Since the Athenians were preventing him from going through the pass, he returned to Macedon, having increased his kingdom by his deeds and by his respect for the god.
(Diodorus 16.38.2)
But Philip had also learned a valuable lesson for the future: the strategic importance of seizing the pass at Thermopylae in order to create an effective threat to his enemies in the south.
As he had been thwarted in the south, Philip turned his attention again to Thrace. In late 352, he was attacking Heraeum Teichos, which was on the shores of the Propontis, the small sea that connects the Hellespont to the Black Sea (Demosthenes 3.4). By this time he had taken over the kingdom of Amadocus, who had ruled in central Thrace, and was now threatening Cersebleptes, who ruled eastern Thrace (Dem. 1.13). However, Cersebleptes was saved from suffering the same fate as Amadocus by a combination of Philip’s illness (Dem. 3.5) and the support of Athens. The price for this Athenian help had been the transfer of the Thracian Chersonese, apart from Cardia, to the Athenians, who established a ‘cleruchy’ (see Glossary) in the city of Sestos – vital for safeguarding the grain fleets through the Hellespont. Nevertheless Cersebleptes, even with Athenian help, was still vulnerable, and therefore the surrender of his son as a hostage was aimed at winning Philip’s goodwill, thereby (he hoped) securing his own position. In 351 and 350, Philip appears to have taken little or no action against the Greek cities, but this was to change in 349, when the sole threat to Macedonian power in the north – Olynthus and the Chalcidian League – became Philip’s next target.
The Olynthian-led Chalcidian League had become more fearful of Philip and, in 352, made peace with Athens and were discussing the possibility of an alliance (Dem. 23.109). This was a breach of their alliance with Philip, and such a threat on the very borders of Macedon sealed the fate of the Chalcidians. If the Chalcidians had been willing to accept subject-ally status, as the Thessalians had, they might have escaped their fate, but their disloyalty provoked the ruthless side of Philip’s nature:
When Philip was 40 stades from the city of the Olynthus, he said that one of two things must happen: either they must stop living in Olynthus or he in Macedon.
(Demosthenes 9.11)
Philip declared war in late 349, and successfully besieged the cities in the Chalcidian League one by one, leaving Olynthus to the last. Despite desperate appeals from the Olynthians and probably three relief expeditions from the Athenians (Philochorus 328 frs 49–51; Demosthenes, Olynthiacs I–III), he had won his war by September 348. Philip was true to his word, for he totally destroyed Olynthus and the Chalcidian cities that had resisted him, and sold the Olynthian citizens into slavery (16.52.9, 53.1–3; Dem. 9.26). Chalcidice was now incorporated within the Macedonian state, and the land distributed to Philip’s supporters.
One of the reasons for Athens’ failure to be more effective in opposing Philip in 348 was the revolt of Euboea, which was of vital strategic importance to Athens. If Euboea were to be occupied by Philip, he could turn the pass at Thermopylae; land troops in Boeotia; link up with the Thebans, his allies in the Sacred War; and invade Attica by land. He may even have inspired the Euboeans to revolt, but this depends upon the possibly corrupt reading of ‘Philip’ in the speech of the Athenian politician, Aeschines (3.87). Nevertheless it was typical of the man, always seeking to extend Macedonian influence and undermining his opponents.
The first steps in the peace process between Philip and the Athenians, culminating in the Peace of Philocrates in 346, began in 348. The Athenians, because of the loss of Euboea, their fears for their continued control of the Thracian Chersonese and the desperate state of their economy, were ready to consider peace. It is hard to say why Philip was so willing. Possibly, the conclusion of peace and an alliance with Athens was the first stage in his planned domination of Greece, as he had done previously with the Olynthianled Chalcidian League when he was attempting to establish Macedonian dominance in the north. Possibly, he desired to remove the Athenians from the Sacred War and from their alliance with the Phocians so that he could achieve his two immediate objectives: first, increased prestige and influence in Greek affairs by ending the Sacred War; and second, membership of the Amphictyonic League, thereby gaining the previously withheld Greek recognition of Macedon’s ‘Greekness’.
