War as I Knew It

by George S. Patton

  I then visited the 90th Division and the Command Post of the 359th Infantry under Colonel Raymond E. Bell. I asked him to take me to an Observation Post north of Saarlautem. We drove part way and, descending from the cars in a wood, started down a long road. Across the river, enfilading the road, I saw a German pillbox with a gun of some description sticking out of it. I asked Bell if the pillbox was manned, and he said he thought it was. The range was less than two hundred yards. Fortunately, they did not shoot, but when we got to the Observation Post, which was in a house, they dropped quite a heavy concentration around us without getting a hit. I have always hated OP’s in houses because I feel so conspicuous in the upper floors—especially when being shelled.

  On the second, it became evident that General Wood had to be sent home for a rest. This was arranged through General Eisenhower, and I sent General Gaffey, then Army Chief of Staff, to take over the division. It was quite a favor to ask of a man, but there was no one else available, and the necessities of war demanded that the 4th Armored have a good commander. The subsequent exploits of this division showed that my choice was correct.

  The situation as to replacements was now extremely bad. In an army of six infantry and three armored divisions we were eleven thousand men short, which, being translated into terms of riflemen—and they are the people who get hurt—meant that the rifle companies were at only fifty-five per cent of their strength. We issued orders to take a second five per cent of corps and army troops and also for the divisions to cannibalize1 their nonessential units, such as anti-tank companies, to provide riflemen.

  On the fifth of December, the day after Gaffey assumed command, the 4th Armored Division advanced seven miles, with General Earnest leading the attack. The 90th Division crossed the Saar above Saarlautem and the 95th Division succeeded in getting a second regiment across south of the town. While enemy artillery fire was heavy, our losses were not excessive.

  On the sixth, Members of Congress Luce and Merrick, while being conducted around the front of the Third Army, pulled the lanyards on two guns firing at Fort Driant. I was very much put out over this, because, in World War I, one of our Congressmen did a similar thing and aroused great public indignation.

  That night Generals Spaatz, Doolittle, and Vandenberg2 came, and we arranged for a heavy bombing attack on the Siegfried Line in the vicinity of Kaiserslautern. This was probably the most ambitious air blitz ever conceived. It was to consist of three successive days of attack, each one in considerable depth, and each day to consist of one thousand heavy bombers. In order to reduce the possibility of our men being hit, we planned to pull the infantry back four thousand yards from their most forward position, so that the bomb line could be put on our former front line. In order to prevent the enemy reoccupying the four-thousand-yard strip thus evacuated, we planned to scatter tanks through the area immediately behind the bomb line. The chance of a direct hit on tanks was small and fragmentation has practically no effect against them.

  In the Saarlautem fight, the 90th Division was unable to maintain its bridge, owing to direct enemy fire, but maintained its position with great gallantry through the use of ferries at night.

  The capture of Metz and the Saar campaign of the Third Army began on November 8, 1944. On December 8—that is, after one month’s fighting—we had liberated 873 towns and 1600 square miles of ground.

  1Cannibalize: to reduce the number of men in the gun crews to provide needed riflemen.

  2Major General H. S. Vandenberg, Commander of 9th United States Air Force.

  We had taken 30,000 prisoners and had killed or wounded about 88,000. We had also accounted for 137 tanks and 400 guns. Our battle losses during the same month aggregated 23,000 killed, wounded, and missing, our non-battle 18.000, for a total of something over 41,000. Our replacements were only 30,000 making us 11,000 short. To delve further into figures, during the 130 days of fighting from August 1 to date, the average losses of the Third Army from all causes had been 812 a day; the average daily losses of the Germans in front of us had been 2,700.

  In order to make our date with the Air Force for the Third Army break-through to the Rhine, which was initially set at December 19, we had to get to the Siegfried Line prior to that date, so from then on the operations on the front of the XII Corps became a horse-race against time. To win this race, it was necessary to bring in the leading combat team (346th Infantry, commanded by Colonel N. A. Costello) of the 87th Division (Brigadier General Frank L. Culin, Jr.) as soon as the combat team arrived, and also to be prepared to re-employ the 4th Armored and the 80th Divisions which had been resting for a few days.

  The weather was so bad that I directed all Army chaplains to pray for dry weather. I also published a prayer with a Christmas greeting on the back and sent it to all members of the Command. The prayer was for dry weather for battle.6

  1On or about the fourteenth of December, 1944, General Patton called Chaplain O’Neill, Third Army Chaplain, and myself into his office in Third Headquarters at Nancy. The conversation went something like this:

  General Patton: “Chaplain, I want you to publish a prayer for good weather. I’m tired of these soldiers having to fight mud and floods as well as Germans. See if we can’t get God to work on our side.”

  Chaplain O'Neill: “Sir, it’s going to take a pretty thick rug for that kind of praying.”

  General Patton: “I don’t care if it takes the flying carpet. I want the praying done.”

  Chaplain O'Neil: “Yes, sir. May I say, General, that it usually isn’t a customary thing among men of my profession to pray for clear weather to kill fellow men.”

