The Peloponnesian War
Thucydides’ work is now known as The Peloponnesian War, although he himself gave no title to his composition, and uses more than one name to refer to this war. The history is divided into eight books (but not by Thucydides), and relates the progress of the war from 431 to 411, where it suddenly breaks off. Books 1–5.24 deal with ‘The Ten Years’ or Archidamian War (431–421), culminating in the Peace of Nicias in 421. However, Book 1 (2–19) also includes a brief historical account of Greece from earliest times up to his own day – the so-called ‘Archaeology’–in which Thucydides sets out to prove that the Peloponnesian War was the greatest war in Greek history; and to stress the important link between sea-power and imperial success. In addition, Thucydides provides the so-called ‘Preface’, in which he outlines his historical methods and his explanation of the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (1.20–23); narrates the events at Corcyra and Potidaea, which were the publicly expressed causes of complaint against Athens in 432 (1.24–65); recounts the debates in Athens and Sparta that led to the declaration of war (1.66–88; 1.118–25; 1.139 to the end); and includes two digressions: first, the so-called ‘Pentecontaetia’ (‘The Fifty Years’), in which Thucydides gives a very brief and highly selective account of the development of Athenian power from the end of the Persian war to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (1.89–118); second, the story of Cylon, who attempted to become the tyrant of Athens in the seventh century, and the downfall of Pausanias and Themistocles, the most famous of the Greek leaders in the Persian War (1.126–38).
Book 5.25 to its end deals with the period of 421–415, when the Athenians and Spartans were officially at peace by virtue of the Peace of Nicias, but both sides regarded it as a phoney peace and did their best to harm each other. This section of Book 5 includes the so-called ‘Melian Dialogue’, which gained its name from an actual dialogue between representatives of Athens and of the island-city of Melos on the issue of whether Melos, which claimed to be a neutral state in the war, should give in to Athenian demands and join the Athenian Empire against its will (5.84–113). Books 6 and 7 give an account of the ill-fated Athenian expedition to Sicily in 415–413, which resulted in total defeat for the Athenians and the renewal of the war by the Spartans and their allies. Book 8 deals with the early years (413–411) of the rest of the war (413–404), which is called either ‘The Decelean War’, after the occupation of this fort inside Attica by the Spartans, or ‘The Ionian War’, since most of the military action took place in this theatre of war. It is most probable that death prevented Thucydides from completing his history of the Peloponnesian War, but he does mention the final defeat of Athens in 2.65 (when he reviewed the conduct of the whole war under Pericles’ successors) and in 6.15 (when he comments on the military ability of Alcibiades and how its absence in the last years of the war brought ultimate defeat).
It would seem from Thucydides’ own words that his original aim was to give a full and comprehensive account of all the military and political events of the war:
I have recorded the events of the war one after another, as they happened, by summer and winter.
(Thucydides 2.1)
This would explain the many repetitions in his history, and especially the excessive recording of minor and historically unimportant details, such as the fact that Anactorium contributed one ship to the 150 ships that the Corinthians led against Corcyra in 433 (1.46). However, such a massive amount of material led Thucydides to limit his scope in favour of selectivity, i.e. recording only ‘the most noteworthy items’, although he states this explicitly only once in his work when describing the Athenians fighting in Sicily in 426 (3.90). As a result there is a constant tension in Thucydides’ work between his desire to record everything fully and his practice of selecting and concentrating on key events or individuals that act as archetypes or prime examples of typical behaviour in the war. Thus the lengthy, detailed description of ‘stasis’ (civil war) in Corcyra (3.70–81) is used by Thucydides as a typical example of the internal revolutions that broke out throughout Greece between democrats and oligarchs, thus allowing him to generalize about this phenomenon in the section that immediately follows (3.82–84) and thereby removing the need to repeat himself later in his history – the exception being the Athenian stasis in 411, which is related in detail because it had a major influence on the Athenians’ conduct of the war. In the same way, Thucydides’ detailed picture (or caricature) of Cleon as the archetypal ‘demagogue’–the Mytilenean debate (3.36–40), the Pylos command (4.27–29), the Amphipolis campaign (5.6–10) – led him to gloss over Hyperbolus’ career and his ostracism in probably 416, mentioning it only in a contemptuous aside when he was assassinated in 411 (8.73).
