Long’s claim that the United States had done everything possible to rescue Jews, which at first pacified the politicians and the press, ultimately evoked a storm of controversy. His figures were highly inflated, as Jewish and non-Jewish sources quickly demonstrated. Earl Harrison, United States Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization, said his department had admitted about 279,000 persons as immigrant aliens and only a portion of those could be considered refugees. Jewish rescue organizations also countered Long’s claims. Long was forced to amend his testimony. The figure of 580,000 included all the visas that could have been distributed to immigrants from all the countries under Hitler’s control, he now said. Congressman Celler immediately accused Long of creating the bottleneck in the granting of visas and described him as shedding “crocodile tears” for the Jews. The liberal press now began to take Long to task.29 The New Republic and The Nation, both of which had been advocates of a more liberal immigration policy for a long time, attacked Long for being duplicitous and accused him of acting in a “deceptive” and “hypocritical” fashion. On December 20 PM published a feature article entitled “Justice Department’s Immigration Figures Knock Long’s Testimony into a Crocked Hat.” The New York Post described Long’s testimony as “false and distorted.” Ten days after the release of Long’s testimony eight prominent Christian clergymen sent Congress a statement strongly urging the creation of a special commission to rescue the Jews, the very action which Long so strongly opposed. The Hearst papers used the occasion to offer another editorial in favor of a rescue commission.30
The confusion regarding the entire American record was reflected in an article by David Anderson, New York Times staff correspondent in London. In it he analyzed how many refugees various countries had admitted. In relation to the United States he observed that the precise number it had admitted was unknown, “or at least it [the number claimed] is not accepted as sufficiently reliable to stand up under close scrutiny.”31
In mid-January the growing pressure on the White House for action was brought to a head by Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau’s memorandum to Roosevelt on the State Department’s dismal rescue record. Roosevelt, well aware of the rising demand for rescue, particularly in the Congress, which stood ready to pass a resolution calling for a rescue commission, established the War Refugee Board with the mandate to effect the “immediate rescue” from the Nazis of as many of Europe’s persecuted “minorities” as possible.32
The establishment of the War Refugee Board was greeted by the press with kudos and with cynicism. A number of commentators castigated the Allied nations for not having done enough to assist Jews in escaping the Nazis. The New Republic was, as might have been expected, still quite dubious about the seriousness of the Allied commitment to rescue, since there was no sign that “either the United States or Great Britain is prepared to let down the bars and permit immigration.” Even more cynical was Edgar Ansel Mowrer, syndicated columnist with the Press Alliance, who had been one of the first American reporters expelled from Germany in 1933. His column in the New York Post questioned the President’s sudden urgency in establishing the Board in light of the fact that during the past years “tens of thousands of Jews” who might have been rescued were not because “the President gave no lead, Congress was of two minds, [and] State Department officials ruthlessly ‘weeded out’ applicants.” Even after Bermuda, a place chosen “for inaccessibility to the press,” where government officials promised to do something “nothing much happened.” Then “suddenly” on January 22 the President established a War Refugee Board to effect “immediate rescue.” Mowrer had no doubt why, after years of delay, “the President demanded almost feverish speed”—1944 was an election year.33
The Hearst papers were pleased that the Board had been established but believed its mandate was “too vague and too general.” Even papers such as the Washington Post began to show a change in editorial policy. In the past it had simply ignored news of the persecution of European Jewry and had vehemently charged the Bergson group with engaging in fraudulent activities. Pleased that the Board had been set up, the Post nonetheless accused America of having been “laggard in this humanitarian duty.” Maybe it could not stop the massacres, but it could, the Post argued, “set up centers where the rescued can go.”34*
But the War Refugee Board and its director, John Pehle, quickly began to quiet some of the critics. By mid-March a 190-line article in the Washington Post on the War Refugee Board’s activities carried a boldface headline which proclaimed the new organization’s success:
RESCUING REFUGEES AND IN TIME!
New Board Is Striving to Get
Victims Out of Europe ‘In Mass’
According to Washington Post reporter Emily Towe, Pehle did not speak “in generalities” when it came to rescuing Jews. He was convinced that the War Refugee Board had been formed to “act right now,” and that, Towe observed in amazement, was “just what the Board is doing.” Even The New Republic had abandoned much of its cynicism and described the War Refugee Board’s work as marking the “first time” since the beginning of the war that the United States was making a “genuine effort” to rescue Jews.36 But just as the War Refugee Board was beginning to move into action, the news from Europe indicated that the situation in Hungary had taken a turn for the worse. Press demands for Allied action now became even more intense.
