Foreign policy
In 1883, the American journal Harper’s Weekly reported that the 4ft 11ins 64-year-old Queen weighed two hundred pounds (14st 4lbs; 90 kilograms) and was getting comfortably fatter every day.53 Her increasing girth mirrored her belief in the enlargement of empire. Queen Victoria wanted to expand the British Empire whereas Gladstone wanted it slimmed down. Not surprisingly, serious disagreement occurred between the Queen and Gladstone over foreign policy. The Queen continued to believe that foreign policy was the peculiar preserve of the sovereign, whereas Gladstone was convinced that the Queen’s partisanship could only bring the throne into disrepute. By now Victoria was a Conservative imperialist and acutely conscious of Britain’s status and reputation in the world. She wanted to rule over as much of the world as possible and saw Gladstone as seeking to undermine that ambition. Indeed, Gladstone was a Liberal anti-imperialist who believed that Britain should never be seen to support a cause that was morally wrong. His government had been elected on an anti-imperialist platform and the prime minister did his best to keep to this promise. For her part, the Queen missed Disraeli’s flamboyant imperialistic foreign policy and made little effort to hide her hostility to Gladstone. Moreover Disraeli used to explain policy in simple language whereas Gladstone continued to make little effort to render politics palatable or attractive to the Queen.
Victoria’s first outburst occurred over the Queen’s Speech. This was a speech that, even at the time, was considered the speech of the ministers rather than the speech of the monarch. It was written by the government and formally read out by a representative of the Queen when she or her spokesperson opened parliament. The speech outlined, and still does, the government’s proposed legislative programme for the year ahead. One of the first flash points concerned the proposed withdrawal of British troops from Afghanistan, based there to protect the Emir Abdul Rahman against insurrectionist forces. The Queen refused to sign the speech unless the sentence about withdrawal was removed: she was wholly opposed to the removal of British troops. Eventually, after much discussion, the speech was approved. The Queen told her private secretary that she had ‘never before been treated with such want of respect and consideration in the forty three and a half years she had worn her thorny crown’.54 In the course of the year, the British forces withdrew from Afghanistan.
The Arabi rebellion
Victoria and Gladstone differed over Egyptian foreign policy too. Gladstone had disapproved of Disraeli’s purchase of shares in the Suez Canal, thinking it an unnecessary extravagance. Nevertheless Gladstone recognised that Egypt was an important trading partner: 44 per cent of Egyptian imports were British and 80 per cent of Egyptian exports were sent to Britain.55 In addition, Britain relied on the Suez Canal as a route to India. Gladstone also recognised the need for a stable Egypt to facilitate trade – but there were problems. Egypt had borrowed heavily and could not repay its loans. As a result, the two leading creditors, France and Britain, installed an Anglo-French Commission in the country to sort out the Egyptian debt. This Commission increased taxes and cut government expenditure even though the country was already hard pressed.
In response, Colonel Arabi, a nationalist leader who deplored the Egyptian ruler’s submissiveness to Britain, seized power in Egypt. He declared ‘Egypt for the Egyptians’ and did everything possible to obstruct the work of the English and French Commission. On 11 June 1882, encouraged by Arabi, there was a riot and massacre of foreigners in the port of Alexandria. Victoria urged Gladstone to stand firm. Gladstone, who was appalled by both Arabi’s desire to establish a dictatorship and his refutation of Egypt’s financial obligations, needed little encouragement. He ordered the bombardment of Alexandria and sent the British Army to reverse the coup and re-install the previous ruler. The Queen had earlier told her private secretary that Egypt was vital to Britain and ‘we must take it’56 rather than allow Egypt to be independent.
On 13 September 1882, the British army defeated Arabi at Tel el-Kabir, promptly occupied Cairo, arrested Arabi and crushed the rebellion. The Queen commented, ‘What an immense satisfaction this is!’57 The war was popular in Britain and for a while the Queen was at one with her government and her subjects. Victoria was personally as well as politically involved as one of her sons, Prince Arthur, went out to fight. When she first heard that ‘her darling, precious Arthur’ was to go to Egypt she thought ‘it seemed like a dreadful dream’ and ‘went with a heavy heart to bed’.58 Nonetheless, like many other army mothers, she did not want her precious son to ‘shirk his duty’. General Wolseley, the general in charge, gave Arthur command of a brigade. At the battle of Tel el-Kabir, Arthur exhibited obvious courage. Victoria was proud of the way in which he had fought and was delighted when General Charles Beresford was ‘full of praise of dear Arthur, how much pluck he had shown and what care he had taken of his men. . . . That I could be well proud of my son, which I said I was.’59 On 21 November 1882 the Queen honoured her son with a medal for gallantry.
