by J E Kauffman
At the beginning of May, General Nivelle and Lebrun worked out plans for the III Corps offensive to recapture Fort Douaumont. General Charles Mangin prepared his 5th Division (III Corps) and ordered the troops to train near the front. Mangin had the reputation of being more aggressive than the other French generals were and for pushing his troops. His actions at Verdun contributed to his nickname of ‘The Butcher’. After the war, Winston Churchill wrote that Mangin was ‘the fiercest warrior figure of France’.* Nivelle put Mangin in charge of the final planning and leading the operation. Mangin assessed the problems he would encounter after the Germans captured two ravines on either side of Fort Douaumont and the ridge to the west of the fort. Since the ravines would mask German troops moving to reinforce their front and endanger Mangin’s operation, he requested four divisions to counter the threat. Joffre, however, refused to deplete the forces he was preparing for the Somme Offensive. Mangin received only one additional division, which was to serve as a reserve for the operation forcing Nivelle to reduce the number of objectives for the attack.23 Colonel J.B. Estienne, who commanded the III Corps artillery during the operation, had 150 pieces of artillery and 10 heavy guns including 4 of the 370mm Filloux mortars.24
While Nivelle and Mangin worked on their plans, disaster struck their enemy at Fort Douaumont on 8 May. The Germans, who considered the fort a safe shelter, used its facilities to treat the wounded and quarter troops coming out of line to rest. The fort also served as a depot for munitions, flamethrowers and other equipment. Accounts vary as to the sequence of events, but most agree that some soldiers lit a fire to cook a meal near a store of flamethrowers or grenades. Sparks from the cooking fire set off a small explosion. The would-be cooks and the men around them, their faces blackened with smoke and soot, staggered out of the accident zone only to be mistaken for French African troops. Thinking that the French had breached the fort, their startled comrades lobbed grenades at them, one of which probably detonated a store of 155mm rounds for the turret gun. There followed a tremendous explosion that caused massive damage to the interior of the fort, killed 700 to 800 men and injured 1,800.25 Elements of two regiments of the 5th Division had occupied the fort at the time. After the medics and the pioneers sorted out the casualties and the damage, the fort continued to serve as a shelter/depot, but some troops were reluctant to stay in it. The turrets continued to serve as observation positions for the Germans.26
The Battle for Fort Douaumont
Fort Douaumont fell to the Germans on 25 February 1916. At the fort, the skeleton garrison was unable to implement fully General Herr’s order to prepare the fort for demolition since the officer responsible never arrived on 25 February. Even had engineers completed the preparations, they would not have changed the situation because a small number of Germans took the fort by surprise on that day. The French infantry garrison left the fort after 22 February. The French battalions assigned to defend the area in front of the fort had also kept a good distance between them and the fort since it proved to be a shell trap as German medium and heavy artillery targeted it. In front and to the left of the fort, Zouave battalions of the 37th Division and the 95th Infantry Regiment held the line. On the right, there were regiments from the 14th Division and 51st Division, but this mixture of regiments from different brigades and divisions must have created problems in coordination.27
Fort Douaumont before the 1916 battle. On the right is a battery position which included an incomplete turret position that was converted into a machine-gun bunker.
