by Mike Maden
Lane turned to Chairman Onstot. “Okay, General. Let’s lay this thing out.”
The chairman flashed a digital projector. A regional map appeared. He highlighted features with a laser pointer.
“The Chinese are clearly becoming more aggressive, not only in the East China Sea, but in the South China Sea as well, pushing out to the so-called nine-dash line. The nine-dash line—”
“—is the Chinese historical claim to the waters and territories in the region,” Lane interrupted. “Disputed by every other nation in the area.” He wasn’t about to let the chairman treat him like a junior officer at an ROTC luncheon. “Move on.”
“It’s also part of the First Island Chain Doctrine,” the chairman continued, somewhat humbled. He ran the laser pointer from the Malay Peninsula in the south to the Kamchatka Peninsula in the north, touching on Taiwan, the Philippines, and the Japanese islands in between. “In the event of war with the United States, Chinese military doctrine calls for preemptive strikes on all of our naval and air bases and other significant assets, including carrier groups, in this geographic chain of archipelagos in order to secure the Chinese mainland from American attack.”
“The strategic importance of the East China Sea to Chinese military doctrine can’t be overstated.” This from the marine corps commandant.
“Beyond expanding its nuclear capabilities, the primary emphasis of China’s massive military buildup over the last ten years has been to develop weapons and assets that will enable them to carry out the First Island Chain Doctrine,” the admiral said. “That’s the primary reason they’ve acquired their first aircraft carrier and pushed their conventional ballistic-missile programs forward. As I’m sure you’re well aware, Mr. President, the Chinese have been increasing their annual defense spending by double digits over the last decade, even as we’ve been cutting back, both in terms of spending, but also in actual force reductions, especially in naval assets. They’re getting stronger even as we weaken.”
“But President Sun is a reformer, not a hardliner,” Wheeler said. “Our ambassador has met with him several times. Assures me he’s a reasonable man.”
“I’m sure he is, but like you said, he’s a reformer. He’s had to pick and choose his battles. In order to wage his domestic anticorruption campaign, he’s given a freer hand to the PLA and the foreign policy hawks. The Chinese economy has its own problems, and securing ECS resources for themselves will go a long way to sort those out.”
“So why not let the Chinese secure the ECS?” Garza asked. “How is our national security threatened by this move?”
Lane picked Garza to be his NSA because the former Green Beret was unafraid to ask the hard questions.
“Because Japan will feel forced to respond,” Wheeler said, nodding at the silent looping Japanese video on the screen. “Imagine if China suddenly claimed the Gulf of Mexico and all of its natural resources as sovereign Chinese territory. We’d feel compelled to respond vigorously, especially if Chinese warships suddenly turned up outside Houston or New Orleans.”
The marine corps commandant nodded in agreement. “And if the Chinese grab the ECS, they’ll feel emboldened to grab the South China Sea as well. Maybe even Taiwan.”
“Okay, Taiwan, the Philippines, the Spratlys—let China take it all. How does that actually threaten us?”
“Don’t you know the history of Red China? Murdering tens of millions of their own in the Cultural Revolution? Their ground war against us in Korea, their proxy war against us in Vietnam?” The marine general’s voice seethed. “China is our greatest geopolitical challenger. A world dominated by Communist China is a world that none of us in this room want to live in.”
“Ever heard of Tibet?” Wheeler asked, sarcasm dripping.
“So, I’m hearing domino theory 2.0, is that it?” Garza was throwing Vietnam right back in their faces. “You’re fucking kidding me, right? Next thing you’ll tell us is that we have to win their hearts and minds.”
Lane tried not to laugh. The Tank was famous for its frank discussions. Garza was laying it on thick, but Lane had told him to. He needed to see where the chiefs really stood.
The chief of naval operations leaned forward, clasping his hands together. “Fifty percent of global merchant fleet traffic passes through the South China Sea, much of it making its way north to the ECS. Oil tanker traffic in these disputed waters is three times greater than the Suez Canal and more than five times greater than the Panama Canal. We’re talking about China seizing control of the majority of global commerce. Does that sound like the Chinese are fucking kidding, Mr. Garza?”
Garza raised a hand in mock surrender. “Okay, just checking. If we’re going to war with the Chinese, I just wanted to be sure it was for a damn good reason.”
So did Lane. Good job, Jim.
“So we’re back to sending the Chinese our own message,” Shafer said. “And we’re running out of time. I spoke with my counterpart in Tokyo earlier this morning. He says Prime Minister Ito’s hand is being forced by this video. Their cabinet is moving into crisis mode. He said if we don’t act forcefully and immediately, they will.”
Wheeler countered. “I say we make a strong public statement, explicitly condemning the Chinese actions yesterday. Pledge our support to the Japanese.”
“Words won’t be enough for the Japanese or our other allies,” the marine general said. “And the Chinese might just laugh us out of the room. This whole conflict is about naval presence. Force.”
The chairman was as grim as a hanging judge. “The Vietnamese have a saying, ‘You can’t put out a nearby fire from a distant well.’ If we don’t show up in force in the area immediately, we’ll shake the confidence of all our allies in the Pacific. Even NATO. Hell, maybe the whole world.”