  General Patton: “Chaplain, are you teaching me theology or are you the Chaplain of the Third Army? I want a prayer.”

  Chaplain O'Neill: “Yes, sir.”

  Outside, the chaplain said, “Whew, that’s a tough one! What do you think he wants?”

  It was perfectly clear to me. The General wanted a prayer— he wanted one right now—and he wanted it published to the Command.

  The Army Engineer was called in, and we finally decided that our field topographical company could print the prayer on a smallsized card, making enough copies for distribution to the army.

  It being near Christmas, we also decided to ask General Patton to include a Christmas greeting to the troops on the same card with the prayer. The General agreed, wrote a short greeting, and the card was made up, published, and distributed to the troops on the twenty-second of December.

  Actually, the prayer was offered in order to bring clear weather for the planned Third Army break-through to the Rhine in the Saarguemines area, then scheduled for December 21.

  The Bulge put a crimp in these plans. As it happened, the Third Army had moved north to attack the south flank of the Bulge when the prayer was actually issued.

  PRAYER

  Almighty and most merciful Father, we humbly beseech Thee, of Thy great goodness, to restrain these immoderate rains with which we have had to contend. Grant us fair weather for Battle. Graciously hearken to us as soldiers who call upon Thee that, armed with Thy power, we may advance from victory to victory, and crush the oppression and wickedness of our enemies, and establish Thy justice among men and nations. Amen.

  REVERSE SIDE

  To each officer and soldier in the Third United States Army, I wish a Merry Christmas. I have full confidence in your courage, devotion to duty, and skill in battle. We march in our might to complete victory. May God’s blessing rest upon each of you on this Christmas Day.

  G. S. Patton, Jr.

  Lieutenant General

  Commanding, Third United States Army

  Whether it was the help of the Divine guidance asked for in the prayer or just the normal course of human events, we never knew; at any rate, on the twenty-third, the day after the prayer was issued, the weather cleared and remained perfect for about six days. Enough to allow the Allies to break the backbone of the Von Rundstedt offensive and turn a temporary setback into a crushing defeat
for the enemy.

  We had moved our advanced Headquarters to Luxembourg at this time to be closer to the battle area. The bulk of the Army Staff, including the Chaplain, was still in Nancy. General Patton again called me to his office. He wore a smile from ear to ear. He said, “God damn! look at the weather. That O’Neill sure did some potent praying. Get him up here. I want to pin a medal on him.”

  The Chaplain came up next day. The weather was still clear when we walked into General Patton’s office. The General rose, came from behind his desk with hand outstretched and said, “Chaplain, you’re the most popular man in this Headquarters. You sure stand in good with the Lord and soldiers.” The General then pinned a Bronze Star Medal on Chaplain O’Neill.

  Everyone offered congratulations and thanks and we got back to the business of killing Germans—with clear weather for battle.

  P. D. H.

  On the twelfth, Stiller and I visited the Command Posts of the 4th Armored, the 26th and the 87th. The 87th was taking over from the 26th and one combat command was in fighting, and apparently doing well. Later it turned out that it had not, in fact, done as well as was first thought; however, it was a good division.

  We next visited the 35th Division, which was fighting along stubbornly, although very tired and very short of men. Its mission was to secure the high ground on the left of the XII Corps at Saarguemines. I decided definitely to place the 6th Armored and the 26th Division in the III Corps near Saarbriicken, because, if the enemy attacked the VIII Corps of the First Army, as was probable,1 I could use the III Corps to help by attacking straight north, west of the Moselle River. If, on the other hand, the XX Corps got jumped from the north, where the enemy was certainly concentrating in the vicinity of Trier, it could face to the left and hold off the attacks, while the III Corps could advance to the east at Saarbriicken, in conformity with the advance of the XU Corps. I talked this thing over with General Eddy and he agreed that the solution was correct.

  On December 13, we definitely set the nineteenth as the date for the air blitz. It was planned to get the XII Corps through the enemy positions by the night of the twenty-second. If, at that time, the VI Corps (commanded by Major General E. H. Brooks) of the Seventh Army on our right had not broken through, we would still have time to move the air blitz down for a second operation in front of this corps.

  1It should be noted that General Patton saw possibilities of an enemy break-through in the First Army zone on this date, December 12. He had his Staff make a study of what the Third Army would do if called upon to counter-attack such a break-through.

  The fighting at Saarlautem was very tedious, as we were fighting from one house to the next, but, on the other hand, the casualties had been remarkably low.

  The 80th and 5th Divisions were now at full strength, owing to the first five per cent cut in the overhead of the army and corps, and we had four thousand additional men gleaned from corps and army troops training at Metz. This would fill the 26th Division and leave some over for the 90th and 95th. If the Communications Zone had done the same thing, we would have had enough soldiers to end the war. All that would have been necessary to attain this result was for General Eisenhower to issue an order that the troops of Com Z be cut ten per cent for the production of riflemen.