It is very difficult to give an accurate account of the events and their chronology in the run-up to the Peace of Philocrates. The main reason for this is that most of the evidence comes from two speeches of Demosthenes (18 and 19) and two from Aeschines (2 and 3), bitter political enemies, delivered a number of years after the swearing of the Peace. By 343, when the first pair of speeches was delivered (i.e. Demosthenes 19 and Aeschines 2), it was patently clear from the advantages that Philip had acquired from the Peace that its ratification had been a grave error of judgement. Unfortunately, both Demosthenes and Aeschines had encouraged the Athenians to accept the Peace, and therefore each wished to distance himself from the responsibility of having recommended the Peace. Furthermore, as they were deadly political opponents, each wished to blacken the other’s name and reputation. As a result the speeches are full of gross distortions of the truth, biased interpretation of the events for political advantage and blatant lies. It is for this reason that the following account has to be treated with caution.
The first peace initiatives came to nothing, possibly because the Athenians, who at first were keen to enter negotiations, became disinclined after Philip’s harsh treatment of Olynthus (Aeschines 2.12–17). Throughout 347, Philip was active in putting pressure on the Athenians: he raided the Athenian settlers on the islands of Lemnos, Imbros and Scyrus, conducted military operations in Thrace (Aeschines 2.72) and once again became involved in the Sacred War. The Phocians had deposed Phalaecus from the generalship (although he still kept control of a considerable number of mercenaries), and appointed three others in his stead. Their successful campaign in Boeotia, resulting in their seizure of several important cities, especially Orchomenus, forced the Thebans to appeal to Philip (16.56.2–3, 58.1):
The king, happily witnessing their difficulties and wanting to humble their pride over Leuctra [see Chapter 25], sent a few soldiers, guarding against one thing only: that he did not appear to be disregarding the plundering of the (Delphic) oracle.
(Diodorus 16.58.3)
Philip had sent only sufficient troops to check the advance of the Phocians, but not enough to conquer Phocis, as he wanted the glory and the resultant prestige for personally ending the Sacred War and punishing the ‘temple-robbers’.
Philip’s repeated offer of peace and an additional request for an alliance in 347 was reasonably well received by the Athenians, but they had not at this point given up hope of resisting Philip, which they had done so successfully in 352. Early in 346 (this dating is a matter of scholarly dispute), the Athenians voted to hold a Greek congress at Athens to discuss the defence of Greece against Philip (Dem. 19.303–6). In addition, when the Phocians (apart from Phalaecus) appealed for military support upon receipt of the news that Philip and the Thessalians were planning to march south, the Athenians and the Spartans sent forces to occupy Thermopylae (Aeschines 2.132–34). However, the Athenians were forced into making a sudden and dramatic change of policy.
Their appeal to the Greeks to form an anti-Philip coalition evoked a lukewarm response: none offered any support (Aesch. 2.79). Far more devastating was the news that Phalaecus had refused to hand over Thermopylae to the Athenian and Spartan forces, and had ordered them home (Aesch. 2.133–34). The Athenians suspected, almost certainly correctly, that Philip and Phalaecus had been negotiating in secret, whereby Phalaecus would hand over Thermopylae to Philip in return for lenient treatment of himself and Phocis for their ‘sacrilegious’ behaviour. The consequence of this would be the exposure of Attica and southern Greece to invasion by Philip’s forces and the Thebans: the Athenians now had an urgent need, in March 346, to enter into serious discussions with Philip for peace.
