Although Thucydides has little to say about Greek–Persian affairs before 412, it is clear that the Spartans were still sending embassies to the King of Persia, Artaxerxes. In 425 the Persian Artaphernes was intercepted by the Athenians at Eion on his way to Sparta. The King’s translated message made interesting reading:
many other points were mentioned but the chief point, with regard to the Spartans, was that he did not know what they wanted. Although many ambassadors had come to him, none were saying the same things. If they wished to make a definite proposal, they should send men to him with Artaphernes.
(Thucydides 4.50.2)
Here was the root of the problem for Sparta. They knew that the King’s price for giving military aid to Sparta would be, at the very least, the return of the Asiatic Greeks to Persian domination, and there was no way that they could agree to this without destroying their credibility as the self-proclaimed liberators of Greece – hence the Spartans’ evasiveness in their dealings with the King. The disaster at Pylos and the fear of a ‘Helot’ revolt probably put paid to any Spartan plans of winning Persian support, as their whole attention from 425 was fixed on regaining the captured Spartiates from Athens and taking precautions against the Helots.
It was the Athenians, possibly worried by the King’s message to the Spartans seeking to establish some concrete grounds for an alliance, who set about improving relations with Persia. Artaphernes was sent back to the King with some Athenian ambassadors, but when they reached Ephesus and learned of Artaxerxes’ death, the Athenians returned home (4.50.3). Thucydides mentions no other negotiations, but the combination of a speech in 391 by Andocides (3.29), in which he mentions the presence of his uncle Epilycus at the negotiations that brought about a treaty and a friendship forever with Persia, and of a fourth-century copy of a fifth-century decree, honouring a certain Heraclides of Clazomenae for his help in negotiating a treaty with the King of Persia (ML 70), suggests that a treaty was signed in 424/3. This whole issue is fraught with problems, but the balance of scholarly opinion does incline towards acceptance of its authenticity and its date.
There are also convincing political reasons for this rapprochement between Athens and Persia. The Athenians’ confidence of 425/4 had taken a blow with the defeat at Delium in 424 and with Brasidas’ capture of Amphipolis and his success at stirring up revolt amongst their allies in the Thraceward region (see Chapter 19). If Brasidas were to gain Persian military support, he could strike at the Hellespont, Athens’ lifeline in respect of the transportation of grain from the Black Sea to the Piraeus – hence the desperate need for peaceful relations with Persia. The new Persian king, Darius II (also known as Darius the Bastard) had pressing reasons for signing the treaty. Artaxerxes I had fathered one legitimate son from a Persian mother, Xerxes, but also seventeen bastard sons from concubines. The murder of Xerxes, after only 45 days as king, by one of Artaxerxes’ illegitimate sons led to a power struggle. At some time in 424/3 Darius II became King of Persia, but his position was tenuous; there were the potential claims of the other bastard sons and of others of pure Persian stock, linked by blood to the royal family. In fact, Darius II’s brother soon led a rebellion against him (Ctesias 50) which was followed by several others, including the revolt of Pissouthnes, the satrap in south-western Asia Minor and a grandson of Darius I, at some time between 423 and 415. The last thing that the new king wanted was to alienate the Athenians and drive them into the arms of one of his rivals. Therefore the treaty of 424/3 was of great benefit to both sides. It was, in essence, probably a renewal of the terms of the 449 Peace of Callias, but included the stronger statement of eternal friendship due to the current military difficulties of both sides. The Athenians’ betrayal of this eternal friendship by supporting the revolt of Amorges, Pissouthnes’ son, in 414 proved to be a fatal error of judgement.
Persia and the Greeks, 413–404
The news of the Athenian disaster in Sicily became common knowledge in Greece in the autumn of 413 and this led to a readiness among Athens’ allies to revolt (8.2). This news also inspired the Spartans to throw themselves more wholeheartedly into defeating the Athenians by sea (8.2), and they commissioned the construction of 100 ‘triremes’, built by themselves and their allies, to be ready for action in 412 (8.3). During the winter of 413/2 appeals for Spartan help came from Euboea, Lesbos, Erythrae and Chios to aid their proposed revolts from Athens.
