by Richard Toye
In Churchill’s mind Far Eastern problems naturally took a lower priority at this moment than the coming launch of Overlord. American troops had been massing in Britain for a long time, a new social fact that was the cause of much official introspection. The government failed in its efforts to persuade the Americans to restrict the numbers of black troops sent. (When the executive secretary of America’s National Association for the Advancement of Colored People cabled Churchill to ask if it was true that such a request had been made, he received no reply because it was impossible to give an honest denial.)74 Britain’s non-white population at this time was tiny. Nevertheless, there were those who felt that the British – with their experience of Empire – could teach the Americans – who maintained widespread segregation – a thing or two about race relations. Most ministers hoped that Britons could be persuaded to maintain a social distance from black soldiers, making formal segregation unnecessary. In October 1942 the question came up at Cabinet, when the War Secretary, P. J. Grigg, proposed that British soldiers should be ‘educated’ to adopt the racial attitudes of their white US counterparts. In response, Lord Cranborne pointed out the difficulties of what he called the ‘ “not too matey” principle’. Not only were significant numbers of black Canadians already present in Britain, but ‘If it can be said we have advocated “colour bar” all the coloured people here fr. our Empire will go back discontented and preach disaffection there.’75 He drew attention to the case of a black Colonial Office official who ‘had always lunched at a certain restaurant which now, because it was patronised by U.S. Officers, kept him out’. Churchill said, ‘That’s all right: if he takes a banjo with him they’ll think he’s one of the band!’76 The War Office largely got its way, and the government in effect colluded with the segregation maintained by the US army.
On 6 June 1944 the invasion of France began. By the end of that day 73,000 American and 83,000 British and Canadian troops had landed in Normandy.77 Within a few days the beachhead was secure enough for Churchill to make an inspection, together with Brooke and Smuts. (The latter’s tendency to support Churchill’s strategic ideas over those of the Americans doubtless added to his congeniality as a companion.) Victory in Europe, although requiring terrible sacrifices of human life, was now largely a matter of time. But when Churchill contemplated the future of the continent he was assailed by doubt. Should he beg Roosevelt to take a tougher line against resurgent Russia, or throw out the hand of friendship to Stalin instead?78 On his way to Canada for a further conference with Roosevelt in Quebec – codenamed ‘Octagon’ – he looked ‘old, unwell and depressed’.79 John Colville recorded, ‘The P.M. produced many sombre verdicts about the future, saying that old England was in for dark days ahead, that he no longer felt he had a “message” to deliver’.80 He was bucked up by his reception when his ship arrived at Halifax. After making a short speech he ‘led community singing, beating time with his cigar’. The crowd then broke into ‘God Save the King’.81 He was further buoyed by the news on 12 September that Canadian troops had taken Le Havre. At lunch with the President and others that day he spoke of India, blaming the famine on ‘the hoarding of food by the people themselves for speculative purposes’ and telling stories against Gandhi.82
Harmony at the conference was not absolute. Mackenzie King, again not included in the Anglo-US talks, was as concerned as ever about Churchill’s attempts at imperial centralization. Mackenzie King was adamant that although Canadian troops could fight the Japanese in the Central or Northern Pacific theatres, they should not do so in South-East Asia. He wrote: ‘Our people, I know, would never agree to paying out of taxes for Canadians fighting [. . .] for the protection of India, [and] the recovery of Burma and Singapore.’ He added: ‘I understand the Americans feel Singapore, Burma and all is a side-show to save the British prestige, and that there is a possibility of American troops actually conquering Japan before the conquest of Singapore might be effected.’83 Meanwhile, Churchill, who had held on to his obsession with Sumatra, plagued his own advisers with accusations that they were conspiring with the Americans against him.84 At the same time, though, he recognized the danger for post-war Anglo-American relations if Britain’s efforts against Japan appeared to be ‘limited to the pursuit of her own selfish interests in Burma, Malaya and Hong Kong’. Therefore he offered to send a fleet to the Central Pacific to operate under US command. This was opposed by the notoriously irascible Admiral King, US Chief of Naval Operations, who allegedly ‘did not want anyone else to intervene in his own pet war’. But Roosevelt accepted Churchill’s gesture without hesitation. ‘The British delegation heaved a sigh of relief, and the story went the rounds that Admiral King went into a swoon and had to be carried out.’85
