Some of the incidents included the killing of three Chinese engineers working on the Gwadar port project; the attack on the chief minister’s convoy; the attack on Sui airport building; regular disruption of power transmission lines and railway lines; and attacks on military and government installations. On 9 April 2014 a bomb blast ripped through an Islamabad market killing twenty-five and injuring dozens. The little-known United Baloch Army (UBA) claimed responsibility for the attack. The blast came following a military operation in Khuzdar and Kalat districts of Balochistan that killed roughly forty people including separatists. Baloch groups allege that children as young as six years old were also killed as helicopter gunships attacked homes. The UBA specifically linked the violence of the army to the attack.86 ‘We carried out the attack in Islamabad in response to the military operation against us,’ said UBA spokesman Mureed Baloch, and warned that there would be more.87
The Islamabad blast was significant because it is the first time that a Baloch group had attacked non-military targets outside of Balochistan. The government dismissed the UBA’s claim. In a text message to reporters, the interior ministry spokesman implied that foreign intervention, rather than an indigenous insurgency, was behind the attack—a long running claim by the government, which primarily blamed India, but also Afghanistan and the US, for fomenting a fabricated Baloch insurgency.88
An important aspect of the militant tactics is the attack on gas infrastructure. Since the bulk of the gas is sent out of Balochistan, the militants have targeted gas extraction and infrastructure to prevent the depletion of this resource. With periodic attacks on pipelines and installations disrupting gas supplies, the Baloch seem determined to increase the cost of the conflict for Islamabad. ‘We might not defeat the Pakistani army but we will drain out the Pakistani economy,’ Sardar Attaullah Mengal told the ICG.89
Repeated government claims over the past decade that the insurgency has been crushed have proved false. Attacks continue, as before, on government targets—installations and personnel and on economic symbols like pipelines.
Levels of Violence in Balochistan
According to partial data collated by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), 62,485 people have died in terrorist violence across Pakistan from 2005 to March 2019. Out of these, 43,697 casualties have occurred in FATA and KPK alone, followed by Sindh (mainly Karachi) with 8,284 casualties, Balochistan with 7,102 casualties and Punjab with 2,396 casualties. In proportional terms, Balochistan, FATA and KPK together account for 81.29 per cent of the total fatalities that occurred in Pakistan between 2005 and March 2019. Besides the loss of human lives, the sociocultural, economic and political fabric of these regions has been severely damaged.90
According to SATP, at least twenty-eight security force personnel were killed till 24 March 2019. During the corresponding period of 2018 the number of such fatalities was twenty-seven. The overall fatalities among security force personnel had increased in 2018 as compared to 2017—from seventy-seven to seventy-nine. While the first half of 2018 (January to June) recorded forty-seven such fatalities, the second half (July to December) accounted for another thirty-two.
Balochistan: North-South security force personnel fatalities
Year Balochistan North South
2011 122 79 43
2012 178 116 62
2013 137 79 58
2014 83 60 23
2015 90 61 29
2016 153 130 23
2017 77 60 17
2018
2019
80
28
56
24
23
4
Total 947 665 282
Out of the twenty-eight security force personnel killed in the province in 2019, at least twenty-four were killed in north Balochistan, while the remaining four were killed in the south. Since 2011, out of 947 security personnel killed in Balochistan, the north accounted for 665 fatalities (70.22 per cent), while the south recorded 282 fatalities (29.77 per cent). Security force fatalities in each of these nine years have been consistently higher in the north.
North Balochistan is afflicted by Islamist terrorist groups like the TTP, LeJ and the ISIS. Baloch nationalist insurgent groups operate largely in the south. Despite the bulk of the casualties being in the north, the army has been targeting ethnic Baloch insurgent groups in the south with much greater ferocity and viciousness.
Weapons
It is undeniable that Balochistan is awash with weapons of all kinds. All tribal chiefs carry private armed guards and some maintain private militias.91 A HRCP mission in 2012 was shocked at the glut of sophisticated firearms in Balochistan and the people’s easy access to them. A rocket, for example, could be bought in Balochistan for less than Rs 1,000.92 The mission questioned how huge quantities of weapons could pass through a series of check posts when common citizens were stopped from even carrying a knife. Its conclusion was that had there been sincere efforts to curtail the free flow of weapons, they would certainly have made a difference.93
In an interview before he was killed, Akbar Bugti admitted that there was no dearth of arms and ammunition in Balochistan. According to him, the Americans had offloaded huge caches of weapons and sums of money to fund the jihad in Afghanistan. Much of this inevitably ended up in the arms markets. He quoted the example of the Ojhri camp that was destroyed specifically to cover up shady arms transfers.94
Weaknesses
Despite the recent spread of the insurgency and growth of anti-Pakistan feeling across the province, the Baloch insurgency is characterized by several weaknesses. First, the small population size of the Baloch relative to the land is a major impediment. Even if the Baloch remain united, their small numbers will be a major handicap vis-à-vis the Pakistani state. They just do not have the critical mass to be able to assert their rights. Militarily too, they do not have the manpower or the hardware to take on the professional Pakistan Army in a conventional war.
