be just per accidens, in order that they may do us no harm. This
last principle is the same as the one that precedes it, with, however,
a different turn of expression. For we desire justice in our friends
for itself, even though it will make no difference to us, and even
though they be in India; whereas in our enemies we desire it for
something else, in order that they may do us no harm.
Also, that which is in itself the cause of good is more desirable
than what is so per accidens, e.g. virtue than luck (for the former in
itself, and the latter per accidens, the cause of good things), and so
in other cases of the same kind. Likewise also in the case of the
contrary; for what is in itself the cause of evil is more
objectionable than what is so per accidens, e.g. vice and chance:
for the one is bad in itself, whereas chance is so per accidens.
Also, what is good absolutely is more desirable than what is good
for a particular person, e.g. recovery of health than a surgical
operation; for the former is good absolutely, the latter only for a
particular person, viz. the man who needs an operation. So too what is
good by nature is more desirable than the good that is not so by
nature, e.g. justice than the just man; for the one is good by nature,
whereas in the other case the goodness is acquired. Also the attribute
is more desirable which belongs to the better and more honourable
subject, e.g. to a god rather than to a man, and to the soul rather
than to the body. So too the property of the better thing is better
than the property of the worse; e.g. the property of God than the
property of man: for whereas in respect of what is common in both of
them they do not differ at all from each other, in respect of their
properties the one surpasses the other. Also that is better which is
inherent in things better or prior or more honourable: thus (e.g.)
health is better than strength and beauty: for the former is
inherent in the moist and the dry, and the hot and the cold, in fact
in all the primary constituents of an animal, whereas the others are
inherent in what is secondary, strength being a feature of the
sinews and bones, while beauty is generally supposed to consist in a
certain symmetry of the limbs. Also the end is generally supposed to
be more desirable than the means, and of two means, that which lies
nearer the end. In general, too, a means directed towards the end of
life is more desirable than a means to anything else, e.g. that
which contributes to happiness than that which contributes to
prudence. Also the competent is more desirable than the incompetent.
Moreover, of two productive agents that one is more desirable whose
end is better; while between a productive agent and an end we can
decide by a proportional sum whenever the excess of the one end over
the other is greater than that of the latter over its own productive
means: e.g. supposing the excess of happiness over health to be
greater than that of health over what produces health, then what
produces happiness is better than health. For what produces
happiness exceeds what produces health just as much as happiness
exceeds health. But health exceeds what produces health by a smaller
amount; ergo, the excess of what produces happiness over what produces
health is greater than that of health over what produces health.
Clearly, therefore, what produces happiness is more desirable than
health: for it exceeds the same standard by a greater amount.
Moreover, what is in itself nobler and more precious and
praiseworthy is more desirable than what is less so, e.g. friendship
than wealth, and justice than strength. For the former belong in
themselves to the class of things precious and praiseworthy, while the
latter do so not in themselves but for something else: for no one
prizes wealth for itself but always for something else, whereas we
prize friendship for itself, even though nothing else is likely to
come to us from it.
2
Moreover, whenever two things are very much like one another, and we
cannot see any superiority in the one over the other of them, we
should look at them from the standpoint of their consequences. For the
one which is followed by the greater good is the more desirable: or,
if the consequences be evil, that is more desirable which is
followed by the less evil. For though both may be desirable, yet there
may possibly be some unpleasant consequence involved to turn the
scale. Our survey from the point of view of consequences lies in two
directions, for there are prior consequences and later consequences:
e.g. if a man learns, it follows that he was ignorant before and knows
afterwards. As a rule, the later consequence is the better to
consider. You should take, therefore, whichever of the consequences
suits your purpose.
Moreover, a greater number of good things is more desirable than a
smaller, either absolutely or when the one is included in the other,
viz. the smaller number in the greater. An objection may be raised
suppose in some particular case the one is valued for the sake of
the other; for then the two together are not more desirable than the
one; e.g. recovery of health and health, than health alone, inasmuch
as we desire recovery of health for the sake of health. Also it is
quite possible for what is not good, together with what is, to be more
desirable than a greater number of good things, e.g. the combination
of happiness and something else which is not good may be more
desirable than the combination of justice and courage. Also, the
same things are more valuable if accompanied than if unaccompanied
by pleasure, and likewise when free from pain than when attended
with pain.
