War as I Knew It
Page 19
We reached Verdun at 1045. Eisenhower, Bradley, Devers, Air Marshal Tedder, and a large number of Staff officers were present. General Strong, SHAEF G-2, gave a picture of the situation which was far from happy. Eisenhower stated that he wished me to get to Luxembourg and take command of the battle, and asked when I could do it. I said that afternoon, December 19. He also stated that he would like me to make a strong attack with at least six divisions.
I told him I would make a strong attack with three divisions, namely, the 4th Armored, and the 26th and 80th Infantry Divisions, by the twenty-second, but that I could not attack with more than that until some days later, and that, if I waited, I would lose surprise.
When I said I could attack on the twenty-second, it created a ripple of excitement. Some people thought I was boasting and others seemed to be pleased.
At that time I figured that I was to have the VUI Corps (First Army) with the 101st Airborne (commanded by Major General M. D. Taylor), the 28th Infantry Division and part of the 9th Armored Division; the HI Corps with the 26th and 80th Infantry Divisions and 4th Armored Division; the XII Corps with the 5th and 4th Infantry Divisions and 10th Armored Division; and the XX Corps with the 90th and 95th Infantry Divisions and 6th Armored Division. The 87th Infantry Division and the infantry regiments of the 42d Division, which we also had at that time, would go to the Seventh Army.
After it was determined that the Third Army should attack, a conference was held between Eisenhower, Devers, and Bradley as to the shift of front. It was finally decided that the Seventh Army would take over part of the Third Army front and assume a static role from somewhere south of Saarlautem to the far end of their present line, the Rhine River. Pending the arrival of a division to relieve it, we were not to be allowed to move our 6th Armored.
Air Marshal Tedder urged me to get rid of the XX Corps so I would have only one offensive front. I stuck to the XX Corps, because I wanted to have it for a rest area. As it turned out some months later, the retention of the XX Corps was probably the luckiest thing I ever did, because through it I had a chance to take Trier and, having taken Trier, the final attack through the Palatinate was made possible.
As soon as these various decisions were made, I telephoned Gay to start the 26th Division and the 4th Armored on Arlon via Longwy, and the 80th Division on Luxembourg via Thionville. The 4th Armored had actually pulled out the previous night, December 18. The 80th started next morning, the nineteenth, and the 26th started on receiving orders.
If we take the casualty report as of December 21, which marked the termination of the fighting in the Saar battle, and subtract from that the casualty report as of November 8, we will see that the fighting in the Saar was bloody and difficult. We will also get a datum plane from which to judge the cost of the Battle of the Bulge, which was now about to start.
The casualty report as of December 21 was:
—————
1
Lieutenant General James H. Doolittle, Commanding General, Eighth United States Air Force, and Brigadier General E. F. Curtis, Chief of Staff for General Spaatz.
2
The dead Germans were the result of a concentration of twenty-seven battalions brought down on their heads by the XX Corps. The American Graves Registration Service, in policing the battlefield, had carried many to the roadside for further disposal.
3
On the U.S.O. Show Circuit.
4
^ajor General L. H. Brereton, Commanding General, First Allied Airborne Army.
5
Major General M. B. Ridgway, Commanding General XVIII Corps, First Army.
6
On or about the fourteenth of December, 1944, General Patton called Chaplain O’Neill, Third Army Chaplain, and myself into his office in Third Headquarters at Nancy. The conversation went something like this:
General Patton: “Chaplain, I want you to publish a prayer for good weather. I’m tired of these soldiers having to fight mud and floods as well as Germans. See if we can’t get God to work on our side.”
Chaplain O'Neill: “Sir, it’s going to take a pretty thick rug for that kind of praying.”
General Patton: “I don’t care if it takes the flying carpet. I want the praying done.”
Chaplain O'Neil: “Yes, sir. May I say, General, that it usually
4 THE BASTOGNE-ST. VITH CAMPAIGN—“THE BULGE”
19 December to 28 January 1945
On December 19, 1944, General Eisenhower called a conference at Verdun to deal with the Von Rundstedt break-through, known as “The Bulge.** As early as the twelfth of December, General Patton had speculated on the possibility of a German offensive on his north flank in the First Army area, and plans to meet such an effort were studied. What happened during these days and those ensuing is best recorded in his notes on the campaign.