Second, the leadership of the Baloch national movement remains highly fractured. The lack of unity among the tribes is a major disadvantage especially because the tribal system continues to be prevalent in some parts of the province. The intertribal rivalries have proved to be a major impediment in the development of a united resistance among the Baloch. This explains their failure to come on one single platform to put forward their demands. The multiplicity of armed groups has also made it difficult for them to properly coordinate with each other. Consequently, there is little unity in tactics. According to the Jinnah Institute—an Islamabad-based think tank—the multiplicity of Baloch leaders with competing motivations has exacerbated the violence, making deciphering the conflict landscape increasingly difficult. According to it, ‘Making sense of this conflict requires parsing the growing categories of violence inflicted by a multiplicity of actors with competing motivations.’95
Third, because of the disunity, the Baloch have not been able to come up with a blue-print for governance. The closest was the effort of the Khan of Kalat and Hyrbyair Marri to work out a united Balochistan charter. This effort came to naught as other Baloch leaders did not evince much enthusiasm. Resultantly, the Baloch case is marked by a lot of criticism of the Pakistan state without presenting a viable alternative. Quite possibly the major hurdle in such an endeavour would be the contradiction between the old bugbear of the tribal system and the fresh impetus of the non-tribal, middle-class Baloch who seek a modern and democratic system. Whatever the reason, without clarity on the positives of what they seek to achieve and establish, the nationalist struggle will remain handicapped.
Fourth, the various groups are engaged in internecine fighting. While the killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti in August 2006 gave a big boost to the insurgency, there have been major disagreements over who would be his successor. Though his grandson Brahamdagh was his chosen political successor, several other relatives have thrown their hat in the ring. These include his cousin Shahzain Bugti,96 another cousin Mir Aali Bugti and the former provin
cial home minister Sarfaraz Bugti, one of Brahamdagh’s worst tribal and political enemies.97 Likewise, following the demise of Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri in June 2014 differences broke out between the Marri brothers on the question of who would succeed the senior Marri.
Fifth, the Baloch insurgents have started targeting Baloch politicians both inside and outside Balochistan. They have alienated the moderate Baloch political parties opposed to violence by questioning their patriotism and commitment to the ‘national cause’.
Sixth, Baloch nationalists have lost a lot of sympathy due to their targeting of non-Baloch ‘settlers’, primarily Punjabi teachers. Even though the killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti and the atrocities of the army possibly provoked such attacks, yet, human rights groups have been critical of such killings. In fact, an intrinsic element of the Baloch culture is the centuries-old concept of protection that enjoins the safety of the life of a ‘settler’ or an ‘outsider’ in a Baloch area. These attacks clearly contradict the Baloch code of conduct, known as Balochmayar¸ and they also alienate supporters of Balochistan who live outside the province and the country.98
Finally, any separatist movement in Balochistan is impaired by the fact that the two countries bordering it—Iran and Afghanistan—have sizeable Baloch populations of their own. Both are apprehensive of a spillover of Baloch nationalism from Pakistan that could create unrest amongst their own Baloch. They also view any movement towards the consolidation of a ‘Greater Balochistan’—Baloch areas in Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan—as a direct threat to their territorial sovereignty. Thus, neither Iran nor Afghanistan would desire, let alone support, an independent Balochistan. For its part, Afghanistan has its own historical claim to parts of Balochistan, territories it lost to the British during the colonial period. The Durand Line as an international border is disputed by the Afghans, who regard the frontier with Pakistan as drawn by the British being agreed to by the Afghans only under duress.99
Surrenders
An interesting development in the ongoing insurgency are the intermittent reports about surrenders of Baloch militants. Such surrenders were initiated soon after the 2006 military operation that led to the killing of Akbar Bugti. For example, a typical such report is that ‘… the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), the media wing of Pakistan’s armed forces, recently confirmed that at least twenty Baloch insurgents, including a Parrari commander, have surrendered to Pakistan Rangers Punjab’. According to another report, ‘… under the political reconciliation scheme launched in Balochistan, 1,025 militants, belonging to various proscribed outfits, have surrendered before the provincial government during the past year. Among the surrendered militants are a dozen key militant commanders, who have laid down their arms before provincial officials,’ said secretary, home and tribal affairs Akbar Hussain Durrani. More recently, 265 militants belonging to different proscribed organizations were supposed to have surrendered on 18 September 2018,100 seventy on 20 November 2018101 and 560 militants on 2 January 2019.102
According to figures released by the National Action Plan Review 2017, some 2,000 Baloch separatists had surrendered to the security forces over the last two years. As part of the amnesty scheme, the surrendered separatists were to be given money and government jobs. The 200–300 who did surrender in January 2018 were reportedly given Rs 0.1million for doing so. However, in none of the cases of surrender, details were provided about either the commanders or the militant and neither were any of them identified.103
In an interview, Baloch rights leader Mir Mohammad Ali Talpur rubbished the government claims about the surrenders. According to him, the government had claimed that there were only a handful of misguided Baloch who resisted progress at the behest of foreign hands. However, despite the large number of surrenders, why were the attacks still going on? For him, these were ‘rent a crowd surrenders,’ and quite pointless’.104
