The preliminary bombardment here as elsewhere broke out shortly after five in the morning, and contained a large proportion of gas-shells which searched the rear lines and battery positions as well as the front defences. So far as the 76th Brigade in the north was concerned no serious infantry attack followed, and save for some sporadic advances which were easily shot to pieces, there was no organised attempt upon their sector. The same applies, though in a less degree, to the central unit, the 8th Brigade. Here there were continual blasts of heavy fire during the day which decimated but were unable to shake the Royal Scots in the front trenches. Several times the enemy infantry made what was rather a menace than an attack, but on each occasion it dissolved into nothing. It is clear that nothing serious was intended and that these demonstrations were to hold the troops to their ground. On the right, however, in front of the 9th Brigade, the attempts were far more deadly and earnest. The first of these lasted from 7:30 till 10, and gained a footing in the front trenches, but failed before a determined attack by bombing parties of the Northumberland Fusiliers. In the afternoon the intermittent shelling became very severe, the trench mortar fire upon the front lines being so heavy as to knock them to pieces and stop all lateral communication. It was a nerve-shattering ordeal to the garrisons of these posts, crouching hour after hour in the midst of these terrible explosions. The bravest man on earth may find his spirit wilt under such conditions. Finally, about half-past three, there came a forward surge of grey infantry from Fontaine Wood which reached and occupied the front line, or the irregular hummocks where the front line had been. Every effort to extend this advantage was crushed almost before it could get started. There was complete stability here, but it was known that things were not altogether well with the Thirty-fourth Division upon the right, and masses of German infantry were seen moving down the Cherisy valley in that direction, a fair mark for the heavy guns. The 4th Royal Fusiliers were brought forward to reinforce their old comrades of Northumberland, and the line on the right was thrown back to get touch with the 11th Suffolks of the The 101st Brigade. In this support position they were solidly linked with the units to right and left, so that the close of the day found the whole of this portion of the front absolutely intact, save for the loss of the obliterated front line.
We shall now turn to the fortunes of the next unit upon the right, the Thirty-fourth Division, a composite hard fighting body composed of Northumbrians, Scots, and East Anglian troops. General Nicholson, commanding this division, had learned from a prisoner that the coming German attack would begin at Bullecourt and then turn to the north. Such incidents make one doubtful of the wisdom of that policy of “teaching men to take an intelligent interest in the operations” which is so often advocated. In this case flank defences were arranged and all due preparation was made.
The blow fell even as had been foretold, but the portion of the line which was crushed in was on the front of the Fifty-ninth Division, to the right of the Thirty-fourth. The result was, however, that after the capture of Bullecourt, which occurred about ten, the German stormers began to work round the right rear of the 102nd Brigade, the nearest unit of the Thirty-fourth Division. The flanking line of defence was manned by the 22nd Northumberland Fusiliers and strengthened by many Lewis guns, so that it took heavy toll from the masses of German infantry who were moving across. This flanking line was thickened by the 25th Northumberland Fusiliers and by the 1st East Lancashires. The heavy blow had forced back the Fifty-ninth Division, and by one o’clock Ecoust also was in the hands of the enemy, bringing them considerably to the rear of the fourth. Up to 4:30 in the afternoon the Germans were attacking the 102nd Brigade from the flank, but up to that hour they had not succeeded in shifting the solid Tynesiders who held the improvised line. Nevertheless the heavy and constant shelling reduced the strength of the defenders, who in many cases were quite cut off, and had to hold their positions with bombs and rifles as best they could. Farther south the Germans, passing Noreuil in their western advance, had turned in considerable numbers to the north, well to the rear of the flanking line, so that the British in reserve found themselves facing south-west, but fought on none the less, the 22nd, 23rd, and 25th Northumberland Fusiliers in a mixed line holding firmly to their ground at the imminent risk of being cut off, while the 160th Brigade R.F.A. were firing at ranges of 800 yards. As the German flood rolled on it engulfed these