Amruss sold at about one tenth of the price of soybean protein, and in the first few years of its production the demand greatly exceeded the supply. It also raised a major problem for the Catholic Church. At first Rome took no official position on the consumption of Amruss by Catholics, but left it to each individual bishop to issue such ruling for his diocese as he deemed advisable. In Puerto Rico the Catholic Church simply chose to close an eye. In a number of South American countries, however, the bishops took the position that partaking of Amruss was a mortal sin, no different from other forms of contraception.
In time, this attitude of the bishops threatened to have serious consequences for the Church, because it tended to undermine the institution of the confession. In countries such as El Salvador, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Peru, women gradually got tired of confessing again and again to having committed a mortal sin, and of being told again and again to do penance; in the end they simply stopped going to confession.
When the decline in the numbers of those who went to confession became conspicuous, it came to the attention of the Pope. As is generally known, in the end the issue was settled by the papal bull “Food Being Essential for Maintaining Life,” which stressed that Catholics ought not to be expected to starve when food was available. Thereafter, bishops uniformly took the position that Amruss was primarily a food, rather than a contraceptive.
The income of the Institute, from the royalties collected, rapidly increased from year to year, and within a few years it came to exceed the subsidies from the American and Russian governments. Because the Institute had internationally recognized tax-free status, royalties were not subject to tax.
The first investment made by the Vienna Institute was the purchase of television stations in a number of cities all over the world. Thereafter, the television programs of these stations carried no advertising. Since they no longer had to aim their programs at the largest possible audience, there was no longer any need for them to cater to the taste of morons. This freedom from the need of maximizing their audience led to a rapid evolution of the art of television, the potential of which had been frequently surmised but never actually realized.
One of the major television programs carried by the Amruss stations was devoted to the discussion of political problems. The function of The Voice of the Dolphins, as this program was called, was to clarify what the real issues were. In taking up an issue, The Voice would discuss what the several possible solutions were and would indicate in each case what the price of that particular solution might be. A booklet circulated by The Voice of the Dolphins explained why the program set itself this particular task, as follows:
Political issues were often complex, but they were rarely anywhere as deep as the scientific problems which had been solved in the first half of the century. These scientific problems had been solved with amazing rapidity because they had been constantly exposed to discussion among scientists, and thus it appeared reasonable to expect that the solution of political problems could be greatly sped up also if they were subjected to the same kind of discussion. The discussions of political problems by politicians were much less productive, because they differed in one important respect from the discussions of scientific problems by scientists: When a scientist says something, his colleagues must ask themselves only whether it is true. When a politician says something, his colleagues must first of all ask, “Why does he say it?”; later on they may or may not get around to asking whether it happens to be true. A politician is a man who thinks he is in possession of the truth and knows what needs to be done; thus his only problem is to persuade people to do what needs to be done. Scientists rarely think that they are in full possession of the truth, and a scientist’s aim in a discussion with his colleagues is not to persuade but to clarify. It was clarification rather than persuasion that was needed in the past to arrive at the solution of the great scientific problems.
Because the task of The Voice was to clarify rather than to persuade, The Voice did not provide political leadership, but by clarifying what the issues were in the field of politics The Voice made it possible for intellectual leadership to arise in this field.
A number of political scientists were invited to join the Institute at the time when The Voice of the Dolphins went into Operation, and the first suggestion of the dolphins in the political field was made one year later. At that time, the dolphins proposed that the United Nations set up a commission in every South American capital and that these commissions function along the lines of the U. N. Commission that had been in operation in Bolivia since 1950. That commission was advising the Bolivian government on all matters pertaining to the economic welfare of the nation; in addition, it made available trained personnel on whom the Bolivian government could draw, if it wanted to put into effect any of the commission’s recommendations.
This proposal of the dolphins was generally regarded as wholly unrealistic. It was pointed out that the governments of the South American nations did not operate in a vacuum, but were subject to political pressures from private interests. It was freely predicted, therefore, that any attempt on the part of a UN. commission to influence the action of the government to which it was accredited would be frustrated by the influence of the private interests, no matter how sound the advice might be. But such was the prestige of the dolphins that their proposal, formally submitted to the United Nations by Uruguay, was adopted by a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly, after it had been vetoed in the Security Council.
Still, the skeptics might well have turned out to be right, had it not been for the activities of the “special agencies” which the Vienna Institute established in every one of the South American capitals where a UN. commission was in operation. Even though these special agencies had no policy of their own other than to support the proposals of the local United Nations commissions, and even though they operated on a rather limited budget-none spent more than $15 million a year-without their activities” the UN. commissions could not have achieved their ambitious goals in South America. The amounts which these “special agencies” spent,small though they were, were effective because they were Spent exclusively for the purpose of bribing the members of the government in office to do what was in the public interest, rather than to yield to the pressures of private interests.
