Terror in Britain

by Martha Twine

  After that, I got used to seeing experienced ex-policemen in all kinds of situations. It was clear that they were able to listen in to Syntel. On one occasion in 2013, the IRA seemed intent on getting rid of me, directing a light beam at me, possibly a carbon-dioxide laser, which delivered trapped droplets of a chemical into my nose, making me fall asleep. I was in the house when it started, and realised that I had to get into the fresh air immediately. I got as far as the garden, before I ‘went out’.

  I was not in a normal sleep state, and part of me was awake, but another part of me was going into hibernation, cuddling up cozily for a long winter.

  ‘Get up,’ ordered my wakeful self.

  ‘Not yet,’ said my sleeping self. ‘I’m comfy now.’

  It was lucky I was outside. It was half an hour before my mind cleared sufficiently to make the effort to get up. I went upstairs to the kitchen, to get a drink of water, and, as I looked out of the window, I saw a couple of ex-policemen hurriedly placing red traffic cones around the entrance to our house. There was a lorry in the background.

  ‘They’re coming in to get me out,’ I thought.

  ‘It’s OK now, thank you,’ I thought-spoke on Syntel. ‘I’m all right again.’

  The message must have been transmitted to the men with the truck. They put the traffic cones back in the truck, smiling, and drove off. The IRA were watching from across the road. They did not repeat that type of attack again.

  At that time, we had a dedicated section of the Counter Terrorism Unit in the town centre. You could tell where they were, because they had technical communications equipment on their roof, including a type of bird-scarer. The terrorists’ ultrasound Syntel equipment also scared birds out of the area, whenever they were broadcasting. When the Counterterrorist Unit switched their bird-scarer device on, all the birds went to perch on roofs out of range. When that happened, the IRA would warn their staff to keep their voices down, as they had a healthy respect for the Counterterrorist Unit, and guessed that they were listening in, using an ultrasound device.

  Every Monday I went to have music lessons in the next village, and afterwards I would get the bus to a local café, and have hot soup and warm crusty bread. The terrorists would wait for me at the café, and would try to direct their electromagnetic weapons at me from close range.

  One day, I was in the café, when the IRA turned up with twelve male trainees in vehicles parked in the public carpark nearby, so that each of them could have the opportunity to target me in turn. Suddenly I caught sight of one of those experienced law enforcement men waving a large tanker into a parking space directly outside the café. It completely blocked the electromagnetic attacks. I could hear the terrorist tutors swearing and muttering on Syntel.

  After that, on Mondays, whenever I went to the café, there was a weary looking law enforcement man sitting there, just drinking coffee, and talking on his mobile. The terrorists gave up their Monday stalking courses. I really appreciated the care taken to protect us British citizens, by these hard-working heroes.

  On Remembrance Sunday 2016, our town held its usual Memorial Service, with the laying of poppy wreaths in memory of those who died serving their country. I was watching from the pavement, accompanied by a friend who was also a targeted victim of the IRA. We turned to follow the procession of Air Force cadets. Suddenly I caught sight of those brave men from the counter-terrorist unit. They had commandeered a municipal recycling bin lorry, and parked it across the high street. They stood guard on either side, wearing orange flak jackets, alert to the risk of terrorist attacks, to make sure that no vehicles were driven into the crowds of pedestrians.

  TERRORISM AND DRUG TRAFFICKING

  IRA units had to be self-financing, except where funds were provided by Al-Qaida for fulfilment of their objectives. Drug trafficking was one of the IRA’s main sources of ‘earned’ income, as opposed to donations from Al-Qaida and US Republican sympathisers. The drug traffickers that I knew to be working with the IRA were Pakistanis. They had a base in Covent Garden, and their Godfather lived in Eastbourne. Drugs entered the country by different routes, Turkey being the main one. They trafficked crack cocaine from Kabul in Afghanistan. It was ready for distribution on arrival in the UK. The drugs arrived by boat at minor sea ports, and were offloaded in black bags and into unmarked vans. Our local drug traffickers had a large warehouse where drugs were stored underground, prior to distribution. On the floor of the warehouse there were two large metal sheets, which folded back to reveal the underground store.

