by Gary Noesner
After negotiating for more than twelve hours, the Texas Rangers agreed to trade the Rowes for Scheidt. Joe Rowe, who had been cut by flying glass during the invasion of his home, had a heart condition, and the Rangers were concerned for his health. As Joe Rowe was taken to the hospital, the ROT gang retreated to their compound. Meanwhile, state authorities filed kidnap charges against McLaren and the other ROT members—Richard Keyes, Gregg Paulson, and Karen Paulson—who had committed the break-in and abduction.
While standard FBI procedure is never to exchange hostages, provide weapons, or furnish illegal drugs, we also leave room for flexibility, particularly when lives are at stake. This trade moved the Rowes out of harm’s way, which meant that McLaren now had to be more concerned than ever about the potential for an assault since he no longer had them to use as shields. And even though Scheidt was out of jail for the moment, no one had any intention of letting him walk free.
The downside of the exchange was that McLaren claimed it as a great victory. It also fueled his grandiosity. He telephoned the media and said that he would not end the standoff until the authorities agreed to a referendum on Texas independence. “Maybe somebody will talk to us now,” he said. “We’ve been trying for two years to get someone to talk to us.” McLaren escalated even further, characterizing law enforcement authorities as “foreign agents” and demanding that the international court in The Hague recognize their legitimacy as a sovereign nation. As the hours passed he became increasingly agitated and his rhetoric more vitriolic.
I flew back to El Paso late Tuesday afternoon, April 29, and was told to check in to a motel and wait there. Profiler Al Brantley had come in just ahead of me and was already en route to Fort Davis in his rental car.
Meanwhile, McLaren’s attorney, Terry O’Rourke, gave Captain Caver of the Texas Rangers some letters from McLaren that expressed some of the ROT leader’s typically inflated concerns. McLaren not only wanted the Rangers and the other authorities to stay away, but he wanted to be dealt with as the ambassador of an independent country.
The conditions Caver offered were considerably less grand. Fundamentally, they called for McLaren’s surrender. Not too surprisingly, the talks broke off, at which point I was told to proceed to Fort Davis.
The following morning, Wednesday the thirtieth, I got up early and drove to the forward command post, which was in a nearby fire department building. In my initial briefing I learned that a negotiation team had already been established, consisting of Texas Ranger Jess Malone, the primary negotiator who would speak to McLaren, and FBI negotiators Lane Akin and Carlos Conejo. Al and I were there to assist.
The Texas Rangers are known for acting decisively to enforce the law and restore order, a heroic reputation summed up in the adage “One riot, one Ranger.” Accordingly, they were already voicing great frustration over their dealings with McLaren, and they were seriously considering a full tactical assault. Texas Ranger senior captain Bruce Casteel was the senior official at the scene when I arrived. He asked me what I thought would happen if they initiated tactical probes against McLaren. I voiced my opinion that ROT members would most likely respond with violence.
Before the siege, McLaren had been thought to have at most thirteen people holed up with him. We knew that Robert Scheidt was there, along with Richard Keyes and Gregg Paulson and his wife, Karen—the party that had invaded the Rowes’ home. The rest of the cast of characters were Robert Otto, a bodyguard, who claimed to be a Native American and was also known as “White Eagle”; Evelyn Horak, McLaren’s common-law wife; and Mike Matson. Beyond these, we weren’t sure. McLaren, Otto, and several others were believed to be carrying semiautomatic weapons.
Given our lack of specific knowledge, I was concerned that we were moving toward a “linear approach” to incident management, which could lead to another debacle. It goes something like this: “First we try to talk them out, then if that doesn’t work, we drop those ongoing efforts and tactically force them out.” I suggested that the Rangers should consider the “parallel approach”: authorities negotiate in good faith while simultaneously preparing for and showing their ability to undertake tactical action. Limited demonstration of tactical movement can help the negotiation process along by encouraging dialogue. Too little action can make the subject feel confident and secure, and thus less likely to negotiate in earnest. Too much action might trigger a firefight.
The Rangers accepted my suggestion and undertook an effort to be more visible to McLaren and the others at the “embassy.” At the same time, they were careful not to encroach on ROT property or get close enough to trigger a violent response.
But McLaren now refused to speak with the Rangers. I suggested that we use the media to get our position out to the public. So far, McLaren was making all the significant statements, characterizing himself as a victim of federal intrusion and portraying the authorities as harassing him and his followers. I felt we could use the press to provide an accurate account of the situation, discourage supporters from rallying to his aid, and encourage McLaren to return to negotiations. The Rangers asked that I work with Department of Public Safety (DPS) press spokesman Mike Cox to develop a strategy. Mike had been plenty busy responding to endless media inquiries about McLaren, the ROT, and the charges pending against those hiding at the “embassy.” He was now happy to use his microphone in a more proactive way.
We worked out the following points for Mike to deliver in his press conference:
1. “This is a State of Texas matter only. This is a case of Texas authorities trying to execute arrest warrants based on probable cause that crimes have been committed. McLaren and others have not been convicted of anything; they have only been charged and must appear to answer those charges according to Texas law and be tried by a jury of their fellow Texans.”
