Fortunately, things soon began to happen. At 0800 hours the guns of the 2nd Division opened up on the Japanese positions encircling the garrison and hammered them for the next half-hour. Then, supported by tanks, the 1st/1st Punjab began attacking along the road, and dropping off pickets on the high ground as they advanced. Peter Steyn wrote of this moment: ‘To the garrison, it seemed unbelievable that the nightmare of the past few weeks could be drawing to a close. Tired eyes watched as fighter-bombers of the R.A.F. roared overhead to strafe G.P.T. Ridge and the surrounding areas.… Weary faces smiled as news of the attack came through.’ There was not a great deal of opposition, but Warren did not want any slip-up and his units felt their way forward slowly. At milestone 45 the Japs had established a road block and, before this could be cleared, the tanks had to be brought into action and the infantry put in a right hook. This took an hour and it was almost noon before the column reached I.G.H. Spur. All this time Major Yeo had been directing the fire of the artillery against the enemy batteries, keeping them quiet; if they were allowed to bring down a concentration on the re-entrant where the relieving troops were entering the perimeter the slaughter would be great. But by now Yeo knew every inch of the ground, and as the 25-pounders at Zubza kept roaring away and the shells shrieked over, the Japs were too occupied to think of offensive action. The Punjabis made their way into the perimeter without difficulty.
After the leading infantry there came the transport; ambulances, three-tonners, and carriers. For some hours Colonel Young had been making arrangements for the evacuation of the wounded, collecting walking cases into groups under leaders, getting non-combatants to help carry the rest of the wounded down to the ambulances. This was a tricky job and had to be done a few cases at a time, as snipers were still active. Some men, having endured days and nights of pain, were wounded again as they went down to the trucks, and others were killed. Several non-combatants, who understandably lost their heads and charged down in groups, were picked off too. The process of evacuation went on till evening.
The commanding officer of the 1st/1st Punjab was Lieut.-Colonel Grimshaw, and as he followed the guide who was to take him to Laverty’s headquarters, he noticed the scene of utter devastation around him, and particularly the black, swollen corpses of the Japanese. His meeting with Laverty was short and confined to the business on hand; the deployment of the Punjabis to give the maximum support to the garrison. In general, agreement was soon reached, but then the position of the D.C.’s bungalow sector was discussed, and Laverty appears to have been in some doubt as to whether the troops should be relieved or merely withdrawn. The matter was referred to Richards who insisted that the sector must be held, so a company of Punjabis moved down to take over from the Royal West Kents. Later events proved Richards to be right.
Though they were still in their slit trenches, still under shell fire, and facing yet another night of attack, the garrison were now in much better heart. The sight of fresh troops arriving had produced a great psychological effect. No longer did they feel isolated and abandoned. They knew it would only be a matter of time now before they were taken out of the perimeter and given a long rest; and this new hope brought new courage.
*
After watching the start of the relief operations, John Grover returned to his headquarters to meet Stopford, who had come forward from Jorhat. Immediately discussions began on the subject of the L. of C. which was causing Grover a good deal of concern. Stopford, it will be remembered, had advised taking a risk, but with the threat to his right flank increasing, Grover begged to differ. The road, he argued, must be kept open until all the road parties of his Division had arrived from India, during the next ten days. Till they were all through, Grover considered, he must hold strong defended areas at Zubza and Priphema, five miles further back.
Stopford agreed to Grover’s appreciation and the discussion moved on to Grover’s plan for future operations. The main features of this were to establish the right flank, to extend the area now held to Kohima, and to carry out forward reconnaissances in anticipation of the major operation of wresting Kohima Ridge from the enemy. Also it was agreed that the 2nd Division should get a footing on Merema Ridge. No timing was mentioned for the operation, but both commanders understood that it must be carried out just as soon as possible. Already it was known by Mountbatten and Slim that the transport aircraft supplying 4th Corps at Imphal had failed so far to achieve their target number of sorties, even in fine weather. The pressure was on.
