General Wilson was eager for action, and plans and preparations for the capture of Rhodes had been perfected in the Middle East Command over several months. In August the 8th Indian Division had been trained and rehearsed in the operation, and was made ready to sail on September 1. But the American pressure to disperse our trained assault shipping from the Mediterranean, either westwards for the preparations for a still remote “Overlord” or to the Indian theatre, was very strong. Agreements made before the Italian collapse and appropriate to a totally different situation were rigorously invoked, at least at the secondary level, and on August 26, in pursuance of a minor decision at the Washington Conference in the previous May, the Combined Chiefs of Staff ordered the dispatch to the Far East, for an operation against the coast of Burma, of the shipping that could have transported the division to Rhodes. Thus Wilson’s well-conceived plans for rapid action in the Dodecanese were harshly upset. He had sent with great promptitude small parties by sea and air to a number of other islands, but once Rhodes was denied to us our gains throughout the Ægean became precarious. Only a powerful use of air forces could give us what we needed. It would have taken very little of their time had there been accord. General Eisenhower and his staff seemed unaware of what lay at our finger-tips, although we had voluntarily placed all our considerable resources entirely in their hands.
We now know how deeply the Germans were alarmed at the deadly threat which they expected us to develop on their south-eastern flank. At a conference at the Fuehrer’s headquarters on September 24 both the Army and the Navy representatives strongly urged the evacuation of Crete and other islands in the ïgean while there was still time. They pointed out that these advanced bases had been seized for offensive operations in the Eastern Mediterranean, but that now the situation was entirely changed. They stressed the need to avoid the loss of troops and material which would be of decisive importance for the defence of the continent. Hitler overruled them. He insisted that he could not order evacuation, particularly of Crete and the Dodecanese, because of the political repercussions which would follow. He said, “The attitude of our allies in the south-east and Turkey’s attitude is determined solely by their confidence in our strength. Abandonment of the islands would create a most unfavourable impression.” In this decision to fight for the Ægean islands he was justified by events. He gained large profits in a subsidiary theatre at small cost to the main strategic position. In the Balkans he was wrong. In the Ægean he was right.
For a time our affairs prospered in the outlying small islands. By the end of September Cos, Leros, and Samos were occupied by a battalion each, and detachments occupied a number of other islands. Italian garrisons, where encountered, were friendly enough, but their vaunted coast and anti-aircraft defences were found to be in poor shape, and the transport of our own heavier weapons and vehicles was hardly possible with the shipping at our disposal.
Apart from Rhodes, the island of Cos was strategically the most important. It alone had an airfield from which our fighter aircraft could operate. This was rapidly brought into use and twenty-four Bofors guns landed for its defence. Naturally it became the objective of the first enemy counter-attack, and at dawn on October 3 German parachutists descended on the central airfield and overwhelmed the solitary company defending it. The rest of the battalion, in the north of the island, was cut off by an enemy landing from the sea which the Navy, by an unlucky event, had been unable to intercept. The island fell.
On September 22 Wilson reported his minimum and modest needs for a new attempt on Rhodes. Using the 10th Indian Division and part of an armoured brigade, he required only naval escorts and bombarding forces, three L.S.T.s (Landing Ship, Tanks), a few motor transport ships, a hospital ship, and enough transport aircraft to lift one parachute battalion. I was greatly troubled at our inability to support these operations, and cabled for help to General Eisenhower. The small aids needed seemed very little to ask from our American friends. The concessions which they had made to my unceasing pressure during the last three months had been rewarded by astounding success. The landing-craft for a single division, a few days’ assistance from the main Allied Air Force, and Rhodes would be ours. The Germans, who had now regripped the situation, had moved many of their planes to the Ægean to frustrate the very purpose which I had in mind. On October 7 I also laid the issue before the President in its full scope, but was pained to receive a telegram which practically amounted to a refusal, and left me, already committed, with his and the American Chiefs of Staff’s approval, to face the impending blow. The negative forces which hitherto had been so narrowly overcome had indeed resumed their control. This is what Mr. Roosevelt said:
I do not want to force on Eisenhower diversions which limit the prospects for the early successful development of the Italian operations to a secure line north of Rome.
I am opposed to any diversion which will in Eisenhower’s opinion jeopardise the security of his current situation in Italy, the build-up of which is exceedingly slow, considering the well-known characteristics of his opponent, who enjoys a marked superiority in ground troops and Panzer divisions.
It is my opinion that no diversion of forces or equipment should prejudice “Overlord” as planned. The American Chiefs of Staff agree. I am transmitting a copy of this message to Eisenhower.
I noticed in particular the sentence “It is my opinion that no diversion of forces or equipment should prejudice ‘Overlord’ as planned”. To pretend that the delay of six weeks in the return of nine landing-craft for “Overlord” out of over five hundred involved, which would in any case have had six months in hand, would compromise the main operation of May 1944 was to reject all sense of proportion. On October 8 I therefore made a further earnest appeal. Looking back upon the far-reaching favourable results which had followed from my journey with General Marshall to Algiers in June, from which the whole of our good fortune had sprung, I thought I might ask for the same procedure, and I made all preparations to fly at once to Tunis. where the Commanders-in-Chief were now assembling in conference.