  The IRA combined drug distribution with attendance at terrorist training courses. The distributors did not pay cash for drugs, instead they brought young people to spend a day on the training course before collecting drug consignments. The drug distributors paid the training fees for their youngsters. This bolstered attendance on courses, making it appear that the courses were well attended and self-financing. That meant the IRA could claim that they had complied with Al-Qaida contract objectives for training courses. They settled up any outstanding balances privately with the drug traffickers.

  IRA training courses were generally run for students belonging to one unit at a time. They came from all over the South of England, the Midlands and Sunderland, camping in tents in gardens owned by the terrorists. At the end of each training course, the visitors’ group leader was given a black bag of crack cocaine to distribute to his own area.

  The Organised Crime Squad arrested quite a number of key people involved in drug distribution locally. According to the press releases, it took a year for the police to prepare their case, but they did their job well, as two weeks after the arrests, most of the perpetrators were charged, and given long prison sentences.

  One of the oldest Pakistani traffickers used to live next door. He was a pusher, and offered free drugs to lower level IRA operatives. They were soon hooked. They could see what he was doing, but feared to refuse the drugs, in case they were victimised. Having drug addicts as employees undermined the effectiveness of the IRA, but their senior managers did nothing about it. They did not appear concerned about efficiency or effectiveness.

  An ambitious Eastern European prostitute, originally from Moldova, known to associates as Danuza, sought to rise through the terrorist ranks by cultivating the company of senior IRA men. The group she wanted to get in with had their own special club. Entry was by initiation. Danuza was asked to kill a baby with her bare hands. She was unable to do it. After that, she quickly fell from grace, and was assigned to work with the Pakistani pusher. He was seen offering her free drugs on several occasions. We heard that she was going to move into his building. Then, one day, she ran away, back home to her own criminal family, who now lived in the Czech Republic.

  She had more sense than most of her peers. She planned her escape around a visit I made to the Botanical Gardens at Kew, which is near Heathrow Airport. She was with a group of terrorists who tailed our gardening club’s coach all the way to London. She was due to join the IRA’s Metropolitan Group to target me with oscillators and other electromagnetic weapons when I was in Kew Gardens. Instead, she slipped away to Heathrow.

  Two months later, she returned to the UK, and dropped in on our local unit to say ‘Hi’. But she did not work there again. A consignment of crack cocaine for her personal consumption had been left outside her door for two months. Nobody touched it till her return. Eventually she collected the crack, but I heard that, unlike many other young terrorists, she did not become a regular drug user.

  The IRA avoided direct involvement in high-risk terrorist activities on the British mainland. Instead, they commissioned subcontractors to organise attacks on British citizens, in order to comply with the Al-Qaida objective of hounding and killing the white population covertly. In our area, the subcontractors referred to themselves as ‘Our Group’, but they did not belong to any unit or group. They were a mixture of Faeces Group operatives, prostitutes, child traffickers, paedophiles, former convicts, people with criminally insane tende
ncies, people in debt, and drug addicts. A lot of the staff used drugs, and some of the females worked for a drugs distribution network, run by Asians in London, but organised by Al-Qaida from Kabul in Afghanistan.

  ‘Our Group’ was managed secretly by middle management IRA women. They received a fixed salary from Al-Qaida to organise the receipt, distribution and cash management of drug trafficking. The women were control freaks when it came to the drugs business, so terrified were they of what might happen to them if they did not deliver expected results. The cash from drug trafficking went to fund the IRA.