Obviously, we felt this last piece was particularly important to help remove the argument that the big bad federal government was coming after McLaren for his beliefs.
2. “This is not a federal matter and should not be viewed as the U.S. government trying to move against the ROT. The DPS and Texas Rangers are in charge of this incident; the FBI is only here in an advisory role.”
We couldn’t deny that the FBI had some personnel on the scene, as this had already been widely reported. A total denial would be a lie.
3. “The ROT claims that people should be free in their homes, yet ROT members violently invaded a home and at gunpoint took two people hostage. The people of Texas expect law enforcement authorities to investigate and prosecute such crimes. Texas authorities are attempting to serve valid arrest warrants; they are not concerned about Mr. McLaren’s political beliefs.”
I hoped this point would elicit a response from McLaren, perhaps even bring him back to negotiations. I didn’t think McLaren would want to be characterized as he was in our statement, which pulled the rug right out from under his self-serving interpretation of events. Right-wing movements always rail about the sanctity of individual rights, saying that a man’s home is his castle and that no one has a right to come into someone else’s home without permission. Yet here we were clearly showing that the ROT had violated this principle.
4. “Texas authorities have continued to undertake extensive efforts to open and maintain dialogue with McLaren. He has broken off contact. Texas authorities have shown patience and are committed to a peaceful resolution; we await Mr. McLaren’s contact.”
Again, this statement put enormous pressure on McLaren to reach out. The version of events he had presented to the media and distributed over the Internet was now a myth blown out of the water. Our statement served to make Texas authorities look rational while at the same time showing McLaren as obstructing efforts to reach a peaceful conclusion.
5. “We plan to serve the warrants.”
And we wanted to make it clear that law enforcement was not going away.
While Mike Cox was preparing to give the press conference to deliver these points, the Rangers also dropped off a w
ritten response to McLaren’s demands from the previous evening. This package included a letter from attorney Terry O’Rourke encouraging McLaren to come out. We also recommended that the package include a personal letter from Jess Malone, our primary negotiator, requesting that McLaren pick up the telephone to speak with him. We felt this would personalize Jess and demonstrate our sincere willingness to talk. Our earlier and repeated efforts to call in and speak to McLaren had been rebuffed.
Mike’s appearance before the press received significant coverage, the overriding theme being that the citizens of Texas would demand that authorities bring to trial anyone who violated the sanctity of any citizen’s home.
We didn’t have to wait long for the ROT to take the bait. At about three that afternoon, Gregg Paulson phoned right-wing radio personality Doug Town. Based in Tampa, Florida, Town had already been on the phone with various individuals inside the ROT compound. Town contacted the FBI, and negotiators from my unit at Quantico spoke with him, trying to make sure that he understood that this was not another Waco, that the FBI was not in charge, and that we did not have a significant presence at Fort Davis.
At the request of negotiator Jim Duffy back at my unit in Quantico, Town set up a direct call between the ROT and negotiator Jess Malone. On that call, Paulson ranted about our characterization of him as having violently kidnapped the Rowes. In contrast, Jess maintained an easygoing, nonconfrontational manner and ran circles around Paulson. Jess carefully avoided getting into an argument. He also stressed the importance of keeping open a direct line of communications in the hope of achieving a peaceful resolution. Jess then asked Paulson if he and McLaren would, with a guarantee of safety and their right to return to the “embassy,” be willing to come out for a “summit meeting.” We knew the word summit would appeal to the ROT’s sense of itself as a sovereign nation. Paulson went for it. He said he would call us back at seven-thirty that night.
This telephone exchange with Paulson reminded me that the authorities had so far not captured the ROT phone lines. Typically, one of the first things we try to do in a siege is isolate the phone lines so that the subjects can only speak with or through the negotiators—but the ROT still had unfettered access to the outside world. I suggested all efforts be undertaken right away to change that, meaning that whenever the ROT picked up the phone they would get us and only us. This would make the negotiators their sole broker for all communications, which was exactly what we wanted.
Unfortunately, this suggestion was misunderstood by someone on the law enforcement side. The result was a screw-up in which the ROT phone was cut off entirely. For some time we had been asking McLaren to speak with us, telling him he could do so whenever he wanted, and now we’d made that impossible. Making matters worse, the lines were cut just before the 7:30 p.m. call we had scheduled with Paulson.
Mistakes do happen during crisis situations, most often because the left hand of law enforcement doesn’t know what the right hand is doing. In this case, someone may have been confused about the instructions, or may have simply assumed that we were following the policy of many police departments, which is to cut phone lines and power immediately when responding to an incident. I don’t think authorities should ever do anything just because it’s been done in the past. Each action has to be carefully considered in the context of the specific situation, with both the positive and the negative potential taken into account.
Similarly, some SWAT teams prefer that negotiators not make initial contact with the subject until the team has the perimeter effectively contained, which can take time. These teams are concerned that the subject may want to come out before a surrender can be accomplished in a tactically preferred manner. I’ve always believed that if someone really wants to surrender before we are fully ready, the officers on hand will somehow make it work, even if it isn’t entirely according to the SWAT playbook. The notion of asking a subject to wait to surrender makes no sense to me.
