Nevertheless, the conflicting aims and aspirations of the supporters of the three factions were secondary; the primary cause of the political unrest was the personal ambition and rivalry of the aristocratic faction leaders in their struggle for political domination. Therefore Aristotle was right to concentrate on the post of ‘eponymous archon’ (chief archon) as the battleground for the competing aristocrats in the period after Solon’s archonship:
In the fifth year after Solon’s archonship (590/89), they did not appoint an archon because of conflict between the factions; and again in the fifth year after this (586/5) the same thing happened for the same reason. After this same passage of time Damasias, having been chosen as archon, ruled for two years and two months until he was driven out of the archonship by force (582/1–580/79). … Thus it is clear that the archon had the greatest power, for there always seemed to be factional conflict over this public office.
(Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 13.1–2)
However, by the late 560s, Peisistratus had decided that he, as tyrant, offered the best hope of political stability for Athens (Herodotus 1.59.3).
The dating of Peisistratus’ three attempts and periods of rule as tyrant of Athens has proved to be a thorny problem. The dates given by Aristotle in the Ath. Pol. are clearly wrong, and there are some inconsistencies in Herodotus’ chronology; however, scholarly opinion has inclined towards the following dating. In c.561/0, Peisistratus made his first attempt to seize power by appearing in the main market-place in Athens, covered in self-inflicted wounds, and by claiming that he had been the subject of a murder attempt by his enemies. His request for a guard was granted by the Athenians on account of his distinguished war record, especially against Megara, and this enabled him to seize the Acropolis with their help:
(59.6) Then Peisistratus ruled the Athenians, neither disturbing the existing public offices nor changing the laws; he governed the city in accordance with the constitution, administering it justly and effectively (60.1). Not long after this the factions of Megacles and Lycurgus united and drove him out.
(Herodotus 1.59.6–60.1)
Either 560/59 or 559/8 would seem a reasonable date, after a short period of rule, for the end of Peisistratus’ first stint as tyrant.
The political alliance between Megacles and Lycurgus soon collapsed, and the resultant pressure on Megacles led him to seek a pact with Peisistratus, offering his faction’s support in a coup to make Peisistratus tyrant on condition that he married Megacles’ daughter. After these terms were accepted, Peisistratus gained the tyranny in c.557/6 by the ruse of dressing up a stunningly beautiful six-foot woman in full armour; it was then claimed through messengers that she was Athene, the patron goddess of Athens, and that she herself in her chariot was delivering Peisistratus to her own Acropolis to take over the rule of Athens (Herodotus 1.60.2–5). In this way, Peisistratus became tyrant for the second time – much to the annoyance of Herodotus at the Athenians’ gullibility. It would seem that Megacles was prepared to acquiesce in Peisistratus’ tenure of power in the expectation that his own future grandson, the offspring of the marriage, would rule after Peisistratus’ death. However, Peisistratus was determined that his grown-up sons from his previous marriage, Hippias and Hipparchus, should succeed him, and so he avoided normal sexual intercourse with Megacles’ daughter to prevent conception. She kept silent about this at first, but later informed her mother. When she told Megacles, his anger at this insult to his daughter (and the impossibility of a future half-Alcmaeonid tyrant) persuaded him to bury his differences with Lycurgus and to renew their political alliance. Faced with the combined forces of these two factions, Peisistratus chose exile, possibly c.556/5, as Megacles’ daughter was unlikely to have kept her unusual marriage arrangements from her mother for long (Herodotus 1.61.1–2).
This second failure taught Peisistratus a valuable lesson: the impossibility of seizing and holding onto the tyranny at Athens by conventional means, namely by relying on the strength of his faction and an alliance with the ‘Men of the Shore’. His ambition would always be thwarted by the superior combined might of the two other factions which, owing to the unreliability of the Alcmaeonid-led ‘Men of the Shore’, would inevitably unite against him at some other time in the future. Therefore he realized that he needed to augment the power of his faction by acquiring troops and by forming alliances outside Attica, but that this would take time and money. During the following eleven years, Peisistratus gained considerable wealth from his involvement in the gold mines and silver mines around Mount Pangaion, near the river Strymon in Thrace (Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 15.2), and also won the support of powerful allies:
He went to the area around Pangaion where he enriched himself and hired mercenaries and, coming again to Eretria in the eleventh year [i.e. after his second failure], he attempted for the first time to recover his power by force, aided enthusiastically by many others, in particular the Thebans, Lygdamis of Naxos and also the ‘Hippeis’ (‘Knights’) who had control over the government of Eretria. After winning the battle at Pallene, he captured the city and deprived the people of their weapons. He now established his tyranny on a secure footing and, taking the island of Naxos, he set up Lygdamis as ruler.
(Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 15.2)
The mercenaries also included Argives from the Peloponnese, and the forces of Lygdamis who proved to be particularly useful to Peisistratus’ cause (Herodotus 1.61.4). It is clear from the subsequent events in Naxos that a pact of mutual aid had been agreed between Peisistratus and Lygdamis.