The Bulge was an exhausting operation, filled with grim fighting, unimaginable situations, precise timing and movement and a superhuman effort on the part of the American soldier. By January 28, the battle of the Bulge ended and American troops were once more well established on the German border, ready to strike at the heart of the Reich without respite. A new all-out offensive began on January 29. (See Map, page 190.)
During the period, General Montgomery took over command of the American First Army north of the German break-through. He countered the German offensive with a First Army push to the south, joining the Third Army in the vicinity of Houffalize. Both the Twenty-First and Twelfth Army Groups then joined in pushing the enemy back to the east and to the Siegfried Line. The Sixth Army Group, having assumed the defensive in order to free the Third Army troops for an offensive, took over a portion of the Third Army lines and set up defensive positions in the Vosges Mountains. There was nothing new in Italy.
In the Philippines, General Mac Arthur landed on Luzon and, at the end of the period, was in the outskirts of Manila.
The Russians, sweeping westward, took Warsaw, Cracow, Lodz, and were within ninety miles of Berlin.
The Air Force continued to blast Germany, while the Navy commanded all the seas.
P. D. H.
The Bulge
I spent the night of the nineteenth with the XX Corps in Thionville, and telephoned from there to have the 5th Division pulled out of action and started on Luxembourg. The next morning, I arrived at Bradley’s Headquarters in Luxembourg and found that he had, without notifying me, detached Combat Command “B” (Brigadier General H. E. Dager) of the 4th Armored Division from Arlon to a position southwest of Bastogne and had halted the 80th Division in Luxembourg. Since the combat command had not been engaged, I withdrew it to Arlon and had the 80th Division resume its march to the vicinity of Mersch.
While Bradley and I were talking over the plans for a combined operation with the First and Third Armies, Eisenhower called up and informed Bradley that Montgomery was to have operational command of the First and Ninth United States Armies, owing to the fact that telephonic communications between Bradley and these armies were difficult. As a matter of fact, this was not entirely true, and it appeared to me at the time that Bradley was being sidetracked, either because of lack of confidence in him, or as the only way Eisenhower could prevent Montgomery from “regrouping.”
Speaking of Montgomery’s lack of speed reminds me of something Sergeant Meeks said to me when we first started, and Montgomery was holding valorously at Caen while we were carrying the ball. Sergeant Meeks remarked that, “’Fore God, General, if General Montgomery don’t get a move on himself, those British soldiers are going to have grass and limpets growing on their left foot from standing in the water.”
In any case, General Bradley took what was practically a demotion in a most soldierly manner, nor did he at any time during the subsequent campaign inject himself into the operations of the Third Army, as he might well have done, since that was the only unit he had to command. On the other hand, I always informed him of what I was going to do, and profited by consultations with him and his Staf
f.
From Luxembourg I drove to Arlon and saw Middleton, Millikin, Gaffey, and Paul, and got from Middleton a first-hand picture of what was going on. The VIII Corps was fighting very well, but had nothing but remnants with which to fight, except in the case of the 101st Airborne Division1 in Bastogne. In Bastogne also was a combat command of the 9th Armored,1 2 3 4 5 6 one of the 10th Armored,7 the 705th Tank Destroyer Battalion, and some colored artillery and colored Quartermaster units. In contrast to some of the colored artillery, the colored Quartermaster men provided themselves with rifles and fought very well.