*
While Stopford was conferring with Grover, Sato was studying a signal from Mutaguchi ordering him to send a regimental group to Kanglatongbi, with a view to reinforcing 15th Division’s attack on Imphal. Apparently intending to comply with the order, he asked Miyazaki to concentrate the 124th Regiment (less its third battalion), the 1st Battalion 138th Regiment, and a battalion of the 31st Mountain Artillery, on the Aradura Spur, to the west of Kohima. He also gave orders for the 13 8th Regiment to hold the Cheswema-Merema ridge, with the task of harassing the Dimapur road, and for the 3rd Battalion 124th Regiment to hold Naga Village. Meanwhile the 58th Regiment were to continue their efforts to capture Garrison Hill. Sato’s plan was a sound one; if he could hold both ridges, and the Kohima Ridge which joined them, the 2nd Division and the formations under its command would be attacking into a deep salient, harassed on their right flank, shelled from their left, and blocked by the almost im pregnable positions ahead. (As Grover put it: ‘It’s like trying to force yourself out of a bottle.’) It is sometimes said that, like Marshal Soult, Sato was better at bringing his troops into battle than manœuvring them afterwards; that his mind was rigid and inelastic. This may be so, though when judging him one should remember that his orders were very limiting; but in defence he was undoubtedly brilliant—a fact that the 2nd Division were soon to discover.
To turn for a moment to Mutaguchi’s order to send the three battalions to help in the attack on Imphal, it now appears that having originally intended to obey the order Sato began to have doubts. About the 19th he signalled Mutaguchi: ‘It will take six or seven days for these troops to arrive on foot, so please send transport.’ To this Mutaguchi signalled: ‘Carry out this order immediately without fail. Use the transport you captured at Kohima.’ This signal (like so many missives from Mutaguchi) enraged Sato; it appears, however, that he did not reject the order but decided to keep stalling and watch events. Why Sato had no transport of his own to use is not clear, as, from reports of the 58th Regiment, they captured some thirty vehicles. It may be that these had all been immobilized, or the Japanese troops, in their enthusiasm, had destroyed them.
On the night of the 18th, after some minor scares, the Japs attacked the Punjabis in the D.C.’s bungalow sector, and a brisk battle developed on the tennis court. Grenades were hurled from end to end, some reaching their objectives but others exploding around the base line. The Punjabis fought gallantly but were outnumbered, and eventually the Japanese were able to move forward on a flank. In the noise and confusion it was impossible to organize a counter-attack that night; all the company could do was hold on till daylight. Then Jemadar Mohammed Rafiq, though all his three section commanders had been killed, put in a platoon attack to regain the lost trenches, and succeeded brilliantly. Sixteen Japanese were killed and the Jemadar was awarded the M.C.
While the Punjabis were engaged at the northern end of the perimeter, ‘A’ Company of the Royal West Kents were trying to beat off an attack from the south-west. A platoon of Indian troops had retired through their lines and the Japs, following up, had occupied their old positions, which included one bunker only a few yards away. From here the Japs attacked again, infiltrated between two sections, then, using the cover of some bushes, began wriggling their way forward. By now they were only forty yards from the Battalion Command Post and the situation looked very ugly indeed. No troops were available for a counter-attack and the only way to stop further penetration was by individual stalking, in the flickering light a game
of hide-and-seek was played, dozens of minor clashes and individual actions being fought. Time went on, and soon it became evident that the Japanese effort had spent itself. The perimeter was torn, but at least the only Japanese inside it were dead ones. At first light, Grimshaw put in a counter-attack to gain the lost ground, using smoke liberally to blanket the objective from Japanese positions on the flanks. The action was completely successful and nineteen of the enemy were killed.
But if the perimeter was still intact, it was by now too small to deploy the troops ready to come into it and Warren decided that Kuki Piquet must be retaken. The whole of the 2nd Division artillery (seventy-two guns) put down a concentration, and then the Punjabis went into the attack. Watching the action, Richards thought that none of the enemy on Kuki Piquet could have survived the concentration, but no sooner had the Indians got on to the feature than all the bunkers came alive and machine-gun fire poured out of them. The attack was therefore broken off. This pattern was to repeat itself over and over again in the weeks to come.
