The Voice of the Dolphins and Other Stories

by Dr. Leo Szilard

  _______________________________________________________________________________________________________

  This special number of the Bulletin reflected the political ideas prevailing on the subject of disarmament in 1987 when the dolphins convened their informal conference at the Vienna Institute. The steering committee of the conference was composed exclusively of staff members of the Institute, and this caused some resentment even though the Institute was careful to explain the reason for being so exclusive. A

  letter circulated by the Vienna Institute pointed out that because of the time-consuming process of coding and decoding the Speech of the dolphins, the dolphins were in no position to participate in the discussions of the conference directly, and that the staff members of the Vienna Institute were the only people who were able to communicate with the dolphins. They would keep the dolphins currently informed of the progress of the discussions, and it was contemplated to adjourn the conference from time to time so as to permit the steering committee to hold extensive consultations with the dolphins.

  At the suggestion of Pi Omega Ro, Ro Epsilon Delta and some of the other leading dolphins, the Institute invited to this conference a number of Russian, American and Chinese scientists who advised their governments on policy planning, but no one was invited whose responsibility was to make policy decisions. Because of the political tension in Europe, the conference was generally regarded as badly timed in Russia, and up to the very last minute it was uncertain whether any Russians would turn up. However, the Russians did come, and they came in time to permit the conference to start on schedule.

  The keynote of the conference was set by an introductory document prepared by the steering committee. This Introduction took the position that in previous negotiations concerned with the problem of disarmament major difficulties had been encountered because the nations were apprehensive of secret violations of the agreement. These difficulties had appeared almost insurmountable at the time of the ill-fated Geneva negotiations of 1960 because people were thinking in terms of an agreement to which Russia, America and the other Great Powers would be irrevocably committed. If this were the case, then the agreement would have to spell out in detail the methods of inspection, to which all nations must submit. Possible secret evasions are innumerable, however, and as time went on there would arise new forms of evasion which were not previously apparent.

  The Introduction stressed that it lies in the very nature of an agreement providing for arms limitations that it could remain in force only as long as Russia, America and China each wanted to keep it in force. The agreement would not be weakened, but, rather, it would be strengthened, by giving these three nations and perhaps also certain other nations the legal right to abrogate the agreement at any time and without cause, because there would then be no need to spell out in the agreement specific measures of inspection. Instead, it would then be understood that if Russia, for instance, were unable to convince America that there were no major evasions on her territory, America would have no choice but to abrogate the agreement. The same would, of course, hold, in the reverse, for Russia.

  With the problem presented in this manner, clearly the issue was no longer what rights of inspection America should demand from Russia or Russia should demand from America, but, rather, in what manner Russia might choose to convince America that there were no secret evasions on her territory, and in what manner America might choose to convince Russia.

  At the outset of the meeting, the steering committee proposed that the simplest questions be discussed first; it proposed that the conference assume, for the sake of argument, an agreement providing for virtually complete disarmament, and that it discuss on this basis in what manner Russia and America could convince each other that they were not secretly evading the agreement.

  In the course of the discussion, it became clear that in case of total disarmament, where there would be no military secrets left that would need to be safeguarded, the Russians would have no objection to admitting as many foreign inspectors as appeared desirable to America or any other nation. But thereupon most of the Americans took the position that by admitting foreign inspectors in practically unlimited numbers Russia could not convince them that she did not have hidden rockets or bombs in substantial numbers. If the Russian government wanted to hide bombs and rockets-so these Americans declared-as long as she had the wholehearted cooperation of her scientists and engineers in such an endeavor America could not be sure that foreign inspectors would be able to discover them.

  At this point one of the Russian scientists proposed that, if and when general and total disarmament was agreed upon, Russia should reassure America on the issue of secret evasions by adopting the following approach: When the agreement was signed and published, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers would address the Russian people and, above all, the Russian engineers and scientists, over radio and television and through the newspapers. He would explain why the Russian government had entered into this agreement and why it wished to keep it in force. He would make it clear that any secret violation of the agreement would endanger the agreement and that the Russian government would not condone any such violation. If such Violations did occur, as they well might, they would have to be regarded as the work of overzealous subordinates whose comprehension of Russia’s true interests was rather limited. In these circumstances, it would be the patriotic duty of Russian citizens in general, and Russian scientists and engineers in particular, to report any secret violations of the agreement to an agent of the International Control Commission. In addition to having the satisfaction of fulfilling a patriotic duty, the informant would receive an award of $1 million from the Russian government. A recipient of such an award who wished to enjoy his wealth by living a life of leisure and luxury abroad would be permitted to leave Russia with his family.