Free Ports: A “Repulsive” Notion
Within three days of the German occupation of Hungary in March 1944, Roosevelt issued a warning that those who took part in the annihilation of European Jewry would not “go unpunished.” Describing the “wholesale systematic murder of the Jews” as one of the “blackest crimes of all history,” he promised that “all who knowingly take part in the deportation of Jews to their death . . . are equally guilty with the executioner.” Roosevelt’s statement was prominently reported by many papers in the country. The Los Angeles Times, New York Times, Christian Science Monitor, and New York Herald Tribune were among those papers which placed it on the front page.37 But the cynicism about the American record which had been growing during the preceding months also greeted the President’s remarks. While the New York Times approved of his statement, it reminded readers that the United States and its allies had to also bear part of the responsibility because they had not done all they could to provide “havens of refuge.” In an editorial on the refugee situation which was even stronger than the one it had published at the time of Bermuda, the paper declared that providing these havens and the “means for maintenance and support” for those facing death was “as important as the winning of a battle.” Another expression of discomfort with the American record appeared in the Baltimore Sun, which challenged Roosevelt to go “beyond exhortations and threats” and “a generalized sympathy” for persecuted Jews and be more specific regarding our rescue policy.38* The New Republic, one of the most fervent advocates of rescue, was also skeptical: “one hopes that the President’s message may do some good, but it is hard to be optimistic about it.”40
But it was a proposal made in the beginning of April by Samuel Grafton, a syndicated columnist for the New York Post, which galvanized the press’s discomfort with America’s rescue record. Aroused by developments in Hungary, Grafton proposed the creation of “free ports for refugees” in which Jews could be temporarily placed until a decision was made about their future. A country could establish a free port without obligating itself to permanently admit the people housed there. Grafton argued that the plan was necessary because of the strong opposition toward allowing refugees to immigrate. It was a proposal born out of desperation, one that treated refugees as unwanted guests at best and pariahs at worst.41 This idea, which had been suggested earlier by German refugees, had been discussed previously by the War Refugee Board staff but opposed by the State Department and others in the administration.42
The proposal won strong press support. The Hearst chain, New York Herald Tribune, New York Post, Christian Science Monitor, B
oston Globe, Washington Post, New Republic, Nation, Commonweal, and even The Christian Century all favored it. It also found a strong backer in the New York Times, which dismissed the two most frequent objections to it—that the free ports would be nothing more than concentration camps for refugees and that refugees, once admitted to the country, would find a way of staying there.43 (In fact the one such haven that came into being in the United States, at Fort Oswego, New York, did become a modified concentration camp, in that entry and exit from it were strictly controlled, and most of those interned there did remain in this country.)
But the press’s support for the plan did not indicate a shift in its long-standing opposition to liberalizing American immigration laws. In fact, one of the reasons many papers were willing to support it was that it did not signal a change in the law. Typical of this sentiment was the attitude of the Christian Century, which favored the free port notion precisely because it could save lives without affecting America’s immigration system “at all.”44 There were also opponents of the plan in the ranks of the press, though many did not vocalize their opposition until some refugees actually arrived. Among those who vehemently spoke out against the idea from the outset was the syndicated columnist Westbrook Pegler, who warned that Roosevelt would use the plan to bring in “many thousands” of undesirable people.45
Not surprisingly, the strongest and most outspoken support for the idea came from the liberal press and journals, which had long been critical of America’s immigration policy. But even as they praised the idea, they did not ignore the basic anti-immigrant sentiment which made such a plan necessary. The New Republic approved but called attention to the basic hostility toward refugees implicit in the plan:
Build a few concentration camps along the eastern seaboard [and] put the refugees into them with the understanding that they are to see no more of America than this, and will be sent somewhere else when the war is over.46
The liberal Catholic publication Commonweal supported the free port idea but also condemned American immigration policy for its lack of “liberality or charity.” Well aware of the reasons why such a plan appealed to many Americans, it sadly noted that “Grafton calls his plan ‘repulsive,’” adding, “We could not get anyone to try the nobler ones.”47
There was strong public support for the creation of free ports. A Gallup poll taken a few days after the publication of Grafton’s column, which appeared in forty-one newspapers with a combined circulation of over 4 million, found the proposal had a 70 percent approval rate. That espousal of saving refugees, particularly without changing America’s immigration policy, may have become a politically advantageous position was further suggested by a rumor then circulating that Thomas E. Dewey, governor of New York and a contender for the Republican presidential nomination, was about to announce his own plan for harboring 100,000 refugees until war’s end.48