But Mr. Roosevelt’s reply quenched my last hopes. He thought my attendance would be inappropriate. I accordingly cancelled my proposed flight. At the critical moment of the conference information was received that Hitler had decided to reinforce his army in Italy and fight a main battle south of Rome. This tipped the scales against the small reinforcement required for the attack on Rhodes.
Although I could understand how, in the altered situation, the opinion of the generals engaged in our Italian campaign had been affected, I remained—and remain—in my heart unconvinced that the capture of Rhodes could not have been fitted in. Nevertheless, with one of the sharpest pangs I suffered in the war I submitted. If one has to submit it is wasteful not to do so with the best grace possible. When so many grave issues were pending I could not risk any jar in my personal relations with the President. I therefore took advantage of the news from Italy to accept what I thought, and think, to have been an improvident decision.
Nothing was gained by all the over-caution. The capture of Rome proved to be eight months distant. Twenty times the quantity of shipping that would have helped to take Rhodes in a fortnight was employed throughout the autumn and winter to move the Anglo-American heavy bomber bases from Africa to Italy. Rhodes remained a thorn in our side. Turkey, witnessing the extraordinary inertia of the Allies near her shores, became much less forthcoming, and denied us her airfields.
The American Staff had enforced their view; the price had now to be paid by the British. Although we strove to maintain our position in Leros the fate of our small force there was virtually sealed. The garrison was brought up to the strength of a brigade—three fine battalions of British infantry who had undergone the whole siege and famine of Malta* and were still regaining their physical weight and strength. The Admiralty did their best, and General Eisenhower dispatched two groups of long-range fighters to the Middle East as a temporary measure. There they soon made their presence felt. But
on October 11 they were withdrawn. Thereafter the enemy had air mastery, and it was only by night that our ships could operate without crippling loss. Early on November 12 German troops came ashore, and in the afternoon six hundred parachutists cut the defence in two. In the last stages the garrison of Samos, the 2nd Royal West Kents, had been dispatched to Leros, but all was over. They fell themselves a prey. With little air support of their own and heavily attacked by enemy aircraft, the battalions fought on till the evening of the 16th, when, exhausted, they could fight no more. Thus this fine brigade of troops fell into enemy power. All our hopes in the Ægean were for the time being ended. We tried at once to evacuate the small garrisons in Samos and other islands, and to rescue survivors from Leros. Over a thousand British and Greek troops were brought off, as well as many friendly Italians and German prisoners, but our naval losses were again severe. Six destroyers and two submarines were sunk by aircraft or mine and four cruisers and four destroyers damaged. These trials were shared by the Greek Navy, which played a gallant part throughout.
I have recounted the painful episodes of Rhodes and Leros in some detail. They constitute, happily on a small scale, the most acute difference I ever had with General Eisenhower. For many months, in the face of endless resistances, I had cleared the way for his successful campaign in Italy. Instead of only gaining Sardinia, we had established a large group of armies on the Italian mainland. Corsica was a bonus in our hands. We had drawn an important part of the German reserves away from other theatres. The Italian people and Government had come over to our side. Italy had declared war on Germany. Their Fleet was added to our own. Mussolini was a fugitive. The liberation of Rome seemed not far distant. Nineteen German divisions, abandoned by their Italian comrades, lay scattered through the Balkans, in which we had not used a thousand officers and men. The date for “Overlord” had not been decisively affected.
I had been instrumental in finding from the British and Imperial forces in Egypt four first-class divisions over and above those which had been deemed possible. Not only had we aided General Eisenhower’s Anglo-American Staff upon their victorious career, but we had furnished them with substantial unexpected resources, without which disaster might well have occurred. I was grieved that the small requests I had made for strategic purposes almost as high as those already achieved should have been so obdurately resisted and rejected. Of course, when you are winning a war almost everything that happens can be claimed to be right and wise. It would however have been easy, but for pedantic denials in the minor sphere, to have added the control of the Ægean, and very likely the accession of Turkey, to all the fruits of the Italian campaign.
At the same time, on Kesselring’s advice, Hitler changed his mind about his Italian strategy. Till then he had meant to withdraw his forces behind Rome and hold only Northern Italy. Now he ordered them to fight as far south as possible. The line selected, the so-called “Winterstellung”, ran behind the river Sangro, on the Adriatic side, across the mountainous spine of Italy, to the mouth of the Garigliano on the west. The natural features of the country, its steep mountains and swift rivers, made this position, several miles in depth, immensely strong. After a year of almost continuous retreat in Africa, Sicily, and Italy the German troops were glad to turn about and fight. They now had nineteen divisions in Italy, and the Allies the equivalent of thirteen. Large reinforcements and much consolidation were required to hold our rapid and brilliant conquests. All this put a strain on our shipping. The first probing efforts at the German line met with little success. Our men had been fighting hard for two months, the weather was shocking, and the troops needed rest and re-grouping. Bridgeheads were thrown across the river, but the main enemy defences lay on high ground beyond. Bad weather, with rain, mud, and swollen rivers, postponed the Eighth Army attack until November 28, but then it made good progress. After a week of heavy fighting we were established ten miles beyond the Sangro. But the enemy still held firm, and more reinforcements came to them from Northern Italy. Some more ground was gained during December, but no vital objectives were taken, and winter weather brought active operations to a close. The U.S. Fifth Army (which included the British Xth Corps), under General Clark, struggled on up the road towards Cassino, and attacked the foremost defences of the German main positions. The enemy were strongly posted on mountains overlooking the road on either side. The formidable Monte Cassino massif to the west was attacked and finally cleared after a tough struggle. But it was not till the beginning of the New Year that the Fifth Army was fully aligned along the river Garigliano and its tributary, the Rapido, where it faced the heights of Cassino and the famous monastery.
