53 261 U.S. at 567, 569-70 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
54 262 U.S. 390, 399, 400 (1923) (citations omitted).
55 262 U.S. at 412 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
56 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
57 198 U.S. at 59.
2. THE NEW DEAL COURT AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION
1 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
3 Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Railroad Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935).
4 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
5 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
6 Radio address by President Roosevelt, Mar. 9, 1937, reprinted in G. Gunther, Cases and Materials on Constitutional Law 151 (10th ed. 1980).
7 Attributed. Lincoln explained and defended his policy of occasionally suspending the right to habeas corpus in his July 4, 1861 message to Congress. See 4 The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln 429-31 (R. Basler ed. 1953) (reprinting Lincoln’s Message to Congress in Special Session, July 4, 1861) (“are all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated? Even in such a case, would not the official oath be broken, if the government should be overthrown, when it was believed that disregarding the single law, would tend to preserve it?”).
8 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
9 Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee, June 14, 1937, reprinted in G. Gunther, supra note 6, at 152.
10 This quote was apparently derived from a similar statement attributed to the young New Dealer Abe Fortas, “a switch in time serves nine.” See The New York Times, June 15, 1937, at A19.
11 317 U.S. 111, 128 (1942).
12 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
13 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
14 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934).
15 Id. at 539, 554, 556 (1934) (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
16 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
17 Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
18 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
19 Id. at 152-53 n.4 (citations omitted).
20 313 U.S. 236, 247 (1941).
21 Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 57, §§ 171, et seq.; L. 1935, pp. 94 et seq., quoted in Skinner v. Oklahoma 316 U.S. 535, 536-37 (1942).
22 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
23 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
24 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
25 Id. at 207. But see Lombardo, Three Generations, No Imbeciles: New Light on Buck v. Bell, 60 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 30 (1985) (arguing that the factual assertions the Supreme Court relied on were false. Carrie Buck, her mother, and daughter were not in fact mentally retarded.).
26 316 U.S. at 540, 541, 543.
27 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 123 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
28 316 U.S. at 541.
3. THE WARREN COURT: THE POLITICAL ROLE EMBRACED
1 Schlesinger, The Supreme Court: 1947, FORTUNE, vol. 35, Jan. 1947, at 73, 201-02.
2 A. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 80 (1962).
3 Ibid.
4 Id. at 84.
5 Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
6 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
7 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
8 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966).
9 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
10 See generally R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself (1978).
11 Handler, The Supreme Court and the Antitrust Laws: A Critic’s View-point, 1 Ga. L. Rev. 339, 350 (Spring 1967).
12 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
13 163 U.S. 537,551 (1896).
14 163 U.S. 552, 557, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
15 347 U.S. at 494.
16 Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955).
17 Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955).
18 New Orleans City Park Imp. Ass’n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958).
19 Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963).
20 See, e.g., Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (1959). See also Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections Between Law and Political Science, 20 Stan. L. Rev. 169 (1968).
21 Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1959).
22 Id. at 19.
23 L. Jaffe, English and American Judges As Lawmakers 38 (1969).
24 Wechsler, supra note 21, at 31-32, 34 (footnote omitted).
25 Bork, The Supreme Court Needs a New Philosophy, FORTUNE, vol. 78, Dec. 1968, at 138.
26 Bork, Civil Rights—A Challenge, THE NEW REPUBLIC, vol. 149, Aug. 31, 1963, at 21.
27 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
28 J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust 32 (1980) (The notion “that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment incorporates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth … is gibberish both syntactically and historically.”).
29 See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636,638 n.2 ( 1975). See also Note, A Madisonian Interpretation of the Equal Protection Doctrine, 91 Yale L.J. 1403 (1982).
30 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
31 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
32 377 U.S. 533, 573, 574, 580 (1964).
33 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
34 377 U.S. 744, 745, 746, 750, 753, 754 (1964) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
35 Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
36 A. Cox, The Court and the Constitution 290 (1987).
37 302 U.S. 277 (1937).
38 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
39 Id. at 669-70 (emphasis in original).
40 383 U.S. at 670, 676-77 (Black, J., dissenting).
383 U.S. 663, 680, 686 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
42 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
43 Id. at 651 n.10.
44 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68, 71-72, 90-92 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (“one of the chief objects that the provisions of the [Fourteenth] Amendment’s first section, separately, and as a whole, were intended to accomplish was to make the Bill of Rights applicable to the states.”).
338 U.S. 25 (1949).
46 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
47 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
48 384 U.S. at 499, 504, 526 (Clark, Harlan, Stewart, and White, JJ., dissenting).
49 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
50 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
51 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
52 Id. at 485-86.
53 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
54 381 U.S. at 486.
