We did not allow these somewhat sorry and ignominious facts to disturb our thought, and fixed our gaze upon the heroic sacrifices of the Russian people under the calamities which their Government had brought upon them, and their passionate defence of their native soil. This, while the struggle lasted, made amends for all.
The Russians never understood in the smallest degree the nature of the amphibious operation necessary to disembark and maintain a great army upon a well-defended hostile coast. Even the Americans were at this time largely unaware of the difficulties. Not only sea but air superiority at the invasion point was indispensable. Moreover, there was a third vital factor. A vast armada of specially constructed landingcraft, above all tank landing-craft in numerous varieties, was the foundation of any successful heavily opposed landing. For the creation of this armada, as has been and will be seen, I had long done my best. It could not be ready even on a minor scale before the summer of 1943, and its power, as is now widely recognised, could not be developed on a sufficient scale till 1944. At the period we have now reached, in the summer of 1941, we had no mastery of the enemy air over Europe, except in the Pas de Calais, where the strongest German fortifications existed. The landing-craft were only a-building. We had not even got an army in Britain as large, as well trained, as well equipped as the one we should have to meet on French soil. Yet Niagaras of folly and misstatement still pour out on this question of the Second Front. There was certainly no hope of convincing the Soviet Government at this or any other time. Stalin even suggested to me on one occasion later on that if the British were afraid he would be willing to send round three or four Russian Army Corps to do the job. It was not in my power, through lack of shipping and other physical facts, to take him at his word.
There was no response from the Soviet Government to my broadcast to Russia and the world on the day of the German attack, except that parts of it were printed in Pravda and other Russian Government organs, and that we were asked to receive a Russian Military Mission. The silence on the top level was oppressive, and I thought it my duty to break the ice. I quite understood that they might feel shy, considering all that had passed since the outbreak of the war between the Soviets and the Western Allies, and remembering what had happened twenty years before between me and the Bolshevik Revolutionary Government. On July 7 I therefore addressed myself to Stalin, and expressed our intention to bring all aid in our power to the Russian people. On the 10th I tried again. Official communications passed between the two Foreign Offices, but it was not until the 19th that I received the first direct communication from Stalin.
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After thanking me for my two telegrams, he said:
Perhaps it is not out of place to mention that the position of the Soviet forces at the front remains tense.… It seems to me therefore that the military situation of the Soviet Union, as well as of Great Britain, would be considerably improved if there could be established a front against Hitler in the West—Northern France, and in the North—the Arctic.
A front in Northern France could not only divert Hitler’s forces from the East, but at the same time would make it impossible for Hitler to invade Great Britain. The establishment of the front just mentioned would be popular with the British Army, as well as with the whole population of Southern England.
I fully realise the difficulties involved in the establishment of such a front. I believe however that in spite of the difficulties it should be formed, not only in the interests of our common cause, but also in the interests of Great Britain herself. This is the most propitious moment for the establishment of such a front, because now Hitler’s forces are diverted to the East and he has not yet had the chance to consolidate the position occupied by him in the East.
It is still easier to establish a front in the North. Here, on the part of Great Britain, would be necessary only naval and air operations, without the landing of troops or artillery. The Soviet military, naval, and air forces would take part in such an operation. We would welcome it if Great Britain could transfer to this theatre of war something like one light division or more of the Norwegian volunteers, who could be used in Northern Norway to organise rebellion against the Germans.
Thus the Russian pressure for the establishment of a Second Front was initiated at the very beginning of our correspondence, and this theme was to recur throughout our subsequent relations with monotonous disregard, except in the Far North, for physical facts. This, my first telegram from Stalin, contained the only sign of compunction I ever perceived in the Soviet attitude. In this he volunteered a defence of the Soviet change of side and of his agreement with Hitler before the outbreak of the war, and dwelt, as I have already done, on the Russians’ strategic need to hold a German deployment as far as possible to the west in Poland in order to gain time for the fullest development of Russian far-drawn military strength. I have never underrated this argument, and could well afford to reply in comprehending terms upon it.
From the first moment I did my utmost to help with munitions and supplies, both by consenting to severe diversions from the United States and by direct British sacrifices. Early in September the equivalent of two Hurricane squadrons were dispatched in H.M.S. Argus to Murmansk, to assist in the defence of the naval base and co-operate with Russian forces in that area. By September 11 the squadrons were in action, and they fought valiantly for three months. I was well aware that in the early days of our alliance there was little we could do, and I tried to fill the void by civilities, and to build up by frequent personal telegrams the same kind of happy relations which I had developed with the President. In this long Moscow series I received many rebuffs and only rarely a kind word. In many cases the telegrams were left unanswered altogether or for many days.
