The fourth is a supinity or neglect of enquiry, even in matters whereof we doubt; rather beleeving, then going to see,. or doubting with ease and gratis, then beleeving with difficulty or purchase; whereby, either from a temperamentall inactivity we are unready to put in execution the suggestions or dictates of reason; or by a content and acquiescence in every species of truth, we embrace the shadow thereof, or so much as may palliate its just and substantiall acquirements. Had our fore-fathers sat down in these resolutions, or had their curiosities been sedentary, who pursued the knowledge of things through all the corners of nature, the face of truth had been obscure unto us, whose lustre in some part their industries have revealed.
Certainly the sweat of their labours was not salt unto them, and they took delight in the dust of their endeavours. For questionlesse in knowledge there is no slender difficulty, and truth which wise men say doth lye in a well, is not recoverable but by exantlation.49 It were some extenuation of the curse, if in sudore vultus tui,50 were confinable unto corporall exercitations, and there still remained a Paradise or unthorny place of knowledge. But now our understandings being eclipsed, as well as our tempers infirmed, we must betake our selves to waies of reparation, and depend upon the illumination of our endeavours. For thus we may in some measure repair our primary ruines,51 and build our selves men again. And though the attempts of some have been precipitous, and their enquiries so audacious as to come within command of the flaming swords, and lost themselves in attempts above humanity; yet have the enquiries of most defected by the way, and tyred within the sober circumference of knowledge.
And this is the reason why some have transcribed any thing; and although they cannot but doubt thereof, yet neither make experiment by sense or enquiry by reason, but live in doubts of things whose satisfaction is in their own power; which is indeed the inexcusable part of our ignorance, and may perhaps fill up the charge of the last day. For not obeying the dictates of reason, and neglecting the cries of truth, we fail not only in the trust of our undertakings, but in the intention of man it self. Which although more veniall unto ordinary constitutions, and such as are not framed beyond the capacity of beaten notions, yet will it inexcusably condemn some men, who having received excellent endowments, have yet sat down by the way, and frustrated the intention of their habilities. For certainly as some men have sinned, in the principles of humanity, and must answer, for not being men, so others offend if they be not more; Magis extra vitia quam cum virtutibus,52 would commend those, These are not excusable without an Excellency. For great constitutions, and such as are constellated unto knowledge, do nothing till they outdoe all; they come short of themselves if they go not beyond others, and must not sit down under the degree of worthies. God expects no lustre from the minor stars, but if the Sun should not illuminate all, it were a sin in Nature. Ultimus bonorum,53 will not excuse every man, nor is it sufficient for all to hold the common levell; Mens names should not only distinguish them: A man should be something that men are not, and individuall in somewhat beside his proper nature. Thus while it exceeds not the bounds of reason and modesty, we cannot condemn singularity. Nos numerus sumus,54 is the motto of the multitude, and for that reason are they fools. For things as they recede from unity, the more they approach to imperfection, and deformity; for they hold their perfection in their simplicities, and as they nearest approach unto God.
Now as there are many great wits to be condemned, who have neglected the increment of Arts, and the sedulous pursuit of knowledge; so are there not a few very much to be pittied, whose industry being not attended with naturall parts, they have sweat to little purpose, and rolled the stone in vain. Which chiefly proceedeth from naturall incapacity, and geniall indisposition, at least to those particulars whereunto they apply their endeavours. And this is one reason why though Universities be full of men, they are oftentimes empty of learning. Why as there are some which do much without learning, so others but little with it, and few that attain to any measure of it. For many heads that undertake it, were never squared nor timbred for it. There are not only particular men, but whole nations indisposed for learning; whereunto is required not only education, but a pregnant Minerva and teeming constitution. For the wisdome of God hath divided the Genius of men according to the different affairs of the world, and varied their inclinations according to the variety of Actions to be performed therein. Which they who consider not, rudely rushing upon professions and waies of life unequall to their natures; dishonour not only themselves and their functions, but pervert the harmony of the whole world. For if the world went on as God hath ordained it, and were every one implied in points concordant to their Natures; Professions, Arts and Common-wealths would rise up of themselves; nor needed we a Lanthorn to finde a man in Athens.55
CHAP.VI. Of adherence unto Antiquity
But the mortallest enemy unto knowledge, and that which hath done the greatest execution upon truth, hath been a peremptory adhesion unto Authority, and more especially the establishing of our belief upon the dictates of Antiquity. For (as every capacity may observe) most men of Ages present, so superstitiously do look on Ages past, that the authorities of the one, exceed the reasons of the other. Whose persons indeed being farre removed from our times, their works, which seldome with us passe uncontrouled, either by contemporaries or immediate successors, are now become out of the distance of envies: And the farther removed from present times, are conceived to approach the nearer unto truth it self. Now hereby methinks we manifestly delude our selves, and widely walk out of the track of truth.
For first, men hereby impose a thraldome on their times, which the ingenuity of no age should endure, or indeed the presumption of any did ever yet enjoin. Thus Hippocrates about 2000. year agoe, conceived it no injustice, either to examine or refute the doctrines of his predecessors: Galen the like, and Aristotle most of any. Yet did not any of these conceive themselves infallible, or set down their dictates as verities irrefragable;56 but when they either deliver their own inventions, or reject other mens opinions, they proceed with Judgement and Ingenuity, establishing their assertion, not only with great solidity, but submitting them also unto the correction of future discovery.