55 Id. at 481-482.
56 381 U.S. at 507, 508, 510 (Black, J., dissenting).
57 381 U.S. at 527, 530 n.7 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
4. AFTER WARREN: THE BURGER AND REHNQUIST COURTS
1 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)
2 See, e.g., United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 20916 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
3 401 U.S. at 431, 436.
4 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
5 443 U.S. at 216 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
6 443 U.S. at 219 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
7 480 U.S. 616, 620, 641-42 (1987).
8 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(a).
9 480 U.S. at 660 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
10 M. Mayer, Today and Tomorrow in America 3-4 (1975).
11 T. Sowell, “Weber and Bakke, and the Presuppositions of ’Affirmative Action,’ ” Discrimination, Affirmative Action, and Equal Opportunity 35, 44-50 (W. Block & M. Walker eds. 1981); T. Sowell, Civil Rights: Rhetoric or Reality? 77-79 (1984).
12 57 U.S.L.W. 4132 (U.S. Jan. 23, 1989).
13 57 U.S.L.W. at 4145 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
57 U.S.L.W. at 4148, 4157 (Marshall, J. and Blackmun, J., dissenting).
15 Will, “Backing Out of a Swamp,” The Washington Post, Jan. 29, 1989, at D7.
16 57
U.S.L.W. 4583, 4586 (U.S. June 5, 1989).
17 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
18 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
19 410 U.S. 113(1973).
20 Id. at 130.
21 Id. at 148.
22 Id. at 152-53.
23 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
24 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
25 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
26 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
27 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
28 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
29 410 U.S. at 153, 164-65.
30 410 U.S. at 171, 172 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
31 410 U.S. at 221-22 (White, J., dissenting).
32 57 U.S.L.W. 5023 (U.S. July 3, 1989).
Id. at 5025 (plurality op. of Rehnquist, C.J.).
34 Id. at 5034 (Scalia, J., concurring).
35 Id. at 5031 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
36 478 U.S. 186(1986).
37 Id. at 190.
38 Id. at 191.
39 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326 (1937).
40 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
41 478 U.S. at 194.
42 478 U.S. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
43 Id. at 204.
44 478 U.S. at 196.
45 478 U.S. at 206 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); 195-96 (opinion of the Court).
46 478 U.S. at 206, 208 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
47 Id. at 211-12 (emphasis added).
48 57 U.S.L.W. 4770, 4774 (U.S. June 21, 1989).
49 Id. at 4775.
50 57 U.S.L.W. at 4776, 4779 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
51 Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, 57 U.S.L.W. 4920 (U.S. June 23, 1989).
52 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 57 U.S.L.W. 5045 (U.S. July 3,1989).
53 Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 57 U.S.L.W. 4168 (U.S. Feb. 21, 1989).
5. THE SUPREME COURT’S TRAJECTORY
1 A. Bickel, The Morality of Consent (1975).
2 Id. at 120-21 (emphasis in original).
3 Ibid.
4 Id. at 121.
II. THE THEORISTS
1 See, e.g., J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (Carolina Academic Press 1987) (1833); T. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (2d ed. 1871).
2 See, e.g., Chapter 9, infra.
3 J. Story, supra note 1, at vi.
4 A. Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind (1987).
5 Kramer, Studying the Arts and the Humanities: What Can Be Done, THE NEW CRITERION, vol. 7, Feb. 1989, at 1,3.
6 Letter from Gertrude Himmelfarb to Robert H. Bork (May 4, 1989).
7 H. Schlossberg, Idols for Destruction 204 (1983).
6. THE MADISONIAN DILEMMA AND THE NEED FOR CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
Letter from Lord Acton to Bishop Mandell Creighton (Apr. 5, 1887), quoted in G. Himmelfarb, Lord Acton: A Study in Conscience and Politics 160-161 (1952).
7. THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING
1 Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 723, 725-27 (1988) (“The relevant inquiry must focus on the public understanding of the language when the Constitution was developed. Hamilton put it well: ‘whatever may have been the intention of the framers of a constitution, or of a law, that intention is to be sought for in the instrument itself, according to the usual & established rules of construction.’ ” [emphasis in original; footnotes omitted]).
2 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
3 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-79 (1803).
4 See also Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849, 853 (1989) (It is a canard to interpret Marshall’s observation in McCulloch as implying that our interpretation of the Constitution must change from age to age. “The real implication was quite the opposite: Marshall was saying that the Constitution had to be interpreted generously because the powers conferred upon Congress under it had to be broad enough to serve not only the needs of the federal government originally discerned but also the needs that might arise in the future. If constitutional interpretation could be adjusted as changing circumstances required, a broad initial interpretation would have been unnecessary.”).
