
The only party publicly backing the census and the issuing of national identity cards to Afghans was the Pashtunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PkMAP), led by Mehmood Khan Achakzai. Clearly, Achakzai’s concern was for the vote bank they represented, one that was growing larger by the day.64
According to the preliminary results of the 2017 census, the total population of Balochistan had increased from 6.565 million in 1998, when the last census was held, to 12.335 million. The results revealed that the Baloch population had shrunk from 61 per cent to 55.6 per cent in the province in the twenty-one districts where the Baloch formed a majority, though the total number of Baloch all over Pakistan had increased from four million in 1998 to 6.86 million in 2017. According to the 2017 census data, the overall average growth of population in Balochistan was recorded at a much higher rate of 3.37 per cent compared to the national average of 2.4 per cent.
Sadique Baloch, chief editor of Quetta-based Balochistan Express, told Dawn that part of the reason for a decrease in the Baloch population of various districts was migration to other provinces and Afghanistan because of ongoing conflict in certain areas. He added that most of the Baloch residing in conflict-ridden areas had migrated to Punjab, Sindh and Quetta. The population of the districts where the Pashto-speaking population was in majority accounted for 26 per cent of the total Balochistan population. This was a slight fall from 26.6 per cent over a period of nineteen years. The Pashtun-majority districts are Qila Abdullah, Pishin, Harnai, Ziarat, Qila Saifullah, Loralai, Musakhel, Sherani and Zhob. The total number of people living in these districts was reported to be 3.2 million in 2017, which had gone up from 1.74 million reported in 1998.65
In Balochistan before the census began, it was believed that the results of the exercise in the province would lead to a hue and cry among the Baloch. However, they were not as irked as expected. For, in the lead-up to the census, the question on every Baloch tongue was: are we going to turn into a minority in our own province? Disaggregated results of the percentage of ethnic and minority groups in Balochistan are awaited, but the provisional results released made it very clear that the Baloch were still the majority group in the province.
9
Economic Exploitation
Economic Potential
THE ISSUE OF EXPLOITATION OF Balochistan’s natural resources and inadequate allocation of funds for the province’s development is a major component in the sense of alienation and resentment in Balochistan. This is largely because for Islamabad, the efforts to ‘develop’ Baluchistan focuses on ‘things’—ports, roads, dams, etc., rather than on the people— while for the Baloch, ownership of these resources and their utilization for the people of the province are uppermost.
The economic potential of the province has been detailed in several reports. In 1944 Maj. Gen. R.C. Money, in charge of strategic planning in India, wrote a secret memorandum stating that Balochistan could be a viable state if its natural and agricultural resources were developed.1 After the forced accession of the state of Kalat to Pakistan, the Central government planned to develop Balochistan to exploit its resources and settle the Muslim refugees from India. For this purpose, the Pakistan government approached the Water Development Division of Johnston International of Los Angeles to suggest a plan for the ‘development of Baluchistan’. The US experts required certain data to enable them to suggest a development plan. The data was obtained from several government departments.2 However, what was done subsequently is not known.
In 1952 Maneck B. Pathawala, the honorary adviser to the Ministry of Economic Affairs of Pakistan, published a monograph based on the material secured from government agencies to discuss the potentialities of Balochistan. His conclusions: ‘The problem of Baluchistan thus resolves itself into: 1. Conserving water; 2. Conserving soil; 3. Promoting vegetation cover.’ He highlighted the scope for resettlement and stabilization of population, especially refugees in this low-density zone of Pakistan; fruit cultivation; growing grass for grazing; sheep rearing; fishing; tourism—all of which were dependent on water.3
Half a century later, a World Bank report of 20084 about the potential and reality of Pakistan noted: ‘Balochistan offers some of the best assets for development.’ These included natural and locational resources; the largest land area of any province of Pakistan; vast rangeland for livestock; two-thirds of the national coastline, giving access to fishery resources; ideally situated for trade with Iran, Afghanistan, Central Asia and the Persian Gulf countries; abundance of natural gas that has been supplied to Pakistan’s economic centres, supporting the country’s industrialization; and large deposits of coal, copper, lead, gold and other minerals.
‘And yet, Balochistan’s economy has not done well’, the report lamented. ‘The province has Pakistan’s most anaemic growth record, worst infrastructure, worst water crisis, and weakest fiscal base. The poor economic performance leads to poor living standards. Balochistan has the highest poverty—along with NWFP (now KPK), lowest social indicators, and, in parts of the province, the weakest state institutions.’ Together with internal conflicts, these factors had given Balochistan ‘… a reputation of being a backward region, far distant from Pakistan’s economic hubs, with a life burdened by the toils of the field and rangeland and tribal disputes rather than a hub of activity surrounding world-class mining explorations, modern trade links, sustainable agriculture and an empowered community.’ The report added that the quality of employment was such that workers produced about one-quarter less than workers in NWFP and Punjab, and over one-third less than workers in Sindh. Employment-wise, less than one in five workers held a regular salaried job, of which the private sector supplied just one in four. Despite this, the report found that workers in Balochistan migrated less than other workers.
The report cautioned that the projected increase of Balochistan’s population from 7.8 million in 2005 to 11.1 million in 2025 [In 2017 it had already reached more than 12 million.] posed major challenges for policymakers in terms of providing education and employment opportunities. As per demographic projections, the labour force could rise from 4.1 million in 2005 to 7.2 million in 2025. Based on the historic employment elasticity, this would require creating an additional 158,000 jobs annually which would, in turn, require an economic grow
th of at least 6.5 per cent.
According to the Balochistan government’s White Paper on the Budget 2015-16, the main nodes of potential economic growth in Balochistan, within the context of Pakistan’s national economy and the wider regional and global economy, were identified as: (a) mineral resources; (b) trade and transit routes; and (c) coastal development. It noted that Balochistan’s strategic location had placed it at the crossroad of potential intra- and inter-regional trade.5
Despite the various reports identifying the economic potential of Balochistan, nothing much has been done to harness that potential.
Overview of Balochistan’s Economy
According to the government’s Budget White Paper 2015-16, ‘for the last fifteen years, the overall share of Balochistan in the national Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has remained constant at 4 per cent’. The Budget White Papers of 2016-17 and 2017-18 show this share being doubled to 8 per cent of the national GDP without any explanatory note.6 However, according to a recent study by noted economist Kaiser Bengali during the three decades period 1970s to 1990s, per capita growth was 0.3 per cent, implying zero growth and stagnancy. As a result, Balochistan’s average share in national income dropped from 4.5 per cent in the 1970s to 4 per cent in the 1980s and 1990s, indicating marginalization. Post-2000, the situation did not improve either given that gross regional product (GRP—the provincial equivalent of GDP estimates for the country as a whole) growth in Balochistan over the decade 2000–11 was the lowest at 2.8 per cent—less than 60 per cent of the average combined GRP growth of the other three provinces. ‘Balochistan is not only lagging behind other provinces, but falling further behind,’ according to Bengali.7
Gross Regional Product by Province: Average Growth Rate- 2000-118
Pakistan- the Balochistan Conundrum Page 15