Cox failed to secure President Barclay’s direct support for emigration plans; however, he was able to use his connections to advance Gordon’s plans in other ways. By Cox’s own statement, he turned to “capable white people who are in sympathy with our cause” to assist Gordon and her supporters. By 1936, Cox was able to persuade members of the Virginia General Assembly to pass a resolution recommending that the U.S. Congress provide federal assistance for black emigration.47 This signified an important development in Gordon’s pro-emigration campaign. While the Virginia resolution was a far cry from the federal legislation Gordon and her supporters desired, it represented a step closer to their goal. Writing to Cox days later, Gordon expressed her gratitude on behalf of the PME but skillfully downplayed her own involvement in the matter: “We were profoundly awed, utterly surprised and received with great enthusiasm your special message of good news to-day. . . . Words are far from inadequate to even attempt to tell you of the esteem and respect this organization holds for you and your mastery in winning this colossal victory.”48
Although Cox’s support helped to propel Gordon’s political career—by increasing media coverage of her activities and thus extending the reach of her message—it also drew some unwelcome attention and public criticism. Mainstream white news outlets mocked Gordon and the PME, while others simply ignored their existence. Writers of one article for Time magazine chose to emphasize Gordon’s outward appearance rather than her political message, describing her as a “portly mulatto.” Others portrayed her as a fanatic who maintained an obsession for Garvey and described her organization disparagingly as a “repatriationist cult.”49
Though Gordon seemed to weather the storm of criticism, her greatest challenge came from some of the people she trusted most. In February 1937, she became embroiled in a bitter public dispute with her secretary, Ethel Waddell.50 Born Ethel Hunter in Arkansas sometime around 1906, Waddell relocated to Chicago during the early years of the Great Migration.51 During the early 1930s, she ran a hair salon from her apartment in Chicago. In 1936, the thirty-year-old beauty shop owner approached Gordon and expressed an interest in joining the organization and serving as one of her private secretaries.52 Waddell’s decision to join the PME marked a shift in her engagement in black nationalist politics. During the mid-1930s, Waddell became a highly visible black nationalist activist, working alongside Gordon and her supporters in Chicago. In addition to accompanying Gordon to several meetings with Liberian officials in the city, Waddell helped Gordon organize a local fundraising drive in 1936, which yielded an estimated $85.00 to support the PME’s delegation to Liberia.53
In the immediate aftermath of this fundraiser, tensions between Gordon and Waddell reached a boiling point. In a sensationalist account, Gordon claimed that it began when Waddell “went to the homes of [PME] members, telling them I had sent her to get their signatures for a closed door meeting.” On December 9, 1936, Gordon noted that Waddell, along with fellow PME member Charles Watkins, “enter[ed] our meeting like gangsters, demanded the delegate money from us under threats.” “Had we resented one word,” Gordon continued, “we would have been killed like dogs that night.”54 In the months that followed her alleged “gangster” encounter with Gordon, Waddell initiated a number of lawsuits, accusing Gordon of “operating a racket” and misappropriating funds that should have been reserved for emigration plans.55 In March 1937, Waddell, along with Watkins and three other black nationalists—Cora Berry, Arthur King, and Antonio L. Paez—established a rival organization, the Peace Movement of Ethiopia, Inc. (PME, Inc.), maintaining the same objective as Gordon’s PME: “repatriation of the American Negro who desire to go to Africa to work out his own destiny and become self-sufficient.”56
With the incorporation in place, Waddell and supporters then sued Gordon in an effort to prevent her from using the name, Peace Movement of Ethiopia. When their efforts failed, they attempted to secure support under the disguise of the original PME. In one instance, Waddell and Watkins contacted FDR’s secretary asking for federal aid for emigration, claiming to be affiliated with Gordon’s organization.57 In the end, Waddell’s lawsuits were all dismissed, and Gordon retained the right to use the name of the organization she had established in 1932. She also managed to hold on to the funds she raised in support of the PME’s delegation to Liberia.58
Importantly, Waddell’s actions shed light on both the political and personal differences among black nationalist women activists during this period. The skirmishes surrounding the PME’s fundraising money and the questions surrounding Gordon’s right to use the organization’s name derived from Waddell’s growing dissatisfaction with Gordon’s leadership and ideological differences. Later recounting the course of events, Waddell admitted that she “didn’t see any need” for sending a delegation to Liberia in the first place. She reasoned that since American citizens—leaders of the ACS—were responsible for establishing Liberia as a colony for free blacks, the U.S. government should be fully responsible for making arrangements and bearing the financial costs for black Americans desiring to relocate to the country.59 As a result, she resisted the idea that ordinary black men and women, already struggling to make ends meet, should use their limited funds to help cover relocation expenses. Her frustration over funds and subsequent lawsuit, then, highlighted an underlying disagreement between the two women about how best to facilitate black emigration during an economic crisis.