  On the fourteenth, at Saarlautem, Codman and I crossed the bridge over the river under alleged fire. It was purely a motion on my part to show the soldiers that generals could get shot at. I was not shot at very much. Nearly all the houses I inspected in Saarlautem on either side of the river were actually forts. The ground floor of each house was made of reinforced concrete about twelve inches thick, and there were machine-gun openings fitted just above sidewalk level in practically every cellar. The Germans are certainly a thoroughgoing race.

  The 90th Division had been doing a magnificent job moving on east of the river, in spite of the lack of a bridge. Also their rifle strength was extremely low, but they were cheerful and were killing an enormous number of Germans.

  We then drove through Thionville to Luxembourg to see Bradley. Apparently Montgomery, with the assistance of the Prime Minister, had secured the services of the Ninth Army. Montgomery was bitterly opposed to the operations of both Patch and myself. He still wanted all available forces massed on the north and wanted to command them himself, maintaining that the Rhine could be crossed only in the vicinity of Cologne and that it must be done under him. All this was very distressing to me, because, while my attack was going forward by short leaps, it was not very brilliant, and I felt that, if I failed to break through after the air blitz, I would have to go on the defensive and lose several divisions.

  On the sixteenth, Eddy was very depressed and nervous, particularly because the 87th Division had not done well and one colonel had been replaced for failure to prevent trenchfoot. This colonel afterward proved to be a splendid fighter.

  At that time I believed the situation was much more favorable than it had been, and contemplated placing the III Corps behind the 35th Division to exploit any success we might get during the break-through, because, while Millikin was untried in battle, he was at least not fatigued.

  I seriously contemplated making Eddy take a short rest, and would have done so had I not feared that the effect of a leave on him might be worse than that of staying at the front.

  General Allen, Chief of Staff of the Twelfth Army Group, called on the night of December 16 to have the 10th Armored Division attached to the VIII Corps of the First Army in order to repulse a rather strong German attack. This was the first official notice we had of the, to us, anticipated German assault, later called the Bulge. As the loss of this division would seriously affect the chances of my breaking through at Saarlautem, I protested very strongly, saying that we had paid a high price for that sector so far, and that to move the 10th Armored to the north would be playing into the hands of the Germans. General Bradley admitted my logic, but said that the situation was such that it could not be discussed over the telephone.

  On the seventeenth, information about the German attack became more definite. Quite a number of single enemy units were located on a wide front, but no large body of troops could yet be found. The night of the seventeenth there was considerable movement among the Germans in front of the XX Corps. This might have been a feint to cover the attack on the VIII Corps of the First Army, or the attack on the VIII Corps might be a feint to cover an attack on our XX Corps. I rather believed that the attack on the VIII Corps was the real thing.

  The situation on the Third Army front was not bad in case the Germans attacked. The 5th Division was relieving the 95th, and the 80th was moving in to the XII Corps line in order to be sure we reached the Siegfried Line by the nineteenth. The only place the Germans could really have hurt the Third Army was in the Saar-Moselle Triangle where Colonel Polk with his reinforced 3d Cavalry, about four thousand men, was holding about a thirty-mile front.

  I had General Millikin in and talked over with him the possible use of the III Corps in an attack to the north in case the Germans continued the attack on the VIII Corps of the First Army. I also directed Eddy to get the 4th Armored engaged, because I felt that, if we did not, it too might be moved to the north by higher authority. The fact that I did this shows how little I appreciated the seriousness of the enemy attack on that date.

  At 1030 on the eighteenth, Bradley called me and asked me to come to Luxembourg with my G-2, G-3, and G-4 for a conference. He stated that he was going to suggest something which I would not like. When we arrived, he showed me that the German penetration was much greater than we had thought and asked what I could do. I told him I could halt the attack of the 4th Armored and concentrate it near Longwy, starting that midnight. I also said that the 80th Division could be removed from the line and start for Luxembourg in the morning, and that the 26th Division, though it had four thousand green replacements from Headquarters’ units, could be alerted to move in twenty-four hours. That night about 2300, Bradley called and asked me to meet him an
d Eisenhower at Verdun at 1100 on the morning of the nineteenth, which was the next day. I immediately called a Staff meeting for 0800 on the nineteenth, with all members of the General Staff, and General Weyland and his Staff, to be present.

  I started the meeting by saying that plans had been changed, and, while we were all accustomed to rapid movement, we would now have to prove that we could operate even faster. We then made a rough plan of operation based on the assumption that I could use the VHI Corps, First Army (Middleton), and the III Corps, Third Army (Millikin), on any two of three possible axes. From the left, the axes of attack were in order of priority as follows: From the general vicinity of Diekirch, due north; from the general vicinity of Arlon, on Bastogne, which was still held by our troops; and, finally, from the general vicinity of Neufchateau, against the left nose of the enemy salient.

  When it is considered that Harkins, Codman, and I left for Verdun at 0915 and that between 0800 and that hour we had had a Staff meeting, planned three possible lines of attack, and made a simple code in which I could telephone General Gay which two of the three lines we were to use, it is evident that war is not so difficult as people think.