Also, everything is more desirable at the season when it is of
greater consequence; e.g. freedom from pain in old age more than in
youth: for it is of greater consequence in old age. On the same
principle also, prudence is more desirable in old age; for no man
chooses the young to guide him, because he does not expect them to
be prudent. With courage, the converse is the case, for it is in youth
that the active exercise of courage is more imperatively required.
Likewise also with temperance; for the young are more troubled by
their passions than are their elders.
Also, that is more desirable which is more useful at every season or
at most seasons, e.g. justice and temperance rather than courage:
for they are always useful, while courage is only useful at times.
Also, that one of two things which if all possess, we do not need
the other thing, is more desirable than that which all may possess and
still we want the other one as well. Take the case of justice and
courage; if everybody were just, there would be no use for courage,
whereas all might be courageous, and still justice would be of use.
Moreover, judge by the destructions and losses and generations and
acquisitions and contraries of things: for things whose destruction is
more objectionable are themselves mo
re desirable. Likewise also with
the losses and contraries of things; for a thing whose loss or whose
contrary is more objectionable is itself more desirable. With the
generations or acquisitions of things the opposite is the case: for
things whose acquisition or generation is more desirable are
themselves also desirable. Another commonplace rule is that what is
nearer to the good is better and more desirable, i.e. what more nearly
resembles the good: thus justice is better than a just man. Also, that
which is more like than another thing to something better than itself,
as e.g. some say that Ajax was a better man than Odysseus because he
was more like Achilles. An objection may be raised to this that it
is not true: for it is quite possible that Ajax did not resemble
Achilles more nearly than Odysseus in the points which made Achilles
the best of them, and that Odysseus was a good man, though unlike
Achilles. Look also to see whether the resemblance be that of a
caricature, like the resemblance of a monkey to a man, whereas a horse
bears none: for the monkey is not the more handsome creature,
despite its nearer resemblance to a man. Again, in the case of two
things, if one is more like the better thing while another is more
like the worse, then that is likely to be better which is more like
the better. This too, however, admits of an objection: for quite
possibly the one only slightly resembles the better, while the other
strongly resembles the worse, e.g. supposing the resemblance of Ajax
to Achilles to be slight, while that of Odysseus to Nestor is
strong. Also it may be that the one which is like the better type
shows a degrading likeness, whereas the one which is like the worse
type improves upon it: witness the likeness of a horse to a donkey,
and that of a monkey to a man.
Another rule is that the more conspicuous good is more desirable
than the less conspicuous, and the more difficult than the easier: for
we appreciate better the possession of things that cannot be easily
acquired. Also the more personal possession is more desirable than the
more widely shared. Also, that which is more free from connexion
with evil: for what is not attended by any unpleasantness is more
desirable than what is so attended.
Moreover, if A be without qualification better than B, then also the
best of the members of A is better than the best of the members of
B; e.g. if Man be better than Horse, then also the best man is
better than the best horse. Also, if the best in A be better than
the best in B, then also A is better than B without qualification;
e.g. if the best man be better than the best horse, then also Man is
better than Horse without qualification.
Moreover, things which our friends can share are more desirable than
those they cannot. Also, things which we like rather to do to our
friend are more desirable than those we like to do to the man in the
street, e.g. just dealing and the doing of good rather than the
semblance of them: for we would rather really do good to our friends
than seem to do so, whereas towards the man in the street the converse
is the case.
Also, superfluities are better than necessities, and are sometimes
more desirable as well: for the good life is better than mere life,
and good life is a superfluity, whereas mere life itself is a
necessity. Sometimes, though, what is better is not also more
desirable: for there is no necessity that because it is better it
should also be more desirable: at least to be a philosopher is
better than to make money, but it is not more desirable for a man
who lacks the necessities of life. The expression 'superfluity'
applies whenever a man possesses the necessities of life and sets to
work to secure as well other noble acquisitions. Roughly speaking,
perhaps, necessities are more desirable, while superfluities are
better.
