The first plenary meeting was held at the Soviet Embassy on Sunday, November 28, at 4 p.m. The conference room was spacious and handsome, and we seated ourselves at a large, round table. I had with me Eden, Dill, the three Chiefs of Staff, and Ismay. The President had Harry Hopkins, Admiral Leahy, Admiral King, and two other officers. General Marshall and General Arnold were not present: “they had misunderstood the time of the meeting,” says Hopkins’ biographer, “and had gone off on a sight-seeing tour round Teheran.” I had my admirable interpreter of the previous year, Major Birse. Pavlov again performed this service for the Soviets, and Mr. Bohlen, a new figure, for the United States. Molotov and Marshal Voroshilov alone accompanied Stalin. He and I sat almost opposite one another. The discussion on this first day came to a crucial point. The record says:
Marshal Stalin addressed the following questions to the Prime Minister:
Question: “Am I right in thinking that the invasion of France is to be undertaken by thirty-five divisions?”
Answer: “Yes. Particularly strong divisions.”
Question: “Is it intended that this operation should be carried out by the forces now in Italy?”
Answer: “No. Seven divisions have already been, or are in process of being, withdrawn from Italy and North Africa to take part in ‘Overlord’. These seven divisions are required to make up the thirty-five divisions mentioned in your first question. After they have been withdrawn about twenty-two divisions will be left in the Mediterranean for Italy or other objectives. Some of these could be used either for an operation against Southern France or for moving from the head of the Adriatic towards the Danube. Both these operations will be timed in conformity with ‘Overlord’. Meanwhile it should not be difficult to spare two or three divisions to take the islands in the Ægean.”
The formal conferences were interspersed with what may be thought to be even more important talks between Roosevelt, Stalin, and myself at luncheons and dinners. Here there were very few things that could not be said and received in good humour. On this night the President was our host for dinner. We were a party of ten or eleven, including the interpreters, and conversation soon became general and serious.
After dinner, when we were strolling about the room, I led Stalin to a sofa and suggested that we talk for a little on what was to happen after the war was won. He assented, and we sat down. Eden joined us. “Let us,” said the Marshal, “first consider the worst that might happen.” He thought that Germany had every possibility of recovering from this war, and might start on a new one within a comparatively short time. He feared the revival of German nationalism. After Versailles peace had seemed assured, but Germany had recovered very quickly. We must therefore establish a strong body to prevent Germany starting a new war. He was convinced that she would recover. When I asked, “How soon?” he replied, “Within fifteen to twenty years.” I said that the world must be made safe for at least fifty years. If it was only for fifteen to twenty years then we should have betrayed our soldiers.
Stalin thought we should consider restraints on Germany’s manufacturing capacity. The Germans were an able people, very industrious and resourceful, and they would recover quickly. I replied that there would have to be certain measures of control. I would forbid them all aviation, civil and military, and I would forbid the General Staff system. “Would you,” asked Stalin, “also forbid the existence of watchmakers’ and furniture factories for making parts of shells? The Germans produced toy rifles which were used for teaching hundreds of thousands of men how to shoot.”
“Nothing,” I said, “is final. The world rolls on. We have now learnt something. Our duty is to make the world safe for at least fifty years by German disarmament, by preventing rearmament, by supervision of German factories, by forbidding all aviation, and by territorial changes of a far-reaching character. It all comes back to the question whether Great Britain, the United States, and the U.S.S.R. can keep a close friendship and supervise Germany in their mutual interest. We ought not to be afraid to give orders as soon as we see any danger.”
“There was control after the last war,” said Stalin, “but it failed.”
“We were inexperienced then,” I replied. “The last war was not to the same extent a national war, and Russia was not a party at the Peace Conference. It will be different this time.” I had a feeling that Prussia should be isolated and reduced, that Bavaria, Austria, and Hungary might form a broad, peaceful, unaggressive confederation. I thought Prussia should be dealt with more sternly than the other parts of the Reich, which might thus be influenced against throwing in their lot with her. It must be remembered that these were war-time moods.
“All very good, but insufficient,” was Stalin’s comment.
Russia, I continued, would have her Army, Great Britain and the United States their Navies and Air Forces. In addition, all three Powers would have their other resources. All would be strongly armed, and must not assume any obligation to disarm. “We are the trustees for the peace of the world. If we fail there will be perhaps a hundred years of chaos. If we are strong we can carry out our trusteeship. There is more,” I went on, “than merely keeping the peace. The three Powers should guide the future of the world. I do not want to enforce any system on other nations. I ask for freedom and for the right of all nations to develop as they like. We three must remain friends in order to ensure happy homes in all countries.”
Stalin asked again what was to happen to Germany.
I replied that I was not against the toilers in Germany, but only against the leaders and against dangerous combinations. He said that there were many toilers in the German divisions who fought under orders. When he asked German prisoners who came from the labouring classes (such is the record, but he probably meant “Communist Party”) why they fought for Hitler they replied that they were carrying out orders. He shot such prisoners.