The Soviet Government had the impression that they were conferring a great favour on us by fighting in their own country for their own lives. The more they fought the heavier our debt became. This was not a balanced view. Two or three times in this long correspondence I had to protest in blunt language, but especially against the ill-usage of our sailors, who carried at so much peril the supplies to Murmansk and Archangel. Almost invariably however I bore hectoring and reproaches with “a patient shrug; for sufferance is the badge” of all who have to deal with the Kremlin. Moreover, I made constant allowances for the pressures under which Stalin and his dauntless Russian nation lay.
It will not be possible in this account to do more than place before the reader the salient features of the new colossal struggle of armies and populations which now began. In the first month the Germans bit and tore their way three hundred miles into Russia, but at the end of July there arose a fundamental clash of opinion between Hitler and Brauchitsch, the Commander-in-Chief. Brauchitsch held that Timoshenko’s Army Group, which lay in front of Moscow, constituted the main Russian strength and must first be defeated. This was orthodox doctrine. Thereafter, Brauchitsch contended, Moscow, the main military, political, and industrial nerve centre of all Russia, should be taken. Hitler forcefully disagreed. He wished to gain territory and destroy Russian armies on the broadest front. In the north he demanded the capture of Leningrad, and in the south of the industrial Donetz Basin, the Crimea, and the entry to Russia’s Caucasian oil supplies. Meanwhile Moscow could wait.
After vehement discussion Hitler overruled his Army chiefs. The Northern Army Group, reinforced from the centre, was ordered to press operations against Leningrad. The Central Army Group was relegated to the defensive. They were directed to send a Panzer group southwards to take in flank the Russians who were being pursued across the Dnieper by Rundstedt. In this action the Germans prospered. By early September a vast pocket of Russian forces was forming around Kiev, and over half a million men were killed or captured in the desperate fighting which lasted all that month. In the north no such success could be claimed. Leningrad was encircled but not taken. Hitler’s decision had not been right. He now turned his mind and willpower back to the centre. The besiegers of Leningrad were orde
red to detach mobile forces and part of their supporting air force to reinforce a renewed drive on Moscow. The Panzer group which had been sent south to von Rundstedt came back again to join in the assault. At the end of September the stage was reset for the formerly discarded central thrust, while the southern armies drove on eastward to the lower Don, whence the Caucasus would lie open to them.
But by now there was another side to the tale. Despite their fearful losses Russian resistance remained tough and unbending. Their soldiers fought to the death, and their armies gained in experience and skill. Partisans rose up behind the German fronts and harassed the communications in a merciless warfare. The captured Russian railway system was proving inadequate; the roads were breaking up under the heavy traffic, and movement off the roads after rain was often impossible. Transport vehicles were showing many signs of wear. Barely two months remained before the dreaded Russian winter. Could Moscow be taken in that time? And if it were, would that be enough? Here then was the fateful question. Though Hitler was still elated by the victory at Kiev, the German generals might well feel that their early misgivings were justified. There had been four weeks of delay on what had now become the decisive front. The task of “annihilating the forces of the enemy in White Russia” which had been given to the Central Army Group was still not done.
But as the autumn drew on and the supreme crisis on the Russian front impended the Soviet demands upon us became more insistent.
Lord Beaverbrook returned from the United States having stimulated the already powerful forces making for a stupendous increase in production. He now became the champion in the War Cabinet of Aid to Russia. In this he rendered valuable service. When we remember the pressures that lay upon us to prepare the battle in the Libyan desert, and the deep anxieties about Japan which brooded over all our affairs in Malaya and the Far East, and that everything sent to Russia was subtracted from British vital needs, it was necessary that the Russian claims should be so vehemently championed at the summit of our war thought. I tried to keep the main proportion evenly presented in my own mind, and shared my stresses with my colleagues. We endured the unpleasant process of exposing our own vital security and projects to failure for the sake of our new ally—surly, snarly, grasping, and so lately indifferent to our survival.
I felt that when Beaverbrook and Averell Harriman got back from Washington and we could survey all the prospects of munitions and supplies they should go to Moscow and offer all we could spare and dare. Prolonged and painful discussions took place. The Service departments felt it was like flaying off pieces of their skin. However, we gathered together the utmost in our power, and consented to very large American diversions of all we longed for ourselves in order to make an effective contribution to the resistance of the Soviets. I brought the proposal to send Lord Beaverbrook to Moscow before my colleagues on August 28. The Cabinet were very willing that he should present the case to Stalin, and the President felt himself well represented by Harriman.
As a preliminary to this mission I outlined the position in general terms in a letter to Stalin, and on the evening of September 4 M. Maisky called to see me to deliver his reply. This was the first personal message since July. After thanking us for offering him another two hundred fighter aircraft, he came down to brass tacks.
“… The relative stabilisation at the front which we succeeded in achieving about three weeks ago”, he cabled, “has broken down during the last week, owing to transfer to Eastern front of thirty to thirty-four fresh German infantry divisions and of an enormous quantity of tanks and aircraft, as well as a large increase in activities of the twenty Finnish and twenty-six Roumanian divisions. Germans consider danger in the West a bluff, and are transferring all their forces to the East with impunity, being convinced that no second front exists in the West, and that none will exist. Germans consider it quite possible to smash their enemies singly: first Russia, then the English.