After September 1914, Fort Douaumont saw only occasional action. Its 155mm gun turret engaged the enemy in September and again in December. The Germans brought up a 420mm battery and their 380mm long-range naval guns to engage the fort in February 1915. The bombardment did not cause any substantial damage to the fort, but left its mark. Joffre’s order to strip the forts of their artillery and ammunition came in the autumn of 1915. Fort Douaumont’s only offensive weapon, the 155mm gun, remained with a supply of ammunition. The two 75mm guns also remained in their turret, but the other guns were removed. Adjutant Hippolyte Chenot, was in charge of the fort with fifty-six territorial troops and a few other soldiers that remained at the fort on 25 February.28 They fired the 155mm turret gun at suspected German positions. The German bombardment, which caused little damage to the fort, forced much of the garrison to shelter deep inside to avoid the thunder of rounds striking the surface and the dust that that thickened the surrounding air. No one manned the observation posts or any position beside the single gun turret. When the German 5th and 6th divisions advanced in the area, it forced back the defending infantry. The fort was located in the sector assigned to the 5th Division, but it was troops of the 24th Brandenburg Infantry Regiment of the 6th Division that actually moved on the fort due to a mix-up. Pioneer Sergeant Kunze and his squad-size unit worked their way up to the fort, found a gap in the obstacles created by an artillery round and climbed down into the moat.29 Since his men refused to follow him, Kunze entered an unmanned coffre alone with nothing but a rifle in his hands, worked his way through the tunnels and captured the turret gun crew single-handedly. Meanwhile, Lieutenant Eugen Radtke and his platoon got into the undefended moat, crossed it and climbed up the scarp onto the fort. They proceeded to capture most of the remaining French troops. Captain Hans Joachim Haupt and Lieutenant Cordt von Brandis followed him. The fort fell without offering any resistance. Brandis became a national hero since his name was in the official report.30 The French 37th Division pulled back on 25 February. On 26 February, the Germans repulsed a French counter-attack. The Germans, expecting a French attempt to take back the fort, readied the guns of the 75mm turret for action. In Germany, church bells rang celebrating the fall of the famous fort and the public became a little more confident of victory. Joffre, most likely as a result of pressure from the government, ordered Pétain to retake the fort. The French public eagerly read of the glowing but misleading reports of successful counter-attacks to take the fort published that month.
Finally, General Nivelle, after taking command of the 2nd Army, launched the first major attempt to retake Fort Douaumont late in May. The operation against the German 5th Division was limited to Lebrun’s III Corps spearheaded by Mangin’s 5th Division. The French artillery bombardment began on 17 May and continued for five days. Even so, on 20 May, the French took heavy losses when the enemy artillery returned fire destroying trenches and other positions prepared in advance of the infantry assault.
Meanwhile, before the French assault on Fort Douaumont, General Knobelsdorf finally realized that the battle had become too costly to continue. He drove to Falkenhayn’s headquarters at Mézières to ask him to abandon the offensive. The 5th Army needed time to recover from these bloody operations which had brought them no closer to victory. However, Falkenhayn, not yet ready to call off Operation Gericht, promised Knobelsdorf fresh divisions from the I Bavarian Corps and told him to prepare to take the Ouvrage of Thiaumont and the Froideterre Ridge. Knobelsdorf agreed to fall in with these plans, but the Crown Prince was outraged and told Falkenhayn, ‘I refuse to order the attack!’ If ordered to attack, he said he would obey, ‘but I will not do it on my own responsibility!’. Falkenhayn issued him written orders. At this point, even if the Germans took the east bank, they would still have to take the west bank where they had not even come near to breaking the fortress line. It was obvious that the French would continue to fight for Verdun. The attrition rate for the Germans turned out to be far worse than Falkenhayn’s prediction of two Germans to every five Frenchmen.31 Joffre was willing to fall into Falkenhayn’s trap, but Pétain refused to waste his men on large, casualty producing offensives. On 16 May, Falkenhayn showed up at the 5th Army headquarters to make his wishes clear. Thus, plans went forward for a new attack on the right bank on 22 May.
Mangin pressed on with his plans as well. Pétain was sceptical because he thought that German artillery fire was superior to the French. The day before the assault, Colonel Est
ienne informed Mangin that his artillery had riddled Fort Douaumont. Mangin, like the Germans before him, was convinced that the artillery had obliterated the enemy positions and that his men could simply walk across the front and take possession of their objectives. The five-day bombardment heralded the assault on the fort giving the Germans time to prepare.