Secondly, Men that adore times past, consider not that those times were once present, that is, as our own are at this instant, and we our selves unto those to come, as they unto us at present; as we relye on them, even so will those on us, and magnifie us hereafter, who at present condemn our selves. Which very absurdity is daily committed amongst us even in the esteem and censure of our own times. And to speak impartially, old men from whom we should expect the greatest example of wisdome, do most exceed in this point of folly; commending the daies of their youth, they scarce remember, at least well understood not; extolling those times their younger years have heard their fathers condemn, and condemning those times the gray heads of their posterity shall commend. And thus is it the humour of many heads to extoll the daies of their fore-fathers, and declaim against the wickednesse of times present. Which notwithstanding they cannot handsomely doe, without the borrowed help and satyres of times past; condemning the vices of their times, by the expressions of vices in times which they commend, which cannot but argue the community of vice in both. Horace therefore, Juvenall and Perseus were no prophets, although their lines did seem to indigitate and point at our times. There is a certain list of vices committed in all ages, and declaimed against by all Authors, which will last as long as humane nature; or digested into common places may serve for any theme, and never be out of date untill Dooms day.
Thirdly, The testimonies of Antiquity and such as passe oraculously amongst us, were not if we consider them alwaies so exact, as to examine the doctrine they delivered. For some, and those the acutest of them, have left unto us many things of falsity, controulable, not only by criticall and collective reason, but common and countrey observation… Other Authors write often dubiously, even in matters wherein is expected a strict and definitive truth; extenuating their affirmations,
with aiunt, ferunt, fortasse,57 As Dioscorides, Galen, Aristotle, and many more. Others by hear say; taking upon trust most they have delivered; whose volumes are meer collections, drawn from the mouthes or leaves of other Authors; as may be observed in Plinie, Ælian, Athenæus, and many more. Not a few transcriptively; subscribing their names unto other mens endeavours, and meerly transcribing almost all they have written. The Latines transcribing the Greeks, the Greeks and Latines each other….
Fourthly. While we so eagerly adhear unto Antiquity, and the accounts of elder times, we are to consider the fabulous condition thereof; and that we shall not deny if we call to minde the mendacity of Greece, from whom we have received most relations, and that a considerable part of Ancient times, was by the Greeks themselves termed μυθικóν, that is, made up or stuffed out with fables. And surely the fabulous inclination of those daies, was greater then any since; which swarmed so with fables, and from such slender grounds, took hintes for fictions, poysoning the world ever after; wherein, how far they exceeded, may be exemplified from Palæphatus, in his book of fabulous narrations. That fable of Orpheus, who by the melody of his musick, made woods and trees to follow him, was raised upon a slender foundation; for there were a crew of mad women, retired unto a mountain, from whence being pacified by his Musick, they descended with boughs in their hands, which unto the fabulosity of those times, proved a sufficient ground to celebrate unto all posterity the Magick of Orpheus harp, and its power to attract the senselesse trees about it….
Fiftly, We applaud many things delivered by the Ancients, which are in themselves but ordinary, and come short of our own conceptions. Thus we usually extoll, and our Orations cannot escape the sayings of the wise men of Greece. Nosce teipsum of Thales: Nosce tempus of Pittacus: Nihil nimis of Cleobulus;58 which notwithstanding to speak indifferently, are but vulgar precepts in Morality, carrying with them nothing above the line, or beyond the extemporary sententiosity of common conceits with us. Thus we magnifie the Apothegmes, or reputed replies of wisdom, whereof many are to be seen in Laertius, more in Lycosthenes, not a few in the second book of Macrobius, in the salts of Cicero, Augustus, and the Comicall wits of those times: in most whereof there is not much to admire and are me thinks exceeded, not only in the replies of wise men, but the passages of society and urbanities of our times. And thus we extoll their adages or proverbs; and Erasmus hath taken great pains to make collections of them; whereof notwithstanding the greater part will, I beleeve, unto indifferent judges be esteemed no extraordinaries; and may be paralleled, if not exceeded, by those of more unlearned nations, and many of our own.
Sixtly, We urge authorities, in points that need not, and introduce the testimony of ancient writers, to confirm things evidently beleeved, and whereto no reasonable hearer but would assent without them; such as are; Nemo mortalium omnibus horis sapit. Virtute nil præstantius, nil pulchrius. Omnia vincit amor. Præclarum quiddam veritas.59 All which, although things known and vulgar, are frequently urged by many men, and though triviall verities in our mouthes, yet noted from Plato, Ovid, or Cicero, they become reputed elegancies….