Opinions differ about when Thucydides wrote his account of the war: the ‘unitarians’ (e.g. Dover) hold the view that the whole work was written over a short period after the end of the Peloponnesian War; the ‘analysts’ (e.g. Hornblower) believe that the work was written over a long period, with some books that covered a later period of the war being completed before the book describing earlier events, i.e. Books 6 and 7 (the Sicilian Expedition, 415–413) being completed before Book 5 (421–416). What can be said for certain is that Thucydides began to take notes, at the very least, from the very beginning of the war in 431 (1.1.1) to its end in 404. This can be proved conclusively, although his history breaks off in 411, by several references to Athens’ defeat at the end of the war – Pericles’ obituary and the mention of the Persian intervention in the war on the Spartan side (2.65.12); the so-called ‘Second Preface’, in which Thucydides dismisses the Peace of Nicias as a genuine peace and states his intention to continue writing his account of the war from 421 to the collapse of Athens (5.26); and his short digression on Alcibiades’ excellent generalship, but also on his wayward character, which led the Athenians to entrust the conduct of the war to others who brought ruin to Athens (6.15).
Thucydides’ greatest quality is the intellectual rigour that he brought to his work in his attempt to discover the truth about the events that he described:
With regard to the facts of the events that took place in the war, I have made it my principle to report them, not through learning of them from the first person I happened upon, nor from what seemed probable to me, but after investigating with as much accuracy as possible each event, in which I myself participated or in which other eye-witnesses were directly involved.
(Thucydides 1.22.2)
This statement, however, must be taken on trust, since Thucydides does not name his sources, but the integrity of his work has been accepted by modern scholarship. There are numerous occasions when it can be safely assumed that Thucydides received accurate information from an oral source: for example, Demosthenes, while bringing reinforcements to the beleaguered Nicias in Sicily in 413, stopped at Anactorium where he was joined by Conon, the Athenian commander at Naupactus, who asked him for some extra ships (7.31); Thucydides could not have learned this from Demosthenes, who was put to death soon afterwards at Syracuse, but very likely from Conon, who was on active service from 410–407 in the North Aegean, close to Thucydides’ home in Thrace. Nevertheless, some caution must still be exercised even when using Thucydides, since he himself admits that eyewitness accounts were not always trustworthy, either through partisanship or through faulty memories (1.22.3). In addition, it is not known how many oral informants were interviewed for each event, nor their social background and political allegiances – Thucydides’ very critical view of Theramenes, the ‘moderate’ oligarch in the 411 revolution (see Chapter 23), has most probably been influenced by the account of one of the exiled ‘extreme’ oligarchs, who bitterly resented Theramenes’ role in the overthrow of The Four Hundred, the narrow oligarchy that governed Athens for almost four months in 411 (8.89).
In the same way, care must be taken when Thucydides attributes motives to various individuals in his history, especially as he explains them so confidently, rarely admitting doubt �
� the sole instances of Thucydides’ uncertainty concern the Spartan king Archidamus in 431 (2.18.5; 2.20.1) and the Persian ‘satrap’ (provincial governor) Tissaphernes in 411 (8.46.5; 8.56.2–3; 8.87). Thucydides seems to have used three methods in his attribution of motive. The first and the most reliable method was to gain information directly from the individual concerned or from that man’s close associates, for example, Brasidas’ motives in 424 at Megara (4.70.1; 4.73.1–2) and at Amphipolis, where his Athenian opponent was Thucydides himself (4.120.2; 4.124.4). The second method was his deduction of motive from the behaviour or action of the individual, or from the attitude of the individual to the situation in which he played a part, for example, Demosthenes’ motives in 426/5 when he led the Acarnanians to victory over an army of Peloponnesians and Ambraciots (3.107.3; 3.109.2; 3.112.4). The third and most unreliable method was Thucydides’ assumption of motive, based on his own assessment of the individual’s character: for example, there was no way that Thucydides could have known or discovered the motives of Cleon, his political enemy, when he took part in the second debate about the Spartan forces on Sphacteria in 425 (4.27–28); nor the motives ascribed to the four individuals most involved with the Peace of Nicias in 421, i.e. Cleon and Brasidas who allegedly favoured the continuation of the war, and Nicias and Pleistoanax who allegedly desired the Peace (5.16–17).