Churchill described Octagon as a ‘blaze of friendship and unity’; certainly, it was an overall success from the British point of view.86 Beforehand, Roosevelt had been told of the full extent of Britain’s financial difficulties; he joked that the news was ‘very interesting [. . .] I will go over there and make a couple of talks and take over the British Empire’.87 In Quebec, though, he agreed that Lend-Lease should be continued during ‘Stage II’ – the period between the end of the war with Germany and the final defeat of Japan.88 It was a necessary but generous offer, contradicting the notion that the Americans never missed an opportunity to use their power to put their British allies in financial bondage. When Colville suggested to Churchill that the advantages obtained for Britain were beyond the dreams of avarice, he replied ‘Beyond the dreams of justice.’89
IV
But this last autumn of the war also brought its share of troubles. Churchill returned home to the news that the First Airborne Division had met its destruction at Arnhem. (Churchill nonetheless told Smuts that the battle had been ‘a decided victory’).90 Moreover, Churchill’s October conference in Moscow with Stalin was at best a partial success. On the way back, he dined in Cairo with his friend Lord Moyne, the British Minister-Resident in Cairo, who had served under him as a Treasury minister in 1924–5. It was the last time he would see him. On 6 November Moyne was returning home for lunch when two gunmen shot his driver dead and then fired through the car door at Moyne, hitting him three times. That same day, Churchill told the Cabinet ‘the bad news that an attempt had been made on Walter Moyne’s life, apparently by Jewish extremists, and that his condition was serious’. News of his death came that same evening.91 When arrested, the assassins confessed that they were from the group Fighters for the Freedom of Israel, formerly known as the Stern Gang.92 Moyne had not been devoid of sympathy for Zionism, but he had attracted the wrath of the militants in part through a speech in which he said that to force Arabs to live under a Jewish regime would be contrary to the Atlantic Charter.93 The Jewish Press in Palestine reacted to the crime with horror. ‘No enemy of the Jewish people could have done more to undermine the foundations upon which our work is reared than the murderers of Lord Moyne have contrived to do’, declared Haaretz. In its view, the killing was the work of a ‘tiny group’ which had ‘gone insane’.94 It was a view shared by the pro-Zionist Leo Amery, who wrote in his diary: ‘It is tragic that a man of such devotion to duty and kindliness to all men should be murdered by insane fanatics who have inflicted a possibly fatal injury on their own cause. If they had only known how helpful Walter has been in all the Palestine discussions in finding fair and workable lines of solutions.’95
Churchill’s Commons tribute to Moyne seemed to confirm that the atrocity had been counterproductive. His eulogy was clearly marked by personal grief, and the House listened in grim silence.96 On 17 November he followed it up with a further statement to MPs:
This shameful crime has shocked the world. It has affected none more strongly than those, like myself, who, in the past, have been consistent friends of the Jews and constant architects of their future. If our dreams for Zionism are to end in the smoke of assassins’ pistols and our labours for its future to produce only a new set of gangsters worthy of Nazi Germany, m
any like myself will have to reconsider the position we have maintained so consistently and so long in the past.97
Moyne’s murder led to a sea-change in Churchill’s attitude to Zionism. It is, however, important to remember that, in spite of the extravagance of some of his language, his support for it had always had limits. Earlier in the war, primed by Chaim Weizmann, he had lent his support to the idea that a Jewish Palestine could be included in a wider Arab Federation to be headed by King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia. That plan foundered – inevitably – on the rock of Ibn Saud’s opposition.98 Subsequently, Churchill told the Cabinet that he was ‘committed to [the] creation of a Jewish National Home in Palestine’. This should be proceeded with, he said, adding that at the end of the war, ‘we shall have plenty of force with which to compel the Arabs to acquiesce in our designs’.99 In 1944 the Cabinet reached agreement on the principle that Palestine should be partitioned