but, most of all, the Spartans felt confident because they considered that the Athenians, having two wars – with themselves and the Sicilians, would be more easily overthrown and because they thought that the Athenians had broken the treaty first.
(Thucydides 7.18.2)
Thus the Spartans were full of enthusiasm for the war, using the winter to gather materials for the building of the fort at Decelea and to prepare to send hoplites of their own and of their allies to Sicily (7.18.3–4). At the beginning of spring 413 the Spartans sent 600 hoplites, picked men from the Helots and the freedmen, to Sicily, to whom the Thebans added 300 hoplites. But their main thrust was into Attica, which Agis and the Spartans allies invaded, laid waste and in it began the building of the garrisoned fort at Decelea. It was this action that has led other ancient historians (e.g. Diodorus) to name this war from 413–404 ‘The Decelean War’, although Thucydides explicitly rejected this title, since he considered the period of the ‘suspicious peace’ (421–413) as part of the Peloponnesian War. However, for the rest of this book, I shall refer to this period of warfare from 413–404 by its more common title ‘The Ionian War’. It is a measure of Athenian courage or foolhardiness that, at the same time as the building of the garrisoned fort at Decelea, they still chose to send the large relief force under Demosthenes to Syracuse (7.20.1).
The total and utter destruction of the Athenian forces in Sicily in the autumn of 413 sent shock waves around the whole Greek world. Yet, just as the power of the Spartans could be destroyed only by an invasion of the Peloponnese and the breaking up the Peloponnesian League and liberation of the Helots (as was to happen in 370/69), so the Empire of the Athenians could be destroyed only by defeating their fleet in the eastern Aegean or the Hellespont and thus liberating their subject-allies there – hence the post-413 theatre of war was concentrated on naval operations in Ionia. However, the occupation of Decelea played a vital if (secondary) role in weakening the Athenian war effort. King Agis had been placed in command, and his constant excursions from Decelea meant that no part of Attica was secure or productive. All the sheep and cattle were killed, and more than 20,000 slaves – including many of the most valuable artisan slaves – escaped to Decelea. As a result there was a great loss of income both for the landowners and for the slave-owners in Athens. These financial problems were further exacerbated by the increased cost and difficulty of imports of provisions and cattle from Euboea. Previously such imports from Euboea had come quickly and cheaply by land but now that route was blocked off by the garrison at Decelea, necessitating the longer and more costly route by sea around Cape Sunium. In fact, these ongoing costs, combined with the massive financial loss of the Sicilian expedition, had crippled the Athenian economy (7.28.4). Furthermore, and a matter of vital importance, the Athenians now depended upon everything being imported by sea – consequently, if their navy were to be destroyed, they would face starvation and total defeat (as was to happen in 404). In addition, there were far more heavy demands on the military, compared to the previous short invasions in the Archidamian War – the Athenian soldiers were now forced to maintain guard duty in Athens, the Piraeus and along the Long Walls both day and night, turning the city of Athens into a garrisoned fort (7.27.4–28.2). Thucydides’ summary of the effect of the constant occupation of Decelea is revealing:
For when Decelea was fortified in this summer, first by the whole army, then by garrisons from the other cities. … it did great damage to the Athenians and, by its devastation of property and by its destruction of men, it was one of the chief causes of the decline in Athenian power.
(Thucydides 7.27.3)
However, the Spartans still had to win the war, but their tardiness and Athenian resilience allowed the Athenians to recover partially and to carry on the war until 404. Three years later in 410 it was still the same Agis, looking out from the walls of Decelea and seeing the countless grain ships sailing into the Piraeus, who complained bitterly that his success at Decelea was pointless unless the Spartans seized the sources of the grain (Xenophon, Hellenica 1.135). It took Persian gold to make that a reality.
Bibliography for second edition
Cartledge, P. Sparta and Lakonia: A Regional History, 1300–362 BC, 2nd edn ch. 12.
Hornblower, S. The Greek World 479–323 BC, ch. 13.
Kagan, D. The Archidamian War, ch. 10 and Conclusion.
Powell, A. Athens and Sparta, ch. 5.
