The Corinthians had already clashed with the Athenians over Corcyra (433) and were playing an active part in Potidaea’s revolt (432). So far they had acted independently, but now in the second half of 432 they decided to bring matters into the open. In fact, the Corinthians played the dominant role in the events that led up to the declaration of war. They feared that Potidaea would capitulate, so they urged their allies to send representatives to Sparta. There the Corinthians accused the Athenians of breaking the treaty and committing acts of aggression against the Peloponnese. It was on this occasion that the Aeginetans, behind the scenes, complained that they had lost their autonomy. The Spartans then issued an invitation not only to their own allies but to any other state, which claimed to have been victims of Athenian aggression, to come to Sparta to put its case. At the Spartan Assembly held for that purpose, many states made various complaints against the Athenians, including the Megarians about the exclusion decree (1.66–67). The Corinthians chose to speak last in order to capitalize on the hardening of Spartan opinion (1.68–72). The Corinthians criticized the Spartans for their constant slowness in recognizing danger and pointed out that the Athenians had exploited this lack of awareness. They urged the Spartans to take immediate action to help their allies, especially Potidaea, by invading Attica. They concluded their speech with a threat that was guaranteed to frighten the Spartans:
‘Do not let your friends and kinsmen fall into the hands of their bitterest enemies. Do not drive the rest of us in despair to seek a different alliance.’
(Thucydides 1.71.4)
The Peloponnesian League was essential in maintaining Sparta’s supremacy in the Peloponnese and ensuring security from the ‘Helots’. If Corinth, the most influential member of the League, were to secede and seek an alliance with Argos or even Athens, Sparta would be substantially weakened, and this could lead to a break-up of the League. The Corinthians knew how potent their threat was and the effect it would have upon the listening Spartans.
The Spartans, having removed all outsiders, continued their Assembly in order to discuss the issues raised by their allies. Most of the Spartan speakers were of the opinion that Athens had acted aggressively and that war should be declared immediately. However, King Archidamus, who would be commander-in-chief of the armed forces in the event of war, counselled caution (1.80–85). He emphasized that the war would be tough and difficult against an enemy that was wealthy, populous and maritime; and, as the Spartans needed to acquire the necessary financial and naval resources in order to wage war on equal terms, they should refrain from war for two or three years until they had remedied their weaknesses. He stressed in particular that the land invasion and devastation of Attica would not bring about a quick, easy victory. His advice in the present situation was:
‘Send an embassy to the Athenians about Potidaea and about the issues, which our allies have claimed that they have been wronged, especially since the Athenians are prepared to submit to arbitration. It is illegal to attack them first, who are offering arbitration, as though they were definitely in the wrong.’
(Thucydides 1.85.2)
He suggested that the Spartans and their allies should use the time taken up with negotiations to prepare more effectively for war.
Sthenelaidas, one of the ‘Ephors’ (see Glossary) for that year, opposed Archidamus’ appeal for a delay in declaring war in a much shorter speech, which put great emphasis on the need to defend their allies from Athenian aggression but contained no detailed arguments to counter the fears expressed by Archidamus about a long, exhaustive war. The tenor of his whole speech is effectively revealed in his final exhortation:
‘Therefore, Spartans, vote for war and the honour of Sparta! Do not allow the Athenians to become stronger, do not betray our allies, but let us, with the help of the gods, advance to meet the aggressor.’
(Thucydides 1.86.5)
The force of this impassioned, patriotic appeal won the day and the Spartans voted for war. Once again Thucydides, echoing his own words in 1.23, gives his opinion of the ‘truest explanation’ of why the Spartans voted for war:
The Spartans voted that the treaty had been broken and that war should be declared, not so much because they were persuaded by the speeches of their allies as because they were afraid of the further growth of Athenian power, seeing that most of Greece was already subject to them.