Lastly, While we so devoutly adhere unto Antiquity in some things, we doe not consider we have deserted them in severall others. For they indeed have not only been imperfect, in the conceit of some things, but either ignorant or erroneous in many more. They understood not the motion of the eight sphear from West to East, and so conceived the longitude of the starres invariable. They conceived the torrid Zone unhabitable, and so made frustrate the goodliest part of the earth. But we now know ’tis very well empeopled, and the habitation thereof esteemed so happy, that some have made it the proper seat of Paradise; and been so farre from judging it unhabitable, that they have made it the first habitation of all. Many of the Ancients denied the Antipodes, and some unto the penality of contrary affirmations; but the experience of our enlarged navigations, can now assert them beyond all dubitation. Having thus totally relinquisht them in some things, it may not be presumptuous, to examine them in others; but surely most unreasonable to adhere to them in all, as though they were infallible or could not erre in any.
CHAP.VII. Of Authority
Nor is only a resolved prostration unto Antiquity a powerfull enemy unto knowledge, but any confident adherence unto Authority, or resignation of our judgements upon the testimony of Age or Author whatsoever.
For first, To speak generally an argument from Authority to wiser examinations, is but a weaker kinde of proof, it being but a topicall probation, and as we term it, an artificiall argument, depending upon a naked asseveration: wherein neither declaring the causes, affections or adjuncts of what we beleeve, it carrieth not with it the reasonable inducements of knowledge; and therefore Contra negantem principia, Ipse dixit, or Oportet discentem credere,60 although postulates very accommodable unto Junior indoctrinations; yet are their authorities but temporary, and not to be imbraced beyond the minority of our intellectuals. For our advanced beliefs are not to be built upon dictates, but having received the probable inducements of truth, we become emancipated from testimoniall ingagements, and are to erect upon the surer base of reason.
Secondly, Unto reasonable perpensions61 it hath no place in some Sciences, small in others, and suffereth many restrictions, even where it is most admitted. It is of no validity in the Mathematicks, especially the mother part thereof Arithmetick and Geometry. For these Sciences concluding from dignities and principles known by themselves, receive not satisfaction from probable reasons, much lesse from bare and peremptory asseverations… In naturall Philosophy more generally pursued amongst us, it carrieth but slender consideration; for that also proceeding from setled principles, therein is expected a satisfaction from scientificall progressions, and such as beget a sure or rationall belief. For if Authority might have made out the assertions of Philosophy, we might have held, that snow was black, that the sea was but the sweat of the earth, and many of the like absurdities…62
In Morality, Rhetorick, Law and History, there is I confesse a frequent and allowable use of testimony; and yet herein I perceive, it is not unlimitable, but admitteth many restrictions. Thus in law both Civill and Divine, that is only esteemed a legall testimony, which receives comprobation from the mouths of at least two witnesses; and that not only for prevention of calumny, but assurance against mistake; whereas notwithstanding the solid reason of one man, is as sufficient as the clamor of a whole Nation; and with imprejudicate apprehensions begets as firm a belief as the authority or aggregated testimony of many hundreds. For reason being the very root of our natures, and the principles there of common unto all; what is against the laws of true reason, or the unerring understanding of any one, if rightly apprehended, must be disclaimed by all Nations, and rejected even by mankinde….
CHAP.VIII. A brief enumeration of Authors63
CHAP.IX. Of the same64
CHAP.X. Of the last and common promoter of false Opinions, the endeavours of Satan
But beside the infirmities of humane nature, the seed of error within our selves, and the severall waies of delusion from each other, there is an invisible Agent, and secret promoter without us, whose activity is undiscerned, and plaies in the dark upon us; and that is the first contriver of Error, and professed opposer of Truth, the devil. For though permitted unto his proper principles, Adam perhaps would have sinned without the suggestion of Satan, and from the transgressive infirmities of himself might have erred alone, as well as the Angels before him. And although also there were no devil at all, yet is there now in our natures a confessed sufficiency unto corruption; and the frailty of our own Oeconomie,65 were able to betray us out of truth; yet wants there not another Agent, who taking advantage hereof, proceedeth to obscure the diviner part, and efface all tract of its traduction: To attempt a particular of all his wiles, is too bold an Arithmetick for man: what most considerably concerneth his popular and practised waies of delusion, he first deceiveth mankinde in five main points concerning God and himself.
And f
irst his endeavours have ever been, and they cease not yet to instill a belief in the minde of man, There is no God at all. And this he specially labours to establish in a direct and literall apprehension; that is, that there is no such reality existent, that the necessity of his entity dependeth upon ours, and is but a Politicall Chymera; That the naturall truth of God is an artificiall erection of man, and the Creator himself but a subtile invention of the creature. Where he succeeds not thus high, he labours to introduce a secondary and deductive Atheisme; that although, men concede there is a God, yet should they deny his providence; and therefore assertions have flown about, that he intendeth only the care of the species or common natures, but letteth loose the guard of individuals, and single existencies therein: That he looks not below the Moon, but hath designed the regiment of sublunary affairs unto inferiour deputations. To promote which apprehensions or empuzzell their due conceptions, he casteth in the notions of fate, destiny, fortune, chance and necessity; tearms commonly misconceived by vulgar heads, and their propriety sometime perverted by the wisest. Whereby extinguishing in mindes the compensation of vertue and vice, the hope and fear of heaven or hell; they comply in their actions unto the drift of his delusions, and live like creatures below the capacity of either….
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