So when Stalin now asked how Germany was to be dismembered, I said it was much too complicated to be settled in five or six days. It would require a very searching examination of the historical, ethnographical, and economic facts, and prolonged review by a special committee, which would go into the different proposals and advise on them. There was so much to consider. What to do with Prussia? What territory should be given to Poland and the U.S.S.R.? Who was to control the Rhine valley and the great industrial zones of the Ruhr and the Saar? A body should be set up at once to examine these matters, and we ought to have its report before reaching any final decision. Mr. Roosevelt suggested asking our Foreign Secretaries to produce a plan for studying the question within twenty-four hours and a definite plan for dismemberment within a month. Here, for a time, the matter was left.
We then arranged to meet next day and consider two topics which were to dominate our future discussions, namely, the Dumbarton Oaks scheme for world security and Poland.
As has been recorded in an earlier chapter, the conference at Dumbarton Oaks had ended without reaching complete agreement about the all-important question of voting rights in the Security Council, and space now forbids more than a reference to some of the salient points in our discussions. Stalin said he feared that, though the three Great Powers were allies to-day, and would none of them commit any act of aggression, in ten years or less the three leaders would disappear and a new generation would come into power which had not experienced the war and would forget what we had gone through. “All of us”, he declared, “want to secure peace for at least fifty years. The greatest danger is conflict among ourselves, because if we remain united the German menace is not very important. Therefore we must now think how to secure our unity in the future, and how to guarantee that the three Great Powers (and possibly China and France) will maintain a united front. Some system must be elaborated to prevent conflict between the main Great Powers.” The Russians were accused of talking too much about voting. It was true they thought it was very important, because everything would be decided by vote and they would be greatly interested in the results. Suppose, for instance, that China as a permanent member of the Security Council demanded the return of Hong Kong, or Egypt demanded the return of the Suez Canal, he assumed they would not be alone and would have friends and perhaps protectors in the Assembly or in the Council, and he feared that such disputes might break the unity of the three Great Powers.
“My colleagues in Moscow cannot forget what happened in December 1939, during the Russo-Finnish War, when the British and the French used the League of Nations against us and succeeded in isolating and expelling the Soviet Union from the League, and when they later mobilised against us and talked of a crusade against Russia. Cannot we have some guarantees that this sort of thing will not happen again?”
After much striving and explanation, we persuaded him to accept an American scheme whereby the Security Council would be virtually powerless unless the “Big Four” were unanimous. If the United States, the U.S.S.R., Great Britain or China disagreed on any major topic then any one of them could refuse their assent and stop the Council doing anything. Here was the Veto. Posterity may judge the results.
I myself have always held the view that the foundation of a World Instrument should be sought on a regional basis. Most of the principal regions suggest themselves—the United States, United Europe, the British Commonwealth and Empire, the Soviet Union, South America. Others are more difficult at present to define—like the Asian group or groups, or the African group—but could be developed with study. But the object would be to have many issues of fierce local controversy thrashed out in the Regional Council, which would then send three or four representatives to the Supreme Body, choosing men of the greatest eminence. This would make a Supreme Group of thirty or forty world statesmen, each responsible not only for representing their own region but for dealing with world causes, and primarily the prevention of war. What we have now is not effective for that outstanding purpose. The summoning of all nations, great and small, powerful or powerless, on even terms to the central body may be compared with the organisation of an army without any division between the High Command and the divisional and brigade commanders. All are invited to the headquarters. Babel, tempered by skilful lobbying, is all that has resulted up to the present. But we must persevere.
CHAPTER XXIII
RUSSIA AND POLAND: THE SOVIET PROMISE
POLAND was discussed at no fewer than seven out of the eight plenary meetings of the Yalta Conference, and the British record contains an interchange on this topic of nearly eighteen thousand words between Stalin, Roosevelt, and myself. Aided by our Foreign Ministers and their subordinates, who also held tense and detailed debate at separate meetings among themselves, we finally produced a declaration* which represented both a promise to the world and agreement between ourselves on our future actions. The painful tale is still unfinished and the true facts are as yet imperfectly known, but what is here set down may perhaps contribute to a just appreciation of our efforts at the last but one of the war-time Conferences. The difficulties and the problems were ancient, multitudinous, and imperative. The Soviet-sponsored Lublin Government of Poland, or the “Warsaw” Government as the Russians of all names preferred to call it, viewed the London Polish Government with bitter animosity. Feeling between them had got worse, not better, since our October meeting in Moscow. Soviet troops were flooding across Poland, and the Polish Underground Army was freely charged with the murder of Russian soldiers and with sabotage and attacks on their rear areas and their lines of communication. Both access and information were denied to the Western Powers. In Italy and on the Western Front over 150,000 Poles were fighting valiantly for the final destruction of the Nazi armies. They and many others elsewhere in Europe were eagerly looking forward to the liberation of their country and a return to their homeland from voluntary and honourable exile. The large community of Poles in the United States anxiously awaited a settlement between the three Great Powers.
