Therefore, it is possible to link the tyrant Hippias and his friends, including Hipparchus, his relative, and the Alcmaeonids and their political allies, with a policy that favoured cooperation or peaceful coexistence with Persia. If this is correct, then it was the people’s mistrust of these Athenian politicians and a rejection of their policy that led to the three successive ostracisms from 488/7 to 486/5 (and probably the fourth in 485/4 – see below). Other ostraka finds from the Kerameikos provide more support for this view: Callixenos, son of Aristonymus from the deme of Xypete, and Hippocrates, son of Alcmaeonides from the deme of Alopece, were both serious contenders for ostracism in the 480s. Both were Alcmaeonids and, although unmentioned in the literary sources, were clearly men of political importance in Athens. In fact, Callixenos on the extant evidence came sixth in the unpopularity contest with 263 ostraka cast against him, and one ostrakon almost certainly calls him ‘Callixenos the [trai]tor’. Thus the people seem to have developed a vendetta against the Alcmaeonids. On the basis of this evidence, it is plausible to believe that the dominant issue in Athenian politics, which split the factions in the 480s, was about the policy that Athens should adopt towards Persia and Persian expansion, namely cooperation/peaceful coexistence or resistance. The roots of this policy disagreement can be found in the events of the last years of the sixth century and the 490s, beginning c.507 with Athens’ request for Persian military aid against their Greek enemies.
Athenian politics 508/7–490
In 508/7, Cleomenes, King of Sparta, invaded Athens at the request of Isagoras, exiled 700 families who were political allies of Cleisthenes and the Alcmaeonids, and tried to set up a narrow pro-Spartan oligarchy under Isagoras (see Chapter 7 for a fuller discussion). However, Cleomenes’ attempt to dissolve the Boule of 400 backfired, leading to an uprising of the Athenian people in support of Cleisthenes’ democratic reforms and the forced departure of his Spartan army. Such a military humiliation of the most powerful state in Greece was bound to have repercussions:
The Athenians sent for Cleisthenes and the 700 families who had been exiled by Cleomenes; then they sent messengers to Sardis because they wanted to make a military alliance with the Persians. For they knew that they were now at war with Cleomenes and the Lacedaimonians [i.e. the Spartans].
(Herodotus 5.73.1)
Cleomenes at that time was assembling an army from the whole of the Peloponnese in order to gain revenge on the Athenians and to reinstate Isagoras. He was organizing a three-prong attack on Athens: the Spartans and the Peloponnesians were to attack Eleusis on the western border of Attica; the Boeotians were to seize Oenoe and Hysiae in the north-west; and the Chalcidians from Euboea were to raid north-east Attica (Herodotus 5.74).
It was this fear of Cleomenes’ hostility that had persuaded the Athenians to seek military help from the Persians, and thus made Athenian–Persian relations a major political issue for the first time at Athens. The huge empire of Persia, under the rule of King Darius, had extended its frontiers to the very borders of mainland Greece. The Greeks on the western coast of Asia Minor had originally been conquered by Croesus the King of Lydia (560–546), but soon had come under the control of the Persians after his defeat in 546 at the hands of Cyrus ‘the Great’, the founder of the Persian Empire. In the last twelve years or so of the sixth century, King Darius, with the help of his generals Megabazus and Otanes, had defeated Thrace and had incorporated it within the Persian Empire, and had accepted the submission of Macedonia (Herodotus 5.18.1). Thus Persia could be viewed as a potential enemy or ally; in 506, threatened on three sides by Greek enemies, the Athenians turned to Persia as an ally.
Herodotus does not reveal the identity of the politician who proposed this military alliance with Persia, possibly due to ignorance or because he wished to protect a political reputation in the light of subsequent events. However, it is possible to believe that Cleisthenes, the leader of the Alcmaeonids, was the driving force behind this policy: his influence was at its peak, owing to the popularity of his democratic reforms, and he personally, his family and his political supporters had the most to lose if the Athenians were defeated by Cleomenes and a narrow oligarchy under Isagoras was imposed. If this is correct, then the first link was forged between the Alcmaeonids and the policy of cooperation with the Persians.