Sealey, R. A History of the Greek City States 700–338 BC, chs 12–13.
21
ATHENS AND THE WEST, 458– 413
The aims of Athenian policy in Sicily and southern Italy developed gradually over this period of time, and it would be wrong to consider the main objective of the 415 expedition (as stated by Thucydides in 6.6.1 – see below) as being the Athenians’ ultimate aim from the beginning of their involvement in the west. As the situation in Greece changed from the 440s to 416, so did the desires and expectations of the Athenians, and it is convenient to chart the changes in policy aims and the reasons for them by dividing the events of this time into three chronological periods.
458/7–428
During this time the alliances that were made between the Athenians and the states in the west were almost certainly diplomatic and not military. The Athenians had to tread warily in the west in order to avoid antagonizing and provoking Syracuse – a powerful naval state and a Corinthian colony. If Athenian imperialist ambitions became too obvious, there was every chance that the Syracusans would provide military aid to the Peloponnesians, and this naval aid would provide a serious threat to Athens’ naval supremacy in Greece. Therefore it is likely that the initiative for these alliances came from the states themselves, which had more to gain (so they hoped) from such an alliance by securing the support of a powerful empire against the growing ambitions of Syracuse. The Athenians, for their part, would be unlikely as an imperial power to refuse an invitation to extend their influence and gain a foothold in the west, which could prove useful at some time in the future.
The first recorded alliance was thought to have been made in the 450s with non-Greek Segesta (or Egesta) in the west of Sicily. The evidence for this comes from an inscription (ML 37), and has been dated either to 458/7 if ‘[Habr]on’ or 454/3 if ‘[Arist]on’ is restored as the name of the ‘archon’ at the time of the treaty. However, the recent use of laser photography on this inscription suggests that the damaged archon’s name could be Antiphon, archon in 418/7. This later date is more convincing, since the Athenians were very keen from 427 onwards to extend their influence (and even to conquer) Sicily – it was Segesta (or Egesta) that appealed for help to Athens in 416, when being hard-pressed by Syrace (see below). At some time in the 440s, possibly after 445, alliances were also made with Leontini, a close neighbour of Syracuse, and Rhegium in southern Italy. The evidence for these comes from inscriptions which record the renewal of these alliances in 433/2 (ML 63 and 64). Such alliances would usually be of at least ten years’ duration, and a date soon after 445 is a distinct possibility as Syracuse’s defeat of Acragas in that year had established its position as the strongest state in the west. Fear of Syracuse’s territorial ambitions would explain Leontini’s and Rhegium’s approach to Athens for protection. However, the Athenians’ defeat in the First Peloponnesian War (462/1–446/5) and the loss of their ‘Land Empire’ would be sufficient reasons to avoid any military commitments, and a diplomatic alliance was the most likely outcome at this time.
The Athenians’ involvement in the foundation of the colony of Thurii was also motivated by the desire to extend their prestige and influence in the west. After many years the exiled citizens of Sybaris in southern Italy had attempted to re-found their city but, after five years, they were driven out again by the people of Croton. They appealed to Athens and Sparta to provide help, which the Spartans refused but which was forthcoming from the Athenians. Diodorus, whose account of these events is very muddled, places the appeal for help and the despatch of Athenia
ns to co-habit with the Sybarites in 446/5 (12.9–11). However, there was a clash between these Athenian settlers and the Sybarites, who were driven out. Pericles then decided, in 444/3, to found, on the former site of Sybaris, the new colony of Thurii which would be open to all Greeks under the leadership of the Athenians (Plutarch, Pericles 11). The Athenians saw the propaganda benefits that would arise from founding a pan-Hellenic colony so soon after the First Peloponnesian War. Such a generous gesture could only bring credit to the Athenians by highlighting their desire for peaceful coexistence with their fellow Greeks, both in mainland Greece and in the west; in reality, the Athenians could not have afforded such a drain on manpower to found an all-Athenian colony after the establishment of so many ‘cleruchies’ and colonies in the early 440s. This policy of extending Athenian influence through diplomatic manoeuvres was maintained throughout this period until 427 when Pericles’ defensive strategy for the conduct of the Peloponnesian War was challenged by other politicians, who first raised the possibility of the conquest of Sicily.