The thorniest problem in using Thucydides as a reliable historical source concerns the authenticity of his speeches. He described his methodology as follows:
It has been difficult for me to remember the exact words that were spoken in the speeches that I myself heard, and for those who brought me reports of other speeches. Therefore it has been my method to record the speeches which I thought were the most appropriate (‘ta deonta’) for each speaker to give in each situation, while keeping as close as possible to the general sense of what was actually said.
(Thucydides 1.22.1)
Unfortunately, there is an inherent contradiction in the last sentence, since the inclusion of ‘which I thought were the most appropriate’ (‘ta deonta’)in his speeches is in apparent conflict with his inclusion of ‘what was actually said’. Consequently there exists a whole spectrum of scholarly opinion on this issue, ranging from those who believe that all the speeches were invented by Thucydides, to those who believe totally in their authenticity, with many other scholars taking a position somewhere between these extremes. There are without doubt certain speeches whose authenticity does seem very suspect: the Corinthian speech (1.120–24) to the Allied Congress at Sparta in 432 contains many points and suggestions, such as borrowing money from Olympia to lure away Athens’ foreign soldiers by offering higher rates of pay, which are precisely ‘answered’ by Pericles in his speech to the Athenians in Athens (1.140–44), although he obviously could not have heard the Corinthian arguments. On the other hand, Pericles’ last speech to the Athenians, in which he set about raising their morale, after they had suffered the destruction of their property twice and the outbreak of the plague, has the ring of truthfulness about it (2.60–64). In reality, there is no absolutely reliable method of assessing how far Thucydides adapted, added to, or even invented the speeches in his history. However, if a doctrinaire approach to the speeches as a whole is rejected, and if each speech is judged individually on the criteria of ‘how likely was Thucydides to acquire an accurate report of the speech?’ and ‘how far does the speaker stick to the point in hand?’, in much the same way as his attribution of motive is to be judged (see above paragraph), then it is possible to make selective use of them.
From the historian’s point of view, Thucydides’ account of the Peloponnesian War has two serious weaknesses: his (lack of) coverage of Persian involvement in the war, and his limited and superficial treatment of economic factors in the war. With regard to Persia, Thucydides acknowledged the key role that Cyrus, the Persian king’s son, and his money played in the defeat of Athens, but only in his brief summary of the war after the death of Pericles (2.65.12). However, numerous embassies were sent by Sparta (4.50.2) in ‘The Ten Years’ or Archidamian War (431–421), and it seems very likely that the Athenians signed a treaty of eternal friendship in 424/3 with the Persian king, which they broke by sending aid to the rebel satrap, Pissouthnes, and later to his son, Amorges, between 421 and 411 (see Chapter 22). Such an ill-considered provocative policy, especially as a major Athenian force was away fighting in Sicily and the Spartans had renewed the war in 413 by occupying Decelea, ultimately brought disaster to Athens by drawing the Persians into the war on the side of the Spartans. Yet Thucydides barely mentions this aspect of Athenian foreign policy, and it is reasonable to presume that Thucydides only recognized the importance of Persia too late, and died before he could rectify his error.
With regard to his treatment of the economic factors in the war, although he knew of their importance (1.80.3–4; 1.141.3–5; 3.13.6; 6.34.20) and even lists some of Athens’ financial resources in 431 (2.13.2–5), his failure to give either the total of Athens’ annual income or the total expenditure for one or more years gives us no insight into the real value of those financial resources. Furthermore, he does not inform us of the changes in the levels of income that came from allied tribute, even ignoring the dramatic increase from 600 talents to roughly 1,500 talents in 425 as a result of the decree of Thoudippos (see Chapter 16), unless he did not wish to praise the so-called ‘demagogues’ for solving Athens’ economic problems in the mid-420s, which Pericles had failed to foresee.