The request for a military alliance was sent to Artaphrenes, the brother of Darius and the ‘satrap’ (provincial governor) of Ionia and Lydia, who resided at Sardis, the main city of his ‘satrapy’ (province). Artaphrenes, having established who the Athenians were, was willing to give aid, but with important pre-conditions:
He briefly summed up the situation as follows: if the Athenians were to give earth and water to King Darius, he would form a military alliance with them; but if not, he would order their [i.e. the messengers’] removal. The messengers, having discussed the issue among themselves, said that they would give earth and water because they wished to have the alliance. When these returned to their own country, they were strongly criticized.
(Herodotus 5.73.2–3)
The reason for the criticism of the messengers was that the offering of earth and water was the symbol of political and military submission to Persia, and thus the Athenians were liable to pay tribute, to supply military forces when required, and to accept Persia’s preferred choice of constitutional government, which at that time was tyranny, as was the case with the Greeks of Asia Minor.
This criticism of the messengers reveals naivety on the part of the Athenians, if they genuinely thought that the Persians were going to offer them a military alliance on any other terms than submission; Athens was hardly likely to be viewed as a military equal, least of all when appealing to a great empire for military help. It is worth noting that the alliance with Persia was not formally rejected by the Athenians but was ignored; either because Cleisthenes, who must have anticipated (if it was his policy) such a demand from Persia, had recognized the political danger to himself by continuing to support such a manifestly unpopular policy or, perhaps more convincingly, because the military threat to the Athenians from their Greek enemies had been removed. For the Spartan invasion had been aborted at Eleusis due to the desertion of Demaratus, Cleomenes’ co-king, the Corinthians and the rest of the Peloponnesian allies (Herodotus 5.75–76; see Chapter 4 for a fuller discussion of these events). This stroke of luck allowed the Athenians to turn their attention, first, to the Boeotians who were decisively beaten in battle while on their way to join up with the Chalcidians; and, second, to the Chalcidians who were defeated in Euboea and had 4,000 Athenian settlers placed upon a confiscated part of their land (Herodotus 5.77). Nevertheless, no matter how convenient it was for the Athenians to forget the embassy to Artaphrenes at Sardis, their ambassadors had formally submitted to Persia by offering earth and water, and the Persians were not going to forget.
The next stage in the deterioration of relations between Athens and Persia was due to the exiled tyrant, Hippias, who was living at Sigeum, situated in Asia Minor at the southern end of the Hellespont. Hippias had his hopes raised of a return to Athens as tyrant by the Spartans who, after their failure in 506 to reinstate Isagoras at Athens, decided to support the restoration of Hippias. However, when the Peloponnesian allies were summoned to Sparta to discuss a proposed invasion of Athens for this purpose, once again the Corinthians came to Athens’ rescue by vigorously opposing any attempt to establish tyranny anywhere. Their arguments led the Peloponnesian allies to reject the Spartans’ scheme, who were forced to give up any future hopes of attacking Athens and to send Hippias back to Sigeum (Herodotus 5.91–94). But Hippias was not prepared to abandon his newly raised hopes and turned to Artaphrenes:
When Hippias returned from Sparta to Asia, he left no stone unturned, slandering the Athenians to Artaphrenes and doing everything to bring Athens under the power of himself and Darius. While Hippias was doing these things, the Athenians, upon learning of his activities, sent messengers to Sardis, urging the Persians not to
be won over by Athenian fugitives. Artaphrenes ordered them, if they valued their safety, to take Hippias back. When his orders were brought to them, the Athenians refused to obey. Since they would not obey, they decided to be openly at war with the Persians.
(Herodotus 5.96)
Thus a state of war now existed between Athens and Persia, and this decision can probably be dated to c.501 owing to subsequent events.