5 U.S. CONST. art. VI.
6 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
7 See Chapter 3, supra, at 78-84.
8 Schlesinger, The Supreme Court: 1947, FORTUNE, vol. 35, Jan. 1947, at 73, 201-02.
9 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
10 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
11 Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 Yale L.J. 1063, 109192 (1981) (footnotes omitted).
12 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
13 See Chapter 3, supra, at 78-84.
14 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
15 Id. at 19.
16 Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L.J. 1 (1971).
17 Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
18 P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Meltzer & D. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 7 (3d ed. 1988) quoting 1 Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention 21 (May 29) (1911).
19 Ibid., quoting 1 Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention 9798, 109 (June 4) (1911).
20 Ibid.
21 The Federalist No. 78, at 465-66 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
22 Monaghan, supra note 1, at 727.
23 Id.; see also Bittker, The Bicentennial of the Jurisprudence of Original Intent: The Recent Past, 77 Calif. L. Rev. 235 (1989).
24 See Scalia, supra note 4, at 861-65.
25 Monaghan, supra note 1, at 741-43; Maltz, Some Thoughts on the Death of Stare Decisis in Constitutional Law, 1980 Wis. L. Rev. 467, 494-96 (“It seems fair to say that if a majority of the Warren or Burger Court has considered a case wrongly decided, no constitutional precedent—new or old—has been safe.”).
26 Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940).
27 Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 627-28 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
28 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870).
29 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871).
30 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
31 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
32 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
33 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
34 Compare Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
35 469 U.S. 528, 547 (1985).
36 Graves v. New York, 306 U.S. 466, 491-92 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
37 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
38 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
39 See R. Berger, Death Penalties 82-83 n. 29 (1982) (Berger makes this statement while referring to a Supreme Court decision that in my judgment is unquestionably correct. His misapplication of the biblical command in this context, however, does not detract from his general point about stare decisis—that past errors in particular cases should not be expanded and elaborated simply because they cannot be undone).
40 Scalia, supra note 4, at 861.
41 F. Frankfurter, The Commerce Clause 80-81 (1937).
8. OBJECTIONS TO ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING
1 J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust 12 (1980).
2 Speech by Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. to the Text and Teaching Symposium, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. (Oct. 12, 1985), reprinted in The Great Debate: Interpreting Our Written Constitution 11 (The Federalist Society 1986).
3 Id. at 14.
4 J. Ely, supra note 1, at 1-2 (footnote omitted).
5 Ted Koppel, Commencement Address at Duke University, Durham, North Carolina (May 10, 1987) (emphasis added).
6 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
7 IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975).
8 Hanoch Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (concurring ops. filed by Edwards, Bork, and Robb, JJ.).
> 9 726 F.2d at 775-98 (Edwards, J., concurring).
10 726 F.2d at 815 (Bork, J., concurring).
11 Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Bork, J., concurring).
12 Id. at 995-96 (with slight adaptations).
13 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
14 Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1162, 1183 (1977).
15 Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. Rev. 204, 234 (1980).
16 Id. at 225 (footnotes omitted).
17 Ibid, (footnotes omitted).
18 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
19 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
20 Speech at Elmira, New York (May 3, 1907).
21 Quoted in Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129, 152 (1893), and in L. Levy, Original Intent and the Framers’ Constitution 56 (1988).
22 Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 469, 470 (1981).
23 R. Bork, Tradition and Morality in Constitutional Law, The Francis Boyer Lectures on Public Policy 11 (American Enterprise Institute, Dec. 1984).
24 J. Ely, supra note 1, at 11.
25 Id. at 12.
26 Id. at 12-13.
27 Id. at 15 (emphasis in original; footnotes omitted).
28 Id. at 22.
29 Id. at 28.
30 4 Wash. CC. 371, 6 F.Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
31 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
32 J. Ely, supra note 1, at 32.
33 See, e.g., Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642-43 (1973) (alien-age); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365,376 (1971) (same); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 773 (1977) (illegitimacy); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (same); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 202 (1976) (gender); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (same).
34 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
35 U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
36 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
37 J. Ely, supra note 1, at 45.
38 Caplan, The History and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 69 Va. L. Rev. 223 (1983).
39 J. Ely, supra note 1, at 35-36 (emphasis added), quoting 1 Annals of Cong. 439 (1789).
9. THE THEORISTS OF LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONAL REVISIONISM
1 A. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (1962).
2 G. McDowell, Curbing the Courts: The Constitution and the Limits of Judicial Power 15 (1988).
3 A. Bickel, supra note 1, at 16.
4 Id. at 18.
5 Id. at 27.
6 Id. at 24.
7 Id. at 64.
8 Id. at 25-26.
9 Id. at 236.
10 Id. at 236-37.
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