  The Russian scientists pointed out that by repeating the same thesis over and over again, as they well knew how to do, the Russian government could create an atmosphere which would virtually guarantee that Russian scientists and engineers would come forward to report secret violations.

  The Russians further proposed that agents of the International Control Commission maintain establishments in all Russian cities, and in the larger cities several establishments. An informant could simply walk into such an establishment with his whole family and make a deposition; if the International Control Commission held that the information revealed a violation of the agreement, then the Russian government would at once deposit the award of $1 million with the Commission. This sum would be returned to Russia if the information later turned out to be invalid, but the burden of proof would be on the Russian government.

  The Russians thought that most Russian informants would probably prefer to remain in Russia. They proposed that such informants be free to remain, but that if they did they be required to report their whereabouts once every six months to the Control Commission, in order to satisfy the Commission that they had not been arrested or shot. Each time they reported they would receive an installment of their million-dollar award.

  The Russians proposed that the arrest or shooting of an informant be classed as a violation of the disarmament agreement and that the reporting of this type of violation rate an award of $1 million, payable by the Russian government.

  The response of the Americans to this novel Russian approach was very enthusiastic. The Americans said that they would favor America’s adopting the same approach for reassuring Russia on possible secret violations. They said that the President would never condone such violations, but that the possibility of such violations could not be ruled out, since they might well be kept secret from the President. They also said that an award of $1 million would be almost meaningless in America, income tax being what it is, unless the Treasury issued a ruling that such awards would be free from tax. They did not doubt, however, that the Treasury could be prevailed upon to issue such a ruling.

  The Americans also said they would recommend that every b
oat and plane capable of carrying a bomb across the Atlantic or the Pacific should carry a team of inspectors on board, in order to reassure Russia and China that these planes or ships did not carry any illicit bombs.

  The discussion of safeguards in the case of virtually total disarmament ended with several Russian participants cautioning the conference against drawing the conclusion that satisfactory safeguards against secret violations would be practicable under prevailing world conditions. Since Russia would undoubtedly insist on retaining bombs and rockets for her defense-so they pointed out-and since these would be moved about on trucks and railroad cars, their current location would represent an important military secret that needed to be safeguarded. In these circumstances, clearly Russia would not be able to tolerate that the locations of the mobile rocket units be reported by informants.

  The discussion of these arguments was deferred to the next series of sessions, which was supposed to examine the “feasibility” of controlled-arms reduction rather than virtually complete disarmament.

  In preparation for that series of sessions, the steering committee drafted a memorandum, “Inspecting the Informant.” This memorandum assumed that as a first step all submarines capable of firing rockets would be destroyed, and that at the same time China, Russia and America would reduce the number of rockets below the shake-up level of the smaller nations. The number of bombs and rockets legitimately retained by America, China, Russia and the other nations would be agreed upon. The legitimately retained bombs and rockets would be marked and all the unmarked bombs and rockets: retained would be considered illegitimate.

  It was assumed that the legitimately retained rockets would: be mounted on railroad cars or trucks and be constantly moved about. A sufficient number of rocket-tracing stations would be set up all over the world; these stations, by locating the origin of the rocket, would be capable of identifying the nation from whose territory the rocket was launched. It was proposed that each railroad car or truck carrying a legitimate” rocket also carry an international team of inspectors. In case-of an attack by a mobile-rocket unit which was not authorized by its government, the inspection teams would thus be in a position to exonerate the innocent units and to identify, by elimination, the particular one that had fired the rocket. The individuals responsible for such an unauthorized attack; could then be brought to justice.

  The teams of international inspectors assigned to the mobile rocket units would also serve as “markers,” and any would-be informant could know that a unit not so marked was not a legitimate one.

  It was made clear that in this stage of arms limitations there would be no secrets left that need be safeguarded, save the location of the mobile rocket units. Accordingly, informants would be free to transmit any information they pleased except this. In order to reassure the nations on this particular point, their governments would be permitted to “inspect” informants engaged in the process of transmitting information.

  The memorandum stressed that even if the number of bombs and rockets which the nations were initially permitted to retain was very large, the further reduction of this number would be easy to police, because international. inspectors could be called in to witness the destruction of each such bomb and rocket. How fast the initially retained number “would be reduced would have to depend on the wishes of the participating nations. The reduction would have to take place steps by step, and the magnitude of each step, as well as its timing, would have to be agreed upon from time to time.

  Finally, the memorandum made it clear that controlled arms limitations of the kind envisaged would not greatly diminish the danger of clashes between the Great Powers, unless the acceptance of these limitations were accompanied by a determination and a pledge not to resort to atomic bombs except in retaliation against an attack with atomic bombs. If the nations were left free to bring pressure to bear on each other by threatening to use their legitimately retained bombs, then the limitation of the number of rockets would not appreciably diminish the danger of a resort to force.