In the Queen’s opinion, Arabi and the other rebels should be ‘severely punished’, as if not, revolution and rebellion would be greatly encouraged.60 Arabi was handed over to the Egyptian authorities to be tried but to the Queen’s intense irritation, he insisted that a British lawyer defend him. Gladstone’s government granted Arabi’s request. Victoria was furious that her government agreed to ‘let Arabi have an English Counsel, a thing contrary to Egyptian law! After sending out and sacrificing numbers of our brave men, in order to put down this man, everything is to be done now to save him! It is inconceivable! One step forward, two steps backwards!’61 The Queen protested to Gladstone that she was
distressed and alarmed at the great facilities given to that arch rebel and traitor, Arabi. . . appearing to protect the very man we sent out our best troops and spent much treasure to defeat. . . . And why in the world should Englishmen defend this wicked man, who is the cause of thousands of innocent lives being lost and many poor people maimed for life?62
Gladstone duly noted the Queen’s opinion but continued to do as he pleased.
Eventually it was agreed with the Egyptian ruler – the Khedive – that Arabi be exiled to Ceylon. The Queen again complained to Gladstone. He ignored her protests and instead asked his sovereign to send a personal message to the Khedive congratulating him on his magnanimity to Arabi. The Queen refused as she ‘highly disapproves of the weakness which actuated it. It is for the British Government, who are solely responsible for this act. . . to send him this message.’63 Queen Victoria was reluctant to relinquish her authority but the threefold increase in the electorate had irretrievably shifted the balance of power to parliament. As more and more men were included in the political process, the Queen’s authority diminished.
The British government promised to control Egypt for only five years and then leave. The Queen thought it foolish to fix a date and told her ministers ‘that I could not agree to their binding this country to evacuate Egypt in a given time, 5 years. That I felt most strongly, it would be a fatal step.’64 She complained to Ponsonby that:
the conduct of the Government in this Egyptian business is perfectly miserable; it is universally condemned; and this weakness and vacillation have made us despised everywhere. . . . the Queen feels much aggrieved and annoyed. She was never listened to, or her advice followed, and all she foretold invariably happened and what she urged was done when too late! It is dreadful for her to see how we are going downhill, and to be unable to prevent the humiliation of this country.65
Ponsonby, using much more ameliorative language, communicated the Queen’s anxieties to Gladstone, writing that ‘the Queen maintains emphatically that it would be unjust to this country and to future Governments to make a promise now which it may be out of their power to keep. . . another Ministry would find themselves hampered’.66 In fact, the British did not leave Egypt, the country remained a British protectorate until 1914 and the British had a military presence there until 1956.
Crisis in th
e Sudan
The revolt in Egypt sparked a crisis in the Sudan. At the time, the Sudan was ruled by Egypt but sensing a weakness in Egyptian rule, Muhammad Ahmad, who considered himself the Mahdi or redeemer of Islam, rebelled against the Egyptian forces. Victoria and Gladstone once more differed over what the British should do. Gladstone thought that the expense of keeping the troops in the Sudan was prohibitively expensive, proposed to withdraw them and appointed General Gordon to do it; Queen Victoria wanted to crush the revolt and tried to pressurise Gladstone to remain in the Sudan because it ‘would be fatal to our reputation and honour if we were to abandon active operations and still more to withdraw from the Soudan’.67 The government remained unyielding. The Queen told the leading Liberal Lord Hartington that her ‘heart bleeds to see such short-sighted humiliating policy pursued, which lowers her country before the whole world’.68
On 18 January 1884, General Gordon left London for Khartoum in order to evacuate the soldiers and civilians and to leave the country with them. But when Gordon arrived in Khartoum, he disobeyed orders and rather than evacuate the troops began organising a defence of Khartoum and asking for more troops to defend the city. Soon the city of Khartoum was under siege by the rebel Ahmad’s army, and was to remain so for 320 days. Victoria believed that any withdrawal would be ‘utterly ruinous’.69 And she was at her fiercest when the crisis was at its height, directing Gladstone to send a force to rescue Gordon saying that she ‘trembles for General Gordon’s safety’.70 She threatened to ‘ hold the Government responsible for any sort of misfortune which will happen. Parliament should be told the truth and how Gordon has again and again told them what to do, and that they have refused.’71 When her advice was ignored, the Queen pleaded with Gladstone: ‘if only for humanity’s sake, for the honour of the Government and the nation’, Gordon must not be abandoned.72 But the Queen was not able to influence the incorruptible and principle-driven Gladstone in the way she had Disraeli.