427–424
In 427 Syracuse was at war with Leontini with the full support of allies on both sides. Leontini, being blockaded by land and by sea, was in grave danger of being captured, and so their allies appealed to the Athenians in accordance with their treaty (renewed in 433/2 – see above) to send a fleet:
The Athenians sent the ships on the pretext of their kinship, but they wanted to prevent corn being imported from there into the Peloponnese and to make a preliminary survey if they could bring Sicily under their control.
(Thucydides 3.86.4)
This was a new and significant development in Athenian policy towards the west, as it marks the first known military intervention in Sicilian affairs. The fact that the Athenians decided to send 20 ships is surprising, since they were still recovering from the effects of the plague (which was to break out again just after these ships had set sail) and state funds were low after the expense of crushing the revolt of Mytilene; but a majority of Athenians were still in favour of limited intervention in Sicily. The official motive was the shared Ionian kinship between Athens and Leontini, but in reality there was a split in the underlying aims for the expedition.
Until 427, the supporters of Pericles’ defensive strategy for fighting the war had held sway in the Assembly, but in 427 this strategy was challenged by others who wished to pursue a more adventurous, offensive strategy in order to win the war decisively and not simply ‘to win through’ (see Chapter 19). The campaigns in Greece between 427 and 424 reflect the shifting influence of these conflicting strategies, but in Sicily there was a dangerous compromise resulting in a lack of coherence and of agreement in the aims for the campaign, which was to prove especially disastrous in the 415 expedition. The first real aim was defensive and reflects the view of those who were staying true to Pericles’ strategy: the Peloponnesians were not self-sufficient in grain production, and disruption of import supplies could cause shortages and lead to widespread dissatisfaction with Sparta and possible defections; more importantly, if the Syracusans were to gain control of the main producers of grain, the Peloponnesians could rely more on increased imports, and this would lead to longer and more damaging invasions of Attica. Therefore, if the Syracusans were prevented in their attempt to conquer Sicily, the Peloponnesians would still be dependent on their own harvests, and the result would be the usual shorter invasions with which the Athenians could cope. For this reason the supporters of Periclean strategy would support the despatch of military aid to their allies in the west. The second real aim to explore the feasibility of future conquest was offensive and reflects the views of those who were seeking new and dynamic policies to end the military stalemate in the war in Greece. At this stage, as only 20 ships were sent, it would appear that the supporters of a defensive strategy were the more influential.
Thucydides’ account of the events in Sicily is short and disjointed, and seems to reflect his opinion that this theatre of war was relatively unimportant in the Archidamian War. In 426/5 the Sicilian allies asked the Athenians to send out more ships in support:
The Athenians manned 40 ships in order to send them there, thinking that the war in Sicily would be brought to an end more quickly and also wanting to provide practice for the fleet.
(Thucydides 3.115.4)
The number of Athenian ships committed was almost as many (a few had been destroyed earlier) as they originally agreed to send in 416. Once again the first motive reflects a split in aims: supporters of Periclean strategy wished to end Athenian commitment in Sicily as soon as possible because it removed vital military resources from the war in Greece, and thus they wanted to pressurize Syracuse into peace and bring about a withdrawal of Athenian forces; their opponents believed that such a large, superior fleet would bring the war to an end by the conquest of Syracuse and its allies. The second motive refers to the lack of trained oarsmen due to the ravages of the plague and the need for them to acquire experience in battle conditions.