The rule of the Peisistratids
Peisistratus ruled from c.547/6 until his death in 528/7, in which time he maintained his hold on power by a mixture of force, diplomacy in his dealings with the aristocracy and supportive policies for the poor. The forces that he had gathered by the time of the battle of Pallene were overwhelmingly superior to those of his aristocratic opponents. A number of his enemies were killed in the ensuing battle, and those of the survivors who refused to accept Peisistratus’ rule departed into exile with the Alcmaeonids (Herodotus 1.64.3). Thus the immediate threat of his most irreconcilable enemies had been removed. Furthermore, in order to ensure the good behaviour of those aristocrats who were prepared to stay in Athens and collaborate with his regime, he took their children as hostages and gave them into the safekeeping of Lygdamis, the tyrant of Naxos (Herodotus 1.64.1). Finally, the disarming of the people and the retention of a force of mercenaries, paid for by tax revenues and by his income from his business interests in Thrace, provided him with the military means to enforce his will, if required.
However, Peisistratus was well aware that a repressive regime, based mainly on armed force, would provoke a violent reaction from the aristocracy and the people, and therefore pursued a liberal policy:
For in all matters he was willing to conduct all the affairs of state in accordance with the laws, granting himself no special privilege … and for these reasons he remained in power for a long time and, when he was deposed [i.e. before 546], he easily recovered power. For the majority of the notables and of the people favoured him, since he won over the former by diplomacy and the latter by his help in their private affairs; he was popular with both.
(Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 16.8–9)
By not flaunting his power, Peisistratus avoided alienating the aristocrats; and by allowing them to retain their status and prestige he persuaded them to collaborate with his regime.
There is no better evidence of this than the fragment that is believed to belong to the list of eponymous archons (chief archons) which was set up in c.425 (see Table 6.1 below).
[On]eto[rides]
(527/6)
[H]ippia[s]
(526/5)
[C]leisthen[es]
(525/4)
[M]iltiades
(524/3)
[Ka]lliades
(523/2)
[Peis]istratos
(522/1)
Source: ML 6.fr.c
Thucydides (6.54.6) states t
hat the sons of Peisistratus ensured that one of their number always held office, which must mean one of their family or political supporters; this presumably was a continuation of their father’s policy. [On]eto[rides] had probably been nominated by Peisistratus before his death, and thus was allowed to hold the post of eponymous archon (chief archon). In the following year, Hippias made sure that he held office to establish his position as his father’s successor as tyrant. It is the next two names that reveal the extent of the collaboration between the Peisistratids and the aristocrats. [C]leisthen[es] was the son and successor of Megacles, the Alcmaeonid leader of the ‘Men from the Shore’, who had fled into exile in 546 after the battle of Pallene. Herodotus (1.64.3; 6.123.1) gives the impression – based most probably on information supplied by the Alcmaeonids – that the Alcmaeonids had stayed in exile for the whole period of the tyranny, but this inscription reveals that a rapprochement between the families had taken place. In the same way, Miltiades, son of Cimon, of the distinguished Philaid family, is revealed as a collaborator. His father had also been exiled, but his dedication of his second Olympic victory, possibly in 532, to Peisistratus (Herodotus 6.103) paved the way for the recall of himself and his family.
Peisistratus showed his astuteness with regard to the aristocrats by allowing Solon’s constitution to operate almost normally, or rather, almost as Solon had intended for the first time:
Peisistratus, as was said before [i.e. 14.3], administered the state in a moderate manner and more constitutionally than as a tyrant.
(Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 16.2)
Thus it is reasonable to believe that the archons, the Areopagus, the Ecclesia and the Boule of 400 carried out their functions, as laid down by Solon, with minimum direct interference by Peisistratus. This appearance of normality would also appeal to the aristocrats since their dignity and prestige would be publicly recognized, especially in their tenure of the archonship and membership of the Areopagus, although in reality their political power was severely curtailed. This policy of non-interference on the part of the tyrants is confirmed by Thucydides:
These tyrants for the most part showed virtue and intelligence in their policy … and in other respects the city used the laws that had been previously enacted, except in so far as they always made sure that one of their own was among the public officials.
(Thucydides 6.54.5–6)
It is clear that Hippias and Hipparchus, Peisistratus’ sons, about whom Thucydides was commenting, were pursuing their father’s moderate policy. There is no direct evidence that Peisistratus even confiscated the land of his exiled enemies; in fact, it is known that the property of Cimon, father of Miltiades, was left untouched during his exile (Herodotus 6.103.3), perhaps as an inducement to encourage his opponents to return. The fact that Cimon of the Philaids and Cleisthenes of the Alcmaeonids, two of the most distinguished aristocratic families in Athenian politics, and presumably other families who were politically aligned to them, returned to Athens under the Peisistratids is a testimony to the success of this policy of diplomacy and reconciliation.