Far more important for the eventual outcome of the war were the approaches to the Spartans by the two satraps of Persia’s westernmost provinces in Asia Minor – Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus (8.5–6). Tissaphernes was the satrap of south-west Asia Minor, roughly covering the area of Lydia, with its capital at Sardis. He had gained the province from a grateful Darius II by capturing Pissouthnes, the former satrap, who had revolted from the King of Persia at some time between 423 and 415; however, he still had to contend with Amorges, Pissouthnes’ son and ally of the Athenians, who had either continued or renewed the revolt after his father’s capture and execution. Pharnabazus was the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia in north-west Asia Minor with its capital at Dascylium. Their involvement in Greek affairs was due to the orders of the King of Persia, who also saw his chance to exploit the Athenian disaster in Sicily:
For it happened that Tissaphernes had been recently ordered to exact the tribute from his own province, which he owed because he was unable to collect it on account of the Athenians. He therefore thought that he would more easily collect the tribute by weakening the Athenians; and at the same time thought that he would make the Spartans allies of the King and thus, in accordance with the King’s orders, either capture alive or kill Amorges, the bastard son of Pissouthnes, who was in revolt in Caria.
(Thucydides 8.5.5)
Pharnabazus was also under the King’s orders to collect the outstanding tribute from the Asiatic Greeks, who had been paying phoros to the Athenians from 478, and wished to make use of the Spartans for this very purpose. It is clear that the Persians had never genuinely accepted Athens’ right to collect tribute and had never given up hope of bringing these cities back under Persian control. The Spartans, therefore, had to choose their area of campaigning: either cooperation with Pharnabazus in Lesbos and the Hellespont, or with Tissaphernes in Chios and the southern coast of Asia Minor. In the event the Spartans, persuaded by Alcibiades’ advice through the ‘Ephor’ Endius, made the wrong decision to work with Tissaphernes, relying upon his promise to maintain the Peloponnesian armed forces (8.6.2).
In the summer of 412 the Spartans at last galvanized themselves into action, although they soon became discouraged by the defeat of their Chios-bound fleet, at the hands of the Athenians (8.10). However, the arrival of the Spartan Chalcideus and Alcibiades with five ships, and the promise of more to come, persuaded Chios to revolt (8.14). This revolt of Athens’ most powerful ally, still autonomous and the sole supplier of ships, had a profound effect upon the Athenians, who feared that Chios would be the rallying-point for all the disaffected subject-allies that wished to revolt. Therefore they voted to use the reserve of 1,000 talents, which Pericles had put aside for emergencies, to strengthen their fleet and to set about the recovery of Chios (8.15). The military campaigns of the next twelve months (summer 412 to summer 411) appear very disjointed, due partly to the unfinished revision of Book 8 by Thucydides, and partly to the piecemeal nature of the fighting. In essence, the Spartans were attempting to widen the revolt of Athens’ subject-allies, and the Athenians to contain it, which resulted in both sides sending out increasingly larger fleets. Erythrae, Clazomenae, Teos, Miletus, Lebedos, Erae, Methymna and Mytilene revolted from Athens in 412 (8.14–23), although the Athenian forces, based at Samos, soon recovered Mytilene and Clazomenae.
The major reason for Sparta’s inability to deliver the decisive blow to the Athenians was the duplicity of Tissaphernes over pay for the Spartan fleet. After the revolt of Miletus, the first treaty was agreed between the Spartans and their allies on one side and the King and T
issaphernes on the other (8.18).
The opening clause is remarkable in what is conceded to the Persians: Whatever territory and cities the King holds and the King’s ancestors held, these are to belong to the King.