I then suggested we should discuss the Polish question. He agreed and invited me to begin. I said that we had declared war on account of Poland. Poland was therefore important to us. Nothing was more important than the security of the Russian western frontier. But I had given no pledges about frontiers. I wanted heart-to-heart talks with the Russians about this. When Marshal Stalin felt like telling us what he thought about it the matter could be discussed and we could reach some agreement, and the Marshal should tell me what was necessary for the defence of the western frontiers of Russia. After this war in Europe, which might end in 1944, the Soviet Union would be overwhelmingly strong and Russia would have a great responsibility in any decision she took with regard to Poland. Personally I thought Poland might move westwards, like soldiers taking two steps “left close”. If Poland trod on some German toes that could not be helped, but there must be a strong Poland. Poland was an instrument needed in the orchestra of Europe.
Stalin said the Polish people had their culture and their language, which must exist. They could not be extirpated.
“Are we to try,” I asked, “to draw frontier lines?”
“Yes.”
“I have no power from Parliament, nor, I believe, has the President, to define any frontier lines. But we might now, in Teheran, see if the three heads of Governments, working in agreement, could form some sort of policy which we could recommend to the Poles and advise them to accept.”
Stalin asked whether this was possible without Polish participation. I said “Yes”, and that when this was all informally agreed between ourselves we could go to the Poles later. Mr. Eden here remarked that he had been much struck by Stalin’s statement that afternoon that the Poles could go as far west as the Oder. He saw hope in that and was much encouraged. Stalin asked whether we thought he was going to swallow Poland up. Eden said he did not know how much the Russians were going to eat. How much would they leave undigested? Stalin said the Russians did not want anything belonging to other people, although they might have a bite at Germany. Eden said that what Poland lost in the east she might gain in the west. Stalin replied that possibly
she might, but he did not know. I then demonstrated with the help of three matches my idea of Poland moving westwards. This pleased Stalin, and on this note our group parted for the moment.
The morning of the 29th was occupied by a conference of the British, Soviet, and American military chiefs. As I knew that Stalin and Roosevelt had already had a private conversation, and were in fact staying at the same Embassy, I suggested that the President and I might lunch together before the second plenary meeting that afternoon. Roosevelt however declined, and sent Harriman to me to explain that he did not want Stalin to know that he and I were meeting privately. I was surprised at this, for I thought we all three should treat each other with equal confidence. The President after luncheon had a further interview with Stalin and Molotov, at which many important matters were discussed, including particularly Mr. Roosevelt’s plan for the government of the post-war world. This should be carried out by the “Four Policemen”, namely, the U.S.S.R., the United States, Great Britain, and China. Stalin did not react favourably to this. He said the “Four Policemen” would not be welcomed by the small nations of Europe. He did not believe that China would be very powerful when the war ended, and even if she were European States would resent having China as an enforcement authority for themselves. In this the Soviet leader certainly showed himself more prescient and possessed of a truer sense of values than the President. When Stalin proposed as an alternative that there should be one committee for Europe and another for the Far East—the European committee to consist of Britain, Russia, the United States, and possibly one other European nation—the President replied that this was somewhat similar to my idea of regional committees, one for Europe, one for the Far East, and one for the Americas. He does not seem to have made it clear that I also contemplated a Supreme United Nations Council, of which the three regional committees would be the components. As I was not informed till much later of what had taken place I was not able to correct this erroneous presentation.
Before our second plenary session began at four o’clock I presented, by the King’s command, the Sword of Honour which His Majesty had had specially designed and wrought to commemorate the glorious defence of Stalingrad. The large outer hall was filled with Russian officers and soldiers. When, after a few sentences of explanation, I handed the splendid weapon to Stalin he raised it in a most impressive gesture to his lips and kissed the scabbard. He then passed it to Voro-shilov, who dropped it. It was carried from the room in great solemnity escorted by a Russian guard of honour. As this procession moved away I saw the President sitting at the side of the room, obviously stirred by the ceremony. We then moved to the conference chamber and took our seats again at the round table, this time with all the Chiefs of Staff, who now reported the result of their morning’s labours.
In the discussions which followed I reminded Stalin of the three conditions on which the success of “Overlord” depended. First, there must be a satisfactory reduction in the strength of the German fighter force in North-West Europe between now and the assault. Secondly, German reserves in France and the Low Countries must not be more on the day of the assault than about twelve full-strength first-quality mobile divisions. Thirdly, it must not be possible for the Germans to transfer from other fronts more than fifteen first-quality divisions during the first sixty days of the operation. To obtain these conditions we should have to hold as many Germans as possible in Italy and Yugoslavia. If Turkey entered the war, this would be an added help, but not an essential condition. The Germans now in Italy had for the most part come from France. If we slackened off our pressure in Italy they would go back again. We must continue to engage the enemy on the only front where at present we could fight them. If we engaged them as fiercely as possible during the winter months in the Mediterranean this would make the best possible contribution towards creating the conditions needed for a successful “Overlord”.
