Examples of this selection, omission, emphasis and understatement can be seen in the following: selection – the crushing of the revolt of Thasos in the 460s is highlighted to show the Athenians exercising imperial power for selfish, commercial reasons (1.100.2–101.3; AE29, p. 21 and AE39, p. 25); omission – the majority of the campaigns against Persia and the ‘peace’ with Persia in 449 are deliberately omitted, thus diminishing the true value of Athenian leadership in the campaigns that achieved for the Ionians freedom and security from the threat of the Persian Empire; emphasis – the arrogant behaviour of Pausanias in 478/7 is emphasized to explain the Spartans’ willingness to be rid of the Persian War and to hand over the leadership to the Athenians (1.94.1–95.7; AE7, p. 13), but this does not fit in easily with his account of the Spartan fear of the Athenians in 479 and their attempt to keep the Athenians defenceless (1.89.3–1.92; AE4, pp. 10–11) – nor with the accounts of Herodotus, Aristotle and Diodorus (see Chapter 12); and finally understatement – his explanation of the Spartans’ reasons for launching an expedition into central Greece to help three very small towns, resulting in them being forced to fight at the battle of Tanagra in 458/7 (1.107.2–108.1; AE39, pp. 26–27), can be called into question – an easier interpretation of the Spartans’ motives, when one considers the size of the Spartan army, its presence in Boeotia (their ally), and the discontent of the Peloponnesian League at Sparta’s fitful involvement in the First Peloponnesian War, is that this was a major and deliberate military campaign against Athens. However, despite these reservations and criticisms, Thucydides’ account is superior to the other accounts of two later writers, Diodorus Siculus and Plutarch (for a fuller discussion of these authors, see Chapter 1). Their works rarely deal with events not covered by Thucydides but rather describe the same events in greater detail, although with differing degrees of reliability. Diodorus is particularly suspect when it comes to dating, although his main source for this period – the fourth-century historian, Ephorus – seems particularly well informed on Peloponnesian history in the fifth century.
Inscriptions
The two most useful types of inscriptional evidence for supplementing the literary works for this period are the so-called Athenian Tribute Quota Lists and the decrees passed in the Athenian Assembly. However, these decrees also have their own limitations, including the fact that they date only from the late 450s onwards, as the publication in stone of public accounts and Assembly decisions became a hallmark of the fully democratic Athens. It is generally accepted that the Athenians moved the League treasury to Athens in 454/3 and the Hellenotamiae (Treasurers of the Greeks) collected one-sixtieth of each ally’s phoros every year (until 414/3 – apart from 449/8 – and again from 410/09 to 406/5) and dedicated it to Athena as ‘first fruits’. These lists of annual offerings were recorded on stone and it is these records that are referred to as the ‘Athenian Tribute Lists’ (ATLs) by modern historians. The phoros-payers would normally pay the same annual amount of phoros in each assessment period, which would usually last for roughly four years; at the end of this period a general reassessment of phoros to be paid would be conducted and each phorospayer’s new contribution would be assessed. These lists, although in fragmentary condition and giving only the payments of individual states, are still very useful in providing an insight into relations between Athens and her subject-allies, both collectively and on an individual basis –‘the lists serve as a barometer of Aegean politics’ (Hornblower). The lists are particularly valuable when they record changes or variations from the norm, such as the unexpected appearance and disappearance of cities, especially if there is an adjustment to their phoros payment, or when there is an increase or decrease in a general re-assessment.