But to go back some hours: at 0630 hours Grover had held a conference at Jotsoma with Warren and Shapland, commander of 6th Brigade. A new situation had arisen. Warren, who up to now had been asking that his brigade should complete the relief and re-garrisoning of Kohima, now said it was too tired and should be withdrawn for a rest. Grover, who was short of troops, couldn’t agree to this request entirely; but he did concede that the troops who had been in the siege should go back to Dimapur and that the remainder of the brigade should be withdrawn to a quiet sector. This meant that units of the 2nd Division must take over, and it was decided that the Royal Berkshires should go into Kohima. But first there was a tricky situation, as news had come through that a company of the 4th Rajputs who were occupying a feature called Terrace Hill, commanding the road into Kohima, had been overrun. Two attacks had been repelled with the aid of the artillery, firing on D.F. tasks, but the third was successful and very few Rajputs managed to get away. Lieutenant Loudon, the gunner officer who had been calling down the fire, suddenly found himself surrounded by the enemy. But he was able to shoot his way through, killing eight Japs with his Sten before he was blown into a nala by the blast from a grenade. It was quite obvious that Terrace Hill must be retaken before any relief column could venture along the road, and the job was given to the Durham Light Infantry.
This was a fine fighting unit, which had already seen action in the Arakan. The artillery fire, the mortars, and the infantry were all co-ordinated like clockwork and soon the men were prodding among the bunkers, hurling grenades, and engaging with the bayonet any Japs who came out to fight. Over fifty of them were killed and the company began to organize itself for defence. Unfortunately, at this moment the company commander, Robert Allen, was caught by a burst of machine-gun fire in the chest. In the few seconds of life left to him he found the energy to whisper congratulations to his men.
All this day wounded were evacuated from Kohima and stores, ammunition and food were taken in. By now there had been more air-drops and the whole ridge was covered with gaily coloured parachutes, many of them unfortunately caught in the trees and their precious cargoes hanging well out of reach.
In the evening Grover received a report from the Camerons that an officer called Carbonell had gone right up to Merema Ridge and found a complete enemy position unoccupied. Grover immediately told Hawkins to send a strong company patrol over, supported by another the next day. Their object should be to establish themselves astride the Merema-Kohima road. Once they had done this plans could go ahead for Victor Hawkins’s left hook.
During this period the regiments stationed along the road running back to Zubza, and beyond, fought a whole string of small actions, too many to enumerate. Most of them were sharp and bloody, life or death dependent on the speed of reaction. For example, on the 14th the Royal Norfolk, who had been given the job of protecting the tank laager at Zubza, were attacked by a company of Japanese, and a brilliant action led by Sergeant Hazell killed thirty of them. Some were grotesque and others comic. On the night of the 16th, a sentry of the Royal Welch Fusiliers, at Zubza, thought he heard some Japanese crawling along a nala bed towards his position and threw a grenade into it. As it happened, some barrels of tar dumped by the road-menders had been rolled into the nala and these exploded, sending burning jets of tar high into the air. Cries of amazement came from all the trenches in the neighbourhood and a man in the Worcestershires was heard to exclaim: ‘Bloody hell! They’ve got a secret weapon!’ About this time, Major Elliott of the Worcestershires fought an action against a Japanese company in which one of their officers was wounded and lay in the open, moaning. Neither side would let the other approach to recover him, and the officer took out a phosphorus grenade, pulled out the pin, and held the grenade to his chest. A column of smoke spiralled into the air and there was the foul smell of burning flesh. But till the moment of his death the officer did not take the grenade away from his chest. A few nights later there was the sound of hoof-beats on the northern edge of the Zubza perimeter, and the cry went up: ‘They’re driving elephants through us.’ Firing broke out all round the box and nothing could control it. The mule company nearest to the point where the sound was heard blazed off most of its small arms ammunition. In the morning a dozen cows were found shot to pieces a few yards in front of the wire. The mule company commander, carpeted by Victor Hawkins, swore that two of his posts had been attacked and one of his men wounded. He was told angrily that if his men ever fired again he’d be expected to produce the bodies. On the 19th the Royal Scots fought their first action, in the Zubza valley, a company attacking two small pimples. Unfortunately the company commander sent his men in without adequate supporting fire and several were killed before the action was broken off. (‘This is the first time I’ve done this,’ he remarked, ‘and the last.’) The wounded were carried into the houses of a nearby Naga village where they weren’t impressed by ‘the evil-smelling cow-dung floors and the gruesome decorations of tiny skulls strung along the walls’. The regiment was annoyed, however, ‘at having lost some good men to no purpose’, not being able to swear that they’d killed a single Jap. The commanding officer therefore asked the 16th Field Regiment to have a go at the forward slopes of the hill with their guns—the rear slopes being too steep to reach. The gunners went into action, then the mortars, and some Hurribombers, after which the Scots imagined that there couldn’t be a Jap alive, and put a company into the attack. But it was the old story; no sooner had the infantry got on to the position than it became alive. A left hook was impossible because the Jap position was sited on the edge of a precipice, and a right hook failed because of a well-sited machine-gun. So the Royal Scots kept hammering at the position with their mortars and machine-guns, and in the morning it was observed that the Japs had gone. Twenty bodies were found, all beheaded and the heads taken away. Among them, though the Royal Scots couldn’t know this, was the corpse of Major Shibasaki, commanding the 1st Battalion, 138th Regiment.
On the night of the 19th the Japanese put in some routine attacks on the Kohima garrison, but they were not pressed home with the usual ferocity and the perimeter was not in any great danger.
At 0900 hours on the 20th, John Grover went forward to his command post to watch the final relief of Kohima, with his C.R.A., Pat Burke, and a radio, ready to call up artillery as required. ‘We sat side by side,’ Grover has recalled, ‘able to see the whole operation in panorama before us, and switching on artillery support to any required area like playing a hose.’ The operation was prefaced by a strike from the Hurribombers, which attacked Japanese positions on G.P.T. Ridge and Jail Hill, then the artillery took over, pounding all the positions from which interference might come. Soon after nine o’clock the men of the Royal Berkshire Regiment debussed at Picket Hill, half a mile beyond milestone 44, and took up their position behind the tanks. Then the column slowly moved forward, winding its way uphill towards the re-entrant on I.G.H. Spur. The Japs were so inactive that Grover e
ven began to wonder whether they had started to pull out of Kohima, and by 0945 hours the Royal Berkshires were climbing up into the perimeter, and the relief of the garrison began.
The contrast between the troops of the Royal Berkshires and the Royal West Kents could hardly be imagined. While the former looked clean and fresh, the latter were filthy, bearded and bedraggled. Their eyes were bleary and deep in their sockets, their figures were thin, and their shoulders drooped. Some of them looked more like scarecrows than soldiers, and there was some good-natured twitting from the Royal Berkshires about ‘standing closer to the razor’. It is said that the men of Kent were too tired to reply, but some jawans3 of the Assam Regiment raised a cheer. They could hardly believe that it was time to go.
Like everyone else who saw Kohima Ridge for the first time, the Royal Berkshires were utterly appalled by the scene around them. Their giant commanding officer, Wilbur Bickford, said later:
‘We were most profoundly shocked by the conditions which prevailed on Garrison Hill…. The stench of festering corpses—Japanese, British and Indian—was overpowering. There were no sanitary arrangements and stores of ah descriptions were lying about. It was possible to pick up anything from a Tommy-gun to a pair of ladies’ shoes, and the place was a veritable paradise for flies.’
Major John Nettlefield, the gunner, has written in similar vein:
‘When we first saw Kohima it was beautifully fresh and green—an attractive town perched on the hills…. Now… the place stank. The ground everywhere was ploughed up with shell-fire and human remains lay rotting as the battle raged over them. Flies swarmed everywhere and multiplied with incredible speed. Men retched as they dug in… the stink hung in the air and permeated one’s clothes and hair.’
Kohima Page 13