The room quieted as everyone processed the implications of the chairman’s statement.
Lane was lost in his own thoughts. He was the commander in chief of the most powerful military in all of human history. He wasn’t nearly as qualified as any of the men in this room on defense and security matters, and yet the Constitution vested him, the president, with the authority to wage war. If the chairman was right, maybe a global war really was possible. Sounded crazy to even think that. But Lane had read his history, and few heads of state in Europe in either 1914 or 1939 were prepared to think about the unthinkable before it happened. Two global wars resulted.
“And that’s why you want a show of force as soon as possible?” Lane said.
“Yes, sir,” the chairman said.
“And what are the options?” Lane asked.
“We’re divided, Mr. President. I believe sending the George Washington carrier battle group to the area is the wisest course of action. The George Washington is based in Yokosuka, Japan.”
Lane saw the marine corps and air force chiefs nodding in agreement.
“But the navy has its reservations,” the chairman added. He turned to the chief of naval operations.
“The Chinese have pursued an aggressive A2AD antiaccess/area denial capability. We believe they’ve achieved a significant breakthrough in their antiship missile technologies. The DF-21D and YJ-12 missiles are proven and reliable conventional antiship systems capable of taking out an aircraft carrier. However, we have our own antimissile defense systems in place that we believe can deal with those threats—provided the Chinese don’t overwhelm us with sheer numbers.”
“Is that likely?” Lane asked.
“Not at the moment, especially in the northern reaches we’re talking about. Down south toward Taiwan, well, that’s a different matter.”
“But the admiral has other concerns,” Shafer said.
“Our biggest concern is the Chinese deployment of the Wu-14, a hypersonic, maneuverable, conventional missile warhead. Not only is it fully capable of taking out an aircraft carrier, but it travels at such a high rate of speed we have n
o means to defend against it at the present time. My concern is that if you send the George Washington into harm’s way we might just lose it. That would send an even stronger message to our allies than doing nothing at all.”
“Of course, the DIA doesn’t believe the Wu-14 is actually operational,” the marine commandant said.
“The CIA hasn’t confirmed it, either,” Shafer added. “Nor have any other national intelligence agencies.”
Lane sighed. “Why the hell not?” It wasn’t really a question. Lane had heard all the excuses before in his PDBs. He also agreed that China was America’s most challenging strategic threat and the Wu-14—if it actually existed—the most dangerous conventional weapon in their arsenal.
“We don’t have HUMINT near it, and their cyberdefenses are impenetrable,” Shafer said.
The air force general wasn’t through carpet bombing the navy’s argument. “It’s just not feasible that the Chinese have it, at least not an operational version. We’ve been trying to crack the HGV nut since the ’80s and still can’t make the damn thing work. The physics behind it are just too hard to engineer around.”
“That doesn’t mean the Chinese haven’t figured it out,” the admiral said. “They say they have. They’ve even leaked the videos of their tests.”
The marine general scoffed. “Pure propaganda. They’re at least five years away. Think about it. What a coup for their intelligence service if they can make us believe they have the Wu-14 when they actually don’t? They could scare us out of the Pacific for the cost of a porno movie.”
“I’m not willing to bet the lives of five thousand sailors on your theory,” the admiral snapped. He turned to Lane. “Are you?”
“What about a preemptive strike against their DF-21 platforms?” the army general asked. “Seems like the easiest way to defeat the Wu-14 system.”
“But those are mobile missiles,” the air force chief said. “Besides, the DF-21s have almost twice the combat range of our F-35Cs. You’ll need to use longer-range assets like sub-launched cruise missiles to effect the strike.”
“The Chi-coms would start crapping golf balls if we lit up their radar screens with cruise missiles. They’d think we were launching a preemptive nuclear strike,” Garza said.
“Not to mention that a preemptive strike without just cause is illegal under international law,” Wheeler said.
“And that would start a war, which, according to our Constitution, you explicitly don’t have the authority to do,” Garza said. “Unless you consider the Chinese an imminent threat to the United States.”
“Which it isn’t,” Wheeler added. “Technically, it’s Japan that’s in imminent danger, not us.”
“There are other options,” the marine commandant said. “The Wu-14 relies on satellite systems for guidance and navigation. We could launch ASAT missiles and take out their satellites.”
“And start a space war with the Chinese, who would take out our satellites,” the air force general said, shaking his head. “We’re far more dependent on space assets than they are.”
“Or disrupt the kill chain,” the army general said. “Disrupt the links between the satellites and the missile.”
“How?” Lane asked.
“Cripple their command and control systems through conventional or cyber attacks.”
“And you’re confident we can do that?” Lane asked.
“Technically, yes, I believe it’s entirely possible.”
“And you’re confident enough that you’re willing to risk one of our carriers and the lives of the sailors on board?”
The army general hesitated, weighing the evidence in his mind. “Frankly, no. The Chinese would know these were points of vulnerability and would have probably prepared defenses against them in advance. We wouldn’t know if our efforts were successful until after they launched the vehicle.”
“Not acceptable,” the admiral said.
