by Gary Noesner
With this in mind, we redoubled our efforts to demonstrate peaceful intentions, as well as our resolve to assist the Davidians in coming out and rejoining their children. Our profilers’ research told us that Koresh had for some time been preaching the necessity of martyrdom in the final confrontation with Babylon. The biblical imagery was now reinforced by his having been shot. In terms he could appropriate from the book of Revelation, “the lamb had been wounded.” We tried not to give him any more evidence to use in convincing his followers that this was the ultimate showdown between the forces of good and the forces of evil. By appearing reasonable and willing to help, we tried to show that the FBI was not, as he might suggest, Babylon.
Before the siege, a documentary film about the Davidians had been produced by the Australian version of 20/20 as a result of child-abuse complaints made by two ejected Davidians from Australia. The film footage was instructive. They had filmed Koresh giving lengthy sermons to his followers at the compound. When our profilers brought these tapes in for us to review, the man we observed, with his silky smile, air of superiority, and emotionally laden sermonizing, came across as a slick con artist more than anything else. But we were detached law enforcement officers, not naive seekers after enlightenment. As we examined the faces of his followers, they appeared absolutely mesmerized, hanging on his every word. Comparing various statements he had made on these tapes, as well as statements he made to us, we could also see how easily he altered his stated beliefs to serve whatever seemed to be in his interest at the moment. If there had ever been any doubt, this persuaded us that arguing religion with him would be a fool’s game. He may have truly believed that he had some divine mission, but in my opinion, he was using religion primarily as a tool for manipulating and controlling others. In addition, the local newspaper in Waco had begun running a series of articles titled “The Sinful Messiah,” which provided more useful information about the Davidians and how they functioned.
During these first few days, we learned that Koresh’s tenure with the Davidians had hit a rocky patch a few years earlier. He had pursued the elderly widow of Branch Davidian founder Benjamin Roden and wound up having a romantic relationship with her. This led to a confrontation for control with Roden’s son, George, which culminated in a gunfight. Koresh was subsequently arrested and prosecuted for assault, but the jury found him innocent.
I discussed this with my negotiation teams, and as a result, our primary negotiators began to use that incident to remind Koresh that the court system could be fair. Henry Garcia, who had become our primary negotiator during the day shift, hit this theme hard. The American legal system had sided with him in the past, so there was no reason for him not to be able to expect a fair trial for the deaths of the ATF agents. At one point he said he would be willing to come out and be judged by what he called “your law,” but he did not say when. Later that night, Koresh released two more children, bringing the total to fourteen.
At 10:06 p.m. on March 1, Henry was on the phone with Koresh when the Davidian leader made an offer out of the blue. If we allowed him to deliver a nationwide broadcast, then he and his followers would surrender peacefully. With a hand signal I encouraged Henry to pursue this in more detail.
“Okay, David,” Henry said. “Let’s see what we can do. What sort of message do you want to convey?”
“I want to speak about the book of Revelation,” Koresh said.
Around the room, we exchanged knowing glances. Fresh on our minds was the 1978 incident in Jonestown, Guyana, when Reverend Jim Jones coerced over 900 of his People’s Temple followers to “drink the Kool-Aid” that led to their deaths. The book of Revelation, with its focus on the apocalypse, could be a dangerous text in the hands of a charismatic and narcissistic leader.
Henry asked Koresh if what Jones had done was the kind of thing he had in mind—a farewell statement and then mass suicide.
“I’m not having anybody kill themselves,” he said.
We told him that we would consider the idea, and the next day Koresh repeated his offer to surrender in return for airtime.
“So, David, if you just want to talk about the Bible, how about a tape-recorded message? Then we can review it and run it past our bosses.”
“That’s okay,” he said. “I can work with that.”
“And just one more thing. We want you to start out by saying on the tape that if the message is broadcast over nationwide radio, then you and all your followers will peacefully surrender.”
“That’s right,” he said. “That’s the deal.”
I asked for a meeting with Jamar and the other SACs and brought with me profiler Pete Smerick from the FBI Behavioral Science Unit. We told them that we saw little risk in playing the tape, assuming that it did not contain any references to suicide. I made clear to the commanders that we had hope, but no guarantee, that Koresh would follow through on his promise.
“Why give him anything when there’s no positive assurance we get something in return?” Jamar asked me.
I explained that this was not a typical bargaining interaction because we had so little leverage.
“The only thing Koresh wants from us is for us to go away. We’re not going to do that. We can’t bargain, since he doesn’t want anything else. So really, we’re not giving up anything.”
I knew I risked losing credibility with Jamar if Koresh didn’t follow through, but as far as I was concerned, we were putting nothing at risk. If it turned out that he was conning us, we would have demonstrated our goodwill, and the onus would be on him to demonstrate good faith in some other way.
Jamar gave his approval, and Koresh made the tape and sent it out for our review. As promised, the recording contained nothing more than a rambling sermon about the book of Revelation. We carefully listened to all fifty-seven minutes and found nothing in it that suggested it was a preamble for mass suicide. We even reached out to religious scholars at nearby Baylor University for their interpretation, and they, too, found nothing problematic.