(Thucydides 1.88)
The Spartans, having voted for war in their Assembly, then summoned a League Congress for the allies to cast their votes, in accordance with the constitution of the Peloponnesian League (see Chapter 12). The Corinthians had already anticipated this by previously sending representatives to all the other allies, urging them to vote for war, and again gave the last speech in the Congress, in which they attacked the Athenians’ ambitions to bring the whole of Greece under their dominion and held out the vision of themselves as the liberators of Greece (1.120–24). The majority of allied representatives also voted for war (1.125). The intervening time was taken up by the Spartans sending embassies to Athens. The first embassy demanded that the Athenians ‘drive out the curse of the goddess’–a reference to impious behaviour by one of Pericles’ ancestors – which was aimed at weakening Pericles’ popularity (1.126–27); the Athenians replied in kind about the Spartans’ impious treatment of Pausanias (1.128–35). The second embassy demanded the withdrawal of the Athenians from Potidaea, the granting of autonomy to Aegina, and principally the repeal of the Megarian Decree (1.139). Finally the third embassy made no reference to the grounds of complaint but said simply:
‘The Spartans want peace and this is possible, if you will allow independence to the Greeks.’
(Thucydides 1.139.3)
This third embassy was viewed by many Athenians as an ultimatum, but by others as still holding out the prospect of negotiation. In the final Athenian debate after the third embassy, many Athenians spoke as though the points raised in the second embassy were still on the table for discussion. However, Thucydides dismissed their views in a few words and concentrated on Pericles’ speech (1.140–44), which clearly reflected Thucydides’ own analysis of the situation. Pericles expressed his belief that the Megarian Decree was of little importance in its own right but was being used by the Spartans to test Athenian nerve – any compromise over the decree would be seen as fear-induced weakness and would provoke greater demands from the Spartans; and that war was being forced upon the Athenians by the Spartans’ refusal to submit to arbitration, by their demands about Athenian allies, and finally by their ultimatum about giving independence to the Greeks. Pericles proposed that the Athenians should reply point by point to the Spartan demands: first, that the Athenians would repeal the Megarian Decree, if the Spartans would exempt the Athenians and their allies from their occasional expulsion of all foreigners from Sparta; second, as regards giving the Greeks their independence:
‘that we will give independence to the cities, if they had independence at the time of the treaty, and when the Spartans allow their own allies to have independence, which fits in with the allies’ wishes and not with Spartan interests. As regards arbitration, that we are willing to submit to it in accordance with the treaty, and that we will not start a war but we will resist those who do.’
(Thucydides 1.144.2)
Pericles held the opinion that the third Spartan embassy was really demanding the dissolution of the Athenian Empire as the only meaningful condition for avoiding war, and that the Athenians should be fully informed of the real nature of the Spartans’ demands. The Athenians accepted his advice and sent an embassy to Sparta, putting their counter-proposals as Pericles suggested. This was the last formal communication between the two super-powers before the outbreak of war in 431.
Athens and Sparta: the ultimate responsibility
Modern historians, like Thucydides, accept the fact that the Corinthians, whether justifiably or not, played a major role in the events that preceded the outbreak of war and in their exhortation of the allies to
vote for war; however, the ultimate responsibility has to reside with the two superpowers, whose decisions made the war happen, and it is here that modern historical scholarship splits into two camps. One school of thought (e.g. Hornblower, Rhodes) believes that the Athenians should be blamed due to their relentless imperial expansion, their provocative behaviour towards Sparta’s allies and the military weakness of Sparta in the late 430s. The other school of thought (e.g. de Ste. Croix) blames the Spartans due to their aggressive behaviour towards Athens throughout most of the fifth century, which was caused by their fear, resentment and overwhelming desire to crush the Athenians.