  ‘Our Group’ organised bizarre job creation schemes for unemployed terrorists. The women held the Al-Qaida cash, and commissioned the services of male terrorists on piecework. The work the men had to do - targeting local people, nursing homes and the elderly with electronic weapons - was in line with Al-Qaida objectives. Work schedules were drawn up by the IRA in administrative offices referred to as ‘police stations’.

  Staff in the so-called ‘police stations’ had a menu of terrorist activities that the male operatives could buy tickets to complete. The tickets were paid for in advance by the women. If the work was carried out successfully, the men received further cash from the police stations. If they failed to do so, they were not paid, and lost the money that the women had given them to buy a ticket. The genetically-modified robotic humanoids were made available to assist the operatives. Electronic attacks had to be launched from locations above the target. The humanoids positioned electronic pointers in trees and high buildings, to facilitate targeting of victims in their homes.

  The police stations monitored the performance of operatives through a complex arrangement of microdot cameras, located on interior and exterior walls of buildings occupied by employees and targeted individuals. Plasma screens lined the walls of the police stations, and staff spent their time scrutinising them, checking what operatives were doing. There were print-outs of activities for each registered electronic weapon, which were reconciled to the schedule of assignments by supervisors.

  There were weaknesses in this system, mainly due to poor independent review. Corrupt practices were widespread and went undetected. But management was never the strong point of the local IRA, who had a tendency to shoot the messenger, so problems were not reported up the line.

  The exception to this was a breakaway group of activists who once had connections with an American cult. They appeared to be on good terms with Al-Qaida, particularly in North America, and when they spotted misuse or misappropriation of Al-Qaida’s money they reported it. These activists were specialists in psychological warfare, which included using synthetic telepathy to harass targeted individuals and application of psychotic drugs. Both methods were intended to damage the perceived mental health of their victims. These specialists acted as advisors to the IRA in the covert disposal of ‘enemies’, but kept themselves at a distance in other respects.

  The activists were supposed to collaborate with ‘Our Group’. Initially, they provided instruction on how sick and elderly people could be ‘helped on their way’. But they withdrew cooperation after a short time. In their view, ‘Our Group’ were an illiterate disorganised rabble, wholly lacking in principles or ethics of any kind – which was fair comment.

  Non-IRA members of ‘Our Group’ did not receive a salary from Al-Qaida. They relied on income from drug trafficking, but entitlement to that income was tied to arranging attacks on me. I decided to sever the connection between drugs and terrorism.

  A female drugs baroness from London came to mind. I had met her once, locally. She was a nasty piece of work; focused solely on the accumulation of money. I tuned into her frequency, and aligned my electromagnetic ‘Global Positioning Satellite’ coordinates towards her. She was in her Covent Garden pad with her husband. They were in their kitchen, racing through their financial records, as they had a busy schedule of management meetings to attend, where reporting of profits would be important.

  I prompted a thought in her husband’s mind to visualize the location of these meetings, and saw a large brass-coloured ornate Victorian building, with steps leading up to a pillared entrance, which looked as if it might be in a street off the Strand.

  I entered the building and was struck by the impressive foyer. There was a grand double staircase with a red carpet. The large vestibule led to two heavy dark wooden doors. Inside was a spacious meeting room with an enormous oval table. About twenty Asian men were sitting round it, all carrying bulky black dustbin bags, which I took to be full of drugs for distribution.

  I briefly introduced myself to the chairman of the meeting, explaining that the people they were funding on Al-Qaida’s behalf were attacking me, and that I should be grateful if they would order them to stop doing so, since this activity was in no way relevant to their mainstream business.

  They looked like frightened rabbits in a car’s headlights.

  ‘Who are these people?’ asked the chairman.

  ‘Oh, I know them,’ said one of the dealers, ‘They live down South,’ and he named a couple of those involved.

  ‘Can you see to it that they stop attacking her?’ asked the chairman.

  ‘Uh, OK,’ said the other man, looking a little uncertain as to how he would do it.

  ‘I’ll believe that when I see it,’ I thought, but I thanked the chairman and left.

