The many reverses of fortune, which had taken place against their expectation in such a short time, caused great panic, and they feared that another disaster of the kind that happened on the island [i.e. Sphacteria] would come upon them; and through this they became far more lacking in confidence in battle, and they thought that whatever they attempted was bound to be a failure, since their morale had collapsed due to a lack of experiencing misfortune.
(Thucydides 4.55.3–4)
The Athenians failed to capitalize on this situation, and after about seven days they set sail for home, ravaging Epidaurus Limera and Thyrea (both on the east coast of Laconia) on the return journey (4.53–57).
The other target in 424 was Megara. There had been two invasions every year from 431, in accordance with Pericles’ original strategy, but now Demosthenes and Hippocrates were in secret negotiations with the democratic faction to gain control of Megara. These two generals were also involved in the attempt to gain control of Boeotia later in the same year (see above) and their tactics also included liaising with the democratic factions in various Boeotian cities. It is very tempting to see the attacks on Megara and Boeotia as part of the same policy – conquest of the Megarid (as in the First Peloponnesian War) would prevent the Spartan army from invading Attica, and this would isolate the Boeotians from their main ally, making them an easier target for conquest later in the year. The Athenians came close to success but the fortuitous presence of Brasidas saved Megara from capture, although the Athenians did capture and fortify Nisaea, the port of Megara on the Saronic Gulf (4.66–74).
The years 427 to 424 had witnessed a major change in strategy from Pericles’ predominantly defensive policy. New generals, such as Demosthenes and Hippocrates, had appeared on the Athenian political scene and, backed by politicians in Athens, had set about taking the initiative in the war from Sparta and winning the war decisively. It was the failure to capture Megara and the heavy defeat at Delium, soon to be followed by Brasidas’ successes in Thrace, that led to the temporary eclipse of Demosthenes and similar advocates of an aggressive war policy, and the return to Periclean defensive strategy for the remaining years of the ArchidamianWar.
424/3–421
After 425, the Spartans were unable to rely upon invasions of Attica as their main offensive weapon, as the Athenians had threatened to execute their prisoners from Sphacteria, if this happened. The Athenian successes in their attacks upon the Peloponnese and the territory of Sparta demanded a new strategy to ease the pressure, especially as a Helot revolt seemed to be in the offing. Therefore the appeals from cities in the Thraceward region (see Map 5, the Athenian Empire), which were still in revolt from Athens, and others that were secretly asking for help to revolt, and also from King Perdiccas of Macedonia (4.79) gave them an opportunity to throw the Athenians on the defensive and regain the initiative in the war – the Spartans were now embracing the ‘adventurous’ strategy. Brasidas with 700 Helots as hoplites and a force of 1,700 Peloponnesian mercenaries marched through Thessaly into Chalcidice. He soon won over Acanthus and Stagira, and impressed the locals by his revival of the claim that Sparta was fighting the war to free the Greeks (4.78–88). But it was the city of Amphipolis, which held such an important economic and strategic position, that dominated his attention. A sudden attack in the winter of 424/3 brought Amphipolis and the crossing over the river Strymon into Brasidas’ hands, which caused the exile of Thucydides the Historian, the Athenian general operating in that area (4.102–7). The loss of Amphipolis caused great alarm among the Athenians, and they feared that Brasidas’ moderation and his declaration of the liberation of the Greeks would lead to a widespread revolt. Brasidas showed admirable enterprise in calling for more troops to reinforce his campaign and in building triremes on the Strymon; he also won over several cities in Athos and captured Torone (4.102–16).
Brasidas, however, had badly misjudged the war aims of those who had supported the ‘adventurous’ strategy in the Thraceward region:
The Lacedaimonians did not give him any help [i.e. send out another army as requested], partly because of the jealousy of the leading men, and partly because they wanted to get back the men from the island and end the war.