The first Athenian embassy to Philip was sent in March 346 (Aesch. 2.18). Philip presumably agreed to send Macedonian representatives to Athens to negotiate terms, and agreed to make no attack upon the Chersonese while the peace negotiations were in progress. Philip then set out to attack Cersebleptes, the last remaining king in Thrace (Aesch. 2.82). After the Athenians, in consultation with Philip’s representatives, had agreed to the terms of the peace and to an alliance, a second embassy was sent to Macedon in order to receive the oaths of Philip and his allies to the Peace. There is no better example of Philip’s deviousness in diplomacy than in the events that followed. First, he deliberately delayed swearing the oath, presumably on the grounds that not all of his allies were present. In the meantime, he pressed on and further reduced the kingdom of Cersebleptes, Athens’ ally (Aesch. 2.89–90; Dem. 19.156). Second, when the second Athenian embassy was joined by other embassies from the Thebans, the Thessalians, the Phocians and the Spartans, whose purpose was to discuss with Philip the settlement of the Sacred War (Justin 8.4.1–3), Philip made sure that he saw each delegation separately. The Thebans and the Thessalians wanted him to take over the hegemony of Greece and punish the hated Phocians (Justin 8.4.4–5). The Phocians, backed by their Athenian and Spartan allies, were begging Philip not to settle the issue by warfare (Justin 8.4.6–7):
Having heard each of the two embassies and having made them swear on oath that they would betray his reply to no-one, he secretly promised his support for each of them in the war; and that he would come and bring help to them; and he ordered both sides not to prepare for nor fear war.
(Justin, Philippica 8.4.11)
His purpose was to convince all of them that he would give his full backing to their preferred outcome of the Sacred War.
Philip succeeded brilliantly in winning over the goodwill and the trust of the two embassies, but at the same time did not reveal his true intentions:
‘Phalaecus, the tyrant of Phocis, distrusted us and the Spartans, but trusted Philip. But was he the only man who did not foresee the outcome? What were your own public feelings in this matter? Did you not all reckon that Philip would humble the Thebans, witnessing their audacity and not wanting to increase the power of men whom he did not trust? … Were not the Theban ambassadors themselves in despair and afraid? Did not the Thessalians laugh at all the rest, saying that the expedition was for their benefit?’
(Aeschines 2.135–36)
In reality, Philip’s only sensible option was to back the Thessalians and the Thebans: he needed the continued support of the Thessalians, who were deadly enemies of the Phocians, and their excellent cavalry; and he would have lost all prestige within Greece and the Amphictyonic League, which was still dominated by the Thebans, if he had sided with the temple-robbers.
The key to winning the Sacred War was possession of Thermopylae. Once again Philip proved too wily for his opponents. He had almost certainly been negotiating with Phalaecus who ‘trusted Philip’, but he needed to bring his army within close striking distance of Thermopylae without frightening the Athenians into fortifying the pass. The means of deception was the small town of Halus on the gulf of Pagasae, which Philip had been besieging for a number of months. Philip was sufficiently convincing to persuade the embassies that his military build-up was directed against Halus. Consequently, when he did advance southwards with his army, accompanied by the embassies, their suspicions were allayed – especially those of the Athenians, as he finally swore the oath to the Peace of Philocrates at Pherae in southern Thessaly, very close to Thermopylae (Dem. 19.158). By the time that the Athenian second embassy had reported to the Athenian Assembly, Philip had gained control of Thermopylae, and the whole of central and southern Greece lay open to his armies: the Athenians were in no position to resist him militarily, and reaffirmed the Peace of Philocrates and the Athenian–Macedonian alliance.
Philip made a truce with Phalaecus, who was allowed to retire with his mercenaries to the Peloponnese. The Phocians immediately surrendered to Philip, thus bringing the Sacred War to an end – the first of his objectives (16.59.2–3). Philip left the final settlement to the Amphictyonic League, although it is certain that he manipulated its decisions behind the scenes. The League passed a decree which granted Philip and his descendants League membership – the second of his objectives – and gave Macedon the two votes that had previously belonged to Phocis. The Phocians were allowed to keep their land, but all their cities were destroyed; they were only allowed to live in small villages. In addition, they were ordered to pay 60 talents every year to Delphi until they repaid all their debt (16.60.1–2). Far more galling for the Athenians was the restoration of Theban power in central Greece: the important Boeotian cities of Orchomenus and Coroneia, previously captured by the Phocians, were given back to the Thebans, who also benefited from the drastic reduction of the state of Phocis (16.60.1; Dem. 19.325).