A good example of the first type is the island of Andros, which does not appear in lists 1–3 (454/3 to 452/1) but suddenly appears in list 4 (451/450), paying 12 talents. In list 5 (450/49) and in subsequent lists, she pays 6 talents. This unexpected appearance of Andros does highlight the limitation of the ATLs when they are the only evidence available: was Andros a shipsupplier who had decided voluntarily or had been ‘encouraged’ to convert to phoros-paying in 451/50? or had she, as a phoros-payer, been in revolt after Athens’ defeat in Egypt in 454 but now had been forced back into line? or was she both a ship-supplier and in revolt, subsequently being crushed and forced to convert to phoros-paying? However, in Andros’ case, there is literary evidence available that strongly suggests that she was in revolt. In 450, the Athenians initiated a policy of sending out ‘cleruchies’ (see Glossary) to disaffected allies’ territory to act as unofficial garrisons and Plutarch records the despatch of one of these to Andros (Life of Pericles 11.5–6; AE231, p. 119). These settlers occupied a portion of confiscated land in allied territory, thus resulting in a decrease in that state’s phoros – hence Andros’ reduction to 6 talents in list 5 (450/49). A good example of the second type is the general re-assessment of 447/6, where as many as 30 states had their phoros reduced. Even allowing for the imposition of cleruchies in some cases, this reduction suggests that the Athenians, after their tough treatment of the subject-allies in the preceding years, were attempting to win back favour by this concession. Later, in the Archidamian War (431–421), there were two extraordinary re-assessments (i.e. not after a regular four-year period) in 428/7 and in 425/4, where the overall amount of phoros was greatly increased. This evidence from the lists reveals the increasing financial pressure that the Athenians were facing as the war progressed.
Decrees enacted in the Athenian Assembly, whether general or involving a particular city, are another valuable source for understanding Athens’ relations with her allies. The main problem with this evidence is trying to find an accurate date for their enactment. In an ideal world, every decree would have in its prescript the name of the eponymous ‘archon’ (chief archon), who gave his name to the Athenian year. Unfortunately, this did not become a common practice until c.420 BC and, although there are earlier instances of the archon being named, surviving inscriptions are usually so badly damaged that their names are either missing, incomplete or impossible to read. Consequently three methods are regularly used, with varying degrees of success, to date an inscription: historical context, names of individuals mentioned in decrees and Greek lettering styles. A good example of historical context is the Chalcis Decree (ML 52; AE78 pp. 44–45). There is no easy way to date this decree on internal evidence, but in 446 the cities of the island of Euboea revolted from the Delian League, angered by the increasingly harsh imperialism of Athens in the early 440s and taking advantage of a major Athenian defeat at Coroneia (c.447 BC), resulting in the loss of her ‘Land Empire’. Pericles soon led a force across to Euboea and crushed the revolt in 446/5. These events supply a convincing historical context for the passing of this decree against Chalcis (a city on Euboea) – a decree with exactly the same provisions was also passed against Eretria, another city on Euboea.
With regard to decrees with names of individuals contained within them, the Cleinias Decree (ML 46; AE190 pp. 102–3), which greatly tightened up the method of collecting phoros, shows the strengths and weaknesses of this approach to dating (see below in section ‘478/7–446/5’ for the full discussion about Cleinias’ possible identification, and the difference of scholarly opinion as to whether the 440s or the 420s were the appropriate historical context for this decree). The third method – Greek lettering styles – is the most problematical and is a matter of fierce academic debate. As the fifth century progressed, there was a change in the form of some letters in the Greek alphabet used in the inscriptions: the beta (b), the rho (r), the phi (ph); but most of the debate has been centred on the sigma (s) which can be written either with three bars or with four bars. One school of thought believes that the ‘three-barred sigma’ was used in inscriptions only up to c.445, and was replaced in later inscriptions by the ‘four-barred sigma’. Therefore it is argued that similar inscriptions with the older form of sigma should be dated to pre-445. Howev
er, Mattingly has argued for a long time against this viewpoint and believes that the old-style of lettering continued to be used after c.430, and consequently Athenian imperial decrees of the early 440s should be placed in the 420s, and should be seen as the policy of Cleon and not Pericles. His case was strengthened by the inscription concerning an alliance between Athens and Segesta (or Egesta) in Sicily (ML 37). This inscription contains the ‘three-barred sigma’ and the old rho (r) and the archon’s name ‘-on’. Most scholars, using the above criteria and not Mattingly’s, dated this alliance to either 458/7, restoring ‘[Habr]on’ as the archon, or 454/3 with ‘[Arist]on’ as archon. However, laser photography has been used on this inscription and its results suggest that the damaged archon’s name could be Antiphon, who was archon in 418/7, which means that the older lettering was still in use nearly 30 years after it was supposed to have died out. This does not mean necessarily that the dating of all the relevant decrees should be lowered – it means that this method of using Greek-lettering styles should be used with care. It is only when all three methods are present that there can be confidence in dating individual decrees.