  During the discussion of this memorandum it became evident that some of the Americans were far from being reassured. They did not doubt that secret violations of the agreement would be detected if the approach proposed by the Russians were in fact adopted, but they were not sure that America would abrogate an agreement even if a rather serious violation were discovered. This provoked the Russians to say that they were prepared to deal with the difficulties that might arise from the distrust of the Russian government by the Americans, but were at a loss how to cope with problems arising from the fact that the Americans did not trust their own government.

  Notwithstanding this first whimsical response, the Russians understood that the problem of abrogation was rather serious, and when the meeting reached an impasse on this subject they suggested that the steering committee prepare a working paper on abrogations for the consideration of the conference. The paper which was prepared made two basic points:

  1. The right to abrogate should be retained by only a small number of nations.

  2. The nations retaining the right to abrogate must not be forced to choose between the two extremes of either tolerating serious violations of the agreement or invoking total abrogation of the agreement. These nations must be able to invoke a partial abrogation of the agreement, but might choose only a partial abrogation leading to one of the “balanced stages of reduced arms levels” specified in advance.

  The working paper on abrogations proposed that the disarmament agreement specify a number of such predetermined “balanced stages of reduced arms levels,” which were intermediate between the prevailing arms level and virtually total disarmament. It was assumed that the transition from a higher to a lower “balanced stage” would require a majority decision of the Security Council, with the concurring vote of the five permanent members. It was proposed that any permanent member of the Security Council should have the right to invoke either a limited or an all-out abrogation of the agreement and thereby to raise the arms level from the stage prevailing at the time of the abrogation to one of the higher of the ten stages specified in the agreement.

  The working paper explained that an abrogation, or even a partial abrogation, of the agreement would have to be regarded as a matter of last resort and that it was essential to have the possibility of bringing other pressure on nations who violated the agreement. To this end, it was proposed that a certain sizable fraction of the amounts saved by the nations in arms cost be paid into a fund, the Fund for Compensations. If a nation that did not retain the right to abrogate were to violate the agreement, it could then be effectively restrained by economic sanctions, because the nations applying such sanctions could be, and would be, compensated for such economic losses as they themselves would suffer.

  After an intermission of ten days, which the participants in the conference spent in the Semmering Mountains conversing with each other unencumbered by any agenda, the conference reconvened in Vienna. Because the existing political situation in Europe made the discussion of a political settlement appear to be purely academic, this part of the conference disappointed those who expected it to produce concrete suggestions in the domain of practical politics.

  A Blue Book prepared by the steering committee was placed before the conference when it reconvened. It attributed the difficulties of Europe to the fact that the political structure in Europe did not reflect the economic interdependence of the nations of Europe, and it suggested that if Germany were not only economically but also politically integrated with Europe, Europe would pose no greater problem to the world than the other continents.

  The steering committee took a dim view, however, of the possibility of bringing about political integration of Europe through the creation of supranational political agencies. Instead, it proposed a method of political integration which could be carried out gradually, step by step, and could start out, for instance, with the integration of France and Germany. As a first step, Germany would be represented in France, i
n the parliament of the Seventh Republic, by delegates who would have 5 per cent of the total votes. Similarly, France would be represented in the German parliament by delegates having 5 per cent of the total votes. In subsequent years these representations could increase step by step, at a predetermined rate, until they might amount to 15 per cent of the votes in both parliaments.

  In much the same manner, the committee thought, through mutual representation of the nations in each other’s parliament the whole of Western Europe could be politically integrated.

  This proposal encountered much skepticism at the conference. It was pointed out that while such a proposal might be received enthusiastically in France, it would have no chance of being passed by the German parliament. There it would be Opposed by the People’s Party, controlling 4.5 per cent of the votes, and would thus fall far short of the required two-thirds majority. Those who read the transcript of the” conference may notice, in retrospect, that the Chinese and the Americans were much more vocal in expressing these misgivings than were the Russians. The Russians met several times among themselves and they must have discussed this problem, but they kept silent about it during the formal sessions. The second part of the conference, having run out of topics that could be usefully discussed, closed one week earlier than scheduled.

  Governmental negotiations on disarmament started about four months after the close of the Vienna Conference. They did not evoke much enthusiasm either in Russia or in America. The Americans were generally lukewarm and said that these negotiations could at best achieve arms reduction, which would not eliminate the possibility of war between the Great Powers; the Russians had misgivings that world public opinion might push them further toward total disarmament than they felt they ought to go.