Moreover, Waddell’s decision to establish her own organization was an assertive move—if only to send the message that she would not allow Gordon to dominate the political scene. Not surprisingly, then, she skillfully used the PME, Inc. as a way to bolster her political leverage and visibility in black nationalist circles. While the exact membership figures are unknown, Waddell used her newly established rival organization as a platform for recruiting black nationalists in Chicago. Unlike Gordon, who in the PME’s constitution claimed to “freely coincide” with Marcus Garvey, Waddell emphasized her loyalty to Garvey and openly touted the training she received from the charismatic black nationalist leader. Describing the PME, Inc. as an “affiliate of the [UNIA],” Waddell boasted that some of the officers had graduated from the School of African Philosophy.60 Introduced by Garvey at the 1937 Regional Conference in Toronto, Canada, the school was an intensive month-long course of instruction in Toronto, which Garvey later made available through mail order and provided students with an introduction to a wide range of subjects, including the history of the UNIA and financial success.61 Waddell was one of ten UNIA leaders, and only four women, who successfully completed the first iteration of the course in 1937.62
Under the auspices of the PME, Inc., Waddell pursued alliances with influential white supremacists, maintaining a biological view of race and envisioning these alliances as a viable strategy for securing federal legislation for black emigration.63 She believed that individuals like Earnest Sevier Cox had greater political capital, including access to state resources, legal support, and financial resources, and the material means to spread these ideas to an even larger audience. Months after establishing the new organization, Waddell reached out to Cox, offering an explanation for why she parted ways with Gordon. “Due to the mishandling of funds, inefficiency of the former officers to carry out intelligently the scheme of the organization, and their attempt to disrupt the [UNIA] and disregard for the Honorable Marcus Garvey,” she carefully explained, “we found it necessary . . . to incorporate [the Peace Movement of Ethiopia].” The PME, Inc., Waddell added, had “capable leaders to carry out intelligently the work for the ultimate success of the ‘Back to Africa’ project.”64 Implying that Gordon was neither “capable” nor “intelligent,” Waddell attempted to discount Gordon’s activities yet capitalize on some of the networks she had established much earlier. While Waddell’s letters threatened to sever Gordon’s alliance with Cox and ultimately derail her plans, Gordon managed to maintain her relationship by preemptively warning Cox.65 In the ensuing years, the two women wor
ked separately with Waddell’s PME, Inc., often collaborating with the UNIA on community events.66
Theodore G. Bilbo and the Greater Liberia Bill
Determined to make strides with the emigration campaign despite mounting tensions with Waddell and others, Gordon again reached out to Cox in June 1937 to insist that he amplify his efforts to secure federal aid for black emigration. Although Cox’s support had resulted in the 1936 congressional resolution, Gordon and her supporters were becoming increasingly frustrated as emigration plans appeared stalled. The Great Depression was in full swing, and despite the implementation of New Deal programs, black Americans remained at the bottom rung of the economic sector, largely excluded from the benefits of these programs.67 For Gordon, the prospect of remaining in the United States—in a constant state of poverty and what appeared to be a never-ending struggle for civil and economic rights—was no prospect at all. Writing to Cox in June 1936, Gordon noted, “Many times I have gone without food yet traveled on to carry out the work. And I have never received one penny of salary. . . . It will be hard for you to understand the groans coming up from a suffering people, the groans which I face daily.”68 Her strategic alliance with Cox, though a source of contention among many of her counterparts, had certainly yielded some positive result, particularly by drawing national attention to her efforts. In reality, however, Gordon and her supporters were no closer to leaving the country than when they launched the pro-emigration campaign years earlier.
