Athens seized the hegemony on account of the disasters that overwhelmed Sparta.
(Philochorus FGrH 328 F117)
This period in the history of Sparta and the Peloponnese is particularly difficult owing to a shortage of literary sources. However, Philochorus’ mention of ‘disasters’ gives the historian a starting-point. It seems, from the fragmentary evidence, that by the late 470s the Spartans were facing an unprecedented challenge to their supremacy in the Peloponnese by a coalition of states, brought together by the influence of Themistocles, which would threaten Sparta’s very existence. But first there is a need to identify these states and to chart the growth of their hostility towards Sparta, which culminated in the formation of this anti-Spartan coalition.
The obvious starting-point is Argos. In the past Argos had been one of the most powerful states in the Peloponnese and, as the introduction of hoplite warfare most probably took place there in the first half of the seventh century (699–650), was even the dominant state. However, the rise of Sparta after the Second Messenian War and the Lycurgan reforms eclipsed the power of Argos. Nevertheless, the Argives never forgot their former pre-eminence and resented Sparta’s usurpation of their position. Thus Argos was a traditional enemy of Sparta which was reflected in numerous battles over the generations. The most recent in this period had been the battle of Sepeia in 494, which had been a resounding defeat for Argos with a loss of 5,000 men (Herodotus 6.76–80). It was this loss of manpower that the Argives gave as their reason for neutrality in the Persian War, although there was no way that they would have ever served under Spartan leadership – so deep was their antipathy. According to Herodotus (6.83), the ruling aristocrats as a class suffered most in the slaughter at Sepeia and that the government of Argos passed into the hands of ‘douloi’ (slaves). This cannot literally be true but it seems possible that some important families, formerly on the fringes of power, took over the government and that ‘douloi’ is a term of political abuse, used by the aristocratic survivors and their descendants against them. These new families had a liberalizing effect on the Argive constitution, which became a moderate democracy – anathema to the oligarchic-minded Spartans. In 471, Themistocles was ostracized from Athens for his anti-Spartan activities (see Chapter 11) and was welcomed by the Argives (Thuc. 1.135) – no clearer sign of Argos’ hostility to the Spartans in the late 470s is required.
Arcadia was also anti-Spartan by the late 470s. There is coin evidence to show that as early as the 490s an Arcadian League had been set up. The mastermind behind this was the fugitive King of Sparta, Cleomenes (Herodotus 6.74), who had been forced to flee from Sparta owing to his disgrace arising from his bribery of the Delphic oracle. The formation of this League and its threat to Sparta led to the recall of its architect to Sparta, where Cleomenes allegedly committed suicide soon after (Herodotus 6.75). However, the League was now in existence and only needed another leader to give it direction. There was also the powerful polis of Tegea in the heart of the Peloponnese and close to the borders of Laconia. Mutual suspicion existed between Sparta and Tegea, especially as Tegea had been the state that had defeated Sparta in the mid-sixth century (c.550). Tegea had been loyal in the Persian War and had fought bravely alongside the Spartans at the battle of Plataea in 479. However, by the late 470s, with the pressure from the outside invader gone, Tegea once again had reason to fear Sparta and was looking for anti-Spartan allies. Finally, there were Elis and Mantinea. Both states had arrived late for the battle of Plataea, which seems hard to explain as there was almost two weeks of skirmishing before the actual battle was fought, unless this lateness was an excuse, similar to Argos’, to avoid fighting under Spartan leadership.
Each state ‘synoecized’ in c.471, i.e. a number of independent villages decided to unite into one bigger state, and have a shared citizenship and a common foreign policy. It was also usual that synoecism was accompanied by the introduction of a democratic constitution. The synoecism of Elis on the borders of the Messenian Helots and the synoecism of Mantinea in the heart of the Peloponnese – both now stronger and democratic – were meant to and did strike fear into the Spartans.
These five areas had one thing in common – hostility towards the Spartans in the late 470s – but they could not become a deadly threat to Sparta unless they could combine their respective strengths. It needed a remarkable politician with exceptional powers of persuasion and patience to bring about the required coalition – Themistocles. In the 470s, Themistocles had turned his back on the policy of the Delian League and had directed his attention towards (in his opinion) Athens’ new enemy, Sparta. Thus he set about stirring up trouble for Sparta by encouraging this hostility among other Peloponnesian states. The reward for his patriotic efforts was to be ostracized from Athens in 471 for these anti-Spartan activities (see Chapter 11). However, he was given a warm welcome by the democratic, anti-Spartan douloi in Argos:
He was living at Argos, though he often travelled about in the rest of the Peloponnese.