into Arab and Jewish areas, which arguably fulfilled the ‘National Home’ pledge. Yet this did not satisfy the Zionists – who wanted the Jews to achieve a majority in the whole of Palestine through immigration – as Weizmann made clear in a meeting with Churchill two days before Moyne was shot. Churchill though, refused to listen to his arguments and made it plain that no more favourable plan was on offer. After Moyne’s murder – which Weizmann condemned – Churchill instructed that discussion of even this scheme be put to one side. Although Roosevelt found him ‘as strongly pro-Zionist as ever’, in the spring of 1945, Churchill (perhaps influenced by Smuts’s opposition to it) refused to revive the partition plan.100 That July, he reacted to US criticisms of his government’s policy in Palestine by suggesting that Britain should give up responsibility ‘for managing this very difficult place’. He wrote: ‘I am not aware of the slightest advantage which has ever accrued to Great Britain from this painful and thankless task. Somebody else should have their turn now’.101 Significantly, he never met Weizmann again, in spite of describing him in the Commons as ‘a very old friend of mine’.102
The suggestion of international involvement in Palestine made, of course, a strong contrast with Churchill’s normal antipathy to outside interference in the Empire’s affairs. On the last day of 1944, after an American request for British proposals on the colonial question, he wrote a minute about the trusteeship issue:
There must be no question of our being hustled or seduced into declarations affecting British sovereignty in any of the Dominions or Colonies. Pray remember my declaration against liquidating the British Empire. If the Americans want to take Japanese islands which they have conquered, let them do so with our blessing and any form of words that may be agreeable to them. But ‘Hands off the British Empire’ is our maxim and it must not be weakened or smirched to please sob-stuff merchants at home or foreigners of any hue.103
The showdown on trusteeship came in February 1945 at the Big Three conference at Yalta in the Crimea.104 (Beforehand, Churchill and Roosevelt had met at Malta – which earlier in the war had earned the admiration of both by withstanding a devastating siege – although the ailing President, who had only weeks to live, avoided substantive talks on political questions.)105 The foreign ministers of all three countries were able to agree that, prior to the forthcoming conference that was to establish the UN organization, the great powers should consult each other on the establishment of trusteeships. But when Edward Stettinius (who had replaced Cordell Hull as Secretary of State) reported this to Stalin, FDR and Churchill, the latter declared that he would never ‘consent to forty or fifty nations thrusting interfering fingers into the life’s existence of the British Empire’.106 Furthermore, ‘After we have done our best to fight in this war and have done no crime to anyone I will have no suggestion that the British Empire is to be put into the dock and examined by everybody to see whether it is up to their standard.’107 In his memoirs Eden described how Stalin ‘got up from his chair, walked up and down, beamed, and at intervals broke into applause’.108
Yet in spite of the pyrotechnics, Churchill slipped up when it came to the detail. Eager to calm him down, Stettinius reassured him that the trusteeship proposal related to the stripping of Japan of islands it held under League of Nations mandates and told him, ‘We have had nothing in mind with reference to the British Empire.’109 These comments were not intended to deceive, but they appear to have lulled Churchill into a false sense of security. He went on to approve a formula whereby trusteeship would apply to a) existing League mandates, b) territory taken away from enemy states as a consequence of the war, and c) any territories that might be placed under trusteeship voluntarily. As Britain did hold existing mandates, for example Tanganyika, the proposal clearly did apply to parts of her Empire, regardless of what Stettinius had said.110 It is unclear whether Churchill ever realized his error; either way, he convinced himself that there was ‘Not much to fear’ as the new world organization would ‘make a mess’ of its responsibilities.111 He was too sanguine. Over the coming years the UN’s Trusteeship Council was to create many opportunities for vocal international criticism of Britain’s colonial policies, contributing significantly to the growing movement for rapid decolonization.112 The episode shows that, although Churchill was more vocally committed to the maintenance of the Empire than many of his fellow politicians, he was by no means immune to the pressures to which later governments were forced to succumb.