guns, but the gunners withdrew the blocks and retired slowly, fighting in line with the infantry. This movement in turn affected the British garrisons of the more forward trenches, who in any case were very severely pressed by the German bombers, so that there was a general retirement towards the north in the direction of Croisilles. Outside this village the remains of the 101st and 102nd Brigades formed a line, and with the aid of the 10th Lincolns and 9th Northumberland Fusiliers of the 103rd Brigade held the enemy off from occupying it. The Fortieth Division was, as will be shown, coming up to fill the gap, and thus, although the Thirty-fourth had been curled backwards as if a huge steel plough had driven a furrow to the south of them, there was still no absolute fracture of the Towards evening patrols of the enemy had succeeded in filtering through into the village of Croisilles, but General Haldane had already seen that his corps front needed reorganisation in view of what had occurred to the south. Orders were given, therefore, to the 15th Royal Scots, who were still holding on near Croisilles, to abandon the village and take up new positions to the west of it. With the help of the 119th Brigade of the Fortieth Division these changes were made, and a line built up in front of Henin Hill for the next day’s battle. The general result, therefore, of the day’s fighting was, so far as the Thirty-fourth Division was concerned, that the left flank was still in touch with the Third Division in the northern support line, but that the right and centre had to hinge back upon it on account of the break through to the south of them, and had been compelled to uncover Croisilles and abandon it to the enemy. The casualties had been high, especially in the 102nd Brigade upon the defensive flank. Of these, about 1200 out of a total trench strength of 1800 were lost, some being cut off but the greater number injured by the bombardment. Three companies of the 25th Northumberland Fusiliers were engulfed in the German tide and submerged, as were the field-guns already mentioned, which were fought by their crews until the very last instant. The 11th Suffolks upon the left flank of the 101st Brigade held absolutely fast all day, and by their fire gave great help to the Third Division to their north.
The next unit upon the line was the Fifty-ninth North Midland Division (Romer) which had a front of over 5000 yards. They covered the important Chapter villages of Bullecourt, Ecoust, and Noreuil, the former being in the very front line. The 178th Brigade of Sherwood Foresters were upon the right and the 176th of Staffords upon the left, with the 177th of Lincolns and Leicesters in reserve. In the southern section of this position was the long shallow slope of the Noreuil valley, the nearer half of which came within the Fifty-ninth area, while the farther was held by the Sixth Division. It was speedily apparent by the intensity of the bombardment and by the rumoured concentration of the infantry that this was the centre of danger. About ten o’clock a demonstration was made against the 2/6 Sherwood Foresters upon the left, but the real attack came later when on the right centre a heavy mass of the enemy surged through the outpost line and established itself within the support line. At about the same hour the German infantry struck in great force up the channel of the Noreuil valley, and having pushed their way as far as the western edge of Noreuil turned to the north-west, working along a hollow road between Noreuil and Longatte. Two companies of the 2/5 Sherwoods, together with the 470th Field Company R.E., were caught between the pincers of this double German attack, and were entirely destroyed on the Noreuil-Ecoust road, only one officer and six sappers making their way safe to Vraucourt. The 2/5 Lincolns of the supporting brigade, moving up to the support of their comrades, were themselves involved in the tragedy and three companies were practically annihilated. This rapid German advance
, with the heavy British losses, had all taken place by 11 A.M., and created the situation which reacted so unfavourably upon the Thirty-fourth in the north. The Germans having got so far forward in the south were able to assail the flank of the 176th Brigade in the north, which threw out a defensive line as far as Ecoust and defended itself strongly. Their position, however, was an almost impossible one, and when later in the day the enemy took Ecoust and swung round to their rear these battalions, already much reduced, were overwhelmed by the attack, the survivors joining up with the Thirty-fourth Division in their retreat. The machine-guns, so long as they were in action, caused heavy casualties to the enemy, but the latter were swarming on all sides, and eventually the guns had either to withdraw or were captured.