(Thucydides 1.135.3)
Using Argos as his base, he now drew together the strands of the policy that he had been working on throughout the 470s. It seems likely that he was the major influence in encouraging the synoecisms and democratization of Elis and Mantinea, and in forging the anti-Spartan north-Peloponnesian coalition in the late 470s. His success was so alarming to the Spartans (even more than Cleomenes in the 490s) that they, with the help of Cimon and his supporters, engineered his condemnation at Athens in c.469/8 on the charge of medism (Plutarch, Themistocles 23). But it was too late. The anti-Spartan coalition of Argos, Elis and Arcadia including Tegea and Mantinea had been established.
Herodotus mentions five battles, in which Sparta was successful:
first the battle of Plataea …; the second the battle at Tegea against the Tegeans and the Argives; the third at Dipaea against the combined forces of the Arcadians excluding Mantinea; the fourth against the Messenians at Ithome; the last against the Athenians and Argives at Tanagra.
(Herodotus 9.35)
Presumably these battles are in chronological order with Plataea in 479, Ithome in 465/4 and Tanagra in c.457. This leaves two little known battles of Tegea and Dipaea, which must have taken place between 479 (Plataea) and 465/4 (Ithome). The mention of the Tegeans, Argives and the combined forces of Arcadia as Sparta’s enemies strongly suggests that the battles of Tegea and Dipaea were the actions of the north-Peloponnesian coalition against Sparta and therefore should be dated between c.471 and 465/4, i.e. between the formation of the coalition and the battle of Ithome. Forrest suggests that the battle of Tegea took place c.469 soon after the bloc was formed. The Spartans won this battle but soon had to face other problems: Diodorus states that in 468 the Spartans could not help their ally Mycenae, which was being attacked by Argos, as ‘they were involved in private wars’ (11.65.4). Clearly the other members of the coalition were stretching the Spartan forces by continual attacks, thus pinning them down in defence of their homeland. Therefore, when the original question is addressed – why were the Spartan hawks not pressing for an attack against Athens’ growing imperialism in the years 471 to 466 – it is clear that the Spartans’ desperate problems in the Peloponnese had forced them into an isolationist foreign policy, having no time to consider Athenian actions and ambitions.
By 465, the Spartans had gained a breathing space from their troubles in the Peloponnese and turned their attention once again to international Greek politics. The Spartan hawks naturally found the situation disturbing: the Athenians were growing in power by the suppression of their allies, as exemplified by the harsh treatment of Thasos which resulted in its revolt from the Delian League (Thuc. 1.100.2; AE29 p. 21). When the Thasians were being besieged and urged the Spartans to come to their aid by invading Attica, the Spartan hawks saw this as the moment to strike:
Unknown to the Athenians, the Spartans promised to do so and would have done so, but were prevented by the earthquake which had taken place, during which th
e Helots and the Perioeci from Thouria and Aithaia revolted and occupied Ithome.
(Thucydides 1.101.2; AE29 p. 21)
Just as the Spartans were about to re-assert their importance in Greek affairs, problems in the Peloponnese forced them yet again into a policy of isolationism. The earthquake was the worst in the history of Sparta. Plutarch (Cimon 16) stated that the whole of Sparta with the exception of five houses was totally destroyed. It was this disaster that encouraged the Helots and the Perioeci of Thouria and Aethaea to throw off the Spartan yoke. It was only the quick thinking of King Archidamus that saved Sparta from ultimate destruction. His drawing up of the surviving Spartans into a battleline saved the Spartans from the Helots who had descended upon Sparta (Plutarch, Cimon 16). Consequently the Helots withdrew to Ithome, which they used as the centre of their rebellion. Sparta’s plight in 465 must also have attracted the attention of the north Peloponnesian coalition. The battle of Dipaea, waged by all of the Arcadians with the exception of Mantinea, has to be fitted in before the battle of Ithome of 465/4. Isocrates, a fourth-century rhetorician, says with almost certain exaggeration that the Spartans had to fight in one line of battle (Archidamos 99), but clearly a drastic shortage of manpower had forced the Spartans to fight in a severely depleted hoplite phalanx. Thus the destruction and loss of life in the 465 earthquake offer strong arguments for the battle of Dipaea to be placed in 465.