Those who blame the Athenians base their belief on the evidence of the increasing size of the Empire and the means by which it was controlled. After the battle of Eurymedon in c.469 the Athenians had concentrated more on bringing their allies under their control (1.99), so that by 446 the Athenians were in possession of an Empire. In addition, the Athenians had interfered with the autonomy of a large number of Greek states to a far greater degree than any other power by its use of garrisons, ‘cleruchies’, ‘phrourarchs’, ‘archontes’ and judicial control (see Chapter 16) – even Pericles and Cleon could agree upon ‘tyranny’ as a description of the nature of Athenian rule. The Thirty Year Peace in 446/5 had been an attempt to put the dual hegemony on a legal basis, ensuring a balance of power in the Greek world between the two super-powers. However, the Athenians were far too restless and ambitious to be constrained by these limits on their territorial possessions – a point stressed by the Corinthians in the Spartan Assembly:
‘Therefore, if someone were to give a brief summary of the Athenians by saying that they were incapable by nature of living a quiet life themselves and incapable of allowing others to do so, he would be speaking the truth.’
(Thucydides 1.70.9)
In the period after the treaty was agreed, the Athenians set about extending their power and adding to their Empire. The west had always been the traditional area of Corinthian influence, but the Athenians set about challenging their position by their foundation of the colony of Thurii in 444/3 (Plutarch, Pericles 11); by their help to the Acarnanians against Ambracia, a Corinthian colony, in the early 430s (2.68.7); by their alliances with Rhegium and Leontini in the 440s, renewed in 433/2; and by their alliance with Corcyra in 433 on the grounds (among others) that it was conveniently situated on the route to Italy and Sicily (1.44.3). In addition, the Athenians were strengthening their power in the Aegean in the 430s. The suppression of Samos, one of the three remaining independent ship-suppliers, and its reduction to phoros-paying subject-ally status showed clearly that the Athenians would accept no challenge to their power. There soon followed, possibly around 437/6, Pericles’ Black Sea expedition (Plutarch, Pericles 20) that resulted in the grain route being secured by the foundation of Athenian colonies and by the display of Athenian military might to the new dynasty in the Bosporan Kingdom; and by the foundation of the strategically important colony of Amphipolis in the Thraceward region.
The second half of the 430s saw the Athenians in a war frame of mind. Callias, almost certainly in 434/3, proposed two financial decrees, which in essence imposed restrictions on public spending, especially on the building programme on the Acropolis, allowed any excess funds to be spent on the walls and the docks, and authorized the removal of treasure from the outlying temples in Attica to the Acropolis for security (ML 58). These measures were clearly taken in anticipation of war: public finance was being directed towards creating a war fund; and fear of a Spartan invasion of Attica necessitated the withdrawal of treasure from the other temples. The war between Corcyra and Corinth was essentially a private affair, and the Athenians could easily have refused to become involved, but Athenian ambitions predominated. The Athenians were also ready and willing to provoke a second clash with the Corinthians by their demands on Potidaea, which had a close relationship with its mother-city and which had done nothing to provoke such harsh treatment. The Megarian Decree may not have broken the letter of the Thirty Year Peace but its crippling effect on the Megarian economy broke its spirit; and their refusal to repeal this decree, even after the Spartans said that war could be avoided by this act, revealed the Athenians’ determination to provoke a war.
The Athenians realized that their unwillingness to check their imperial ambitions would provoke war, and therefore they wished to fight the war in the most favourable circumstances for themselves – when they were in a stronger military position than the Spartans and when they could claim that they were in the right as they were victims of aggression. King Archidamus’ speech (1.80–85) gives an excellent analysis of Athens’ strength and Spartan weakness on the eve of the war:
‘Why should we so readily start a war against these Athenians, whose land is far away and who are also the most experienced in naval matters and are the best equipped in all other ways, in private and public wealth, in ships, in horses, in arms and in a population that is greater than in any other Greek territory, and in addition have many phoros-paying allies? On what are we going to rely by rushing in unprepared? On our ships? But we are inferior in that respect. If we pay attention to them and prepare ourselves, it will take time. On our wealth? But we are even more inferior in that respect since we have neither public funds nor can we easily raise money from private sources.’