In my opinion, the very first thing an agency should try to achieve is “verbal containment.” This means establishing a dialogue, trying to keep the barricaded person calm, and explaining each of our movements in advance so that he does not see them as threatening.
Fred Lanceley used to tell negotiation classes that our job is not just about what happens over the phone line. It is everything the subject observes from his window as well as everything he hears on radio or sees on television. All of these stimuli have to be carefully controlled and managed in an integrated manner.
Unfortunately, we were now in a situation in which the press conference had set us up for progress, but we had no way to capitalize on it because we had no way to talk to the subjects.
At 10:00 Thursday morning I requested a meeting with Captain Caver. He was a tall, lean man, clean-cut with dark hair. By all appearances he was approachable, laid-back, and easygoing. I’d never encountered him at Waco, but I knew that he, too, had been part of the law enforcement team outside the Branch Davidian compound. I was hoping he had taken away from that ill-fated siege the same lessons I had. Though he listened patiently while Al Brantley and I explained our concerns and made our recommendations, I could tell he was growing impatient with McLaren and that he was leaning toward quick and decisive action.
I thought it would be appropriate to share my concerns with him about any direct tactical action, so I took him aside and asked him a few key questions. “What will you say to the widow of one of your Rangers when you have to deliver the news that her husband has been killed making this assault? If the widow looks at you with tears in her eyes and wants to know if you had done everything possible to avoid putting her husband in harm’s way, will you be able to say you had? Will you be able to say that you explored every possible alternative? If you can’t say yes to those questions, then perhaps you need to consider attempting some other initiatives before you send your people into harm’s way. I believe we should try to reach our objectives without the use of force if at all possible.”
Caver looked startled. “What do you suggest I do?”
I told him I thought we might be able to undertake some incremental actions that would encourage McLaren to negotiate with us in earnest to avoid bloodshed. We could posture that we were going to assault him, without actually moving in, to try to convince him to surrender.
“I’m open to your suggestions and will do anything reasonable to keep my men safe,” he said.
In this conversation, he also acknowledged that he had never been told about the call scheduled with Paulson for seven-thirty the night before. He said that cutting the phone lines had been his decision, but he also said that he never would have done so if he had known about the call. Inadvertently, we had experienced the same communications problems that had plagued us at Waco. Even a well-meaning and open-minded commander can wind up spending more time with the tacticians than with the negotiators, which means that they may not be fully aware of the progress of the dialogue with those inside.
When teaching the FBI negotiation course, I would describe this as the “crisis within the crisis,” emphasizing the critical need for negotiation leadership to have direct access to the on-scene commander. I used to tell my students that negotiating with an on-scene commander was often more difficult than dealing with the perpetrator. But Captain Caver made it clear that he wanted our input, and that he would do whatever he reasonably could to avoid an escalation to violence.
Shortly after our meeting, Caver directed that a telephone line be sent in to McLaren to support the reopening of negotiations. Two hours later Jess was able to reestablish contact.
McLaren was surprisingly civil, but he also complained that he had been trying to communicate but hadn’t been able to get a call out. Jess Malone rose to the occasion, casually stating that there had been some problems with the telephone lines. McLaren then announced that he was sending out a “diplomatic pouch” with a letter we should read.
The pouch arrived around three in the afternoon. It contained a formal
-looking ROT document written to look like a legal affidavit, along with a formal cease-fire agreement that McLaren had signed and wanted the Rangers to sign as well. This second document requested mediation by a neutral country. The inflated diplomatic tone was vintage McLaren.
About an hour later, the negotiation team met to formulate a response. The group decided to send McLaren a letter informing him that the authorities could not sign the agreement as drafted. The carrot included along with that stick was that the authorities would, however, honor their earlier promise of a humane surrender process.
This letter was delivered to McLaren at around eight that evening. At around nine, McLaren called Jess Malone and said that the letter was not what he had expected. He began to posture about his official standing as an ambassador of the ROT and rambled on in his convoluted way. After listening patiently to this for some time, Jess, becoming somewhat frustrated, responded, “You are not an ambassador.” McLaren, who evidently did not appreciate the reality check, immediately hung up.
Late that evening, Paulson called Jess and engaged in a lengthy discussion. Paulson seemed scared, seeking reassurance that the Rangers would not be coming in during the night to get them. In keeping with our prepared strategy, Jess provided no such reassurance. Paulson’s willingness to die for the cause appeared to be waning. We let him sleep on it.
At 9:05 the following morning, Paulson called once again. He told Jess that the only things keeping him from coming out were his honor and his duty. He said that he had written orders from the ROT command to defend their flag, and these were orders he could not disobey. I sensed that Paulson was fishing for help.
In keeping with my role as the primary negotiator’s coach, I passed a note to Jess saying, Let’s find out who, besides McLaren, Paulson would accept orders from.
The coach always sits shoulder to shoulder with the primary negotiator, listening on a headset while remaining absolutely quiet. Learning to write good notes that help the primary negotiator stay on track is an art unto itself. A well-timed note can make a big difference, allowing the negotiator to seize a sudden and unexpected opportunity that arises in the dialogue.