  The attacks continued, so, in the days that followed, I began to remove groups of drug traffickers, room by room, throughout their London building, depositing them dead in the back garden of Al-Qaida’s French safe house from a height of four hundred feet. Al-Qaida had to lay groundsheets over the bodies, and arrange for their collection by night in lorries.

  The attacks on me continued, and no matter how many men I removed, the troops were replaced by others. It took a long time to achieve an impact, but, eventually, a decision was taken not to supply Our Group with drugs or use them as a distribution point anymore. At last, I was getting somewhere. (See Chapter Twenty-One on The Death Camp for details on this.)

  I noticed that wherever IRA, US mafia and Islamic State soldiers were operating, there was always drug trafficking operating in parallel, supported by Al-Qaida. For a long time, I did not fully understand the significance of the connection. I knew a house in our area, operated by Asians, where the head man visited Kabul every month to arrange delivery of crack cocaine. He allowed Daesh people to stay in his house and to use it as a base from which to target British citizens with electronic, chemical and biological weapons, obtained from the nearby North American mafia underground research base. He also allowed terrorist training courses to use his facilities.

  North American mafia operatives frequently visited the site, and they invariably turned out to be crack addicts, with poor work records, who were seeking a safe place to escape to from the hectic pace of North American gangland, particularly now that, as they reported, the American Military were going after them in a systematic way.

  One day the IRA were facilitating a training course in electronic weapons for Islamic State Sergeant ranks. I noticed that the ISIS troops were all doing cocaine.

  ‘I’m sure that the Islamic State officers’ cadre would disapprove of that,’ I thought.

  I went to the safe house where the Islamic State officers lived inside the perimeter of the North American underground research base. They recognized me, and knew that I would defend myself if attacked, but they were careful not to attack me, so a neutral dialogue was possible.

  I knocked on the front door, and an Islamic State officer opened it. He looked at me in an enquiring way.

  ‘Hi,’ I said. ‘I just called to let you know that some of your Sergeants group are doing drugs, cocaine, in fact.’

  ‘Oh,’ he said, smiling, ‘You mean this stuff?’

  Reaching behind him he took out a rucksack filled to the brim with white powder. Then he shook some of the powder out of the rucksack and made a line with it.

  ‘You see, we use the powder like this,�
�� he said, demonstrating.

  I was rather shocked by that, and my expression must have showed it, as he smiled at my discomfort.

  ‘We need it to help with our everyday work,’ he explained.

  ‘Thanks,’ I said. ‘I will not take up any more of your time,’ I said, and left.

  I wondered how typical these guys were of Islamic State in general. Were they all cocaine users, and was access to drugs a significant factor in their military campaigns in Syria and Iraq? It was now apparent why the Afghan drug traffickers had a pre-eminent place in Al-Qaida’s arrangements. They were supplying basic provisions to the troops. *

  *For a full analysis of the relationship between drugs and terrorism see Shooting Up: A History of Drugs in Warfare, by Lukasz Kamienski, published in 2016 by C Hurst and Co (Publishers) Ltd.

  THE TIDE TURNS

  Several times in this book, I report how I killed terrorists when they attacked me or other innocent people. In fact, it took several years for me to learn that I was technically capable of doing it via the electromagnetic computer system. This is how I first found out.

  One sunny day I was preparing a liquid feed for my plants, when I heard a lot of noise, talking, and festivities in a nearby garden belonging to the terrorists. A tent had been erected, and a garden party was in full swing. It was a terrorist ‘Funders Day’. Terrorist funders and their representatives had assembled at the IRA’s grand house, for food and drinks, and discussions on how things were going. The following day they would proceed to the secret research centre for reports on return on investment, trends, and future expectations. The garden party nearby was a modest event for lower and middle level terrorists. Despite the festivities, work must go on, while there were hostages and victims to be attacked, and IRA operatives still had to be put through their paces.