For the army, the ‘surrenders’ were quite useful in that they could arrange alleged ‘confessions’ that pointed to foreign funding. This, in turn, provided the army an alibi for its own failures to prevent the continuing violence from essentially home-grown militants.105 However, as the Nation puts it, ‘Every now and then, some militants lay down their weapons voluntarily or are arrested, yet the situation on the ground has never changed because of such surrenders or arrests. The problem of separatism must be tackled from its roots; the causes for its existence must be addressed, instead of fighting tooth and nail for territory against our own people.’106
The Daily Times pertinently remarked: ‘… how do we know who exactly is surrendering?’ ‘… This incentive driven “inclusion” of certain sections of Baloch society will do nothing to quell the resentment of a people who have been routinely exploited by the country’s larger provinces,’ adding, ‘… piecemeal experimentation rarely works. What the province needs is an all-out effort by the Pakistani state to ensure that its political and economic marginalization ends. The priority for now should be to gain the trust of ordinary Baloch by ushering in a set of reforms that will ensure provincial autonomy in letter and spirit.’107
17
The Response of the Government
THREE TRACKS CAN BE NOTED in the overall response of the state to the insurgency in Balochistan. One is the response of the provincial government in Quetta, the second is the response of the federal government in Islamabad and the third is the response of the army. As far as the nationalist leaders are concerned, the civil governments, both at the Centre and the province, are not in charge, having abdicated their constitutional responsibilities to the security agencies led by the army.1
The Provincial Government
One of Balochistan’s misfortunes has been that its political leadership has been handicapped either by not being able to fully govern the province or because it has found it simpler to follow the diktats of Islamabad rather than implement policies for the benefit of the people. This was especially so under Musharraf when Balochistan’s provincial government was a subsidiary arm of the Centre, working at its behest and following its directives. ‘The provincial government,’ said Abdul Hayee Baloch, a Baloch nationalist politician, ‘is the tool of the federal establishment.’ There is no ‘… provincial purview [over] political and economic decisions. All our decisions are made for us’ by Islamabad.2 The provincial legislature’s sessions, for instance, were repeatedly cancelled under Central pressure to prevent the opposition from discussing the direction and impact of the conflict. Even administrative appointments and transfers were made in Islamabad.3 The Balochistan chief minister is reported to have publicly stated that the military officials did not listen to him. Despite the restoration of democracy after the exit of Pervez Musharraf, the military continued to remain the dominant political force paying little heed to the provincial government.
Following the May 2013 elections, a tribal chief for the first time did not lead the provincial government. The HRCP Mission in 2013 was told that the government formation was considered to be a positive step that could lead to an opportunity for ending grave human rights violations in the province. The National Party (NP) that formed a coalition in Balochistan with the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) after the 2013 elections was expected to focus on three issues: that of missing persons; reversing the policy of kill-and-dump4; and reaching out to the leadership of the Baloch militants apart from tackling at least some of the issues of socio-economic development in Balochistan. The two-and-a-half years of Abdul Malik Baloch’s chief ministership that ended in December 2015 unfortunately did not make much of a dent on any of the three issues. Nor did the succeeding government of the PML-N make much of a difference.
To be fair, the provincial government did not have much authority to tackle these issues, which were in the domain of the army. The 2013 HRCP mission had cautioned that they did not see many signs of a change in policy within the security and intelligence agencies as the kill-and-dump policy continued.5 Despite this, Abdul Malik Baloch did actively try to engage with
the exiled Baloch leadership to find a political solution to all issues. However, he carried little credibility with them since they were sceptical of his authority in taking decisions. Neither could the provincial government make much of a dent on the issue of missing persons. The army’s kill-and-dump policy continued apace and persons kept going ‘missing’ with sickening frequency.
In fact, it is well recognized that all chief ministers of Balochistan have been powerless on such issues. As Jamil Bugti, the son of late Akbar Bugti, put it, the status of the chief minister of Balochistan was nothing more than that of a munshi or clerk as everything was remotely controlled from Islamabad. ‘He has to run to Islamabad every month to get the salaries for his employees in the secretariat. So, he is given a cheque for the month’s salaries and sent home to return again next month with palms outstretched.’6 As a journalist put it: ‘Balochistan is the only province whose total budget is [based] on loans. Provincial budgets are prepared purely on the basis of imagination and presumption; there is not even a modicum of reality in them’.7
The ground realities in Balochistan are such that economic resources and political power are concentrated in the hands of the federal government despite devolution of powers to the provincial government under the Eighteenth Constitutional Amendment. The situation in Balochistan is, however, worse than in the other provinces since even the maintenance of law and order has been taken over by the federally controlled paramilitary troops and not the local police. According to Zahid Hussain, a Newsline columnist, ‘The master–servant relationship is starker here than in any other province. The return of military rule further aggravated the situation. Even the present pro-military provincial government does not have any real power.’8
Pakistan- the Balochistan Conundrum Page 29