The Ionian Revolt broke out in 499, initiated by Aristagoras of Miletus; he had promised to capture the island of Naxos and bring it under Persian control, but his failure and fear of punishment persuaded him that revolt was his best means of safety (Herodotus 5.30–38). The Ionians needed help from mainland Greece, if their revolt was to have any chance of succeeding, and so Aristagoras went at first to Sparta where he was rebuffed by Cleomenes (Herodotus 5.49–51). Aristagoras then appealed to Athens, stressing the kinship between the Athenians and the Milesians, and the weakness of the Persian armed forces. He had picked the right moment, for the Athenians were still angry with Artaphrenes and his demands to reinstate Hippias; they voted to send 20 of their 50-strong fleet:
These ships were the beginning of the troubles for both the Greeks and the foreigners.
(Herodotus 5.97.3)
However, the Athenians, after burning Sardis but then being defeated by the Persians, withdrew their ships and played no further part in the Ionian Revolt.
The decade of the 490s, beginning with the initial Athenian participation in the Ionian Revolt, is particularly devoid of literary sources until the battle of Marathon in 490 which is fully documented. The internal politics of Athens during this period can only be surmised, but the events of 499 suggest that the issues of Hippias and Persia had become connected, and that the dividing line between the political factions concerned future Athenian policy towards both: whether it should be cooperation with Persia and, therefore, the restoration of Hippias, or resistance. The sending and the withdrawal of the 20 ships could have been approved only by the people in the Ecclesia (Assembly), and thus there must have been a full debate on both occasions in which arguments for and against intervention on behalf of the Ionians were expressed. Those who favoured resistance must have won the day on the first occasion, when the Athenians voted to send nearly half of their navy to the Asiatic Greeks; but those who favoured cooperation with or caution towards Persia enjoyed success subsequently with the ships’ recall. As the course of the Ionian Revolt unfolded from 499 to 494, this issue must have been placed numerous times on the agenda of the Ecclesia for discussion. It is into this context that the very few events, of which there is mention in the sources, are usually placed.
The first of these is the election of Hipparchus in 496/5 to the post of eponymous (chief) archon. It would seem that his kinship tie to Hippias was not the political handicap that it would have been ten, or even five, years earlier. By 496, the Persians had regained Cyprus and were in the process of launching a three-pronged attack along the whole of the western seaboard of Asia Minor. Such success would have stirred fears of retribution against Athens for taking part in the burning of Sardis. Hipparchus’ election may have been an attempt to give him a position of authority in order to use his influence on behalf of the Athenians with Hippias and, through him, with Persia, possibly to explain away the initial involvement in the revolt as an error of judgement which had been quickly rectified. At the very least, his appointment would be seen as opposition to the policy of open warfare against Persia.
The defeat of the Ionian League at the sea-battle of Lade and the capture of Miletus in 494, followed by the mopping up operations in 493 brought the Ionian Revolt to an end. The failure of the revolt had two consequences of note: the return of Miltiades to Athens in 493/2 and the battle of Marathon in 490. Miltiades had been tyrant in the Thracian Chersonese (the narrow peninsula on the European side of the Hellespont), but was forced to flee by the Persian navy, which was stamping out the last remnants of the Ionian Revolt in the Hellespontine region (Herodotus 6.41). The arrival of such a powerful personality on the Athenian political stage provoked conflicting reactions. As the leading member of the powerful Philaid clan, he had cooperated with the Peisistratids, holding the post of eponymous (chief) archon in 524/3, and had gained the tyranny of the Thracian Chersonese with their support: such a link with Hippias was bound to provoke hostility in some quarters. On the other hand, his participation in the Ionian Revolt until the bitter end would have earned him popularity amongst those who favoured resistance to Persia.