The questions which we discussed may be summarised as follows:
How to form a single Provisional Government for Poland.
How and when to hold free elections.
How to settle the Polish frontiers, both in the east and the west. How to safeguard the rear areas and lines of communication of the advancing Soviet armies.
Poland had indeed been the most urgent reason for the Yalta Conference, and was to prove the first of the great causes which led to the breakdown of the Grand Alliance. I myself was sure that a strong, free, and independent Poland was much more important than particular territorial boundaries. I wanted the Poles to be able to live freely and live their own lives in their own way. It was for this that we had gone to war against Germany in 1939. It had nearly cost us our life, not only as an Empire but as a nation, and when we met on February 6, 1945, I posed the question as follows: Could we not create a Government or governmental instrument for Poland, pending full and free elections, which could be recognised by all? Such a Government could prepare for a free vote of the Polish people on their future constitution and administration. If this could be done we should have taken one great step forward towards the future peace and prosperity of Central Europe.
In the debate which followed, Stalin claimed to understand our attitude. For the British, he said, Poland was a question of honour, but for the Russians it was a question both of honour and security; of honour because they had had many conflicts with the Poles and they wished to eliminate the causes of such conflicts; of security, because Poland was on the frontiers of Russia, and throughout history Poland had been a corridor through which Russia’s enemies had passed to attack her. The Germans had done this twice during the last thirty years and they had been able to do it because Poland was weak. Russia wanted her to be strong and powerful so that she could shut this corridor of her own strength. Russia could not keep it shut from the outside. It could only be shut from the inside by Poland herself. This was a ma
tter of life and death for the Soviet State.
As for her frontiers, Stalin went on to say that the President had suggested some modification of the Curzon Line and that Lvov and perhaps certain other districts should be given to Poland, and I had said that this would be a gesture of magnanimity. But he pointed out that the Curzon Line had not been invented by the Russians. It had been drawn up by Curzon and Clemenceau and representatives of the United States at the conference in 1918, to which Russia had not been invited. The Curzon Line had been accepted against the will of Russia on the basis of ethnographical data. Lenin had not agreed with it. The Russians had already retired from Lenin’s position, and now some people wanted Russia to take less than Curzon and Clemenceau had conceded. That would be shameful. When the Ukrainians came to Moscow they would say that Stalin and Molotov were less trustworthy defenders of Russia than Curzon or Clemenceau. It was better that the war should continue a little longer, although it would cost Russia much blood, so that Poland could be compensated at Germany’s expense. When Mikolajczyk had been in Russia during October he had asked what frontier for Poland Russia would recognise in the west, and he had been delighted to hear that Russia thought that the western frontier of Poland should be extended to the Neisse. There were two rivers of that name, said Stalin, one near Breslau, and another farther west. It was the Western Neisse he had in mind.
When we met again on February 7 I reminded my hearers that I had always qualified the moving of the Polish frontier westwards by saying that the Poles should be free to take territory in the west, but not more than they wished or could properly manage. It would be a great pity to stuff the Polish goose so full of German food that it died of indigestion. A large body of opinion in Great Britain was shocked at the idea of moving millions of people by force. Great success had been achieved in disentangling the Greek and Turkish populations after the last war, and the two countries had enjoyed good relations ever since; but in that case under a couple of millions of people had been moved. If Poland took East Prussia and Silesia as far as the Oder that alone would mean moving six million Germans back to Germany. It might be managed, subject to the moral question, which I would have to settle with my own people.
Stalin said there were no Germans in these areas, as they had all run away.
I replied that the question was whether there was room for them in what was left of Germany. Six or seven million Germans had been killed and another million (Stalin suggested two millions) would probably be killed before the end of the war. There should therefore be room for these migrant people up to a certain point. They would be needed to fill the vacancies. I was not afraid of the problem of transferring populations, so long as it was proportionate to what the Poles could manage and to what could be put into Germany. But it was a matter which required study, not as a question of principle, but of the numbers which would have to be handled.
In these general discussions maps were not used, and the distinction between the Eastern and Western Neisse did not emerge as clearly as it should have done. This was however soon to be made clear.*
On the 8th Mr. Roosevelt agreed that the eastern boundary of Poland should be the Curzon Line, with modifications in favour of Poland in some areas of from five to eight kilometres. But he was firm and precise about the frontier in the west. Poland should certainly receive compensation at the expense of Germany, “but,” he continued, “there would appear to be little justification for extending it up to the Western Neisse.” This had always been my view, and I was to press it very hard when we met again at Potsdam five months later.
Thus at Yalta we were all united in principle about the western frontier, and the only question was where exactly the line should be drawn and how much we should say about it. The Poles should have part of East Prussia and be free to go up to the line of the Oder if they wished, but we were very doubtful about going any farther or saying anything on the question at this stage, and three days later I told the Conference that we had had a telegram from the War Cabinet which strongly deprecated any reference to a frontier as far west as the Western Neisse because the problem of moving the population was too big to manage.