478/7–446/5
The first recorded action of the Delian League was the capture of Eion:
First [476/5] the Athenians under the command of Cimon son of Miltiades besieged and took Eion on the Strymon, which the Persians held, and enslaved it.
(Thucydides 1.98.1; AE29 p. 21)
Apart from driving out the Persians from Greek territory, Eion commanded a very important position in the Thraceward region, which was rich in mineral wealth, offered excellent trading possibilities and even more importantly had abundant supplies of wood for the League fleet:
Then they enslaved the island of Scyros in the Aegean, which the Dolopes inhabited, and settled it themselves.
(Thucydides 1.98.2; AE29 p. 21)
The Dolopes on Scyros had attracted the League’s attention owing to the fact that they made their living by practising piracy in the Aegean. According to Plutarch (Cimon 8), Cimon soon conquered the island, established a colony there and freed the Aegean from piracy. This campaign, unlike the one against Eion, was not directed against the Persians, and shows that even at this early stage there was flexibility, at least on the part of the Athenians, in the League’s aims. The League was made up of islands and coastal towns in the Aegean, and their economies were mainly dependent upon trade. The removal of piracy, the resulting free flow of trade and increased prosperity would have been greatly welcomed by the allies, but it would also be especially valuable to the Athenians, because the Piraeus was becoming the major trading centre in the eastern Mediterranean. In addition, Scyros was ideally situated on the grain route from the Hellespont to Athens.
The third recorded action of the Delian League was against Carystus, situated on the strategically important island of Euboea:
War arose between the Athenians and the Carystians who were not supported by the other Euboeans, and in time a settlement was made by agreement.
(Thucydides 1.98.3; AE29 p. 21)
Once again, as in the Scyros affair, the Delian League had conducted a campaign against fellow Greeks. Thucydides does not explicitly state the reason for the attack, but possibly it is implicit in his words ‘who were not supported by the other Euboeans’. Carystus was a coastal town in Euboea and would have been enjoying all the political and commercial benefits of freedom from Persia and the removal of the pirates. However, unlike the other Euboean cities (and the other League allies), it was gaining all these advantages brought about by the League without contributing to the League’s income. It is reasonable to assume that the ‘terms’, on which Carystus surrendered, were to become a phoros-paying member of the League. This incident again shows how Athens was willing to go beyond the League’s original aims, especially when the action benefited themselves – Carystus was also a key city on the vital grain route from the Hellespont.
Around 471, the Athenians marked a turning point in their relations with the Delian League:
After this they made war on the Naxians, who had revolted, and besieged and subdued them. This was the first allied city deprived of its freedom contrary to Greek custom.
(Thucydides 1.98.4; AE29 p. 21)
Naxos was one of the original members of the League and, since it was the first member to be subjugated, Thucydides has highlighted the event. The enslavement refers to Naxos losing its autonomy and becoming a subject-ally under Athenian political control. In concrete terms, this would probably involve the establishment of an Athenian garrison, the confiscation of its fleet and the imposition of phoros-paying status (and possibly the installation of a democratic constitution). Although Thucydides gives no reasons for Naxos’ revolt, it was probably a combination of Athens’ increasingly high-handed behaviour and, after seven years, the growing feeling of security from Persian conquest. It would be valuable to know the feelings of the allies about this treatment of Naxos. Undoubtedly, some of the allies would have entertained the same resentment against the Athenians and would have felt great sympathy towards Naxos. Equally others, being fully aware that the Persian threat to the Aegean was far from finished, would have supported the Athenians; Naxos had been the Persians’ prime target in 500 and 490 in order to gain control of the Cyclades (Herodotus 5.28–34, 6.96) and, for that reason, it was too important strategically to be allowed to secede.