Stalin asked what would happen if there were thirteen or fourteen mobile divisions in France and more than fifteen available from other fronts. Would this rule out “Overlord”?
I said, “No, certainly not.”
Before we separated Stalin looked at me across the table and said, “I wish to pose a very direct question to the Prime Minister about ‘Overlord’. Do the Prime Minister and the British Staff really believe in ‘Overlord’?” I replied, “Provided the conditions previously stated for ‘Overlord’ are established when the time comes, it will be our stern duty to hurl across the Channel against the Germans every sinew of our strength.” On this we separated.
CHAPTER VII
TEHERAN: CRUX AND CONCLUSIONS
NOVEMBER 30 was for me a crowded and memorable day. It was my sixty-ninth birthday, and was passed almost entirely in transacting some of the most important business with which I have ever been concerned. The fact that the President was in private contact with Marshal Stalin and dwelling at the Soviet Embassy, and that he had avoided ever seeing me alone since we left Cairo, in spite of our hitherto intimate relations and the way in which our vital affairs were interwoven, led me to seek a direct personal interview with Stalin. I felt that the Russian leader was not deriving a true impression of the British attitude. The false idea was forming in his mind that, to put it shortly, “Churchill and the British Staffs mean to stop ‘Overlord’ if they can, because they want to invade the Balkans instead.” It was my duty to remove this double misconception.
The exact date of “Overlord” depended upon the movements of a comparatively small number of landing-craft. These landing-craft were not required for any operation in the Balkans. The President had committed us to an operation against the Japanese in the Bay of Bengal. If this were cancelled there would be enough landing-craft for all I wanted, namely, the amphibious power to land against opposition two divisions at a time on the coasts of Italy or Southern France, and also to carry out “Overlord” as planned in May. I had agreed with the President that May should be the month, and he had, for his part, given up the specific date of May 1. This would give me the time I needed. If I could persuade the President to obtain relief from his promise to Chiang Kai-shek and drop the Bay of Bengal plan, which had never been mentioned in our Teheran conferences, there would be enough landing-craft both for the Mediterranean and for a punctual “Overlord”. In the event the great landings began on June 6, but this date was decided much later on, not by any requirements of mine, but by the moon and the weather. I also succeeded when we returned to Cairo, as will be seen, in persuading the President to abandon the enterprise in the Bay of Bengal. I therefore consider that I got what I deemed imperative. But this was far from certain at Teheran on this November morning. I was determined that Stalin should know the main facts. I did not feel entitled to tell him that the President and I had agreed upon May for “Overlord”. I knew that Roosevelt wanted to tell him this himself at our luncheon which was to follow my conversation with the Marshal.
The following is founded upon the record made by Major Birse, my trusted interpreter, of my private talk with Stalin.
I began by reminding the Marshal that I was half American and had a great affection for the American people. What I was going to say was not to be understood as disparaging to the Americans, and I would be perfectly loyal towards them, but there were things which it was better to say outright between two persons.
We had a preponderance of troops over the Americans in the Mediterranean. There were two or three times more British troops than American there. That was why I was anxious that the armies in the Mediterranean should not be hamstrung if it could be avoided. I wanted to use them all the time. In Italy there were some thirteen to fourteen divisions, of which nine or ten were British. There were two armies, the Fifth Anglo-American Army, and the Eighth Army, which was entirely British. The choice had been represented as keeping to the date of “Overlord” or pressing on with the operations in the Mediterranean. But that was not the whole story. The Americans wanted me to undertake an amphibious operation in the Bay of Bengal against th
e Japanese in March. I was not keen about it. If we had the landing-craft needed for the Bay of Bengal in the Mediterranean we should have enough to do all we wanted there and still be able to keep to an early date for “Overlord”. It was not a choice between the Mediterranean and the date of “Overlord”, but between the Bay of Bengal and the date of “Overlord”. However, the Americans had pinned us down to a date for “Overlord” and operations in the Mediterranean had suffered in the last two months. Our army in Italy was somewhat disheartened by the removal of seven divisions. We had sent home three divisions, and the Americans were sending four of theirs, all in preparation for “Overlord”. That was why we had not been able to take full advantage of the Italian collapse. But it also proved the earnestness of our preparations for “Overlord”. Stalin said that was good.
I then turned to the question of landing-craft, and explained once again how and why they were the bottle-neck. We had plenty of troops in the Mediterranean, even after the removal of the seven divisions, and there would be an adequate invading British and American army in the United Kingdom. All turned on landing-craft. When Stalin had made his momentous announcement two days before about Russia’s coming into the war against Japan after Hitler’s surrender I had immediately suggested to the Americans that they might find more landing-craft for the operations we had been asked to carry out in the Indian Ocean, or that they might send some landing-craft from the Pacific to help the first lift of “Overlord”. In that case there might be enough for all. But the Americans were very touchy about the Pacific. I had pointed out to them that Japan would be beaten much sooner if Russia joined in the war against her, and that they could therefore afford to give us more help.
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