At 8:15 a.m., March 2, Koresh released two more children, bringing our total to sixteen. He also released two women in their seventies who lived in a trailer adjacent to the compound. Unfortunately, though long-term Davidians, they seemed a little out of it and couldn’t give us any useful information about conditions inside, or what, if anything, the Davidians were planning. At 1:20 p.m., following further negotiations, Koresh released another two children. That made eighteen children and two adults out. Each additional person released gave us hope that we were headed in the right direction.
That afternoon at 1:32, the Christian Broadcasting Network broadcast Koresh’s tape nationwide, uncut, as promised. In subsequent conversations Koresh told us that he had heard the broadcast and was pleased with it.
Now it was time for him to deliver on his promise to come out peacefully.
With Jamar’s approval, we worked out a plan whereby Koresh would be carried out on a stretcher by several of the Davidians. The others would then follow in small groups, marching to school buses that would take them to the receiving facility.
Koresh’s number two man, Steve Schneider, would stay on the phone with us throughout the process to ensure coordinated movement. He would then come out last.
Koresh agreed to all these arrangements, and we brought up the buses so that they could be seen from inside the compound. HRT stood by, ready to secure the individuals. I asked Bill Luthin, the HRT liaison officer working in the negotiation room, to take special care to avoid appearing to manhandle anyone, as this would be watched by those still inside. Bill was very experienced and agreed to emphasize this point with HRT team members. We didn’t want any misunderstanding that might short-circuit this peaceful end to such a volatile situation. Earlier, Koresh had told us that twenty children, forty-seven women, and forty-three men remained in the compound, and we wanted them all to make it out alive.
The negotiation team waited patiently, in radio contact with the frontline tactical people as the appoi
nted time came and went. HRT reported no movement, so we called Steve Schneider.
“Steve, what’s going on?”
“Everybody’s lined up with their stuff, ready to go out,” he said. He sounded confident, even relieved.
“What about David?”
“We’re trying to get him downstairs on a stretcher, but the wounds make it tough to move him. He’s hurting, you know.”
“Yeah, we know. It must be tough. Just do the best you can.”
We waited awhile longer, but still no one emerged from the compound.
We called back in, but this time Schneider’s optimism seemed to have faded. Koresh was still coming, he told us, but this time his assurances sounded vague and unconvincing.
“Steve,” Henry said, “you’ve really got to come clean with us. What’s going on? We’ve delivered on everything we’d promised. Everyone’s standing by.”
“David just wants to give everybody a final Bible study lesson before coming out,” he said.
This sounded like something Koresh would do, so we regained some measure of hope that things were still on track.
More time passed, and we called in yet again at 5:59 p.m., and spoke to Schneider. “The Lord spoke to David,” he said. “The Lord told David to wait, not to come out.”
Now we knew we’d been had. Funny how conveniently this divine intervention had appeared.
I slipped Henry a note, which he delivered verbatim: “But we delivered on our end of the bargain! We did everything you asked.”
“I understand. But God has the final word.”
“Steven, can you put David on the phone, please?”
“He’s praying. He doesn’t want to talk right now.”
We were extremely disappointed, to say the least, but not totally surprised. As experienced negotiators, we were used to dealing with manipulative people, which is to say that we were accustomed to being lied to. These kinds of setbacks are a normal part of the negotiation process. It’s important not to abandon the strategy just because Koresh had reneged in this instance. It’s important not to overreact.
This created an immediate challenge. I knew that Rogers and Jamar would view it as a sign that Koresh was manipulating the negotiation team and that we were not being firm enough with him. Further, they would view it as an insult to their authority.
I went into Jamar’s office to explain what had—or had not—happened, and sitting in a chair in front of his desk was Dick Rogers. Both were visibly angry.
I reminded them that we had warned them that this kind of thing could happen, but that it shouldn’t alter our approach. They listened, but I could see that they’d already decided that they wanted to punish Koresh. It became clear to me that their decision was based on a strong emotional response to what Koresh had done.
“This joker is screwing with us,” Rogers said. “It’s time to teach him a lesson.”
“I don’t think that’s going to advance our cause,” I said. “It doesn’t matter if Koresh is jerking us around. The point is, we’re getting people out of there.”
Rogers and I were talking past each other, both trying to influence Jamar, but his body language showed he agreed with Rogers.
“My people can get in there and secure that place in fifteen minutes,” Rogers said.
“Still too soon for that,” Jamar said. “But I agree it’s time to teach him a lesson.”
I protested, saying we might well be able to get things back on track, but they were adamant, violating a core principle of the FBI negotiation program: never confuse getting even with getting what you want. Talladega had buoyed Rogers’s confidence about what his team could do, but this was a very different situation; for one thing, they had guns, lots of them. For another, they had children inside. Philosophically, Rogers believed the best way to force them out was to tighten the noose around them, to apply increasing pressure until they capitulated. Yet I knew this approach would be counterproductive.