The French had finally wrested control of the air from their enemy and eliminated five of the six German tethered observation balloons hovering over the battlefield, blinding the enemy artillery.32 French aircraft flew over the fort and photographed it to allow Mangin to assess the damage. The four 370mm mortars had landed several hits inflicting some damage, but none had actually penetrated the roof of the fort. The prolonged bombardment had reduced the two regiments of the 5th Division (the 8th Liebgrenadiers and the 52nd Infantry) holding the line in front of the fort to a handful of men.33 A large number of German troops had taken shelter in Fort Douaumont during the bombardment, but their situation became quite unbearable after some shells hit the exposed facade of the gorge. Dust, noise, flying fragments and noxious fumes and odours assailed the occupants. The heavy artillery damaged a gallery leading to the Casemate de Bourges causing it to collapse. The attack between the vicinity of Fort Douaumont and Fort Vaux was launched on 22 May, the same day as Falkenhayn’s planned offensive. A brief German artillery barrage inflicted heavy casualties on the four French battalions before the assault. Just before noon (French time), despite losses, those battalions advanced under a rolling barrage laid down by 75mm guns.
Further down the line, the German 1st Division (X Reserve Corps) repelled an attack coming from Fort Vaux, but the ferocity of the French assailants drove the X Reserve Corps back. The 5th Division reeled back to the outskirts of Fort Douaumont. The 19th Reserve Division and 6th Division on either flank of the 5th Division gave ground. The battalions of the French 9th and 10th brigades of Mangin’s 5th Division were to converge on the fort.34 They took losses from a German barrage but advanced under their own rolling barrage. German machine guns took a heavy toll as well. The French reached the fort and made it onto its superstructure where they set up positions on the glacis. Heavy fighting ensued. The Germans had installed machine guns in the empty Casemate de Bourges, but the French attackers took the casemate, the counterscarp coffre on the northwest corner of the fort and the double coffre. The Germans, however, had blocked the tunnels. The French soldiers set up defences inside the tunnel when they discovered that the Germans had blocked it with their own defensive position. The Germans used the northeastern machine-gun turret (the northwestern was badly damaged) to pin down the French troops on the superstructure. However, the French managed to reach the damaged machine-gun turret and access the passage to the barracks, only to find it blocked with debris. The French troops fruitlessly searched for ways to enter the fort. The Germans controlled the two gun turrets and the northeastern machine-gun turret, but the surface of the fort was crawling with French soldiers.35 As the fighting for the superstructure of the fort intensified, both sides suffered significant casualties. The Germans used the 75mm gun turret to send light signals to headquarters at a higher elevation since the fort was virtually isolated and all means of communication were cut.36 As the battle raged around and on top of Fort Douaumont from 23–4 May, Mangin pushed his troops to take the fort.37 The Germans managed to sneak reinforcements into the fort during the night through the northeastern section that the French had failed to occupy. On 23 May, the French forced most of the German defenders back into the fort.38 According to Pétain, two German companies stubbornly resisted while German batteries prevented French reserves from reaching the two battalions on the fort. The 5th Division rallied on 23 May, and in a fierce counter-attack recovered its former positions and secured the village by nightfall. In the afternoon of 24 May, the remnants of the two French battalions clinging to the fort’s superstructure were eliminated. Mangin’s division had to be relieved that evening. The arrival of the 2nd Bavarian Division allowed the X Reserve Corp to drive back the French troops. By the end of 24 May, the Eastern Group had regained control of its lost positions and cleared Thiaumont Woods with the help of the 19th Reserve Division. However, the troops holding Thiaumont Farm had to pull back. The I Bavarian Corps reached the battlefield at the critical point of the operation and moved between the VII Reserve and X Reserve Corps relieving the 19th Reserve Division and taking command of the 5th Division. The Germans took over 2,000 prisoners, but suffered heavy casualties. The German offensive planned for 22 May amounted to no more than an effort to push the French off Fort Douaumont and other positions.
On the Woëvre, the German troops of the 30th and 39th divisions and the XV Corps were subjected for months to constant bombardment that included gas shells in their relatively open positions, but they stubbornly held on under the watchful eyes of French observers on the heights. In the Argonne, on the 5th Army’s right flank, the XVI Corps continued the mine warfare and close combat in the forest and fought tooth and nail for possession of the craters left by mine explosions.