At first Gladstone refused to send a relief mission and only reluctantly agreed to do so when it was too little and too late. Britain’s most eminent general, Wolseley, was given command of the Sudan expeditionary force. At one time, the Queen wrote secretly to General Wolseley asking him to ‘resist and strongly oppose all idea of retreat’ and confided that she thought some of her Government were unpatriotic. She asked Wolseley to destroy the letter as ‘it is so very confidential . . . or perhaps lock it up and destroy it later, but if he fears it might get into wrong hands, pray destroy it at once’.73 This was seriously illegitimate behaviour by a sovereign. By this time, the Queen recognised that she was only titular head of the armed forces and her insistence on secrecy shows that she was well aware that she had no right to instruct her generals.
By the time Wolseley arrived, Gordon and his entire 7,000 army garrison had been killed and rebel troops were in charge of the city. On 5 February 1885 news of Gordon’s death reached Britain. Victoria heard the ‘dreadful news, after breakfast. Khartoum, fallen . . . All greatly distressed. . . . It is too fearful. The Govt is alone to blame, by refusing to send the expedition, till it was too late.’74 She confided to Ponsonby that:
Gladstone should remember what SHE suffers when the British name is humiliated. . . and he can go away and resign but she MUST REMAIN and she has suffered so cruelly from humiliation and annoyance from the present Govt since the unlucky day when Mr Gladstone came in. . . . Mr G never minds loss of life etc and wraps himself up in his own incomprehensible delusions and illusions.75
The Queen believed that ‘Mr Gladstone and the Government have – the Queen feels it dreadfully – Gordon’s innocent, noble, heroic blood on their consciences.’76 Nonetheless, Gladstone refused to reverse his foreign policy and continued to withdraw from the Sudan. This led to the Queen complaining to Ponsonby that she could not ‘express her indignation at Mr Gladstone’s behaviour. No Minister has ever yet set her positive orders at such utter defiance. How she prays he may give up – for he is insufferable arguing and never listening to anything said.’77 Queen Victoria had forgotten – or chose to forget – that the sovereign was not expected to give orders to her ministers.
Queen Victoria’s anger led her to disregard state protocol. Telegrams between the Queen and her ministers were always sent in code. Just after Gordon’s death, Victoria sent Gladstone an uncoded telegram, copied to the war minister and the foreign secretary. In it, the Queen formally rebuked the prime minister saying ‘to think that all this might have been prevented and many precious lives saved by earlier actions is too frightful’.78 Naturally, the content of these telegrams soon became public knowledge, which in turn fuelled the already vociferous public outcry at what was seen as Gladstonian bungling. Indeed, Gladstone’s affectionate nickname of GOM – Grand Old Man – was now replaced by MOG – Murderer of Gordon. Not surprisingly Gladstone was furious that the Queen should have sent a confidential telegram in this manner, and more so when she refused to express regret for it. Relationships between the Queen and the prime minister deteriorated further when the Queen was discovered passing confidential documents to the leader of the Conservative Party.
Victoria was well aware of the damages of war – she visited military hospitals on a regular basis. She had seen
some dreadful wounds. Two in the Cavalry had had their heads nearly cut off, by double handed swords, and axes, and there was a large piece taken out, frightful to look at. . . . Two had lost their legs. . . . a man, whose face was scarred with sabre cuts . . . saw Captain Dalrymple . . . suffering much, as splinters, and bits of bone keep coming away.79
Nonetheless, in her opinion, the continuation of British rule in the Sudan was worth the suffering which went with it.