After holding the prestigious post of president of the Pythian Festival:
Philip returned to Macedon, not only having gained a reputation for piety and superb generalship, but also having made considerable preparations for the increase of power that was destined to be his. For he wished to be appointed the commander-in-chief of Greece and to wage war against the Persians.
(Diodorus 16.60.4)
There are doubts whether Philip was already planning a Panhellenic crusade against the Persians as early as 346. On the other hand, it would help to explain, first, his desire for an alliance with the Athenians, who possessed the best navy in Greece, which was vital for such an enterprise; and, second, his decision not to invade Attica, when Athens was so vulnerable to attack after his seizure of Thermopylae. However, there could be no doubt about one thing: Macedon under Philip was now the strongest power in Greece.
The further rise of Macedon in Greece, 346–338
The Peace of Philocrates lasted from 346 to 340, but throughout that time Demosthenes, although an original supporter of the Peace, employed all his energy and eloquence to bring about its collapse. He had been convinced since 351 that Philip was a dangerous threat to Athens in particular and was intent upon the subjection of Greece. Thus, at every opportunity, he highlighted Philip’s infringements of the Peace, and gradually won the Athenians over to his policy of open warfare with Philip. It is difficult to assess accurately how justified or how exaggerated were Demosthenes’ accusations against Philip for his alleged breaches of the Peace, since most of the evidence comes from the very speeches of Demosthenes who had a vested interest in damning every action of Philip. The leadership of the policy of peaceful cooperation with Philip was held by Aeschines, but he gradually lost ground to Demosthenes. From 346–345, Philip was concerned with internal reforms within Macedon (Justin 8.5.7) and delivering yet another defeat to the Illyrians (16.69.7). However, his actions in 344 provided ample scope for Demosthenes and his supporters to stir up Athenian animosity against Philip.
In 344, Philip conducted a reorganization of Thessaly by dividing it up into four ‘tetrarchies’, each with its own governor. Immediately Demosthenes complained bitterly about the Thessalians’ loss of freedom (Dem. 9.26), even though the Thessalians had already elected Philip as archon (leader) of Thessaly for life in 352 (see above). Demosthenes was even more perturbed when he heard that Philip was sending help to the citizens of Messene, Argos and Megalopolis (Dem. 6.9, 15). It would seem that the Spartans yet again were trying to restore their position of influence within the Peloponnese, and that Philip’s demand that the Spartans should renounce their claim to Messenia was the result of an appeal for help from the Peloponnesians (Dem. 6.13). Demosthenes, fearing the growth of Macedonian influence in a new area of Greece, was sent on an embassy to dissuade these Peloponnesian states from allying themselves with Philip (6.19–26). He failed to win them over, because he did not appreciate that such states, having for very many years been under the control of Sparta, saw Philip as the guarantor of their continued freedom and independence (Polybius 18.4.1–11
). They did not consider, as Demosthenes did, that the freedom of Greece was directly linked with Athenian power, especially as the Athenians were allies of the hated Spartans.
In 344, an embassy arrived in Athens, probably sent jointly by Philip and by the Messenians and Argives, to discuss the situation in the Peloponnese. This gave Demosthenes the chance to deliver his powerful Second Philippic in which he accused Philip of plotting against the whole of Greece (Dem. 6.2). It is not known what was the resultant decision of the Athenian Assembly, but it seems likely that an embassy was despatched to Philip to complain about the unfair terms of the Peace of Philocrates. In 343, Philip sent an embassy to Athens, led by Python of Byzantium, in an attempt to preserve his good name and to maintain peaceful relations with the Athenians:
‘Therefore Python urged the public speakers not to find fault with the Peace, because it was not good policy to end it. But if they were not satisfied with any of the terms in the Peace, they should put forward amendments since Philip intended to do all that you [i.e. the Athenians] had voted for. But if these men slander him, but do not put forward proposals with the result that the Peace continues to exist but the distrust of Philip does not stop, you should ignore such men.’
Aspects of Greek History (750–323BC) Page 67