The major difference between the Peace of 375/4 and 386 was that it was signed by two groups of allies, led by Sparta and Athens; for the Spartans were now prepared to accept the Athenians’ hegemony over their new naval league in the Aegean as the price to be paid for their cooperation against Boeotia (Nepos. Timotheos 2.3). However, there was no way that Thebes was going to accept another dissolution of the Boeotian League, and it is a sign of both Spartan and Athenian weakness and of Boeotian strength that no military action was taken when ‘the Thebans’ presumably agreed to the Peace on behalf of ‘the Boeotians’.
The rapprochement of Sparta and Athens was the best hope of containing Boeotia, but a clash over Zacynthos and Corcyra in 373 led to renewed fighting between the two states, thus foolishly playing into the hands of the Boeotians. From 373–371 the Thebans strengthened their grip in Boeotia by crushing Plataea and Thespiae, two of their three pro-Spartan rivals, and in 371 were campaigning again against Phocis, an ally of Athens and Sparta (6.3.1, 3.5). This brought both states to their senses, and when Artaxerxes requested (possibly again prompted by the Spartans) a second renewal of the King’s Peace, because the commander of his forces against Egypt had also revolted (Diodorus 15.50.4), the proposed Peace of 371 was seen as a means to curb Boeotia. King Cleombrotus was again sent with a large force to Phocis, ready to invade Boeotia, if the Thebans refused to attend the peace conference or to accept the terms of the Peace. The peace negotiations were held in Sparta, and both Sparta and Athens stressed the need for the reinforcement of the autonomy clause in the 386 King’s Peace, but tacitly accepting that this clause would not be applicable to Sparta’s Peloponnesian League nor Athens’ Second Athenian League. But it would be applicable to Thebes and the Boeotian League; and a new clause, which gave states the right to refuse to fight against violators of the autonomy principle, would allow the Athenians to avoid military involvement while Sparta and Thebes fought it out, when the Thebans predictably refused to dissolve the Boeotian League (6.3.18).
The stage was thus set for confrontation between Sparta and Boeotia. The Spartans took the oath to accept the Peace of 371 on behalf of themselves and their allies, and the Athenians and their allies swore individually. At first the Thebans acquiesced and signed on their own behalf, according to Xenophon (6.3.19), but on the next day they demanded that ‘the Thebans’ should be replaced by ‘the Boeotians’; in other words, the Thebans were claiming the right to sign on behalf of the Boeotian League. There was a clash between Agesilaos and the leading Theban Epaminondas:
Agesilaos asked if it was just and equal for the cities of Boeotia to be autonomous. Epaminondas instantly and boldly asked Agesilaos in return if he thought it was just and equal for the cities of Laconia to be autonomous. Agesilaos jumped up from his seat and insisted that Epaminondas say plainly if he would grant autonomy to Boeotia; but Epaminondas only answered again in the same way, by asking Agesilaos if he would grant Laconia its autonomy.
(Plutarch, Agesilaos 28)
Epaminondas’ refusal to accept the Spartan definition of autonomy pleased Agesilaos, as he could exclude them from the Peace and declare war.
King Cleombrotus was ordered to invade Boeotia from Phocis, but at the battle of Leuctra in 371, the Spartans suffered a terrible defeat:
The victory of the Thebans was the most famous of all those won by Greeks over Greeks.
(Pausanias 9.13.11)
Four hundred Spartiates, including Cleombrotus, were killed at Leuctra – about a third of the Spartan citizen body. Although neither side knew it at the time, this battle was one of the turning points in Greek history: the Spartans, who had been so dominant in Greek politics for two and a half centuries, were about to be reduced to the status of a second-rate power. The Boeotians, under the leadership of Epaminondas and Pelopidas, were now on the threshold of becoming the most powerful state in Greece. This fact was recognized by the Athenians, who later in 371 organized a third renewal of the King’s Peace; but the clause about coming to the aid of a threatened ally, previously voluntary, now became compulsory (6.5.1–2). The Thebans, by their exclusion from the Peace, were marked out as the enemy, for the Athenians, now so fearful of Theban power, were attempting to establish a balance of power with the Spartans, and this Peace was a prelude to a full military alliance between Athens and Sparta, sworn in 369 (7.1.1–14).