After leaving this meeting, I visited the Headquarters of the 9th and 10th Armored Divisions and the 4th and 80th Infantry Divisions (all northeast of Luxembourg) and directed General Morris,8 who commanded the 10th Armored Division, to take temporary command of the two combat commands of his division present, and the one combat command of the 9th Armored Division in his vicinity, and also of the 4th Infantry Division, pending the arrival of General Eddy’s XII Corps from the south. I told General Leonard, commanding the 9th Armored Division, to move his Headquarters to join the VIH Corps and assume command of the two combat commands of the 9th Armored Division and the one of the 10th Armored Division in Bastogne. In my opinion, splitting up the 10th and 9th Armored Divisions in the VIII Corps had been a mistake; however, the situation at the time may have rendered it necessary. I also did a lot of telephoning to get up self-propelled tank destroyer battalions, divisional tank battalions, hospitals, ammunition, bridging materials, etc., and I directed the two armored divisions and the 4th Infantry Division to cannibalize their anti-tank gun units and turn them into riflemen, because all three divisions were excessively short.
At the end of this rather hectic day, my driver, Sergeant Mims, said to me, “General, the Government is wasting a lot of money hiring a whole General Staff. You and me has run the Third Army all day and done a better job than they do.” Actually the remarkable movement of the Third Army from the Saar to the Bulge was wholly due to the superior efficiency of the Third Army Staff, particularly General Gay, General Muller, Colonel Nixon, and Colonel E. Busch, Quartermaster of the Third Army. Those who desire to inform themselves on how an army should be moved should study this operation as set forth in meticulous detail in the “After Action Operations Report” of the Third Army. The setup at nightfall of the twentieth of December was as follows: The VIII, Corps (Middleton), now Third Army, on the left consisted of the 101st Airborne with attachments, the 28th Infantry Division less about two regiments, the 9th Armored, and certain corps artillery units; the III Corps (Millikin) had the 26th and 80th Infantry and 4th Armored Division; the XII Corps (Eddy) had at that particular moment in Luxembourg the 4th Infantry Division, the 5th Infantry Division, the 10th Armored Division, currently commanded by Morris pending Eddy’s arrival; the XX Corps (Walker) had the 90th, 95th, and 6th Armored. However, the 6th Armored was not free to leave its location near Saarguemines until it had been relieved by elements of the Seventh Army. The 35th Division was moving on Metz, where it was to pick up replacements and be attached to either the XII or VIII Corps as circumstances indicated. The time of attack for the III Corps was definitely set at 0400, December 22.
On the twenty-first, I received quite a few telephone calls from various higher echelons, expressing solicitude as to my ability to attack successfully with only three divi- I sions. I maintained my contention that it is better to attack with a small force at once, and attain surprise, than it is to wait and lose it. At that time, I was sure that by the twenty-third or twenty-fourth, I could get up General Eddy’s Corps and have him attack with the 5th Infantry and 10th Armored Divisions, and possibly the 4th Infantry Division, although the latter was very short of men and battle-weary. I felt sure, and stated at the time, that the First Army could attack the northern flank of the Bulge on the twenty-third if it wanted to. I feared that the enemy might start a spoiling attack1 south from the vicinity of Echtemach against the 4th Division and, had he known the situation, he would undoubtedly have done this, but, as always, the German communications system was very bad, and I doubt that at this time he knew the Third Army was moving.
The Corps Staffs of the HI, XII, and XX met me at Luxembourg. The VIII Corps was too far away and could not attend the meeting. As usual on the verge of action, everyone felt full of doubt except myself. It has always been my unfortunate role to be the ray of sunshine and the backslapper before action, both for those under me and also those over me. I can say with perfect candor that, at that time, I had no doubt as to the success of the operation, even when, at 1700, December 21, the 4th Infantry Division reported a violent attack, which later turned out to be nothing. My chief feeling at that time was that I wished it was one day later, because, when we are attacking, the enemy has to parry, while, when we are defending or preparing to attack, he can attack us. During the night Millikin asked to delay the hour of attack till 0600 December 22.
The III Corps jumped off at that hour, 0600, and in spite of considerable resistance and a great deal of trouble from blown roads and bridges, advanced for an average of seven miles. This was less than I had hoped, but I realized that it is always difficult to get an attack rolling, and I further felt that the enemy would probably not react for an additional thirty-six hours, by which time I hoped we would be moving.
1Spoiling attack: An old name given to an attack to cause a diversion or apprehension.