(Thucydides 4.108.7)
The men of influence at Sparta no longer thought in terms of the liberation of Greece. At the time of disaster on Sphacteria, the main offer of the Spartans, when attempting to negotiate peace, was to restore the dual hegemony of Greece (4.17–20). There was no discussion with the Peloponnesian allies, for the Spartans were purely motivated by their own need to regain their men and were prepared to betray everyone in the pursuit of this aim. Thus the aim behind Brasidas’ campaign was that, when the Spartans had a chance to make peace:
they would be able to give back places held by themselves and receive back theirs from Athens, and bring about an end of the war for the Peloponnese.
(Thucydides 4.81.2)
The Spartans knew that the success of Brasidas was causing alarm at Athens and that an offer of a one-year armistice would be well received. In this way the Spartans hoped that the Athenians would get a taste for peace and would be willing to make a longer peace, whose terms would include the return of the 120 Spartiates (4.117). There was no way that Brasidas could ultimately be successful when there was such a major conflict in aims.
It is reasonable to argue that the opponents of Brasidas were correct in their assessment of Sparta’s capabilities. The support of Perdiccas of Macedonia was always suspect, which was confirmed in 423 when he made peace with the Athenians (4.128); the route through Thessaly was precarious – Perdiccas’ influence prevented Spartan reinforcements from getting through Thessaly in 422 (5.12–13); and finally, there was a need for a first-class fleet, which could only be supplied by Persian gold. However, Spartan attempts to tap this source failed in the 420s through their reluctance to pay the Great King’s price, which presumably was the return of the Asiatic Greeks to his dominion – it is hardly surprising that the King’s letters, intercepted by the Athenians, expressed his bewilderment as to what the Spartans really wanted since each embassy said different things (4.50), but the Spartans as the self-proclaimed liberators of Greece could hardly give him a straight answer. This being the case, the Spartans were pleased with the one-year’s armistice; the Athenians were also pleased to accept it, as it would put an end to Brasidas winning over other Athenian allies. Consequently they were very annoyed when Brasidas received Scione and Mende, both of which had revolted around the time of the armistice, as allies (4.120–23).
The armistice had been reasonably successful, but it was allowed to lapse mainly because of the on-going conflict in the Thraceward region. In 422 the Athenians concentrated their efforts on regaining control of this area, and sent out Cleon with an armed force to achieve this (5.2). Mende soon changed sides and Torone was captured (5.2–3). The crucial battle, however, was going to be over Amphipolis (5.7–11). Cleon’s failure to capture this vital city and his death and that of Brasidas provided the impetus to make peace. The Athenians had lost their confidence of the mid-420s due to their defeats at Delium and Amphipolis; they were also worried that the defeat at Amphipolis would lead to a widespread revolt of the subject-allies and the possible collapse of their Empire. The Spartans had desired peace from the time of the disaster at Sphacteria; their hopes of a quick, easy victory by invading Attica had proved to be in vain, and now they were being
Map 6 The Peloponnesian War, 404–423 BC.
Map 7 The long walls of Athens
attacked from Pylos and Cythera; in addition, the Thirty Year Peace with Argos was coming to an end, and the Argives were acting in a bellicose manner (5.14).
The peace process was helped, first, by the deaths of the two men who most favoured the war, Cleon and Brasidas; and second, by the desire of the influential Nicias and King Pleistoanax for peace – the former, on the grounds that he wished to avoid future risk and to bring a relief from troubles f
or Athens, the latter, because peace would make it difficult for his political enemies, who constantly blamed him for Spartan misfortunes in the war (5.16). In 421 the Archidamian War came formally to an end with the signing of the Peace of Nicias, which was to last for 50 years (5.18–19). However, it proved to be a phoney peace or, in the words of Thucydides, ‘the suspicious truce’ (5.26.3 – see Chapter 20).
Bibliography
Brunt, P.A. ‘Spartan policy and strategy in the Archidamian War’, Phoenix 19.
Cartledge, P. Sparta and Lakonia, pt 3, ch. 12.
Cawkwell, G. L. ‘Thucydides’ judgement on Periclean strategy’, YCS 24.
Davies, J. K. Democracy and Classical Greece, 2nd edn, ch. 7.
Holladay, A. J. ‘Athenian strategy in the Archidamian War’, Historia 27.
Hornblower, S. The Greek World 479–323 BC.
Kagan, D. The Archidamian War.