Having saved Sparta itself from destruction at the hands of the Helots and the north Peloponnesian coalition, the Spartans now turned their attention to subduing the Helot revolt in Messenia. This allowed the Athenians to continue their imperialist policy of crushing Thasos unhindered (Thuc. 1.101.3; AE39 p. 25). The Spartans defeated the Helots in battle but then had the difficult task of reducing them to submission in their fortress on Ithome. By 462/1 the Spartans had still failed to take the place by storm and end the Helot revolt, which was paralysing the Spartans’ foreign policy. There can be no clearer proof of the Spartans’ desperation than their humiliating appeal for help not only to their Peloponnesian allies but also to the Athenians (Thuc. 1.102.1–3; AE39 p. 25). After a clash in the Athenian Assembly, in which Ephialtes argued strongly but unsuccessfully against helping Sparta (Plutarch, Cimon 16), Cimon came with 4,000 hoplites to Ithome. However, this expedition provoked a serious disagreement between the Spartans and the Athenians, and led directly to the outbreak of the First Peloponnesian War (462/1–446/5):
For when the place was not taken by force, the Spartans grew frightened at the bold and revolutionary character of the Athenians and also because they thought of them as alien in race. They feared that if they stayed, they would be persuaded by those on Ithome to instigate something revolutionary.
(Thucydides 1.102.3; AE 38 p. 25)
There is doubt about the meaning of ‘the bold and revolutionary character’–possibly it refers to the democratic reforms passed by Ephialtes in Cimon’s absence – but there is none about the Spartans’ fear of the Athenians. The difference in attitudes, values and ways of life was highlighted by their close proximity. In addition, the Athenians seem to have sympathized with the Helots’ cause – fellow Greeks trying to achieve liberty. This was too much for the Spartan hawks and so the Athenians, alone of the allies, were dismissed on the grounds that the Spartans had no further need of them (Thuc. 1.102.3; AE38 p. 25). This humiliating snub at Ithome caused great anger among the Athenians and:
as soon as they returned home put an end to the alliance which they had made with them against the Persians and to spite the Spartans made an alliance with the Argives, who were the Spartans’ enemies.
(Thucydides 1.102.4; AE38 p. 25)
This formal renunciation of membership of the Hellenic League meant that Athens and Sparta were no longer allies, and this was tantamount to a declaration of war. This was confirmed by the Athenians’ military alliance with Sparta’s deadliest enemy. It only needed an incident to turn the cold war into open conflict.
Sparta, 462/1–446/5
Unlike the Peloponnesian War of 431, which the Spartans waged with all their strength, the First Peloponnesian War was essentially between Sparta’s allies and the Athenians. This was not due to a lack of hostility on the part of the Spartans – this had been revealed in abundance in the events at Ithome (Thuc. 1.102.1–3; AE38 p. 25) – nor lack of desire for armed conflict, but to their problems in the Peloponnese. Spartan foreign policy was always greatly affected directly or indirectly by the Helots. Since a Helot revolt threatened the very existence of the Spartan state, its suppression dominated Spartan thinking almost to the virtual exclusion of all other issues. The fact that the revolt lasted until 455 (accepting ‘in the tenth year’, Thuc. 1.103.1; AE38 p. 25) would on its own have severely limited Sparta’s active participation in this war. However, the defection of Megara and its fortification with long walls and Athenian soldiers, in addition to the Athenian occupation of the passes over Geraneia, proved decisive for the Spartans (Thuc. 1.103.4, AE39 p. 25; 1.105.3, AE39 p. 26). Their one venture into central Greece in wartime without control of the Megarid – culminating in the battle of Tanagra in c.457 – nearly ended in disaster (Thuc. 1.107–8.2; AE39 pp. 26–27), and they did not attempt another incursion until 446, when Megara had returned to the Peloponnesian League (see below).
Although this expedition into central Greece was a risky adventure, there were sound reasons for it. If the subjugation of Doris, the ‘mother country’ of the Spartans, was allowed to go unpunished, Sparta’s standing among the Peloponnesian allies, already unhappy at bearing the full brunt of the war without their hegemon, would have plummeted to an all-time low and may have led to further defections from the Peloponnesian League. Another motive was the hope of creating an effective opposition and threat to Athens in central Greece. Boeotia had been working towards a federal structure under the leadership of the Thebans, but their disgrace, arising from their support of the Persians in 480–479, had undermined their position in Boeotia and had arrested the growth of federalism. The Thebans therefore made an attractive offer to the Spartans:
They thought it a good idea for the Spartans to help them to gain the hegemony of Boeotia. They promised in return for this to wage war on the Athenians by themselves so that there would be no need for the Spartans to send a land army outside the Peloponnese.