With the two front brigades destroyed and the whole position occupied, the Germans may well have thought that a long advance was within their power, but in this they were soon undeceived. The support brigade, the 177th, still barred their way, and it had been strengthened by Headquarters staffs, bands, transport men and others, and very especially by the pioneer battalion, the 6/7 Scots Fusiliers. These men occupied the third defence line, and from the Hog’s Back on which it was sited, they defied every effort of the Germans to get forward from Ecoust. This position was well covered by artillery and supported by machine-guns. So strong was the defence that the enemy were beaten back three times, and on the last occasion, late in the afternoon, fairly took to their heels. Shortly afterwards the 120th Brigade from the Fortieth Division came into support, and the situation was saved for the day. How terrific had been the strain upon the Fifty-ninth Division may be reckoned from the fact that their losses were close upon 5000 out of a ten-battalion unit. It is true that they had been driven by vastly superior numbers out of their two front lines with the attendant villages, but evening found them still defiant, and, for the time, victorious, with their right still linked up with the Sixth Division and their left with the Thirty-fourth. There could not have been a finer recovery under more arduous circumstances. It was the last of the Fifty-ninth Division, however, for many a day to come, for the Fortieth (Ponsonby) taking charge in this sector, gathered to itself the fifteen field-guns still left of the artillery and the only remaining brigade. It was as well, for they would need every gun and every rifle in the dark days to come. Four German divisions, the 111th, 221st, 6th Bavarian, and 2nd Guards Reserve, had been engaged in the attack. Even admitting that some of these divisions were concerned also with the attack upon the Thirty-fourth Division, the latter had the 234th and some smaller units in front of it, so that it is within the mark to say that five German had attacked two British divisions, and by the aid of a vastly superior light and heavy artillery equipment had pushed them back to their reserve line, but had failed to break them. It was not a fight of which either nation need be ashamed.
This completes a superficial view of the experiences of the Sixth Corps upon March 21. In order to get the full picture one should understand that the Sixth Division upon the right had also been driven from their sector, including several important villages. For the sake of continuity of narrative it will be best to merely indicate this fact for the moment, and to continue to follow the fortunes of Haldane’s Corps during the fateful days which followed, casting a glance also to the north where the Seventeenth Corps was gradually involved in the fight. We shall bear in mind, then, the long slanting front from the old positions on the left to Henin Hill and the Hog’s Back upon the right, and we shall return to the Third Division at the northern end of the line.
The night had been quiet along the whole corps front, which seemed to imply some exhaustion of the attack. In the morning this lull still continued in the region of the Third Division, which had up to now been just outside the track of the storm. During the morning and afternoon of March 22 no serious attack was made upon this point, but in the evening the enemy, having made a lodgment upon Henin Hill in the south-west, was able to make a powerful onslaught from the flank which met with very little success. Its first onrush pushed back the 20th K.R.R., pioneer battalion of the division, in the trench called Hind Avenue, but the ground was regained by the 13th King’s Liverpool, while the 4th Royal Fusiliers loosened the German grip of another small corner of trench. Up to nightfall the attempts continued, alternating with bombardments, but no progress was made, the 9th Brigade beating down every new advance.
About ten o’clock at night orders reached the division that as the Seventeenth Corps were falling back for strategic reasons to the west of Monchy on the north, while the Thirty-fourth were also retreating upon the south, the Third Division must retire in conformity with them. It was no easy task under a heavy shell-fall and with an elated enemy in close contact. It was of importance that the telephoned orders should not be tapped, and it is suggestive of the world-wide services of the British soldier that they were sent over the wires in Arabic and Hindustani. Before morning the weary troops had been quickly withdrawn without confusion or mishap, and all were safely aligned in their new positions. Their defence of their battleground had been a splendid one, and though they had no huge mass attack to contend with, such as had dashed the line of the Fifty-ninth to pieces, still they had constant severe pressure and had withstood it completely.