The very first thing I talk about when training new negotiators is the critical importance of self-control. If we cannot control our own emotions, how can we expect to influence the emotions of another party? But I also remind my negotiators that “negotiators negotiate and commanders command.” It is the negotiators’ responsibility to make the very best strategy recommendations we can, but to also know that the advice we give commanders will not always be embraced.
Despite my warning, Jamar ordered the armored Bradley vehicles to move onto Davidian property as a visible display of the FBI’s power. I was concerned that this would only ratchet up the tension and damage our credibility.
That proved true in our next conversation with Schneider: he angrily denounced us for moving the armored vehicles forward.
“You promised to stay off our land,” he said.
“But David promised to come out. It was a firm commitment, Steve. My bosses are angry and frustrated,” said Henry.
“Honestly, we were going to come out, but what could we do? God told David to wait.”
Koresh had conveniently used God as the ultimate trump card, but from everything I could tell, Schneider sincerely believed what he was saying. Under the circumstances, he had to hold his faith in what David had said about God. This firm belief shut down the conversation, at least temporarily.
When we spoke to Schneider the next day, now the fourth day of the standoff, he admitted that he was “personally embarrassed” that the Davidians hadn’t followed through with the promise to come out. We hoped this signaled the opening of a wedge between Schneider and Koresh. Schneider was far better educated—he held a master’s degree in divinity—and more articulate than Koresh, a high-school dropout. We had also learned that Schneider’s wife, Judy, had become one of Koresh’s concubines. Koresh had even fathered a child with her, whereas she and Steve had never conceived one. There seemed to be more than enough reasons for Schneider to harbor resentment that we could exploit. But that would require that Schneider had reserved some of his mind for independent thought. Of that there was no evidence.
The FBI and ATF leadership team began holding regular daily press conferences, with key remarks prepared by my negotiation team. Jamar ran these at first. Our team provided him with the daily talking points we wanted to convey, not just to the world but to the Davidians inside: all we wanted was a peaceful solution, and our primary concern was the safety of the children.
The scripted portion of the press conferences generally went well and served our objectives. We were less successful later when, during question-and-answer sessions, one or more of the FBI or ATF leaders would shoot from the hip. More than once during questioning by reporters, officials made offhand remarks casting doubt on the sincerity of Koresh’s beliefs, with sarcastic references to his conversation with God. It then fell on our team to backtrack with the Davidians and explain what they meant. This did not help our cause.
As governments and corporations have learned through the years, it’s far better to have a designated press spokesperson stand before the media rather than the boss. When faced with a tough question, the spokesperson can reply that he or she doesn’t have the information sought but will follow up later. This provides much-needed time to formulate and deliver the best answer to the question.
It was also problematic that ATF officials continued to be involved in the daily press conferences. This undercut efforts to distance the FBI, and specifically our negotiation team, from this organization that the Davidians hated. Despite my repeated requests to remove the ATF from the press conferences, FBI officials in Washington preferred to try to underscore “unity” by keeping the ATF in the picture.
Once the Bradleys moved forward, I realized the internal battle over strategy was going to be as challenging as talking to Koresh. There was a growing disconnect between the strategy we were pursuing as negotiators and the thoughts of the tactical folks on the perimeter. The deeper realization was that Dick Rogers had not been chastened at all by the outcome of his rash orders at
Ruby Ridge. Buoyed by Talladega, he was still committed to the tough-guy rule book.
Making matters worse, there appeared to be a growing misunderstanding at the forward position about what we negotiators were doing. Coordination between us and HRT was complicated by our separate locations; they were located just outside the Davidian compound, whereas we were eight miles away. I volunteered to brief the HRT operators as they were coming off or going on their shifts, but Dick Rogers declined the offer, saying it wasn’t necessary and that he’d tell the guys what they needed to know. I was beginning to sense his personal frustration and growing discontent with the progress of the negotiations.
I also recommended that Rogers, Jamar, and I meet face-to-face at regular intervals in order to work out any strategy disagreements, but Jamar again declined to follow my suggestion. He said that the existing system, whereby I met with him and then he went forward and met separately with Rogers, was working to his satisfaction.
In truth, it contributed greatly to our problems.
Despite the growing tension with the Davidians, we were able to get back on track, and on March 3, the fourth day of the incident, at around four-thirty in the afternoon twelve-year-old Mark Jones was allowed to leave. At seven-thirty the following morning, his eleven-year-old brother, Kevin, followed. Our tally was now two adults and twenty children released, about half the total number of children thought to be inside at the beginning of the siege. Regardless of how else Koresh might be manipulating us, he was letting these children live, and that was a good thing.
At 8:41 on Friday morning, March 5, we negotiated the release of nine-year-old Heather Jones, the twenty-first child and twenty-third person overall to leave. Unfortunately, she would be the last person to exit for several days. It seemed that our continuing show of force had failed to make Koresh more compliant, and in fact had made him angry enough to break off contact.