After this the sea and land battle at the river Eurymedon in Pamphylia took place between the Athenians and their allies and the Persians. The Athenians under the command of Cimon son of Miltiades were victorious on the same day in both battles, capturing and destroying some 200 Phoenician triremes.
(Thucydides 1.100.1; AE29 p. 21)
The battle of Eurymedon c.469 was a massive victory for the Delian League, virtually removing the Persian threat from the Aegean. There were two great battles on the same day, which totally destroyed for the foreseeable future any Persian ambitions of regaining the Asiatic Greeks or the control of the Aegean. It was this success which probably affected the attitude of the allies towards the League more than any other event. The majority would have felt that the primary purpose of the League, i.e. the liberation of the Greeks from Persia, had been achieved, and consequently were reluctant to continue paying phoros or supplying ships for future campaigns. The Athenians, however, were determined that the allies should carry out their agreed obligations, and this led to them exercising a harsher and increasingly imperialistic control over the allies.
Thucydides in 1.99.1–4(AE29 p. 21) gives thereafter a brief but slightly confused summary of the process, by which the Athenians transformed the League into the Athenian Empire. It is important to separate the strands of his narrative to establish the different process of subjugation for the phoros-payers and the ship-suppliers. The phoros payers after Eurymedon failed to pay their tribute, resulting in their revolt from the League. However, they were easily crushed and became subject-allies. The ship-suppliers (the islands in the League) always had a heavier burden than the phorospayers, as they had to take part in the dangerous campaigning and had the added expense of maintaining their ships. Therefore, when the Athenians became more unpopular through their tough and insensitive leadership, the ship-suppliers reacted in one of two ways. Some such as Naxos and Thasos (see below) chose to revolt but were easily defeated by Athens’ superior naval power. The others reacted as follows:
because most of them disliked military service and absence from home, they agreed to contribute their share of the expense instead of ships.
(Thucydides 1.99.3; AE29 p. 21)
This played into the hands of the Athenians. Whenever a ship-supplier became a phoros-payer, not only was the number of allied ‘triremes’ reduced but also the Athenians used the new phoros to replace those allied triremes with Athenian ones.
As a result the Athenian fleet grew from the money that the allies brought in, and when they revolted, the allies were unprepared a
nd short of experience in war.
(Thucydides 1.99.3; AE29 p. 21)
Athens’ action against Thasos in 465 was blatantly self-seeking and imperialistic:
Some time later Thasians revolted. A quarrel had arisen about the trading posts on the Thracian mainland opposite and the mine, all of which they gained profit from.
(Thucydides 1.100.2; AE29 p. 21)
Clearly both the trading posts and the mine belonged to Thasos, and the only possible cause for the dispute must have been Athens’ demand for possession of them – an obvious case of commercial greed by the Athenians. This situation was further exacerbated by Athens’ attempt to establish a colony at the Nine Ways on the river Strymon (1.100.3; AE29 p. 21), which revealed Athenian ambitions to gain control of that part of the Thraceward region. The Thasians felt that they had no other alternative but to revolt. The Athenians under Cimon won the sea-battle and began the lengthy siege of Thasos, which finally surrendered in 463. The terms imposed on Thasos were very harsh: the destruction of their defensive walls, the surrender of their navy, the payment of an indemnity, the imposition of phoros-paying status and, to complete the humiliation, the surrender of the trading posts and the mine (1.101.3; AE39 p. 25).
The feelings of the League allies can usually only be imagined owing to the lack of literary sources, but Diodorus, although writing much later, gives a convincing insight into their mood and their views about the nature of the Athenian leadership:
For generally the Athenians’ power was much increased and they did not use the allies fairly, as they had previously, but ruled them in a violent and overweening manner. Many of the allies were unable to put up with this harshness, and they talked to each other about revolt, and some gave up attending the Common Meetings and made their own private dispositions.
Aspects of Greek History (750–323BC) Page 28