Pythodorus was sent at once with a few ships, but Sophocles and Eurymedon did not arrive until the summer of 425 with the bulk of the fleet, having been involved in the events of Pylos and Corcyra. They seem to have made little impact in Sicily since Thucydides sums up their contribution in one sentence –‘they carried on the war with their allies there’ (Thuc. 4.48.6 – all subsequent references in this chapter are to Thucydides, unless otherwise stated). In 424, the Congress of Gela was held in which Hermocrates the Syracusan persuaded the warring Sicilian Greek states to make peace in order to remove the presence of the Athenians, which was a menace to all Sicilians (4.58–65); however, the Athenian allies made sure that the Athenians were included in the peace settlement. The generals returned home, pleased that the aim of bringing the war to an end had been achieved and that there was now no need to worry about longer invasions due to corn imports from Sicily, since the capture of the Spartiates on Sphacteria in 425 had ended the invasions of Attica. Unfortunately for the generals, the mood of the Athenians had swung decisively in favour of conquest as the desired means to end the war in Sicily – Eurymedon was fined, and Sophocles and Pythodorus were exiled (4.65). The Athenians’ probable alliance with Segesta (or Egesta) in 418/7 (see above) was a clear sign that Sicily was still in their sights. If an opportunity were to present itself in the future, conquest would be the only satisfactory outcome for the majority of Athenians.
416–413
The peace that was negotiated at the Congress of Gela did not last long, and as early as 422 Leontini had been dismantled by the Syracusans (5.4.2). In 416 Segesta was being hard pressed by Selinus and Syracuse by land and by sea, and called upon the Athenians to come to their aid by sending a fleet (6.6). This was the opportunity that so many Athenians had been waiting for:
The Athenians were eager to make an expedition, wanting as the truest reason to conquer the whole of Sicily, but at the same time wishing to have the pretext of bringing help to their kinsmen and their other allies.
(Thucydides 6.6.1)
This desire to conquer Sicily was made even more attractive by the Segestaeans’ claim that they could pay for the expedition. An Athenian delegation was sent out in 416 to check this claim, and returned in the spring of 415 with 60 talents and reports of great affluence in Segesta (6.8); these reports, however, proved to be false as the Segestaeans had cleverly conned the delegation (6.46).
The Athenians held an Assembly and, having heard the report of their delegation and the comments of the Segestaeans:
voted to send sixty ships to Sicily with Alcibiades son of Cleinias, Nicias son of Niceratus, and Lamachus son of Xenophanes as generals with full powers, to help the Segestaeans against the Selinuntines; also to restore Leontini, if they had success in the war; and to settle the other matters in Sicily in whatever way that they thought was best for Athens.
(Thucydides 6.8.2)
It is interesting that the Athenians were so circumspect in their third stated objecti
ve, which was to encompass the defeat of Syracuse and the conquest of Sicily. It is possible that they hoped to conquer Syracuse by conspiring with its pro-Athenian faction, and therefore did not wish to make this aim explicit.
Five days later the Athenians held another Assembly to discuss the quickest way of getting the expedition under way (6.8). Nicias had not wanted to be appointed to the command and felt that the Athenians were making a dreadful mistake, presumably because this expedition would put the city at risk and thus clashed with Pericles’ strategy of not adding to the Empire in the time of war – so jaundiced was he with the phoney peace of 421 that bore his name. His first speech stressed the dangers that confronted the Athenians: Sparta, Corinth, Boeotia and others were still hostile and would seize any opportunity to wage war; their own allies in the Thraceward region were still in revolt and it made more sense to secure the present Empire before seeking another; Sicily, even if it was conquered, would be impossible to control; and, finally, there was the ambition of Alcibiades whose enthusiastic support for the expedition was motivated by his desire to advance his own career (6.9–14). Alcibiades responded with a bravura defence of his own character and behaviour, and then stressed that Sicilian disunity would facilitate conquest; that their enemies in Greece were demoralized and offered no threat; and, finally, the overwhelming superiority of the Athenian fleet would guarantee the security of the naval expedition (6.16–18). Alcibiades’ speech was received enthusiastically by the vast majority of the Athenians, and they became even more eager for the campaign. Nicias then tried a different approach to dampen their zeal by providing an exaggerated estimate of the forces needed to undertake the expedition safely (6.20–23). However, his hopes that the Athenians would be put off by the scale of armaments and the cost produced the opposite effect: the Athenians were now totally convinced that such a huge force would make victory a foregone conclusion. As a result, the Athenians and their allies eventually set sail with 134 ‘triremes’, 5,100 ‘hoplites’ and more than 1,000 light-armed troops (6.43).
Aspects of Greek History (750–323BC) Page 54