“As a result we have lost more than one-half of the Ukraine, and in addition the enemy is at the gates of Leningrad.…
“I think there is only one means of egress from this situation—to establish in the present year a second front somewhere in the Balkans or France, capable of drawing away from the Eastern Front 30 to 40 divisions, and at the same time of ensuring to the Soviet Union 30,000 tons of aluminium by the beginning of October next and a monthly minimum of aid amounting to 400 aircraft and 500 tanks (of small or medium size).…”
The Soviet Ambassador, who was accompanied by Mr. Eden, stayed and talked with me for an hour and a half. He emphasised in bitter terms how for the last eleven weeks Russia had been bearing the brunt of the German onslaught virtually alone. The Russian armies were now enduring a weight of attack never equalled before. He said that he did not wish to use dramatic language, but this might be a turning-point in history. If Soviet Russia were defeated how could we win the war? M. Maisky emphasised the extreme gravity of the crisis on the Russian front in poignant terms which commanded my sympathy. But when presently I sensed an underlying air of menace in his appeal I was angered. I said to the Ambassador, whom I had known for many years, “Remember that only four months ago we in this Island did not know whether you were not coming in against us on the German side. Indeed, we thought it quite likely that you would. Even then we felt sure we should win in the end. We never thought our survival was dependent on your action either way. Whatever happens, and whatever you do, you of all people have no right to make reproaches to us.” As I warmed to the topic the Ambassador exclaimed, “More calm, please, my dear Mr. Churchill,” but thereafter his tone perceptibly changed.
The discussion went over the ground already covered in the interchange of telegrams. The Ambassador pleaded for an immediate landing on the coast of France or the Low Countries. I explained the military reasons which rendered this impossible, and that it could be no relief to Russia. I said that I had spent five hours that day examining with our experts the means for greatly increasing the capacity of the Trans-Persian railway. I spoke of the Beaverbrook-Harriman Mission and of our resolve to give all the supplies we could spare or carry. Finally Mr. Eden and I told him that we should be ready for our part to make it plain to the Finns that we would declare war upon them if they advanced into Russia beyond their 1918 frontiers. M. Maisky could not of course abandon his appeal for an immediate second front, and it was useless to argue further.
I at once consulted the Cabinet upon the issues raised in this conversation and in Stalin’s message, and that evening sent a reply, of which the following paragraphs are pertinent:
“Although”, I wrote, “we should shrink from no exertion, there is in fact no possibility of any British action in the West, except air action, which would draw the German forces from the East before the winter sets in. There is no chance whatever of a second front being formed in the Balkans without the help of Turkey. I will, if your Excellency desires, give all the reasons which have led our Chiefs of Staff to these conclusions. They have already been discussed with your Ambassador in conference today with the Foreign Secretary and the Chiefs of Staff. Action, however well-meant, leading only to costly fiascos would be no help to anyone but Hitler.…
“We are ready to make joint plans with you now. Whether British armies will be strong enough to invade the mainland of Europe during 1942 must depend on unforeseeable events. It may be possible however to assist you in the extreme North when there is more darkness. We are hoping to raise our armies in the Middle East to a strength of three-quarters of a million before the end of the present year, and thereafter to a million by the summer of 1942. Once the German-Italian forces in Libya have been destroyed all these forces will be available to come into line on your southern flank, and it is hoped to encourage Turkey to maintain at the least a faithful neutrality. Meanwhile we shall continue to batter Germany from the air with increasing severity and to keep the seas open and ourselves alive.…”
I thought the whole matter so important that I sent simultaneously the following
telegram to the President while the impression was fresh in my mind:
“The Soviet Ambassador … used language of vague import about the gravity of the occasion and the turning-point character which would attach to our reply. Although nothing in his language warranted the assumption, we could not exclude the impression that they might be thinking of separate terms.… I feel that the moment may be decisive. We can but do our best.”
On September 15 I received another telegram from Stalin:
“I have no doubt that the British Government desires to see the Soviet Union victorious and is looking for ways and means to attain this end. If, as they think, the establishment of a second front in the West is at present impossible, perhaps another method could be found to render the Soviet Union an active military help?
“It seems to me that Great Britain could without risk land in Archangel twenty-five to thirty divisions, or transport them across Iran [Persia] to the southern regions of the U.S.S.R. In this way there could be established military collaboration between the Soviet and British troops on the territory of the U.S.S.R. A similar situation existed during the last war in France. The arrangement mentioned would constitute a great help. It would be a serious blow against the Hitler aggression.…”
It is almost incredible that the head of the Russian Government with all the advice of their military experts could have committed himself to such absurdities. It seemed hopeless to argue with a man thinking in terms of utter unreality, and I sent the best answer I could.
The Second World War Page 61