June Days – From Fort Vaux to Fleury
In June, Crown Prince Wilhelm and General Knobelsdorf had to settle for holding the line on the west bank between Hill 304 to Le Mort Hommes and Cumières while concentrating their main effort on the east bank. Their primary May objective, Fort Vaux, remained out of reach. Behind it lay forts Souville and Tavannes and two older forts of limited value.
Fort Vaux was a newer, modernized fort. In 1914, it had a single turret with two 75mm guns and a pair of Casemate de Bourges. Early in the war, the gun turret had fired on German troops on the Woëvre. When the Germans brought up the big guns to fire on Fort Douaumont in February 1915, Fort Vaux also became a target. A couple of rounds had penetrated the fort, causing a little damage. The fort, however, generally remained in good condition even though its garrison had been rattled by the dust and the din caused by repeated hits that made the situation appear far worse than the damage. Joffre’s 1915 order led to the removal of the 75s from the casemate in 1915, leaving only the turret guns. On 24 February, when it appeared that the Meuse Heights might fall, General Herr ordered the engineers to prepare the forts for demolition. When Pétain took charge late on 25 February, he countermanded these instructions. On the 26 February, the day after Fort Douaumont fell, the Germans turned their heavy 420mm artillery pieces on Fort Vaux. These guns damaged the counterscarp walls and one of the observation cloches, and literally tore another cloche out of its well. The big rounds also collapsed the double coffre in the northwest corner. The gun turret was blocked when the gallery roof caved in. Next, an explosion – caused by a 420mm round, according to some claims – detonated one of the demolition chambers damaging the turret. When he received the news, the commanding general of the sector ordered the fort destroyed. However, that same afternoon, another 420mm round destroyed the room containing the primers so that it became impossible to ignite the explosives. Shell craters pocked the fort surface and its glacis. On that day, the German V Reserve Corps, having received the order to take Fort Vaux, cleared the French from Hardaumont Ouvrage in preparation.39 However, heavy French artillery fire repelled each German advance on Fort Vaux.
Fort Vaux, 1914.
The next German attempt to take Fort Vaux was on 2 March, but it failed once again and the assailants took significant losses. An attack on 7 March met a similar fate in spite of a heavy preliminary shelling. Part of the problem for the Germans was that between the Hardaumont ouvrage, which they had captured, and Fort Vaux there was a ravine fringed on its west side by Caillette Woods from which the French enfiladed the soldiers advancing from the Hardaumont Heights into the gully. On the south side of the ravine, the Germans had to negotiate the steep slope of the hill overlooked by the fort and Fumin Woods. The French troops on the slopes of Vaux Hill and in Caillette Woods easily picked off the Germans moving across the ravine. Thus, repeated attempts to take Fort Vaux failed in April. Undeterred, the Germans tried again on 7 M
ay and once again were unsuccessful.40
After March, the French began to clean up and repair Fort Vaux. After the army engineers examined the 75mm gun turret, they declared it beyond repair.41 A detachment of the 44th Territorial Regiment with a less than stellar record manned the fort until a new garrison consisting of two infantry companies of the 142nd Infantry Regiment with machine-gun sections took over before June.42 Since this was more men than the facilities of the fort could accommodate, one company took up a new position on the outside. However, the fort still lacked its own weapons. The fort attracted soldiers seeking shelter, which led to overcrowding and an increased depletion of supplies.
The new commander, Major Sylvain-Eugène Raynal, had been wounded three times before and declared unfit for service. When he was offered the opportunity to get back into the fray, he was eager to accept. On 24 May, he arrived at the fort a cane in hand and with a pronounced limp. Upon inspection, he realized that Fort Vaux was in poor shape indeed. Even though Pétain had ordered its rearmament, Fort Vaux had little to defend it beyond machine guns, a small number of trench mortars and a few small guns in the coffres. The Casemate de Bourges contained only machine guns. It had been impossible to return 75mm guns to the fort. The rest of the fort was in disrepair since nothing had been fixed since March. There was no well and the water pipes were broken so that the troops had to draw water from outside the fort. Sanitation was poor and a foul odour permeated the entire fort.