(Thucydides 1.80.3–4)
Pericles, the main advocate for the war, recognized the weakness of the Spartan position even more than most of the Spartans and explained it fully to the Athenians in the last Assembly before the war (1.141–43). The offer of arbitration was a cynical ploy, since the Spartans were bound to refuse, and therefore on the basis of the above arguments the Athenians should be blamed for the outbreak of the war.
Those historians, who apportion the greater share of the blame to the Spartans, base their belief on the Spartans’ long-standing fear, their readiness to attack Athens whenever the Athenians were facing a crisis or were in a weak position, and their expectation of a quick victory in 431. Even before the Delian League had been founded, the Spartans, with the encouragement of their allies, had attempted to prevent the Athenians from rebuilding their defensive walls after the retreat of the Persians in 479 – fear of the sudden growth in the size of the Athenian navy and the daring that they showed in the war were the reasons cited by Thucydides (1.89.3–90.2; AE4 p. 10). Diodorus records a debate in Sparta (dated to 475, although 478/7 seems more likely) where the discussion was about the Spartans regaining the hegemony of Greece by force from the Athenians, and a majority was in favour of this until Hetoemaridas persuaded them that it was not in their interest to lay claim to the sea (11.50 – see Chapter 12). In 465, when the two states were still officially allies, the Spartans prepared to invade Attica while the Athenians were involved in a difficult campaign to suppress the revolt of Thasos (1.101.1–2; AE29 p. 21). Soon after this they snubbed the Athenians, who had to come to help them to put down the Helot revolt, by sending them away alone of the allies because:
the Spartans grew frightened at the bold and revolutionary character of the Athenians and also because they thought of them as alien in race.
(Thucydides 1.102.3; AE39 p. 25)
This action revealed the latent hostility of the Spartans to the Athenians and led to the First Peloponnesian War from 462/1 to 446/5.
In 440, the Spartans cynically ignored the terms of the Thirty Year Peace by voting in their Assembly to aid Samos – an Athenian-listed ally and a powerful naval state that offered a serious challenge to Athens’ sea power:
They [i.e. the pro-Athenian democratic faction in 411] also had control of Samos, which was not weak but had come very close to removing the control of the sea from the Athenians when it had waged war against them.
(Thucydides 8.76.4)
In the same way the Spartans had encouraged Potidaea, another Athenian-listed ally, to revolt by promising to invade Attica, if the Athenians took action against them (1.58). They deliberately exaggerated
the importance of the Megarian Decree, whose effect upon the Megarian economy was minimal, in order to have a good excuse for declaring war (1.126). Finally the third embassy, stripped of its grandiose language about the freedom of the Greeks, demanded nothing less than the dissolution of the Athenian Empire, while retaining control over their Peloponnesian allies. The Athenian offers of arbitration and repeal of the Megarian Decree (1.78, 1.144) were ignored because the Spartans preferred to settle their complaints by war. Later, in 414/3, the Spartans were prepared to admit their greater responsibility for causing the outbreak of the war:
In the former war [i.e. the Archidamian War, 431–421] the Spartans felt that they had acted more illegally, because the Thebans had entered Plataea in peace-time, and because, although it was written down in the former treaty [i.e. the Thirty Year Peace] that they should not take up arms if the other side wished to go to arbitration, yet they themselves refused to listen to the Athenian request for arbitration.
(Thucydides 7.18.2)
The Spartans were prepared to ignore arbitration and the terms of the treaty because they felt so confident of a quick and easy victory:
The Spartans for their part found that the war had gone very differently from their expectations, when they thought that they could destroy the power of the Athenians within a few years if they devastated their land.
(Thucydides 5.14.3)
The invasion of 446 and its dramatic success in bringing the First Peloponnesian War to a swift end had convinced the Spartans that a similar strategy would bring about the same result. Their hopes were buoyed up by the opinion of the rest of the Greeks:
At the beginning of the war some thought that, if the Peloponnesians invaded their land, the Athenians might hold out for a year, others for two years or three years, but nobody thought that they could last longer than that.
Aspects of Greek History (750–323BC) Page 47