(Thucydides 8.18.1)
This, in effect, gave the Persian king control over not only Asia Minor but also Thessaly and Boeotia, which had medized in the Persian War of 480– 479. The treaty also laid down that the Athenians should be prevented from collecting phoros from their cities; that the war should be waged jointly by the Spartans and the Persians, and that the consent of both allies was required in order to make peace with the Athenians. The Persians were clearly the main beneficiaries of this treaty, since, in theory, it recognized their claim over the Asiatic Greeks and beyond, and did not formally commit them to pay the Spartans. Soon after this, with the help of the Peloponnesians, Tissaphernes captured Amorges at his base in Iasos and ended the revolt, which had plagued the King and which Tissaphernes had been specifically ordered to suppress (8.28); then he caused Cnidus to revolt and installed a Persian garrison (8.31). Owing to Spartan dissatisfaction, a second treaty was soon negotiated, which was similar to the first except that the King agreed to pay the expenses of all troops in his territory at his request, and the Spartans agreed not to replace the Athenians as the collectors of tribute (8.36–37).
It was in the winter of 412/1 that Tissaphernes began his policy of weakening the Spartans by using his most effective weapon – money. Thucydides mentions Tissaphernes’ reduction of Peloponnesian pay on two occasions: first, soon after the capture of Amorges, when he paid a month’s payment at the rate of six obols per day per man, but proposed for the future to pay only three obols unless the King should decide otherwise (8.29); second, through the alleged influence of Alcibiades, when he decided to pay only three obols per day per man, and that irregularly (8.45). It is not clear whether these are two separate occasions, or whether both passages refer to the one and same pay reduction; either way it caused damage to the Spartans. According to Thucydides (8.45–47), Alcibiades, who had come under suspicion at Sparta and had consequently sought refuge with Tissaphernes, masterminded this policy of pay reduction. He allegedly pointed out the danger to the Persians of giving their full support to the Spartans to ensure the victory, since they, after the defeat of the Athenians, were bound to use their land and naval forces to liberate the Greeks from the Persians. He argued that the Athenians would make better allies as they would be more willing to concede sovereignty over the Asiatic Greeks to the King; and therefore it would be far better to let both sides wear themselves down and, when the Athenians were sufficiently weakened, to get rid of the Spartans completely.
As a result of Alcibiades’ advice:
Tissaphernes gave poor support to the Peloponnesians and did not allow them to fight a sea-battle, but kept saying that the Phoenician fleet would come and that they could then fight with greater superiority. Thus he damaged their cause and severely weakened the efficiency of the fleet which had been very great; and in general he made it very clear that he was not eager to wage war.
(Thucydides 8.46.5)
The accuracy of Alcibiades’ assessment of the Spartans’ ultimate objectives in Asia Minor was soon confirmed to Tissaphernes at his meeting in Cnidus with the eleven Spartan commissioners, who had been sent out to organize the conduct of the war. Lichas, one of the commissioners, repudiated the two previous treaties on the grounds that acceptance of the King’s territorial claims would result in Sparta offering the Greeks, including the mainland as far as Boeotia, not liberation but Persian domination (8.43). His demand for a new treaty was met by the angry walkout of Tissaphernes. Soon after this, the three cities of prosperous Rhodes revolted and joined the Spartans, thereby raising their hopes of being able to fund the war themselves without needing Tissaphernes’ money (8.44).
Alcibiades’ advice to Tissaphernes was designed not only to injure the Spartans, who had ordered his execution, but also to engineer his own recall to Athens. He was convinced that the democracy would never pardon him, and consequently that the establishment of an oligarchy was the essential pre-condition for his return to Athens. Therefore he started to negotiate with the officer class of the Athenian fleet at Samos, promising the friendship and support of Tissaphernes in return for the overthrow of the democracy (8.47). This proposal was welcomed enthusiastically by the Athenian upper class at Samos and in Athens who were bearing the economic brunt of the democracy’s military mistakes, and accepted grudgingly by the sailors at Samos who were at least pleased at the thought of Persian pay (8.48). Phrynichus, who distrusted Alcibiades and refused to believe that the Persians would desert the Spartans in favour of the Athenians, and Peisander, two generals with the fleet at Samos, then began their machinations in early 411 to overthrow the democracy and establish an oligarchy (see Chapter 23). The Athenian Assembly (in a specially convened meeting at Colonus outside the walls) reluctantly agreed to a change in the constitution and the recall of Alcibiades, as they felt that the survival of Athens was at stake (8.53–54). Peisander was sent out to negotiate with Alcibiades and Tissaphernes (see Chapter 23 for fuller discussion).