Lewis, D. M. CAH vol. 5, 2nd edn, ch. 9.2.
Westlake, H. D. Essays on Greek Historians and Greek History, ch. 5.
20
SPARTA, THE PELOPONNESE AND THE OUTBREAK OF THE DECELEAN WAR, 421– 413
The Spartans had ‘lost’ the Archidamian War and needed peace in 421 more than the Athenians, especially as they were desperate to get back the ‘hoplites’ captured on Sphacteria in 425 (Thuc. 5.15.1 – all references in this chapter are to Thucydides, unless otherwise stated). In the first place, they had failed in their primary declared aim of liberating the Greeks from Athenian domination (2.8.4). Second, the Spartan reputation for military excellence had plummeted after their defeat at Sphacteria, leading to a drastic diminution of their prestige and authority among their Peloponnesian allies and Greece:
For at this time Sparta had especially fallen into disrepute and was held in contempt on account of its disasters.
(Thucydides 5.28.2)
Third, the cornerstone of their strategy – the annual invasions and laying waste of Attica – neither had forced the Athenians into a decisive pitched battle nor had destroyed their will to resist, even after the devastating consequences of the plague. Fourth, the Spartans had been forced to abandon this key strategy after the capture of 292 hoplites (including 120 Spartiates) on Sphacteria owing to the Athenian threats to execute them if the Spartans invaded Attica. Fifth, damaging raids from Cythera and Pylos were being directed against Spartan territory – see below. Sixth, the ‘Helots’ were deserting, and the Spartans feared that the loyal ones might be tempted to stage another Helot revolt (5.14.3). Finally, their Thirty Year’s Peace with Argos was coming to an end in 421 or 420, and the Argives were determined to exploit Spartan difficulties and replace them as leaders of the Peloponnese (5.28.2) – a distinct possibility, since the Spartans suspected (rightly as events proved) that some of her most important allies were considering switching sides (5.14.4).
The Athenians were also keen to make peace:
The Athenians, being beaten at Delium and soon after at Amphipolis … feared that their allies, encouraged by Athens’ failures, would spread their revolt. (Thucydides 5.14. 1–2)
Nicias led the pro-peace supporters at Athens and, although Thucydides ascribes personal motives to him (5.16.1), there were compelling reasons for him to pursue this policy. As a supporter of Pericles’ war aims, Nicias believed that these had been achieved: the Athenians had ‘won through’ (1.144.1), had avoided defeat, and, by wearing the Spartans down, thus disabused them of the belief that Athens could easily be conquered. Nicias wanted a return to the ‘dual hegemony’, the policy that had underpinned the original Thirty Year Peace of 446/5, the terms of which had probably been initially agreed by Pericles and King Pleistoanax of Sparta. It comes as no surprise that Pleistoanax, having returned to Sparta from exile in c.426/5, was also enthusiastic for peace.
The Peace of Nicias and its immediate aftermath
The Peace of Nicias was finally concluded in about March 421 BC after negotiations throughout the previous winter (5.17). Its main terms, as stated by Thucydides (5.18–23), were as follows:
1. The treaty was to last for fifty years.
2. It was unlawful for either Athens or Sparta and their respective allies to do harm to each other. Any future dispute was to be resolved by law or oath.
3. The Spartans were to give back Amphipolis – vital for its strategic position in Thrace, as well as its control of mining revenues and shipbuilding timber – to the Athenians. Furthermore, the other cities in Spartan possession in Thrace should be neutral, belonging to neither alliance, but must pay ‘phoros’ to the Athenians at the rate fixed by Aristides in 478/7. As regards Scione, Torone and other cities which were still in revolt and contained besieged Peloponnesians and their allies, the Athenians were required to release these men but were free to treat these cities as they wished – for Scione, this was to mean the execution of all men of military age, and the enslavement of the women and children (5.32.1). The Spartans were also to give back Panactum, a fortress on the Athenian border which had been seized by the Boeotians, and the Boeotians’ Athenian captives held in it.