Lane took a sip of coffee, processing the conversation. He leaned toward the chairman. “So what you’re telling me is that the best way to prevent a war with China is to threaten war with China?”
“Yes.” The irony wasn’t lost on the chairman or anyone else in the room.
Lane turned back to the admiral. “But the only way we can safely deploy the George Washington is to first launch a preemptive strike against the Wu-14?”
“That’s my assessment, sir.”
“If you can find it,” the army general added.
“So we have to start a war to prevent it,” Garza said, shaking his head. “Or roll the dice and hope the Chinese are just bluffing.”
Lane turned back to Shafer. “And we’re talking about provoking a regime that’s already proven itself recklessly aggressive?”
The secretary of defense nodded grimly.
“And yet, backing down or doing nothing would only embolden them in their recklessness? Threaten our existing alliances?”
The secretary of state nodded in agreement.
Wheeler added, “And if we don’t act quickly and decisively, the Japanese will start their own war, dragging us into it anyway.”
Lane addressed the whole room. “In other words, we’re damned if we do and damned if we don’t.”
“That’s about the shape of it,” the chairman said. “A Texas longhorn–size dilemma.”
“So my options really are war on Chinese terms or war on our terms. Push the George Washington into harm’s way and see if the Chinese strike—or launch a massive preemptive cruise-missile strike without cause to protect our carrier from a missile that may or may not actually exist?”
“And then there’s the North Koreans and their MIRV missile testing,” Garza said, grinning. “Who knows what those batshit crazies will do.”
Lane tented his hands, calculating.
“Your decision, Mr. President?” the chairman finally asked.
Lane wasn’t exactly sure. He’d already cast his lot with Pearce and Myers. With nothing but two bad choices in front of him, they were his only hope of avoiding either. But if they failed, it looked like World War III was all but certain.
He prayed they wouldn’t. But they needed time.
Time he didn’t have.
FOURTEEN
JAPANESE EMBASSY
CHAOYANG DISTRICT, BEIJING, CHINA
8 MAY 2017
Helmeted Chinese riot police stood shoulder to shoulder against the screaming crowd, eyes burning against the tear gas blowing in their faces from the shifting winds. The front ranks clung desperately to their wire-mesh shields that had gaps between the steel rods just large enough for fingers to grasp—a distinct design flaw now made apparent as rioters seized the mesh and pulled on the tops of the shields like mountain climbers. A few succeeded in leaping over and stepping onto shields held aloft like a roof.
The police were under orders to not open fire with their weapons, but they swung their batons with abandon, trying to break the fingers clawing through the mesh or busting the ankles of the men overhead.
More than two thousand Chinese nationalist protestors shouted and surged at the wavering green police line. Black smoke choked the air as two overturned Toyota sedans burned and dozens of small fires crackled with piles of Japanese flags.
A sea of Chairman Mao posters and red and gold PRC flags hovered over the rioters’ heads. A thick, bald-headed man with Chinese flags painted on his face shouted in a megaphone. “For the love of our homeland! War with Japan! War against the invaders!”
The grim Japanese ambassador stood in the second-floor window watching the riot, a secure cell phone pressed against his ear as he gave a live description to his boss, the foreign minister back in Tokyo. He also confirmed similar riots in Shanghai, Tianjin, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen. Japanese restaurants, department stores, and manufacturing facilities were looted; Japanese citizens were harassed on the
streets and even assaulted. Japanese-brand televisions, computers, and appliances were being smashed in stores and on the sidewalks.
Two embassy staffers standing next to the ambassador shot official videos with Canon video cameras while other frightened staffers shot home videos on their cell phones.
The ambassador and foreign minister both agreed. The real danger wasn’t the rioting. The Chinese government would never allow spontaneous protests to erupt on the streets. Tiananmen Square was proof of that.
—
Vice Chairman Feng watched the riots unfolding on his television. He lit a cigarette.
He had to give the MSS its due credit. The bumblers had nearly killed the Japanese activists on the dive boat two days ago. He’d seen the video footage shot by the Japanese and posted on the Internet. His explicit orders were to simply scare off the Japanese civilians, not beat them into comas.
But at least the MSS handled the controlled rioting at home well enough. State security had worked tirelessly over the last forty-eight hours to fan the flames of Chinese national outrage. Marathon television broadcasts of old newsreel footage, elderly victim interviews, and state-sponsored feature films depicting the Rape of Nanking, the invasion of Manchuria, and other Japanese wartime atrocities in China and elsewhere in Asia blanketed the airwaves. MSS social-networking agents overwhelmed the Internet, flooding blogs, websites, and the Chinese version of Twitter, Weibo, with virulent anti-Japanese propaganda and calls for vengeance even as they bullied, blocked, or secretly arrested citizens who dared suggest calm, reason, and peace.
The MSS social-networking campaign worked flawlessly. They convincingly portrayed the Chinese fishing trawler as the victim of a Japanese assault, and the old slogans about the Diaoyu Islands being stolen Chinese territory were on the lips of half a billion people. Chinese newscasts repeated the most recent public opinion poll: 57 percent said that war with Japan in the next few years was inevitable. Of those, 79 percent said that it was both necessary and good.