Churchill returned from Yalta via Cairo. While in Egypt he met King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia, joining him for an enormous lunch. The British were given whisky and soda, albeit in coloured glasses and described as ‘medicine’ in order not to offend Islamic sensibilities.113 Churchill raised the question of Palestine (which shows he had not lost interest in it altogether). According to the King, ‘Mr Churchill opened the subject confidently wielding the big stick’, drawing attention to the subsidies given him in the past and urging compromise with Zionism. The King said that such a compromise would be ‘an act of treachery to the Prophet’ and that at any rate it would do Britain no good, ‘since the promotion of Zionism from any quarter must indubitably bring bloodshed, wide-spread disorder in the arab lands, with certainly no benefit to Britain or any one else’. Ibn Saud observed: ‘By this time Mr Churchill had laid the big stick down.’114
Egypt’s King Farouk, whom Churchill met next, was more pliable. The conversation was recorded by Lord Killearn, the British High Commissioner. Farouk was young, sybaritic and ineffectual. Although the head of a nominally independent state, it was clear where the power lay. In 1942, Killearn (then Sir Miles Lampson) had forced Farouk to choose between abdication or the formation of a new government acceptable to the British, making the position clear by surrounding his palace with tanks. Churchill spent a fair part of the discussion telling Farouk
that he should take a definite line in regard to the improvement of the social conditions in Egypt. He ventured to affirm that nowhere in the world were the conditions of extreme wealth and extreme poverty so glaring. What an opportunity for a young Sovereign to come forward and champion the interests and living conditions of his people? Why not take from the rich Pashas some of their superabundant wealth and devote it to the improvement of the living conditions of the fellaheen?
This was highly revealing of Churchill’s attitudes, and not only because it showed that his concern with economic development, which had been especially strong during the Edwardian period, was still present. Equally striking was his romantic conception that the problems could easily be taken in hand by a progressive ‘young Sovereign’, ignoring both the corrupt nature of the regime and the likely difficulties that Farouk would have faced even if he had been serious about tackling poverty. Churchill also urged the execution of Lord Moyne’s assassins, who had been sentenced to death but who had not yet been hanged.115 He had previously complained to Killearn about the delay, saying that failure to carry out the executions (which in due course went ahead) would be a ‘gross interference with the course of justice’ and would likely cause a breach in Anglo-Egyptian relation
s.116 Churchill does not seem to have reflected that his own pressure was itself an attempted interference with the judicial process.
In March 1945 another of Killearn’s visitors was Wavell, returning to London for consultations. The Viceroy wanted to discuss with ministers his ideas for constitutional progress. Churchill had agreed to this only reluctantly. Wavell’s credibility with the Prime Minister had been dented by his decision in May 1944 to release Gandhi on medical grounds. His prediction that ‘Gandhi is unlikely ever to be an active factor in politics again’ had soon been falsified, which led to ‘a peevish telegram’ from Churchill asking ‘why Gandhi hadn’t died yet!’117 A letter from Gandhi to Churchill received no reply.118 Wavell had continued to press for some political initiative and Churchill had in turn denounced him in Cabinet ‘for betraying this country’s interests in order to curry favour with the Indians.’ (On that occasion Amery told the Prime Minister ‘to stop talking damned nonsense’; previously he had said that he ‘didn’t see much difference between his outlook and Hitler’s’.)119 Eventually, Amery joined forces with Cripps to make the Prime Minister accept that Wavell’s desire for forward movement could no longer be ignored. Having given in, Churchill wrote a letter to his wife from Malta, while on his way to the Crimea. In this he confided his ‘feeling of despair about the British connection with India’ and about what would happen if it were broken. ‘Meanwhile we are holding onto this vast Empire, from which we get nothing, amid the increasing criticism and abuse of the world, and our own people, and increasing hatred of the Indian population, who receive constant and deadly propaganda to which we can make no reply. However out of my shadows has come a renewed resolve to go on fighting on as long as possible and to make sure the Flag is not let down while I am at the wheel.’ These thoughts had been prompted by reading a book by the author Beverley Nichols, Verdict on India (1944). The book denounced the Hindus, so it is not too surprising that Churchill agreed with it. More striking is the fact that – as he also told Clementine – he agreed with its support for the principle of Pakistan.120 His remarks on similar lines to Butler in 1943 had not been merely casual ones.