Theban foreign policy, 371–365
Theban foreign policy after the restoration of the Boeotian League in 378 was mainly in the hands of the seven Boeotarchs, of whom the most influential in this period were Epaminondas and Pelopidas. In the immediate aftermath of Leuctra the Thebans did little to follow up their success against Sparta, partly because they failed to realize how seriously they had weakened Sparta, partly because they still needed to consolidate the position of Boeotia in central Greece. Orchomenus, the last major opposition to the Boeotian League within Boeotia, and Phocis, the traditional enemy, were both still hostile; and there were serious concerns about the imperialist ambitions of their ally, Jason of Pherae in Thessaly. The first target was Orchomenus which, when given the choice of joining the League or being destroyed, promptly chose the former, even though its citizens would not have full citizen rights (Diodorus 15.57.1). The security of the now-unified Boeotian territory was increased by strengthening the defences along the southern coast on the Gulf of Corinth. The Spartans had previously launched sea-borne invasions of Boeotia as an alternative to land invasions through the Isthmus, but the commencement of fortifying the coastal cities and of building watchtowers and signalling stations ensured protection on the vulnerable southern flank.
Now that Boeotia had been united and fortified, there was the pressing need to take action outside the Boeotian borders in central Greece. Jason of Pherae, having brought Thessalian reinforcements at the time of Leuctra, had captured Hyampolis and destroyed Heraclea in Trachis on his return journey (6.4.27), thus giving him direct and unimpeded access to Boeotia from Thessaly. However, his probable ambition of making Thessaly into a major Greek power was brought to a sudden end by his assassination in 370. The ensuing internal turmoil and blood-letting relieved the Thebans of that threat, and they consolidated their position in central Greece by making alliances with Phocis, which, deprived of Spartan protection, was now willing to embrace the Boeotian League; with Euboea and Acarnania, both of whom deserted the Second Athenian League; and with Locris, Malis and probably Oetaea (6.5.23). Thus, by the summer of 370, the whole of central Greece, with the exception of the Athenians, had allied itself with the Boeotian League, which was now ready to adopt a higher profile in Greek affairs.
During the Theban hegemony, foreign policy was directed towards three areas: the Peloponnese; Thessaly and Macedon; and, in the second half of the decade, the Aegean. However, ‘hegemony’ is not a precise term to describe the power of the Thebans in this decade, since they never gained the hegemony of Greece in the way that the Spartans had in the first 30 years of the fourth century; ‘pre-eminence’ or ‘ascendancy’ is a more accurate reflection of their political position in Greece. For the Thebans made no attempt to create an empire by conquest, nor to impose direct rule on Greek cities, nor impose garrisons (except for a few special cases), nor levy tribute.
There were two reasons for this: first, their lack of manpower which prevented widespread conquest and occupation; and second, their lack of financial resources to maintain a large army for long periods of time. Epaminondas and Pelopidas recognized these constraints on Theban foreign policy, and consequently relied upon the creation of a network of alliances, in which the Boeotian League (i.e. Thebes) would be the leading ally, in order to exert Theban influence in the Peloponnese, and in Thessaly and Macedon. However, the failure of the Thebans to create a formal organization, such as the Peloponnesian League, in which a common foreign policy could be agreed, resources shared, and disputes between allies resolved, and to establish themselves as the legal and official hegemon of such an organization seriously und
ermined their position and led to the collapse of their ascendancy in Greece. It will be useful to consider each of the three geographical areas in turn – the Peloponnese, northern Greece (Thessaly and Macedon) and the Aegean – and finally return to the Peloponnese where Theban ambitions were checked at the battle of Mantinea in 362.