(Diodorus 11.81.2)
The Spartans naturally enough saw that Boeotia, united under Theban leadership, would offer an excellent check upon Athens’ growing power and would reduce the importance of the loss of the Megarid. In the event the Spartans were nearly cut off in central Greece, only just won the battle of Tanagra with heavy casualties and had to endure the ignominy of Boeotia and the rest of central Greece becoming Athens’‘Land Empire’ after the battle of Oenophyta (Thuc. 1.108.2; AE39 p. 27).
The resolution of the Helot revolt in c.455 brought to an end the most difficult and dangerous period of Spartan history since the Second Messenian War in the mid-seventh century (Thuc. 1.103.1–3). From the late 470s the Spartans had faced the most sustained challenge to their military supremacy in the Peloponnese, which had been exacerbated by the ten-year Helot revolt. The lack of active warfare in Greece by the Athenians after 454 gave the Spartans the necessary respite to recuperate and to recover their strength. For the same reasons the Five Year Truce of 451–446 was also most welcome. Both the Spartan hawks and the doves probably saw this period as a valuable breathing-space before the necessary and inevitable attack upon the Athenians – the hawks rarely needed any incentive to fight, but in this situation they were joined by the doves, who viewed with alarm the Athenian ‘Land Empire’ which undermined the foundations of the dual hegemony. However, the Spartans’ credibility among their allies and in Greece was at stake, and for that reason the attack could only be launched when they were fully confident that their renewed strength would bring victory – hence the willingness to sign a five-year truce with the Athenians. In addition, this truce allowed the Spartans to make peace with
the Athenians’ ally in the Peloponnese, Argos. The fact that this was a thirty-year truce and not another five-year truce clearly reveals the underlying intentions of the Spartans. In 446, they would be free to attack the Athenians without any fear of Argive intervention on the side of the Athenians, having effectively neutralized Argos.
The Sacred War in 448 was ostensibly undertaken to restore Delphi to its inhabitants, but in reality this gave the Spartans an acceptable excuse to intervene in central Greece (including Euboea) and Megara, and almost certainly spread anti-Athenian propaganda (Thuc. 1.112.5; AE64 p. 39). The swiftness of the uprising in Boeotia in c.447 and of the revolts of Megara and Euboea in 446 (Thuc. 1.113.1–114.1; AE64 p. 39) seems to be too close in time to Sparta’s presence in central Greece to be coincidental. Finally, in 446, the Spartans, led by King Pleistoanax and Cleandridas, marched into Attica and trapped the Athenians behind their long walls, while the revolt of Euboea gathered strength. At this very moment, with the Athenians in dire straits, the Spartan army returned home, thus allowing the Athenians to reconquer Euboea (Thuc. 1.114.2; AE64 p. 39). This action on the part of the Spartans begs two questions: why retire when they had the Athenians at their mercy; and, even if there was no desire to destroy Athens, why retire so quickly? A siege of Athens would have helped Euboea to consolidate its revolt, especially if the Spartans had sent a garrison, and encouraged the subject-allies to gain their independence; at the very least, it would have strengthened the Spartans’ bargaining position at the future peace negotiations. The answer to the Spartan ‘Gerousia’ was obvious – Pleistoanax and Cleandridas had been bribed to withdraw the army (Plutarch, Pericles 22). Money may have changed hands but it seems too simple an explanation. More convincing is the view that a deal was struck, in which the Athenians would be allowed to have a sea empire but must give up all ambitions of a land empire and also surrender its territorial possessions in the Peloponnese. In other words both spheres of influence – Sparta on land, Athens at sea – would be defined and legalized in the forthcoming peace treaty. If this interpretation is correct, then Pleistoanax belonged to the dove faction and thus was a believer in the dual hegemony. This policy fits in with that of the three Agiad kings who succeeded him, and who also believed in coexistence with the Athenians. However, a majority of the Gerousia was not convinced of the wisdom of his actions. The hawks would be angry at losing such an excellent opportunity to destroy Athens and even the non-aligned members may have felt that too many advantages had been thrown away. Thus Pleistoanax and Cleandridas were forced into exile; although their preferred foreign policy was reflected in the terms of the Thirty Year Peace (see Chapter 17).
Aspects of Greek History (750–323BC) Page 35