by Gary Noesner
If I’ve gained any wisdom in my FBI career, it has come from recognizing the degree to which everyday life can mirror the dynamics of the destructive standoffs I faced in my FBI job. Each of us is called upon to negotiate stressful situations in business, social encounters, and family life time and again. From what I’ve observed, the happiest and most successful people tend to be those who are able to remain calm at these difficult times and put aside emotions such as pride or anger that stop them from finding common ground. We all need to be good listeners and learn to demonstrate our empathy and understanding of the problems, needs, and issues of others. Only then can we hope to influence their behavior in a positive way.
You might even say that all of life is a negotiation.
EPILOGUE
When I retired from the FBI I went to work for Control Risks, the premier kidnap-response consultancy in the world. My primary role was to assist clients in preparing for and operationally managing the kidnapping of one of their employees or family members to achieve the best outcome possible. My travel schedule increased significantly as a consultant, but I found I enjoyed the comparative freedom from the bureaucratic burdens that came with being a unit chief at the FBI.
However, my operational work was not over. From 2003 through 2008, I worked a lengthy and very complex kidnap incident involving three American defense contractors who were seized by a terrorist group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). This case received significant interest and active participation from a host of agencies within the U.S. government. It was among the most difficult I ever worked, and once again, dealing with parties other than the kidnappers often created a crisis within the crisis.
The government is staffed with many hardworking and capable individuals. It has tremendous resources and can be of great assistance in these matters, but it also has the capacity to make matters unnecessarily complicated. The government did much good in supporting Colombian military intelligence-gathering that eventually proved to be key in this incident. But constricted thinking and outdated policy guidelines often proved to be an impediment to creative problem solving that might have helped achieve an earlier release for the hostages.
Despite a number of government mistakes, after five and a half years of captivity the hostages were rescued by the Colombian military and returned home safely to their families. Working this case alongside the government, but this time from the perspective of the victims’ families and employers, provided me with additional insights into what I see as shortcomings in the way our government sometimes responds to terrorist situations.
Even among government leaders, the word terrorism evokes a great deal of emotion. This response can often lead to constricted thinking. The fact that a hostage is taken and held by a terrorist group isn’t the most important factor to consider when developing an effective resolution strategy. What’s more important to understand is what the terrorists are trying to achieve. If money or some other tangible item is their goal, then a classic negotiation strategy can be employed, usually with great success. However, if the demands are political, then the situation is infinitely more complicated and challenging, but not necessarily hopeless. Such cases require great patience and creative thinking. In 1990, we secured the safe release of Brent Swan from terrorists in Africa, not by paying the ransom they sought but by providing office and medical supplies as an alternative. This creative and flexible approach worked. Often tactical intervention is necessary, but not in every case.
Unfortunately, many government officials do not appreciate the different and nuanced aspects of terrorism. Instead they simply react to the word terrorist, concluding that the demands must be political and therefore, they must respond in a firm, unyielding, and inflexible manner. This one-size-fits-all reaction may not be the best response to the kidnappers’ true motivations or allow for thoughtful consideration of the wider range of resolution strategies that might be possible. In reality, most kidnap victims don’t care if they are taken by criminals or terrorists, held for money or for political objectives. They and their families simply want them to be free, and I believe everything reasonable should be done to make that happen.
There is no legal prohibition against a U.S. family or corporation paying a ransom in a criminal kidnap case. However, if an American is held by a group on the State Department’s terrorist list, paying a ransom may violate the prohibition against providing material support to a terrorist organization. Congress intended that prohibition to apply to organizations raising funds in the United States for terrorist groups abroad. It was never envisioned to apply to kidnap cases. In my opinion, it should never be used to prevent a family or corporation from securing the safe release of a loved one or employee taken hostage, as some in government have tried to suggest.
In the days following September 11, 2001, there was a hard and noticeable turn toward use of the military as the exclusive response mechanism for dealing with such situations. Many officials felt compelled to repeatedly declare that the United States would not negotiate with terrorists. These strong declarations have helped promote the use of military action as a response to any crisis. As the saying goes, if you’ve got a hammer, you tend to think everything is a nail. But saying we will not negotiate with terrorists has never been shown to protect American citizens from being kidnapped abroad. In fact, Americans remain among the most sought-after individuals to kidnap.
I concur that the U.S. government should not make substantive concessions to terrorists. (I am not speaking of families or employers here.) However, this should not be interpreted, as it so often is, to mean that U.S. authorities will not hold discussions—that is, negotiate—with terrorists. I’m confident that the FBI would indeed attempt to actively negotiate with terrorists holding hostages on an aircraft at JFK Airport. To do otherwise would be dangerous and foolish. But negotiating with terrorists doesn’t mean we will comply with their demands. It is counterproductive to restrict ourselves from opening a line of communication with the hostage takers simply because they happen to be terrorists and we feel a need to appear and sound tough. This is what President Fujimori did in Peru, and he was lucky he avoided a total catastrophe. I look at the recent effective efforts of the U.S. military in Iraq to reach out to extremist factions and even bring some onto our payroll as a tool to stop violence. Such creative and effective negotiations save American lives. I believe it is sufficient to say that it is our policy as a nation not to make substantive concessions to terrorists.