As the Hungarian situation grew more dire, public and press pressure for the plan increased. At the end of May Senator Guy Gillette sought Senate approval for a resolution urging Roosevelt to create centers for “temporary detention and care” of refugee Jews and other victims of Nazi persecution.49 In an editorial in May the New York Times again castigated the Allies by arguing that the tragedy in Hungary was “in part the fault of the United Nations, who did not offer them [Hungarian Jews] adequate places of refuge.” It was during that same week that Christian Century, apparently struck by the desperation of the Hungarian situation, came out in support of the free port plan.50
Meanwhile the War Refugee Board, aware of the importance of press support to get the measure accepted, was quietly pushing Jewish organizations to conduct a campaign to win approval for the plan from the press and radio commentators. Liberal journalists such as Max Lerner and I. F. Stone also worked to win press support for the plan. On June 1—in the wake of the news that a portion of Hungarian Jews had already been deported—Stone addressed a letter “to fellow newspapermen and to editors the country over.” Published in that week’s edition of The Nation, the letter argued that it was the press which could make the difference between a program that would die stillborn and one that would save lives. “A few sneering editorials” mocking Roosevelt’s refusal to act could well effect a change in the White House’s attitude.51
After increased public pressure, threats from some House members that hearings would be conducted on a rescue bill if no action was taken, and questions from reporters at his press conference, the President announced his support of the idea. But, in a move which Newsweek accurately described as leaving matters in a “confused state,” he expressed his opposition to calling the refugee havens “free ports” and, more important, to establishing any of them “in this country.” In light of his statement, The Nation wondered just how sincere the President was about his putative support of this program. The New York Post dismissed his statement as too indefinite and wondered how, if this country refused to establish them, “can we ask other countries to set up havens?” At his next press conference, when asked to elaborate on his remarks and clear up the confusion, Roosevelt said that the government was considering using abandoned army bases to house refugees. Finally on June 9 the President told the press that 1,000 refugees and “that is all” would be brought to this country. The Washington Post described admitting 1,000 as “but a drop in the bucket compared with the needs.”52
In early August the 1,000 refugees, who were to be housed at the army base at Fort Oswego, arrived from southern Italy, where they had reached the safety of Allied territory. They were the only refugees brought here under this much-hailed program. Roosevelt, wary of arousing the anti-immigrationists, made it clear that he had no intention of expanding on this plan. As David Wyman points out, these 1,000 refugees arrived in this country at a time when immigration quotas were 91 percent unfilled. During the preceding year Sweden, a country about one-twentieth the size of America, had admitted 8,000 Danish Jews. Despite the paucity of the American response, the arrival of these refugees captured the front page in a way that the destruction of millions never had. By focusing attention on rescue, the press made it appear as if America was at long last forcefully responding to the terrible situation in Europe. In truth its action was a gesture, a gesture that was, in the words of I. F. Stone, “a bargain-counter flourish in humanitarianism.”53
Auschwitz and Birkenau: The Truth Emerges
In June of 1944—as the Allies opened a second front and Hungary’s Jewish community reached its final days—details about a place called Auschwitz began to be revealed to the world.* The description of Auschwitz was based on an extensive eyewitness report transmitted by four young Jews and a Polish major who had escaped from the camp there. After a long circuitous passage their information reached Geneva in mid-June. On the basis of their testimony it was firmly established that Auschwitz was not a labor camp or slave town with crematoria or even gas chambers attached. It was a place whose primary purpose was to serve as a killing center, a “model” killing center whose efficiency surpassed all others.
There had been previous reports on Auschwitz, and Birkenau as well—some had even mentioned gas chambers—but none had attracted much attention. On March 22 the Washington Post devoted twenty lines on page 2 and the New York Herald Tribune devoted twenty-three lines to a summary of a “lengthy report” issued by the Polish government in exile. According to the dispatch, the Nazis had built gas chambers and crematoria at “a concentration camp at Oswiecim, southwest of Krakow,” which could “dispose of ten thousand bodies a day.”54** On June 4 the New York Times reported on page 6 that a young Pole who had been in Auschwitz and escaped when transferred to a camp in Germany had described the Auschwitz and Birkenau gas chambers. He related how in 1942 “trainload after trainload of Jews were shipped to camps for execution.”55 On June 16 the New York World Telegram and on June 17 the Los Angeles Times carried small UP dispatches on the execution of 3,000 Jews in gas chambers during the preceding March. The thirteen lines on page 3 devoted to th
is topic by the Los Angeles Times included somewhat garbled information on how these Jews had been moved from Birkenau to Terezin and “executed in gas chambers.” (The transfer had been from Terezin to Birkenau.) The New York World Telegram avoided this problem by cutting the dispatch back to ten lines and dropping all references to the place of execution.56
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