The 10th Infantry Regiment (Colonel Robert P. Bell) of the 5th Infantry Division did a remarkable thing by attacking in the direction of Echtemach at noon on the day of its arrival, after moving about seventy-five miles from Saarlautern. It fortunately ran into two German battalions just preparing to make an attack on the 4th Infantry Division, and destroyed them. At Arlon I met eight enlisted men and one officer who had been at Wiltz when the Germans attacked, and had walked out on the nineteenth of December. They had come straight across the southern portion of the German-occupied territory and seen only seven Germans. This led me to believe that the density of the German attack was less than reported.
Owing to weather conditions in England, we had been unable to resupply Bastogne by air on the twenty-second, but made arrangements to do so on the night of December 22-23. At this time it became evident that the XII Corps could not attack north of the Sauer River until we had driven the enemy east of that river and had replaced the 4th Infantry Division, which was exhausted and sixteen hundred men short, with a new infantry division—probably the 90th. The 6th Armored Division from the XX Corps was to join the XII Corps, while the 4th Infantry and 10th Armored Divisions would join the XX Corps. There was a possibility at this time that the 11th Armored, which was alleged to be closing in the vicinity of Reims in SHAEF Reserve, might be turned loose. The amount of corps and army artillery supporting the attack of the Third Army was quite impressive, consisting as it did of 88 battalions or 1056 guns of 105 mm. caliber or bigger.
On the twenty-second, Bastogne received a violent attack from the northeast which the 101st Airborne repulsed. It was possibly the first reaction to our attack.
From captured orders we learned that the Germans had intended to move west beyond Arlon and then turn south and attack the city of Luxembourg from the west.
Since this possibility still existed, it became necessary to consider the left flank of the army. The XII Corps, using all of the 5th and part of the 4th Infantry Divisions, made a limited-objective attack to drive the enemy east of the Sauer River, while the XX Corps made another limited-objective attack in the direction of Saarburg as a diversion. The weather had turned fine and we had seven groups of fighter-bombers doing a splendid job, also some planes from the 9th Air Force which bombed and destroyed bridges in the vicinity of Saarburg. On the other hand, it was necessary to move Combat Command “R” of the 4th Armored Division (Colonel Wendell Blanchard) from the right flank to the left flank of the III Corps in order to attempt a break-through to Bastogne. This movement left a huge gap between the 26th Infantry
and the 4th Armored Division, which we filled up with the 6th Cavalry Group under Colonel E. M. Fickett. The advances for the day were not impressive, varying from two to five miles.
The day of the twenty-fourth was rather discouraging. All along the line we received violent counter-attacks, one of which forced Combat Command “B” of the 4th Armored Division back several miles, with the loss of a number of tanks. This was probably my fault, because I had insisted on a day and night attack. Such an attack is all right for the first night of battle and possibly the second night, but after that the men become tired. Furthermore, unless you have very bright moonlight and clear going, armored battle at night is of dubious value. I remember being surprised at the time at how long it took me to learn war. I should have known this before.
The 101st Airborne had got some supplies by air drop and had not been attacked during daylight, probably because the enemy was afraid of our fighter-bombers.
The XII Corps, attacking on the front Diekirch to Echtemach to secure the Sauer River line, had progressed * practically to the river, except in the vicinity of Echternach. Prisoners taken that day stated that they had not received any regular rations for some three to five days. I We also intercepted a radio message from the German 5th Para Division (General Major Ludwig Heilman), fighting against the 26th Infantry Division, that they could not hold out much longer without help and needed bazookas and ammunition. On the front of the XX Corps nothing happened.
Casualties as of December 22:
It was my belief at that time, which subsequent events proved incorrect, that this attack had been planned and was being run by the German General Staff for the purpose of regaining the initiative. However, it was evident that they were already behind schedule, so I believed then that we might possibly surround and destroy them. There was the worrisome thought, though, that in 1940 they had attacked as at present and then swung southwest through Saarbrucken and Thionville to Metz, and of course they might repeat this. We had no idea what the German resources were and unquestionably overestimated them, although I was probably less guilty in this respect than most others.