Nevertheless, even with the reservations stated above, Thucydides is by far the best of our literary sources, and where there is a direct conflict in the evidence supplied by him and by other historians, his version is to be preferred, due to his great desire and effort to find out and to give an accurate account of historical events.
Xenophon
Life and career
Xenophon was born in the very early years of the Peloponnesian War, possibly c.428/7, and his family background was upper class – his keen interest in horses and horsemanship suggest membership of the class of ‘Hippeis’ (Knights). If this is so, then he may well have shared the same political outlook as portrayed in Aristophanes’ The Knights, who had an aristocratic contempt for the so-called demagogues; and it may explain in part his dislike of Athenian democracy, and his respect for and praise of Sparta’s well-ordered and hierarchical society. The main sources for his life and career are his own works and a section in Diogenes Laertius’ third century AD Lives of Philosophers (2.49–58). His education followed the traditional pattern of an upper-class Athenian with its emphasis upon athletic training. However, at some point in his teens he came under the influence of Socrates who, as Xenophon would have us believe, improved his intellect and shaped his moral outlook. He probably played his part in the defence of Athens in the very last years of the Peloponnesian War, and possibly in the political upheavals in the immediate aftermath of Athens’ defeat in 404.
In 402, he decided to join the large Greek mercenary force, which formed a contingent in the army being assembled by the Persian prince, Cyrus, in his Spartan-backed bid to seize the Persian throne from his hated brother, Artaxerxes II. In 401, at the battle of Cunaxa, around 50 miles north-west of Babylon, Cyrus threw away his victory by his impetuous personal attack upon his brother that brought about his death on the battlefield. The purpose of the expedition had died with Cyrus, and the Ten Thousand, as the Greek force came to be known, were stranded in the depths of the Persian Empire. Their plight was made even more difficult by the treacherous assassination of their generals. In the event, Xenophon was chosen as one of the generals, whose task it was to lead this mercenary army as it fought its way back to the Black Sea and then the Aegean. This return journey is recorded in Xenophon’s Anabasis (March Up-Country), to which there are scattered references in this textbook.
After their successful return to the Aegean and some mercenary service in the pay of a Thracian king, Xenophon and part of the Ten Thousand joined t
he Spartan forces that had been sent out purportedly to liberate the Asiatic Greeks from Persia, first under Thibron (400), then Dercylidas (399–397) and finally King Agesilaos. This was the first time that the two men had met, and Xenophon soon formed a very high opinion of Agesilaos’ ability, which praise was amply rewarded by the Spartan king’s patronage. The outbreak of the Corinthian War in 395 (see Chapter 24) led to the recall of Agesilaos and Xenophon to defend Sparta. The presence of Xenophon at Agesilaos’ victory in the battle of Coroneia in 394 over the forces of the Quadruple Alliance, an anti-Spartan coalition of Greek states including Athens, may have been the occasion of his formal exile from Athens on a charge of Laconism, i.e. being pro-Spartan (Xenophon, Anabasis 7.7.75). However, his exile may have been passed earlier in c.399 on a charge of medism, i.e. being pro-Persian through his military involvement with Cyrus (Anabasis 3.1.5).
In 394, Xenophon settled in the Peloponnese with his wife and two sons, first in Sparta, and later on an estate at Scillous in Triphylia, just south of Olympia, which was given to him by the Spartans (Anabasis 5.3). Later his two sons underwent, allegedly on the advice of Agesilaos (Plutarch, Ages. 20.2), the Spartan ‘agoge’ (education system) which allowed them to become members of the class of ‘trophimoi xenoi’ (Spartan-raised foreigners). It is very likely that his exile was formally lifted after the Peace of Antalcidas in 386, but it seems that he preferred the delights of Scillous. However, the devastating defeat of the Spartans in 371 by the Thebans at the battle of Leuctra and the re-acquisition of Triphylia by Elis as a consequence forced Xenophon to move. The remaining years of his life, on the basis of his literary works, seem to have been spent in Athens, which in the 360s had joined Sparta in an anti-Theban alliance, and in Corinth where the ancient tradition claimed that he died c.354.
Aspects of Greek History (750–323BC) Page 5