It is certainly true that payment of ransom to a criminal or even a terrorist group in order to secure the safe release of a hostage serves to encourage further kidnappings. But what is the alternative? Do we allow a hostage to languish in the jungle for years or be killed? Simply put, in an overwhelming majority of kidnap cases, no ransom payment means there will be no release, plain and simple. In my view, our efforts should first and foremost be focused on the safe release of the hostage. After that, we can and should vigorously pursue the kidnappers in order to bring them to justice, or when appropriate use our military capabilities to punish them for having taken an American hostage. We should continue to track them relentlessly. Only when terrorists learn that there will be a price to pay for holding Americans will this crime be reduced or eliminated. But we should not let our desire to punish terrorist kidnappers cloud our judgment and restrict our options. Saying we refuse to negotiate simply does not make the problem go away.
I know from firsthand experience that the current worldwide terrorism threat is both real and substantial, and that we must remain prepared to deal with this problem through a wide array of response strategies. Recently, Somali pirates have engaged in abroad campaign of hijacking ships in international waters to secure ransom payments. In these cases, ransom payments may be required on humanitarian grounds to secure the safe release of the crews and ships involved. However, that action should be closely followed by the full force of military operations. The pirates will stop their hijacking spree whe
n they begin to suffer the consequences of their actions, no sooner. Capturing boats loaded with kidnappers and letting them go because they’ve not yet attacked a ship does nothing to discourage this terrible crime. I firmly believe in negotiations, but that does not preclude strong punitive military action when necessary. Yet we need to understand that when it is appropriate to conduct negotiations as a strategic tool, such an effort should not be viewed as a decision to acquiesce to terrorism.
The world’s positive perception of America took a sharp decline in recent years. Some believed that we were acting with arrogance and disregard for the views of others, that we rejected cooperation with the international community and would go our own way. Fortunately, that trend seems to have abated.
Diplomacy and negotiation are allied skills. The process of listening carefully to others, acknowledging their points of view, and crafting appropriate strategies enables us to positively influence their behavior. We need to do a better job of understanding that others may see the world and its problems differently than we do. That doesn’t necessarily mean that they are right or that we are wrong; it’s just a different perspective that needs to be understood and acknowledged.
I was pleased to read not long ago that Robert Gates became the first secretary of defense to say that the United States needed more diplomats and the funding to support their activities. It speaks to his appreciation of the fact that the “hammer” alone will not solve all of our problems as a nation. We must have a wide range of tools available in our toolbox, including negotiation, and learn to use them appropriately. As with law enforcement SWAT teams, U.S. military power should be used only when we are left with no recourse, and not simply because we can. Whenever possible we should follow Martin Luther King Jr.’s advice to “pursue peaceful ends through peaceful means.” Force should always be viewed as the least desirable and last option.
My thoughts and observations are based on almost three decades of directly dealing with terrorism around the world. I am not opposed to the use of force when necessary. My recommendation to use deadly force to save lives at Sperryville and my support for the HRT’s assault at Talladega are two dramatic examples of that. I’ve also had the great honor and privilege to work with the U.S. Army Delta Force and the U.S. Navy SEALs on both exercises and real-life operational deployments. I’m a great supporter of their dedication, capabilities, and commitment to saving American lives. Further, I also happen to be the very proud father of a Navy SEAL. Yet, I know that it’s absolutely vital that government leaders not use these brave soldiers and sailors, and the tremendous capabilities they represent, unless it’s absolutely necessary.
The 2002 Moscow theater incident, in which a tactical action to dislodge Chechen terrorists led to the deaths of 129 hostages, the 2004 Beslan School incident in the Caucasus, when 334 hostages died, including 186 children, and the botched Egyptian rescue attempt in Malta discussed earlier, show the continuing danger of trying to resolve situations through force alone. Just because a situation may appear nonnegotiable shouldn’t mean we don’t try to negotiate.
None of the U.S. military counterterrorism teams has negotiators; that role is reserved for the FBI. But if the leaders who dispatch our military don’t think negotiators will be required in a terrorist incident, based on their preconceived notions about terrorist behavior, they won’t deploy them. That would eliminate the use of one of our most important and successful tools.
I also remain concerned that leaders in our government today still have, for the most part, insufficient experience in managing a major siege incident. The FBI has not handled one in more than a decade. The public assumes the required skills to manage a crisis incident are inherent within the organization, but are they? Past crisis management training exercises have concentrated on assembling resources, sorting out jurisdiction, establishing joint interagency command posts, deploying improved computer programs to track intelligence, and linking communications capabilities. All of that is important, but it does nothing to actually prepare an incident commander or key decision maker for the most important task he or she will face: determining how to effectively communicate with the terrorists. There will be much we will need to understand. What are their goals? What have they demanded? What do their actions and behaviors suggest to us? How do we effectively communicate with them in response to their demands? How do we forestall violence? How do we buy time to better prepare for possible tactical intervention? How can the negotiators assist the tactical forces that may have to intervene? These are some of the critical questions that need to be addressed, yet no management training program that I know of adequately addresses these questions.