Had it not been for the extra income that the Vienna Institute derived from the sale of Amruss, its activities would have come to an end in 1970, at the time of the Communist revolution in Iraq, when all Russian-American contracts were canceled and the Institute lost its government subsidies.
In order to make the subsequent events fully understandable to the reader it is necessary to make him aware of the change that the character of the so-called atomic stalemate underwent between.1960 and 1970.
Between 1962 and 1965 the world passed through an agonizing transitional phase in the atomic stalemate. At the beginning of this period America had still to rely mostly on bombers, based on airfields located in the proximity of Russia. Because of the possibility of a surprise attack which could have knocked out America’s ability to strike a counter blow, the United States felt impelled to keep one third of her bombers in the air on an around-the-clock basis in times of crisis. Russia, on the other hand, had no foreign bases, nor was she in need of any, since she possessed an adequate stockpile of long-range rockets which could be launched from bases inside Russia and were capable of carrying hydrogen bombs large enough to demolish a city. By 1965 America had an adequate stockpile of such long-range rockets also, and thereafter she was no longer in need of foreign bases, either.
By 1965 America and Russia were capable of destroying each other to any desired degree. They both had long-range rockets mounted on trucks or railroad cars that were kept constantly on the move, and it would have been impossible for either country to destroy, by one single sudden blow, the power of the other to strike a devastating counter blow. With the fear of a surprise attack thus eliminated, the atomic stalemate began to-gain a stability
which it did not formerly possess.
At a time when America and Russia could have destroyed each other to any desired degree, the threat of massive retaliation would have been tantamount to a threat of murder and suicide. Such a threat might be believable if it were made by a. nation in a conflict in which its very existence was at stake, but it would not be believable if it were made by America in a conflict in which American interests were at stake, but not America’s existence as a nation. In these circumstances America ceased to rely on long-range rockets and the large bomb for the defense of her national interests in case of an armed conflict. Instead, America planned to send troops to the area involved and to resist by using small atomic bombs against troops in combat, within the contested area.
In time, people in America came to understand well enough that the “real aim” of such a limited war could not be victory, which clearly would. not be obtainable in every case, but, rather, the exacting of a. price from the enemy. It was thought that if America were able to exact a price higher than the price which the enemy would be prepared to pay, then America’s ability to fight a limited atomic war anywhere on the globe would effectively deter the enemy from attempting to change the map by force. It was recognized, of course, that America might have to be prepared to pay a price as high as she proposed to exact, not only in money but perhaps also in lives-the lives of the young men who would die in the fighting.
It was generally taken for granted that the large bombs
and the long-range rockets would play no role in any of the foreseeable conflicts. They were kept as an insurance for the sole purpose of retaliating if Russia were to attack America with such bombs.
No one had any doubt that the revolution in Iraq, which caught America by surprise in 1970, was in fact Communist-inspired, and America responded promptly by landing troops in Lebanon and Jordan. This time America was determined to settle the issue of control of the Middle East and thus to end, once and for all, the threat that Western Europe might be cut off from its Middle East oil supply. Egypt and Syria declared that they would regard an invasion of Iraq by American troops as an attack against themselves. Turkish troops were poised to move into Syria, and Russia was concentrating troops on the Turkish border, for the purpose of restraining Turkey.
At this point America proclaimed that she was prepared to send troops into Turkey, to use small atomic bombs in combat against Russian troops on Turkish soil and, perhaps, also in hot pursuit beyond the prewar Turkish-Russian boundary.
It appeared that Russia strongly disliked the prospect of fighting an atomic war on her southern border. There was little assurance that such a war would not spread and finally end up in an all-out war, and rather than to take this risk Russia decided to adopt a strategy of another kind. In a note, which was kept very short, she proclaimed that she would not resist by force of arms in the Middle East an American invasion of that area, but would, rather, seek to “deter” America by setting a high price for such an invasion. The price would be set, however, not in terms of human life but solely in terms of property.
The Russian note listed twelve American cities by name. Russia stated that if American troops crossed over into Iraq she would single out one of these twelve cities, give that city four weeks of warning to permit its orderly evacuation, as well as to allow time to make arrangements for the feeding and housing of refugees, and thereafter the city would be demolished with one single long-range rocket.
America replied in a note which was even shorter and intimated that for each city that Russia demolished in America, America would demolish two cities in Russia.
To this Russia replied in a second note-a note of unprecedented length-that if America were to demolish two cities in Russia for each city that Russia might have demolished in America, and if Russia were to demolish two cities in America for each city that America might have demolished in Russia, then the destruction of even one city would trigger a chain of events which would, step by step, lead to the destruction of all American as well as all Russian cities. Since clearly America could not possibly want this result, she should not make such a threat of “two for one” and expect it to be believed. Russia, on her part, would tolerate America’s demolishing one Russian city, in return for Russia’s having demolished one American city. But for each additional city that America might demolish, Russia would demolish one and just one additional city in America.