The Gordon calamity weakened the government and on 9 June 1885 it was unexpectedly defeated over a proposal to increase duties on beer and spirits. The Irish Nationalists voted with the Tories and many Liberals abstained. As the government stumbled to defeat, Gladstone, now aged 75, sent a telegram handing in his resignation. A ministerial crisis ensued: for nearly a fortnight the United Kingdom was without a government because the Queen was at Balmoral and refused to return to London to appoint one. She summoned her former prime minister to Scotland to hand in the keys to his office. Gladstone, as obstinate as his sovereign, refused replying that he had not much more to say and wished to avoid travelling because he had to pack up 10 Downing Street. He advised his sovereign to return to London to appoint a new prime minister. Queen Victoria ignored his advice and summoned the Conservative peer Lord Salisbury to Scotland.
Robert Gascoyne-Cecil, Lord Salisbury: 23 June 1885–28 January 1886
Lord Salisbury was in a difficult position. His Conservative Party was in a minority in the House of Commons; a general election would have to be called. Unfortunately, no election could take place until the new electoral registers required by the 1884 Reform Act were ready but nonetheless the country needed a government. Salisbury was initially reluctant to take on the job and only the Queen’s tearful pleas made him agree. On 24 June 1885, Salisbury became prime minister of a minority government. Victoria liked his relaxed, down-to-earth, non-intellectual manner – Salisbury only managed to gain a fourth-class degree from Oxford – and she considered him a welcome relief from the cause-obsessed, too-clever-by-half Gladstone. In fact, Salisbury was a very clever man but, unlike Gladstone, he wore his learning lightly. Salisbury’s daughter-in-law Violet claimed that it was ‘easy to see that she is very fond of him, indeed I never saw two people get on better, their polished manners and deference to and esteem for each other were a delightful sight and one not readily to be forgotten’.80 Salisbury may have lacked the sparkle of Melbourne or Disraeli but his nonchalant approach to politics appealed to Victoria who often spoke with admiration ‘as of one in whom she had great confidence’.81 Moreover, the Queen was able to coerce Salisbury more than she ever could Gladstone. For example, when Salisbury was forming his government and suggested one Colonel Stanley be appointed to the
War Office, the Queen insisted that he ‘ought not to go to the War Office, as he had done even more harm there. . . Ld Salisbury was vexed at this, but I urged it very strongly.’82 Salisbury conceded. Salisbury was appointed prime minister three times, each time leading the Conservatives from the House of Lords. He was the last prime minister to do so.
Salisbury’s Conservative government would inevitably be short-lived. The creation of a new electorate in 1884 meant that new elections would take place – and the increase in the franchise would undoubtedly favour the Liberal Party. The general election held in November and December 1885 resulted in 334 seats for the Liberals, 250 for the Conservatives 250 and 86 for the Irish Nationalists. The effect of the new franchise was greater in Ireland than in the rest of the British Isles, as it increased the Irish electorate by 230 per cent and doubled the number of Parnell’s supporters. The Conservatives, though in a minority, again returned to office because the Irish MPs supported them.
However, events moved swiftly. In December 1885 Gladstone announced his conversion to Home Rule and the Irish MPs switched sides. They liked the prospect of Home Rule because it would mean a separate Irish parliament based in Dublin which would control all Irish affairs, except defence and foreign affairs. In early January 1886 Salisbury was defeated in the House of Commons when Irish MPs voted with the Liberals to overthrow him. During this crisis the Queen refused to leave Osborne. Bertie, the Prince of Wales, asked Ponsonby to persuade the Queen to come to Windsor as ‘the inconvenience to ingoing and outgoing Ministers is obvious. People are much astonished that she has not come up at once, and most unfavourable criticisms are made on the subject.’ Ponsonby replied that the suggestion had already been made, however, he had been told by the Queen’s doctor, that ‘I had made H.M. quite ill with such a proposal, and that I must not do so, as her health would suffer.’83 Typically, Queen Victoria would do as she pleased, backed up by her very compliant physician.
Queen Victoria Page 30