I believe it’s time for our nation to become better prepared for a terrorist siege event. The terrorist attack in Mumbai, India, in late November 2008 should serve as a warning that a similar incident could happen here in the United States. If it does, will we have the right resources and capable managers to effectively resolve the crisis with the least loss of life possible? The terrorists have to be good only once to do serious harm. We have to be good all the time.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Without the hard work, dedication, and vision of the hostage negotiation pioneers in law enforcement who came before me, this book and the story it tells would not be possible. Their efforts in the negotiation field helped start this important discipline down the path to become the true profession it has become today. My own growth and development as a hostage negotiator were greatly influenced by these forward-thinking individuals, as well as the many skilled police and FBI negotiators around the world whom I worked with through the years. I will forever be in their debt. I continue to be in awe of their dedication to saving lives in the most challenging of situations.
I want to thank the FBI for giving me the opportunity and great honor to serve my country for over thirty years. I will always appreciate the unique opportunity I had to travel throughout the United States and a good bit of the world on so many challenging, interesting, and varied assignments. Few others in law enforcement will ever have such opportunities. I will always be proud of having been an FBI special agent and for all that stood for. The FBI’s motto, Fidelity, Bravery, and Integrity, meant much more to me than just words.
Special recognition goes to Fred Lanceley, who was my mentor and partner during my early years as an FBI hostage negotiator. Fred’s insightful analysis of hostage, barricade, and suicide incidents was a great influence on my own thinking. His review of the section of this book on the Ruby Ridge incident was most helpful. I would also like to thank Lt. George Bradford (retired), of the Washington Metropolitan Police Department, for his friendship and support during my early fieldwork as a negotiation practitioner. The entire MPD negotiation team that Lt. Bradford led was instrumental in helping me first put theory to practice. I would also like to give thanks to my old friend and negotiation colleague Jim Botting, FBI Los Angeles (retired), who has been and remains today a great source of wisdom, support, and friendship. Also, Dr. Mike Webster, my Canadian psychologist friend, has inspired me both professionally and personally for almost two decades.
It’s appropriate that I recognize the members of the original FBI Critical Incident Negotiation Team, of which I was honored to be a part. This small hand-picked group of select FBI negotiators contained some of the best agents the FBI has ever produced. You know who you are. No crazier, more outrageously funny, more talented, and more resourceful group of FBI agents was ever assembled. Despite their zany antics, their manifest skills and abilities influenced countless law enforcement and correctional negotiators across this nation.
I am proud to have led the FBI negotiation program for the last ten years of my career. Being named the first chief of the FBI Crisis Negotiation Unit was a singular honor that will remain my proudest career achievement. The opportunity to advance the negotiation profession from that leadership position was something I will always cherish and appreciate. As chief of the CNU, I viewed my most important t
ask as directly serving the training and operational needs of the FBI’s 350 negotiators assigned throughout the field. Serving this special group of individuals was both an honor and a privilege.
It’s important that I thank the many FBI agents and support employees with whom I worked during my various career assignments. You are too numerous to mention, but there are no finer or more dedicated public servants than these individuals. I’ve also been extremely fortunate to work alongside many skilled negotiators involved in the International Negotiation Working Group and the National Council of Negotiation Associations. I was proud to have played a role in helping form these important professional organizations that continue to promote the negotiation profession far and wide.
This book began as an idea many years ago. In exploring the process of writing a book, I reached out to my friend Peter Bergen, who has written several books about Osama bin Laden. Peter’s insights and suggestions were most helpful to me. His most important recommendation was to work with literary agent Tina Bennett. Without Tina’s encouragement, support, and guidance, this book would never have been written. I would also like to thank William Patrick for his excellent work helping to edit the original lengthy manuscript. Bill’s skill and talents were of extraordinary help in organizing the material that went into this book. My editor at Random House, Tim Bartlett, was also an enormous help in crafting the kind of book that I wanted to write. I thank him for the many hours he spent with me on the phone going over the material. His patience and thoughtful suggestions were key factors in achieving the final product.
I also want to recognize my former FBI colleague and dear friend Steve Romano, who graciously read over the manuscript to ensure its accuracy. His attention to detail is legendary and his insightful suggestions were a big help to me. Former FBI colleague Byron Sage was also kind enough to provide assistance by reading over the Waco chapter and providing me with critical feedback. It’s also an honor to give special thanks and recognition to Cheryl Hart Frappier, whose personal ordeal and courage are written about in the first chapter of this book. She kindly reviewed the Sperryville chapter and provided important insights that will help the reader better understand the ordeal she experienced. I’m continually inspired by her heroic story of survival.