Thus the position in Italy was changed greatly to our disadvantage. The Germans were strongly reinforced and ordered to resist instead of to withdraw. The Allies, on the contrary, were sending eight of their best divisions from Italy and the Mediterranean back to England for the cross-Channel attack in 1944. The four extra divisions I was gathering or had sent did not repair the loss. A deadlock supervened, and was not relieved during eight months of severe fighting.
Nevertheless, in spite of these disappointments, the Italian campaign had attracted to itself twenty good German divisions. I had called it the Third Front. If the garrisons kept in the Balkans for fear of attack there are added, nearly forty divisions were retained facing the Allies in the Mediterranean. Our Second Front, North-West Europe, had not yet flared into battle, but its existence was real. About thirty divisions was the least number ever opposite it, and this rose to sixty as the invasion loomed closer. Our strategic bombing from Britain forced the enemy to divert great numbers of men and masses of material to defend their homeland. These were not negligible contributions to the Russians on what they had every right to call the First Front.
I must end this chapter with a summary.
In this period in the war all the great strategic combinations of the Western Powers were restricted and distorted by the shortage of tank landing-craft for the transport, not so much of tanks, but of vehicles of all kinds. The letters “L.S.T.” (Landing Ship, Tanks) are burnt in upon the minds of all those who dealt with military affairs in this period. We had invaded Italy in strong force. We had an army there which, if not supported, might be entirely cast away, giving Hitler the greatest triumph he had had since the fall of France. On the other hand, there could be no question of our not making the “Overlord” attack in 1944. The utmost I asked for was an easement, if necessary, of two months—i.e., from some time in May 1944 to some time in July. This would meet the problem of the landing-craft. Instead of their having to return to England in the late autumn of 1943 before the winter gales, they could go in the early spring of 1944. If however the May date were insisted upon pedantically, and interpreted as May 1, the peril to the Allied Army in Italy seemed beyond remedy. If some of the landing-craft earmarked for “Overlord” were allowed to stay in the Mediterranean over the winter there would be no difficulty in making a success of the Italian campaign. There were masses of troops not in action in the Mediterranean: three or four French divisions, two or three American divisions, at least four (including the Poles) British or British-controlled divisions. The one thing that stood between these and effective operation in Italy was the L.S.T.s, and the main thing that stood between us and the L.S.T.s was the insistence upon an early date for their return to Britain.
The reader of this narrative must not be misled into thinking (a) that I wanted to abandon “Overlord”, (b) that I wanted to deprive “Overlord” of vital forces, or (c) that I contemplated a campaign by armies operating in the Balkan peninsula. These are legends. Never had such a wish entered my mind. Give me an easement of six weeks or two months from May 1 in the date of “Overlord” and I could for several months use the landing-craft in the Mediterranean in order to bring really effective forces to bear in Italy, and thus not only take Rome but draw off German divisions from either or both the Russian and Normandy fronts. All these matters had been discussed in Washington without
regard to the limited character of the issues with which my argument was concerned.
As we shall see presently, in the end everything that I asked for was done. The landing-craft not only were made available for upkeep in the Mediterranean; they were even allowed a further latitude for the sake of the Aftzio operation in January. This in no way prevented the successful launching of “Overlord” on June 6 with adequate forces. What happened however was that the long fight about trying to get these small easements and to prevent the scrapping of one vast front in order to conform to a rigid date upon the other led to prolonged, unsatisfactory operations in Italy.
CHAPTER V
ARCTIC CONVOYS
THE year 1942 had closed in Arctic waters with a spirited action by British destroyers escorting a convoy to North Russia, which had led to a crisis in the German High Command and the dismissal of Admiral Raeder from control of naval affairs. Between January and March, in the remaining months of almost perpetual darkness, two more convoys of forty-two ships, and six ships sailing independently, set out on this hazardous voyage. Forty arrived. During the same period thirty-six ships were safely brought back from Russian ports and five were lost. The return of daylight made it easier for the enemy to attack the convoys. What was left of the German Fleet, including the Tirpitz, was now concentrated in Norwegian waters, and presented a formidable and continuing threat along a large part of the route. The Atlantic battle with the U-boats was moving to a violent crisis. The strain on our destroyers was more than we could bear. The March convoy had to be postponed, and in April the Admiralty proposed, and I agreed, that supplies to Russia by this route should be suspended till the autumn darkness.
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