We left the Thirty-fourth Division upon the evening of March 21 still holding its reserve lines, with its three brigades in line, the 103rd on the right in touch with the Fortieth Division, and the 101st on the left where the Third Division joined it. A spirited little body, the J Special Company R.E., had joined the fighting line of the Thirty-fourth, and did good work with it. About 8 A.M. upon March 22nd the enemy attacked the 102nd Brigade in the Croisilles sector, but two attempts had no result, though the general British line was now 500 yards west of the village. About ten o’clock a misfortune occurred, for a heavy column of the enemy, moving up through a dense mist, broke through the 101st Brigade and carried the greater part of Henin Hill, a most important strategic point. The possession of the hill was, however, contested most strongly by the Fortieth Division machine-gun company and by the 11th Suffolks, who by their valiant resistance prevented the enemy from gaining the whole crest, though they could not stop them from extending north and south, which turned the line of the troops at the flanks and caused them to fall back. The troops to the south, the 15th and 16th Royal Scots, withdrew slowly to a new position west of Boyelles; the remains of the 102nd Brigade (it was but 500 strong at the beginning of the action) fell back upon the supports; while the valiant men of Suffolk, aided by Colonel Roberts’ machine-guns, still fought stoutly upon the top of the incline, though entirely isolated upon the right flank. Finally the shattered remains of this staunch battalion withdrew towards the north-west, their slow retreat being covered by Lieutenant Woods, who met his death in the venture, and by a handful of machine-gunners.
The chief evil result from the capture of Henin Hill was in the south, where it enabled the enemy by a joint frontal and flank attack at the junction of the Thirty-fourth and Fortieth Divisions, to push back the 9th Northumberland Fusiliers and 13th Yorkshire, and to get possession of the village of St. Leger. The 103rd Brigade moved back to Judas’ Farm to the west of St. Leger, while the 119th Brigade prolonged the line to the south. A few machine-guns, with their feed blocks removed, were lost on Henin Hill, but otherwise no booty was obtained by the enemy. On the evening of the 22nd the infantry of the Thirty-first Division was rushed to the front, and the Thirty-fourth Division after their two days of desperate and honourable battle, were drawn back for a rest. During March 22 the 103rd Brigade held on to St. Leger and St. Leger Wood, and so blocked the valley of the Sensée.
To the south of the Thirty-fourth Division the Fifty-ninth Division had now been entirely replaced by the Fortieth, save for the 177th Brigade, the artillery, and machine-guns, some of which rendered splendid service during the day. There was little fighting in the morning of March 22, but about mid-day it was found that some hundreds of Germans s with a profusion of machi
ne-guns (“many bullets but few men” was the key-note of the new advanced tactics) were close to the divisional front in the region of St. Leger Wood. These were driven back, and fourteen of their guns taken, after some confused but vigorous fighting, in which Lieutenant Beal captured four guns himself before meeting a glorious death. Several times the enemy pushed strong patrols between the Sixth and Fortieth Divisions in the Vaux-Vraumont sector, but these were always expelled or digested. Shortly after mid-day, however, a very strong attack broke upon this line, pushing back the left of the Sixth Division and causing heavy losses to the Highlanders of the 120th Brigade upon the right of the Fortieth Division. The 14th Argyll and Sutherlands, with the 10/11 Highland Light Infantry, were the units concerned, and they restored their line, which had been bent backwards. Finding, however, that they had lost touch with the Sixth Division to the south, they fell back until communication was restored. All day groups of German machine-gunners could be seen rushing forward, their crouching figures darting from cover to cover, while all day also the guns of the division observed and shattered the various nests which were constructed. Major Nesham distinguished himself in this work. Towards evening of the 22nd it was known that Vraumont to the south was in German possession, and orders were given to withdraw to the new general line which this change and the Capture of Henin Hill must entail. In the new position the Fortieth was still in close touch with the Sixth in the neighbourhood of Beugnatre, the general line of the withdrawal being in a south-westerly direction. The losses had been heavy during Sixth the day, and included Colonel Eardley-Wilmot of the 12th Suffolks.
Delphi Complete Works of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle (Illustrated) Page 1207