The third element that was fundamental to the maintenance of Peisistratus’ rule was his supportive policies for the poor:
Moreover he lent money to the poor for their husbandry so that they might make a living from farming. He did this for two reasons: firstly, so that they did not spend their time in the city, but would be scattered throughout the countryside; secondly, so that they would be reasonably well off and involved in their own private affairs, and consequently would neither want nor have the time to attend to public affairs. At the same time, the cultivation of the land increased the revenues, since he imposed a tax of 10 per cent (‘decate’) on the produce from the land.
(Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 61.2–4)
Solon’s cancellation of debts and his ending of hectemoroi status (see Chapter 5) had only given temporary economic relief to the poor farmers, but he had done virtually nothing to provide the means to improve their financial position and thus avoid falling into debt again. Peisistratus improved upon Solon’s economic reforms by lending money to the poor farmers, which provided them with positive help in a number of ways: either to invest in their land, thus increasing its agricultural output; or to support themselves in the interim period while they changed over from cereal farming to the cultivation of olives and vines; or to tide others over until the rise of employment opportunities in industry allowed them to switch from farming, for his tax on agricultural produce encouraged those with capital to diversify and invest in industry. By the fifth century, Athens had a widespread class of successful small farmers, and much of the credit for this belongs to Peisistratus.
Aristotle, revealing his pro-aristocratic bias, stresses the political motives for the tyrant’s generous loans to the poor, which may have played a part in the formulation of this policy, although his motives look anachronistic, i.e. post-democratic; but the attainment of economic security by the formerly impoverished farmers was a far more important motive for the tyrant, since their resultant gratitude was a more secure way of retaining their loyalty. There is a story that on one occasion, in his many tours of Attica during which he constantly reviewed and resolved disputes, he saw a farmer struggling to cultivate a very stony patch of land. When Peisistratus asked his attendant to find out what the land produced, the farmer replied bitterly ‘aches and pains’ and went on to complain about the tyrant’s 10 per cent tax on his meagre produce; Peisistratus immediately exempted him from all taxes (Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 16.6). The authenticity of this particular story may be doubted, but not Peisistratus’ frequent tours of inspection around Attica which reveal his concern for the welfare of the poor. The 10 per cent tax, not very demanding in its own right, was in fact probably only a 5 per cent tax, as it was under the rule of Peisistratus’ sons (Thucydides 6.54.5), since the Greek word ‘decate’ was probably the traditional word for any ‘tax’. Furthermore, in order to improve the quality of life of the lower classes, he introduced local judges so that the administration of law would be removed from the local aristocrats, thus ensuring justice for the poor and emphasizing the superior position of the state over the aristocrats (Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 16.5).
The foreign policy of Peisistratus and his sons also indirectly helped Athenian prosperity: peaceful foreign relations created a favourable economic climate in which Athenians could take full advantage of the export markets:
In general Peisistratus gave the people no trouble during his rule, but always maintained peace at home and abroad; as a result the tyranny of Peisistratus was often called the age of Cronus [i.e. ‘a Golden Age’].
(Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 16.7)
Peisistratus, unlike some other tyrants such as Cleisthenes of Sicyon (see Chapter 3), did not rely on an aggressive foreign policy to unite the people behind his rule. He had already acquired allies in Greece during the period after his second exile from Athens, namely Eretria, Thebes, Argos and Naxos; and during his tyranny an alliance was probably made with powerful Thessaly, strongly suggested by the name of his third son, Thessalos. At some point an alliance was also made with the Spartans, as revealed in the speech of Cleomenes, King of Sparta, when he was attempting to persuade his Peloponnesian allies to reinstate Hippias as tyrant of Athens (Herodotus 5.91), although this may have been formed during Hippias’ rule. It would seem that Peisistratus in general preferred to secure peace by forging diplomatic links with foreign powers; but this did not prevent him from using force, when he thought that it was in Athens’ or his own interests. This dual policy of diplomacy and force proved to be very effective in foreign affairs.
One of the first acts of his rule was to attack Naxos and install Lygdamis, his ally, as tyrant (Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 15.3). Athens’ position in the Aegean and prestige among the Ionian states were further strengthened by Peisistratus’ religious purification of the island of Delos (Herodotus 1.64.2) – Delos was the venue of an Ionian festival of athletics, poetry and music, in which the cities of Ionia, the is
lands and Athens participated (Thucydides 3.104). Sigeum, which occupied an important geographical position on the Ionian mainland close to the Hellespont, was recovered by force from Mytilene by Peisistratus who installed a son, Hegistratus, as ruler (Herodotus 5.91.5). In addition, Miltiades became the ruler of the Dolonci in the Chersonese, the peninsula on the western side of the Hellespont. Although Herodotus states that dissatisfaction with the rule of Peisistratus was an important motive for Miltiades’ acceptance of the invitation of the Dolonci (6.34–35.3), it is far more likely this colony was founded with the full approval of Peisistratus, since colonists could not be removed from Athens without his consent and its important strategic position near the Hellespont, complementing Sigeum on the opposite eastern side, would have been welcomed by the tyrant. Thus a combination of peaceful relations with foreign powers and of political stability at home provided the basis for a widespread improvement in the standard of living of the Athenians during the second half of the sixth century.
Aspects of Greek History (750–323BC) Page 17