Though Gordon had turned to Cox three years earlier in a strategic effort to realize her goals, she understood that she could not rely on this one ally. After receiving no favorable response from her letters to FDR, Eleanor Roosevelt, and every member of the Illinois legislature, Gordon reasoned that she needed the backing of an influential white politician who would have the ears of other white politicians and constituents.69 After carefully expressing thanks to Cox for his unwavering support of her efforts, Gordon made her intentions clear in a 1937 letter, requesting the name of a white politician willing to take a financial bribe to push for legislation. “Can you cite a purchaseable member of either House who is on the market, and try to learn his price?” she asked Cox in no uncertain terms.70 As she waited for a response, the answer came in the person of Senator Bilbo, apparently without the need for any financial incentive.
An ardent separatist, Bilbo had already begun advocating for black emigration months before introducing the Greater Liberia Bill. In 1938, during a filibuster against the NAACP’s proposed federal anti-lynching bill on January 21, the senator recommended racial separation as the only solution. “It is essential to the perpetuation of our Anglo-Saxon civilization that white supremacy in America be maintained,” he argued, “and to maintain our civilization there is only one solution, and that is either segregation within the United States, or by deportation or repatriation of the entire Negro race to its native heath, Africa.” While he offered no further explanation for how such a plan might be accomplished, Bilbo immediately identified Liberia as the ideal location and referenced the PME’s 1933 petition to FDR as evidence that African Americans were ready and willing to leave the country. Arguing that the U.S. government could relocate African Americans just as they did Native Americans, Bilbo rationalized that black emigration to West Africa was not only logical but also feasible.71
His controversial comments drew the attention of Cox, who at the time was on the lookout for new political collaborators to assist Gordon and her supporters in the PME. On the same day of Bilbo’s filibuster against the NAACP’s anti-lynching bill, Cox wrote to the senator, offering a gesture of support and providing Bilbo with information on his speeches and writings on the emigration issue. Clearly enthused by the gesture, Bilbo immediately responded and requested a copy of Cox’s pro-emigration article, “The Effort to Colonize Them Will Be Continued.”72 In the weeks to follow, Bilbo requested additional information from Cox, asking for advice on how to advance the emigration of black Americans. “I am anxious to get your plan,” Bilbo wrote to Cox, “[in order to] eliminate the NAACP from future efforts related to the anti-lynching bill.”73 Notwithstanding his commitment to racial separatism, Bilbo’s comments underscore his own efforts to advance an emigration bill for this own political interests—as a way to undermine anti-lynching legislation. Regardless, Cox was anxious to give advice and immediately began laying out plans to advance black emigration through the widespread support of Gordon, Waddell, and other like-minded black nationalist activists.
FIGURE 11. Senator Theodore Bilbo. Harris & Ewing Collection, LC-H22-D-10044-X, Library of Congress.
Meanwhile, Bilbo continued to bring up the issue of black emigration in Senate proceedings, making several proposals and reiterating his earlier stance that racial separatism was the ultimate solution to the nation’s racial problems. On May 24, 1938, Bilbo presented an amendment to the work relief bill, calling for the federal government to cover the “transportation and colonization expenses for the almost two million Negroes who have joined in a request to be repatriated to Liberia, Africa.” According to Bilbo, “It would be better for [African Americans] and for their own country to use the money that will be spent in their maintenance here . . . in paying their transportation and colonization . . . in Africa.”74 Thus, he proposed that the federal government provide monetary aid for all black Americans, under age forty, willing to leave the country. When it became quite apparent that Liberia could not possibly accommodate the proposed two million blacks willing to relocate, Bilbo then amended his proposal, suggesting that England and France should relinquish control of their West African colonies to provide more physical space for potential black emigrants, in exchange for American forgiveness of their war debts.75 In true Bilbo fashion, the presentation included a number of overtly racist statements, including Bilbo’s crass suggestion that “God created the whites [but] I know not who created the blacks. Surely a devil created the mongrels.”76
Convinced that Senator Bilbo was a means to an end, black nationalist activists publicly appeared unfazed by the senator’s remarks. In a letter to Cox shortly thereafter, Gordon expressed her gratitude for Bilbo’s support. “We are inclined to believe we have found a Moses to lead us [through] the Senate,” she argued, “and [believe] that our work will become an accomplished fact.”77 “For my part,” she wrote to Cox in a subsequent letter, “nothing Senator Bilbo says, or can say, offends me, it does not matter what he says so long as he puts this bill through successfully.”78 Notwithstanding the irony of a black nationalist leader referring to a white supremacist as “Moses,” Gordon’s comments underscore the activist’s dogged determination to realize her political goals irrespective of the questionable nature of her political alliances. Certainly, the activist maintained full knowledge of Bilbo’s beliefs about black people—ideas that clearly reinforced the very same ideals she vigorously rejected. However, Gordon’s comments also offer a glimpse into the performative nature of her politics. Given the intended recipient of the letter—another white supremacist—it is not surprising that Gordon spoke positively of Bilbo, overemphasizing her gratitude for the senator’s help.