Tissaphernes, however, had little intention of making an alliance with the Athenians, the King’s long-standing enemy, especially as he wished to maintain the policy of wearing down both sides and also because he was afraid of alienating the Spartans, based so close to his satrapy. Alcibiades, realizing this and not wishing to lose face in front of the Athenian envoys, deliberately engineered an Athenian walkout. He therefore proposed increasingly exorbitant demands in return for a treaty: at first, the handing over of the whole of Ionia; and when this was accepted, then the islands off the coast; and, when there were still no objections, finally the right of the King to sail anywhere along his coast with as large a fleet as he wished. This proved to be the breaking point as it would give control of the Aegean to the Persians and expose Greece to another invasion. The Athenians walked out (8.56). Tissaphernes then returned to the Spartans, gave them pay and negotiated a third treaty, almost certainly formulated by the King himself. The King’s dominion was now limited to Asia Minor to overcome Lichas’ earlier objections; Tissaphernes would pay the Peloponnesian forces only until the King’s fleet should arrive, after which the Peloponnesians must pay for their own ships or receive a loan from Tissaphernes (8.58).
This treaty also included, for the first time, the agreement of Pharnabazus, the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, and it is hardly a coincidence that the Spartans sent out a force under Dercylidas around April 411 to cooperate with Pharnabazus. As a result, Abydus and Lampsacus on the Hellespont revolted from Athens, although Lampsacus was soon retaken (8.61–62). By mid-summer the Peloponnesians were again disaffected with Tissaphernes owing to the irregularity of pay. The offer of Pharnabazus to pay for a fleet in the Hellespont and the appeal of Byzantium for help to revolt encouraged them to send a force there under Clearchus. A storm prevented most of the 40 ships from reaching the Hellespont, but the 10 ships that did arrive brought about the revolt of Byzantium (8.80). The recall of Alcibiades by the Athenians at Samos led to the belief that Tissaphernes was now in collaboration with the Athenians, and this, combined with the dissatisfaction over their lack of pay from him, provoked great anger amongst the Peloponnesians and especially among the Syracusan allies (8.83–84). Therefore, when Mindarus took over the command of the Spartans and their allies in mid-summer, mindful of the duplicity of Tissaphernes and the anger among his forces, he decided to respond to Pharnabazus’ appeals and to move the main theatre of war to the Hellespont. He set out with the main fleet and reached the Hellespont where he joined up with 16 ships that had previously been sent there (8.101).
In late September or October 411 there took place the first major naval battle of the Ionian War. Mindarus with 86 ships attacked Thrasyllus and Thrasybulus, the Athenian generals, and their 76 ships at Cynossema, opposite Abydus in the Hellespont. The result was a victory for th
e Athenians, which did much to boost their morale after their sufferings under the rule of the Four Hundred (see Chapter 23) and the revolt of Euboea (8.104–6). Even more encouraging was the withdrawal of the Peloponnesian fleet of 50 ships from Euboea, which was still in revolt, to reinforce Mindarus’ forces at the Hellespont; this same fleet was almost destroyed in a great storm as it passed the headland of Mount Athos. Four days after the battle, the Athenians crushed the revolt of Cyzicus in the Propontis (8.107).
It is at this point that the excellent history of Thucydides is broken off, and the Hellenica of Xenophon and the History of Diodorus become the main sources (referred to as ‘Xen.’ and ‘D.S.’, respectively, in this chapter) for the remaining part of the war. Although there have been modern attempts to redeem the reputation of Xenophon, the omissions, the bias and the inability to analyse deeply rightly draw unfavourable comparisons with the quality of Thucydides’ work, whose detailed and analytical account of historical events has been so helpful to modern scholarship. Diodorus’ history must always be used with great caution, particularly when he uses as his source Ephorus, a fourth-century historian, who was not highly rated in the ancient world. However, the discovery in 1908 of fragments of the reliable and solid ‘Oxyrhynchus Historian’ reveal him to be the ultimate source for Ephorus in this period; thus Diodorus’ narrative to the end of the war can be considered more trustworthy than usual, while Xenophon’s merits as a reliable narrative historian have been devalued even more by the discovery.
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