The Peloponnese: 370–365
The defeat of the Spartans at Leuctra encouraged many of the Peloponnesian states to rid themselves once and for all of Spartan domination. The first stage was ‘stasis’ (civil war) in Corinth, Sicyon, Argos, Phlius, Elis, Achaea and in Arcadia (especially Tegea and Mantinea), where the pro-Spartan oligarchies were being challenged by anti-Spartan democracies. The second stage was the development of anti-Spartan alliances within the Peloponnese. In 371 Mantinea re-synoecized (see ‘synoecism’ in Glossary) by bringing back the (four or) five villages into a unified democratic state within a rebuilt city wall (6.5.3). The probable driving-force behind this was Lycomedes, who aimed to make the Arcadians a major power in the Peloponnese. He was the architect of a new Arcadian League, formed in 370, which included most (and all of the most important) of the city-states in Arcadia (Diodorus 15.59.1). The Eleans wanted to regain Triphylia, of which they had been deprived by the Spartans c.400, and, thinking that their best hope lay with an anti-Spartan military power, allied themselves to the Arcadian League. The Argives, the traditional enemy of the Spartans, needed no second invitation to become the third member of the triple alliance – another major omission by the pro-Spartan Xenophon who conveniently ignores any institution (e.g. the Second Athenian League) or individual (e.g. Epaminondas) that outshines the Spartans.
This anti-Spartan alliance now threatened the position of dominance that the Spartans had held for the last 200 years, and was bound to provoke a Spartan military response. The triple alliance made an unsuccessful appeal to the Athenians to join their alliance, and so approached the Thebans who voted to become allies (Diodorus 15.61.3). This alliance was the backbone of Epaminondas’ Peloponnesian policy: if the Spartans could be surrounded by a ring of hostile states, then they would be cut off in the south Peloponnese and be fully committed to self-defence, thus ensuring the security of Boeotia, since all future warfare would be in the Peloponnese. In the winter of 370/69, the Thebans and their central Greek allies, under the leadership of Epaminondas and Pelopidas, led the first invasion of the Peloponnese since the Dark Ages. Having united with the forces of the triple alliance, and reinforced by the defection of the Perioeci in northern Laconia, the Thebans invaded the heartland of Sparta. They threatened the city of Sparta itself and ravaged the land of Laconia (6.5.27–32). The Spartans, although aided by Corinth, Epidaurus and a few other faithful Peloponnesian League states, could do little to prevent this humiliation.
It is doubtful whether Epaminondas aimed for the total destruction of Sparta, since its existence would be a constant source of disunity in the Peloponnese – very useful for Boeotian security. However, it was vital that the power of the Spartans was permanently reduced so that they could never again dominate Greek (and Boeotian) politics. This could only be achieved by destroying the economic base of Spartan military might through the liberation of the Messenian ‘Helots’:
Epaminondas, who by nature believed in great enterprises and aimed at eternal fame, won over the Arcadians and the rest of the allies to found Messene, having been controlled for many years by the Spartans, as it was well-positioned to oppose Sparta.
(Diodorus 15.66.1)
Epaminondas realized that the creation of an independent Messenian state would have two results: first, the Spartans would need to support themselves economically, thus undermining the entire military system and ending their military superiority; second, the ring of anti-Spartan states would be closed even tighter around the Spartans, thus trapping them in the south-east Peloponnese. Therefore, in early 369, Epaminondas created the state of Messene with a fortified capital at Ithome (Diodorus 15.66.6). He then returned with his forces to Boeotia, leaving behind a fatally weakened Sparta.
The Spartans turned in desperation to the Athenians, who were becoming more alarmed at the growth of Theban power, and a military alliance was concluded on the basis of equal leadership (7.1.1–14). In the summer of 369, the Arcadians, Argives and Elis again appealed to the Thebans to send an army into the Peloponnese (Diodorus 15.68.). Although the same spectacular success of the previous expedition could not be achieved and the addition of the Athenians as Spartan allies would provide stiffer resistance, Epaminondas was determined to complete the permanent reduction of Sparta. Sparta’s loyal allies along the north coast of the Peloponnese, especially Corinth, were still an important source of manpower to the Spartans and prevented easy communications between the Thebans and the triple alliance. Therefore, Epaminondas’ main aim in the second invasion was either to detach them from Sparta or to put them under such intense military pressure that they would be incapable of offering military aid, thus isolating Sparta even more. Sicyon was captured and Pallene in Achaea surrendered, resulting in both states joining the anti-Spartan coalition, and the territory of Corinth, Epidaurus, Troezen and Phlius was devastated (7.1.18–22). These four cities proved to be impregnable, but such was the damage inflicted upon Epidaurus and Troezen that they no longer took part in the war on Sparta’s side. Thus Epaminondas’ second invasion was successful in depriving the Spartans of much-needed Peloponnesian manpower and in showing to the remaining Peloponnesian allies the inability of Sparta, their hegemon, to protect them.