We accordingly decided to insert the following in our declaration:
The three heads of Governments consider that the eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line, with digressions from it in some regions of five to eight kilometres in favour of Poland. They recognise that Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the north and west. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course on the extent of these accessions, and that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the Peace Conference.
There remained the question of forming a Polish Government which we could all recognise and which the Polish nation would accept. Stalin began by pointing out that we could not create a Polish Government unless the Poles themselves agreed to it. Mikolajczyk and Grabski had come to Moscow during my visit there. They had met the Lublin Government, a measure of agreement had been reached, and Mikolajczyk had gone to London on the understanding that he would come back. Instead, his colleagues had turned him out of office simply because he favoured an agreement with the Lublin Government. The Polish Government in London were hostile to the very idea of the Lublin Government, and described it as a company of bandits and criminals. The Lublin Government had paid them back in their own coin, and it was now very difficult to do anything about it. “Talk to the Lublin Government if you like,” he said in effect. “I will get them to meet you here or in Moscow, but they are just as democratic as de Gaulle, and they can keep the peace in Poland and stop civil war and attacks on the Red Army.” The London Government could not do this. Their agents had killed Russian soldiers and had raided supply dumps to get arms. Their radio stations were operating without permission and without being registered. The agents of the Lublin Government had been helpful, and the agents of the London Government had done much evil. It was vital for the Red Army to have safe rear areas, and as a military man he would only support the Government which could guarantee to provide them.
It was now late in the evening and the President suggested adjourning till next day, but I thought it right to state that according to our information not more than one-third of the Polish people would support the Lublin Government if they were free to express their opinion. I assured Stalin that we had greatly feared a collision between the Polish Underground Army and the Lublin Government, which might lead to bitterness, bloodshed, arrests, and deportations, and that was why we had been so anxious for a joint arrangement. Attacks on the Red Army must of course be punished, but on the facts at my disposal I could not feel that the Lublin Government had a right to say that they represented the Polish nation.
The President was now anxious to end the discussion. “Poland,” he remarked, “has been a source of trouble for over five hundred years.” “All the more,” I answered, “must we do what we can to put an end to these troubles.” We then adjourned.
That night the President wrote a letter to Stalin, after consultation with and amendment by us, urging that two members of the Lublin Government and two from London or from within Poland should come to the Conference and try to agree in our presence about forming a Provisional Government which we could all recognise to hold free elections as soon as possible. But this was apparently impracticable. Molotov acclaimed the virtues of the Lublin-Warsaw Government, deplored the failings of the men from London, and said that if we tried to create a new Government the Poles themselves might never agree, so it was better to try to “enlarge” the existing one. It would only be a temporary institution, because our sole object was to hold free elections in Poland as soon as possible. How to enlarge it could best be discussed in Moscow between the American and British Ambassadors and himself. He greatly desired an agreement, and he accepted the President’s proposals to invite two “non-Lublin” Poles. There was always the possibil
ity that the Lublin Government would refuse to talk with some of them, like Mikolajczyk, but if they sent three representatives and two came from those suggested by Mr. Roosevelt conversations could start at once.
“This,” I said, “is the crucial point of the Conference. The whole world is waiting for a settlement, and if we separate still recognising different Polish Governments the whole world will see that fundamental differences between us still exist. The consequences will be most lamentable, and will stamp our meeting with the seal of failure. If we brush aside the existing London Government and lend all our weight to the Lublin Government there will be a world outcry. The Poles outside of Poland will make a virtually united protest. There is under our command a Polish army of 150,000 men, who have been gathered from all who have been able to come together from outside their country. It has fought, and is still fighting, very bravely. I do not believe it will be at all reconciled to the Lublin Government, and if Great Britain transfers recognition from the Government which it has recognised since the beginning of the war they will look on it as a betrayal.”
“As Marshal Stalin and M. Molotov well know,” I proceeded, “I myself do not agree with the London Government’s action, which has been foolish at every stage. But the formal act of transferring recognition from those whom we have hitherto recognised to this new Government would cause the gravest criticism. It would be said that His Majesty’s Government have given way completely on the eastern frontier (as in fact we have) and have accepted and championed the Soviet view. It would also be said that we have broken altogether with the lawful Government of Poland, which we have recognised for these five years of war, and that we have no knowledge of what is actually going on in Poland. We cannot enter the country. We cannot see and hear what opinion is. It would be said we can only accept what the Lublin Government proclaims about the opinion of the Polish people, and we would be charged in Parliament with having altogether forsaken the cause of Poland. The debates which would follow would be most painful and embarrassing to the unity of the Allies, even supposing that we were able to agree to the proposals of my friend M. Molotov.”
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