4. The Athenians were to give back cities that they had captured from the Spartans. These included Pylos (Coryphasium to the Spartans), garrisoned by Athenians and by the Messenian ex-Helots from Naupactus, who were using it as a base for guerrilla warfare against Laconia and as a focal point for stirring up rebellion among the Helots (4.41.2–3); and also Cythera, an island close to Laconia which was being used by the Athenians to make frequent raids on the Peloponnese (4.55–56.1).
5. All Spartan and Athenian prisoners, including their allies, who had been captured in war, were to be given back.
6. If any point had been overlooked in connection with this treaty, the Athenians and the Spartans, by mutual agreement, could make alterations to it.
This treaty, even while it was being discussed, had caused great resentment among Sparta’s chief allies. The Boeotians, the Corinthians, the Eleans and the Megarians opposed the terms of the treaty (5.17.2) and (presumably) voted against it. Apart from individual grievances (e.g. the Corinthians were angry that they did not get back Anactorium and Sollium from the Athenians – 5.30.2), they were particularly upset by the last clause of the treaty:
For this clause especially threw the Peloponnese into panic, raising suspicions that the Spartans together with the Athenians were planning to enslave them. It was right, they felt, that any alteration should be made with the consent of all of the allies.
(Thucydides 5.29.3)
The Boeotians, showing their growing strength and influence in Greek affairs, independently made a ten days’ truce (possibly a truce renewable every ten days) with the Athenians (5.32.5). The continued refusal of this important minority of allies to accept this treaty, the refusal by the Argives to renew their former treaty, and the possible defection of their Peloponnesian allies to Argos, induced the Spartans to strengthen their ties with the Athenians by making an individual alliance with them. The Spartan thinking behind this move was that, first, the menace of a resurgent Argos would be neutralized, if it was cut off from a treaty with the Athenians (5.22.2); and second, the disaffected Peloponnesian allies would be fearful of taking action against Sparta, deterred by the prospect of having to face the combined forces of Sparta and Athens. In both instances Sparta had made a serious error of judgement. Nevertheless, a fifty-year defensive alliance was made between the Spartans and the Athenians, in which either side would come to the aid of the other if attacked. Furthermore, the Athenians agreed to send military help in the event of a Helot revolt – a major concession considering Sparta’s treatment of Athens in 462/1 in the previous Helot revolt. Finally, neither city could make an alliance with a different state without the other’s agreement (5.23). This swearing of a defensive alliance produced an immediate and the most major benefit for the Spartans: the return of their hoplites captured at Sphacteria (5.24.2).
This rapprochement between the two states did not la
st long, and, in the opinion of Thucydides, the years between 421 and 413 –‘the suspicious truce’ (5.26.3) – should be seen as part of a 27-year war, i.e. the Peloponnesian War, as it is called by modern historians:
If someone does not think it proper to consider the interval of the treaty as war, he will be making a mistake … he will find that it is not reasonable for it to be judged as a peace, where neither party either gave back or received all that they had agreed. And, apart from this, there were violations on both sides with regard to the Mantinean and Epidaurian wars, as well as in other matters.
(Thucydides 5.26.3)
The main reasons for the failure of the Peace of Nicias were: first, the Spartans’ inability to carry out their obligations to Athens, by returning to Athenian control Amphipolis and a fully equipped Panactum (see below) – this resulted in the Athenians’ refusal to restore Pylos and Cythera; second, the Athenians, distrusting and disillusioned with the Spartans, supported the growing challenge by Sparta’s former allies, centred around Argos, to Sparta’s leadership of the Peloponnese. With regard to the implementation of Peace of Nicias, lots were drawn to decide who should start this process of giving back their gains, and it fell to Sparta to return Amphipolis, the other Thracian cities in revolt and Panactum (5.35). However, the citizens of Amphipolis and the other Thracian cities were determined to stay out of the Athenian Empire, and so, faced with this intransigence, the Spartans simply removed their troops. The Spartans’ failure throughout the summer of 421 to carry out this and the rest of their treaty obligations, apart from returning all Athenian prisoners in their possession, led the Athenians to suspect them of bad faith; consequently, they refused to restore Pylos and regretted returning the prisoners captured on Sphacteria (5.35.4).
Aspects of Greek History (750–323BC) Page 52