In 368 the Spartans were thrown a lifeline by Ariobarzanes, the Persian ‘satrap’ of Hellespontine Phrygia, who lent them 2,000 mercenaries (Diodorus 15.70.2). At the same time the first cracks in the Peloponnesian triple alliance appeared. Under the influence of Lycomedes, the Arcadian League began to entertain hopes of replacing Sparta as the dominant power in the Peloponnese and to take an independent line from Thebes in Peloponnesian policy (7.1.22–25). By 368, Megalopolis (‘The Big City’) had been built as a major fortress to protect south-west Arcadia and Messenia from Spartan invasion, and as the new federal capital of the Arcadian League – a symbol of Arcadian ambitions. In addition, the Arcadian League accepted Triphylia as an ally, which greatly angered the Eleans, who had joined the triple alliance in order to regain Triphylia, previously removed from their control by Sparta (7.1.26).
It is in these events that the short-sightedness of the Thebans is most in evidence. If a formal league had been established with Thebes as the hegemon, there were two probable results: first, the leadership ambitions of the Arcadians would have been curtailed at the outset, thus avoiding the rivalry which led to the collapse of the anti-Spartan alliance; and second, the dispute between Elis and the Arcadian League would have been resolved, thus removing the festering grievance and source of conflict within the alliance, which finally led to the Eleans deserting and going back to the Spartans. In the event, the Spartan defeat of the Arcadians, unsupported by the Thebans and the Eleans, in the ‘Tearless Battle’ (so called because there were very few Spartan casualties) of 368 acted as a temporary check upon Lycomedes’ ambitions; this battle showed that the Spartans were not yet a completely spent force and that the Arcadians had much to do before they could become serious challengers for the supremacy of the Peloponnese. Even more revealing, and pessimistic for the future of the anti-Spartan alliance, were the feelings of the Thebans and the Eleans after the news of the Arcadian League’s defeat:
The Thebans and the Eleans were almost as pleased as the Spartans at the defeat of the Arcadians – they were now so angry at their arrogance.
(Xenophon 7.1.32)
By 367, the Thebans had achieved their major aim of weakening the Spartans in the Peloponnese by liberating Messenia and creating a Boeotian–Peloponnesian alliance, but this success came under threat when the Spartans yet again sought the help of the Persians. There had been a series of Persian-dictated Common Peaces (so called because the terms applied in principle to all th
e Greek states and not just to those engaged in hostilities), beginning with the King’s Peace in 386, which had allowed the Spartans, with Persian backing, to arrange the affairs of Greece to their own satisfaction. Therefore it was essential for the Thebans to persuade the Persians to choose Thebes as their most favoured Greek ally in place of Sparta, and thus create a Common Peace that best suited Theban interests in Greece. When the Greek states’ representatives attended a preliminary peace conference at Susa, Pelopidas pulled off a brilliant diplomatic coup by convincing Artaxerxes that the Thebans were the best overseers of Persian interests in Greece. As a result, the Thebans were able to dictate the terms of the peace in the King’s name: the liberation of Messenia from Sparta; the independence of Amphipolis from Athens; and Elis’ claim to Triphylia at the expense of the Arcadians were confirmed (7.1.33–37).
It is hardly surprising that the conference in Thebes, which was called in 366 to formalize terms of the Peace, ended in failure as the three major states refused to weaken themselves for the benefit of the Thebans (7.1.39– 40). The Arcadians were especially angry over Triphylia, as they realized that the Thebans were deliberately supporting and strengthening Elis against themselves, and that the Theban hostility had been provoked by the Arcadian challenge to the hegemony of the Boeotian–Peloponnesian alliance. This divisive issue would not have arisen, if the Thebans had created a formal league with a constitutionally agreed hegemon in 370. This marked a further stage in the break-down of the alliance, but the Arcadians were not yet strong enough to declare war upon the Thebans who, in turn, did not dare to attack Arcadia directly, as it might have led to the immediate dissolution of the anti-Spartan alliance. Therefore, they found a more subtle way of bringing the Arcadians to heel.
Aspects of Greek History (750–323BC) Page 64