Also, what cannot be got from another is more desirable than what
can be got from another as well, as (e.g.) is the case of justice
compared with courage. Also, A is more desirable if A is desirable
without B, but not B without A: power (e.g.) is not desirable
without prudence, but prudence is desirable without power. Also, if of
two things we repudiate the one in order to be thought to possess
the other, then that one is more desirable which we wish to be thought
to possess; thus (e.g.) we repudiate the love of hard work in order
that people may think us geniuses.
Moreover, that is more desirable in whose absence it is less
blameworthy for people to be vexed; and that is more desirable in
whose absence it is more blameworthy for a man not to be vexed.
3
Moreover, of things that belong to the same species one which
possesses the peculiar virtue of the species is more desirable than
one which does not. If both possess it, then the one which possesses
it in a greater degree is more desirable.
Moreover, if one thing makes good whatever it touches, while another
does not, the former is more desirable, just as also what makes things
warm is warmer than what does not. If both do so, then that one is
more desirable which does so in a greater degree, or if it render good
the better and more important object-if (e.g.), the one makes good the
soul, and the other the body.
Moreover, judge things by their inflexions and uses and actions
and works, and judge these by them: for they go with each other:
e.g. if 'justly' means something more desirable than 'courageously',
then also justice means something more desirable than courage; and
if justice be more desirable than courage, then also 'justly' means
something more desirable than 'courageously'. Similarly also in the
other cases.
Moreover, if one thing exceeds while the other falls short of the
same standard of good, the one which exceeds is the more desirable; or
if the one exceeds an even higher standard. Nay more, if there be
two things both preferable to something, the one which is more
highly preferable to it is more desirable than the less highly
preferable. Moreover, when the excess of a thing is more desirable
than the excess of something else, that thing is itself also more
desirable than the other, as (e.g.) friendship than money: for an
excess of friendship is more desirable than an excess of money. So
also that of which a man would rather that it were his by his own
doing is more desirable than what he would rather get by another's
doing, e.g. friends than money. Moreover, judge by means of an
addition, and see if the addition of A to the same thing as B makes
the whole more desirable than does the addition of B. You must,
however, beware of adducing a case in which the common term uses, or
in some other way helps the case of, one of the things added to it,
but not the other, as (e.g.) if you took a saw and a sickle in
combination with the art of carpentry: for in the combination the
saw is a more desirable thing, but it is not a more desirable thing
without qua
lification. Again, a thing is more desirable if, when added
to a lesser good, it makes the whole greater good. Likewise, also, you
should judge by means of subtraction: for the thing upon whose
subtraction the remainder is a lesser good may be taken to be a
greater good, whichever it be whose subtraction makes the remainder
a lesser good.
Also, if one thing be desirable for itself, and the other for the
look of it, the former is more desirable, as (e.g.) health than
beauty. A thing is defined as being desired for the look of it if,
supposing no one knew of it, you would not care to have it. Also, it
is more desirable both for itself and for the look of it, while the
other thing is desirable on the one ground alone. Also, whichever is
the more precious for itself, is also better and more desirable. A
thing may be taken to be more precious in itself which we choose
rather for itself, without anything else being likely to come of it.
Moreover, you should distinguish in how many senses 'desirable' is
used, and with a view to what ends, e.g. expediency or honour or
pleasure. For what is useful for all or most of them may be taken to
be more desirable than what is not useful in like manner. If the
same characters belong to both things you should look and see which
possesses them more markedly, i.e. which of the two is the more
pleasant or more honourable or more expedient. Again, that is more
desirable which serves the better purpose, e.g. that which serves to
promote virtue more than that which serves to promote pleasure.
Likewise also in the case of objectionable things; for that is more
objectionable which stands more in the way of what is desirable,
e.g. disease more than ugliness: for disease is a greater hindrance
both to pleasure and to being good.
Moreover, argue by showing that the thing in question is in like
measure objectionable and desirable: for a thing of such a character
that a man might well desire and object to it alike is less
desirable than the other which is desirable only.
Aristotle Page 118