Moreover, the activist consciously and strategically described Bilbo as a “Moses” of black people to signify the representative role Bilbo would play in facilitating the Greater Liberia Bill. It is especially striking that Gordon selected Moses—the biblical hero who would lead his people to freedom. In African American folklore, Moses represented “ideal black leadership,” and the Hebrews symbolized the experiences of black men and women under slavery.79 Certainly, Bilbo was no black hero, and his intentions for supporting black emigration had much more to do with his desire to maintain white supremacy than a genuine interest in improving conditions for blacks in the diaspora. However, by evoking the biblical character, Gordon was emphasizing the magnitude of the senator’s bill and its ability to significantly alter the lives of people of African descent—using a familiar analogy that her followers and Cox immediately underst
ood. In this way, Gordon’s words and acts of performance embodied the traditional stories of the communities in which she came of age.80 Moreover, by referring to Bilbo as a “Moses,” Gordon attempted to situate him within a larger historical trajectory of white political leaders who, in her view, took initiatives that aided black nationalists’ political goals. She drew a parallel between Bilbo and U.S. Presidents Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and Abraham Lincoln; U.S. Senator Henry Clay; and U.S. Congressman Charles Fenton Mercer—all individuals who had supported the idea of relocating black Americans to Africa or the Caribbean. As she explained to Cox, “We see and recognize the spirit of Jefferson, Madison, Clay, Lincoln, and Mercer [in Bilbo].”81
In early 1939, Bilbo began drafting the Greater Liberia Bill, drawing on his earlier proposals before the Senate. With the assistance of Puerto Rican attorney Ramon A. Martinez, president of the Detroit-based Negro Nationalist Society of America, Bilbo completed the bill that spring and began circulating copies to Cox, Gordon, and other political collaborators. Similar to the earlier proposals, the Greater Liberia Bill called for the relocation of African Americans to West Africa. In addition to Liberia, the bill stipulated that U.S. officials would obtain additional land throughout West Africa. Reiterating his earlier proposal, Bilbo explained, “We shall buy 400,000 square miles from France and England, the purchase price of which will be credited upon their war debts.” He added, “The bill further provides that building materials and supplies necessary for the proper resettlement of the emigrants may be furnished not only by France and England but by any country in Europe which owes us a war debt, and credit will be given for the supplies furnished.”82 Moreover, the bill provided fifty-acre land grants and financial assistance for black Americans between the ages of twenty-one and fifty to relocate to West Africa. It granted each emigrant up to $300 for clothing and household items; $300 for “machinery, tools, implements, and materials of labor”; up to $1 per day for food (50 cents per day for children under age 12); and up to $50 a year for “educational and recreational facilities.” It further stipulated that such financial assistance “shall not extend, under ordinary circumstances, for more than 1 year after the migrant and his household shall have settled in their new location, or, under extraordinary circumstances, for more than 2 years.”83 Though Bilbo envisioned the U.S. government providing fifteen to twenty billion dollars over a period of forty years, the Greater Liberia Bill set an initial cap of one billion dollars in federal aid to facilitate black emigration.84
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