Immediately upon his return, Miltiades was brought to trial by his enemies on the charge of being a tyrant in the Chersonese (Herodotus 6.104.2). It is difficult to believe that there was such a crime in Athenian law, and thus the motive for this prosecution appears to have been political. However, as Herodotus does not identify the accusers, it is not possible to know for certain whether rivalry and jealousy between the aristocratic clans or disagreement over policy towards Persia was the primary cause of his prosecution. What is certain is that his acquittal and election to the post of strategos (tribal general) were a boost for those who supported an anti-Persian policy.
In the same year as Miltiades’ return and court case, Themistocles was probably elected to the post of eponymous (chief) archon. His archonship was particularly noteworthy for his development and fortification of the Piraeus:
Themistocles persuaded them to complete the walls of the Piraeus [i.e. in 479 or soon after], which had been begun previously during the year of his archonship [493/2], thinking that it was a fine site, having three natural harbours, and that the development of Athens into a naval state would be of great benefit in the acquisition of power. For he was the first man who dared to say that their future lay with the sea.
(Thucydides 1.93.3–4)
Previously the bay of Phalerum, open and indefensible, had served as the base for the navy; now the task of turning the Piraeus into the secure and fortified harbour of Athens had been begun. Prudent defence against the threat of Aegina, which was at war with Athens at different times from 505 to 481, was one motive for Themistocles’ concentration on the Piraeus; the other, and probably more important, was his concern about the expansion of Persia and the likelihood of their desire for revenge. Whether this willingness to oppose Persia brought Themistocles into a political alliance with the like-minded Miltiades, it is impossible to say as there is no direct evidence. However, it must be remembered that Miltiades was a politician of the first rank due to his vast experience, while Themistocles’ election to the archonship marked only the beginning of a promising political career; therefore the possibility of a political relationship between the two should be treated with great caution.
The second consequence of the failure of the Ionian Revolt was the battle of Marathon in 490. In the late 490s, the Persians set out to achieve three objectives: the reorganization of the crushed Asiatic Greeks, the consolidation of their control over the northern Aegean, and the punishment of those non-Asiatic Greek cities that had participated in the attack on Sardis. Artaphrenes mostly carried out the first objective, although it was Mardonius, the son-in-law of King Darius, who substituted so-called democracies for tyrannies as the preferred means of Persian control over the Greek cities in Asia Minor (Herodotus 6.42–43); Mardonius was also instructed to carry out the other two. In 492, he reasserted Persian control over Thrace and Macedonia, and took possession of the island of Thasos. However, his plan to march through Greece in order to punish Athens and Eretria, which had sent five ships against Sardis, was thwarted by a terrible storm as the Persians attempted to sail around the peninsula of Mount Athos in Chalcidice in the north-west Aegean; the heavy loss of ships and men led to the temporary abandonment of the third objective (Herodotus 6.44–45).
In 490, Darius appointed Datis and Artaphrenes, the son of the satrap, aided by the ex-tyrant Hippias, to complete the enslavement of Eretria and Athens. To avoid the dangers that Mardonius experienced, the large Persian force sailed across th
e Aegean, conquering Naxos and other islands of the Cyclades on their journey until it came to Eretria, which was burnt in revenge for Sardis and its citizens enslaved and transported to Asia (Herodotus 6.95–101). The Persian forces then landed in the bay of Marathon on the east coast of Attica and awaited the arrival of the Athenian forces. The Athenians had already asked for help from the Spartans, who replied that they could not come until the full moon had passed owing to their religious practice. In the event, only the Plataeans sent help and fought alongside the Athenians. The ‘polemarch’ (commander-in-chief) of the Athenian army was Callimachus, who was aided in his decision-making by the ten tribal generals, the most influential proving to be Miltiades. It is clear from his speech to Callimachus in support of an immediate attack (Herodotus 6.109) that he feared the betrayal of Athens by those who favoured cooperation with or appeasement of Persia; Eretria had already shown how the issue of relations with Persia could disastrously split a Greek state (Herodotus 6.100). Callimachus’ decision to risk battle ended in a decisive victory for the Athenians (Herodotus 6.111–15).
Aspects of Greek History (750–323BC) Page 22