The note made it clear that even though Russia would abide by such a principle of “one for one,” this did not mean that America would be free to demolish a large city in Russia in return for a small city demolished in America. What would count in this respect, the note stated, would be the size of the city, as expressed by the number of inhabitants rather than by the number of square miles covered by the city.
Twenty-four hours after this Russian note was received in Washington, the Division of Vital Statistics of the Vienna Institute issued a document which listed the number of inhabitants of all American and all Russian cities. In their preface the dolphins stated that if American troops were to invade Iraq, and Russia were to demolish one of the twelve cities she had listed, an undesirable controversy might arise on the issue of which American city was equal to which Russian city, unless an authentic list of the number of inhabitants was readily available.
This document was issued so promptly that it aroused Russian suspicion. The Russians thought that somehow the Vienna Institute might have had inside information about Russian intentions and thus been able to prepare in advance this list of cities. American and British statesmen had so often said that the Russians were unpredictable that finally the Russians themselves came to believe it. There is no reason, however, to think that the Vienna Institute had any advance information. Rather, it seems that the dolphins, being not inferior in intelligence to the men in Moscow who devised Russia’s policies, were frequently able to predict the moves that Russia would make. This view is borne out by the few records of the Vienna Institute which survived the fire that destroyed the Institute in 1990.
The second Russian note caused a turmoil in Washington. Various groups urged that the Government adopt a rigid policy of demolishing two Russian cities for each city demolished in America, or that it accept the principle of “one for one,” or that it do neither, but just keep the Russians guessing.
At a meeting of the National Security Council several public-relations experts expressed the view that were Russia actually to demolish one of the twelve cities she had listed, the public would demand that America retaliate by demolishing a number of Russian cities. They said that the President would thus not be able to abide by the principle of “one for one,” even if he desired to do so, without seriously risking the defeat of his party at the next elections.
The Government thereupon asked Gallup to conduct a poll on an emergency basis. Residents of the thirty largest cities were asked whether if Rochester, New York, one of the twelve cities named, were demolished, America ought to retaliate by demolishing just one Russian city, or whether she ought to retaliate by demolishing a number of Russian cities. To the surprise of the Government, 85 per cent of those who had an opinion favored the demolishing of just one Russian city. In retrospect, this response does not appear to be so very surprising; the people polled knew very well that if America were to demolish two Russian cities in retaliation for Rochester, Russia would demolish one additional American city-and this additional city might be their own.
Some of the members of the National Security Council declined to take this poll at its face value and said that the people would react differently if Rochester were actually demolished. The rather involved psychological argument they cited in support of their view was never put to a test, however, for America did not intervene in Iraq.
Within a few days after the receipt of the first Russian note which listed the twelve cities, people began to register in Washington as lobbyists for one or another of the twelve cities, and ten days later there was not a hotel room to be had in t
he whole city. It was the most powerful lobby that ever hit Washington. After an initial period of uncertainty, this lobby succeeded, with steadily increasing editorial support across the nation, in forcing a re-examination of the whole Middle Eastern issue. Doubts were raised as to whether Western Europe was really in danger of losing its supply of Middle Eastern oil, since there was no other market for it. It was said that while the price of oil from the Middle East could be raised, it could not be raised very much, since it could be replaced by oil from. the Sahara. As the result of a reexamination of the whole issue, America decided to withdraw her troops from Lebanon and Jordan.
This decision was reached in the face of strenuous opposition on the part of a small, but vocal and influential, group of Opinion makers. There were prophets of doom who declared that if America yielded to Russia’s threat on this occasion, then from here on Russia would be in a position to get her way on any issue; she would be in a position to change the map at will, simply by threatening to demolish a limited number of American cities, in case America should try to resist locally, by force of arms.
Fortunately these prophecies proved to be incorrect. For the time being, at least, Russia appeared to be quite satisfied with the map as it stood. True enough, a number of nations in Southeast Asia went Communist, and so did several nations in Africa. On the other hand, the Communist government of Iraq broke diplomatic relations with Russia, in protest against Russia’s supplying oil at cut-rate prices to Western Europe, thus demonstrating once more that the capitalist nations have no monopoly in feuding with each other.
Russia did derive great economic benefits from her decision to forgo war. In short order, she abolished her Air Force and her entire Navy, including her fleet of submarines; she also reduced her Army and retained only a comparatively small number of highly mobile units equipped with machine guns and light tanks. Russia continued to maintain, of course, a large number of long-range rockets mounted on trucks or on railroad cars, which were constantly moved around along her highways and railroad tracks.
The Voice of the Dolphins and Other Stories Page 2