Christmas dawned clear and cold; lovely weather for killing Germans, although the thought seemed somewhat at variance with the spirit of the day. I left early in the morning with the purpose of visiting all the divisions in combat, and succeeded in seeing two combat commands of the 4th Armored, the 26th, the 80th, the 5th, and elements of the 4th Infantry and 10th Armored Divisions.
It is to the great credit of the Quartermaster Corps that on this Christmas Day every soldier had turkey; those in the front had turkey sandwiches and the rest, hot turkey. I know of no army in the world except the American which could have done such a thing. The men were surprisingly cheerful.
While we were with Combat Command “A” (Brigadier General H. L. Earnest) of the 4th Armored, two German airplanes strafed and bombed us, but without success. This was the only time in the fighting in Germany or France that I was actually picked out on the road and attacked by German Air.
As a whole, the day was not too successful. We continued to advance, but we had not relieved Bastogne. Owing to weather conditions, Bastogne had not been resupplied from the air. The only bright spot was that the 5th Infantry Division had driven the enemy back to the Sauer River in its front, and killed quite a few when they tried to escape across the river.
Arrangements had been made for the 6th Armored to relieve the 10th Armored north of Luxembourg, and for the 35th Division, which had been in Metz since the night of the twenty-third, to move up and join the III Corps on the morning of the twenty-sixth, taking its place between the 26th and the 80th Divisions. The 80th Division would then join the XII Corps.
Late that night we had a quiet Christmas dinner at General Bradley’s mess. Afterward Bradley and I had a long talk, during which he told me that Montgomery stated that the First Army could not attack for three months, and that the only attacks that could be made would be made by me, but that I was too weak. Hence, we should have to fall back to the line of the Saar— Vosges, or even to the Moselle, to gain enough divisions to permit me to continue the attack. We both considered this a disgusting idea, which would, we felt, have tremendous political implications and probably doom to death or slavery all the French inhabitants of Alsace and Lorraine, whom such a move would abandon to the Germans.9 10 1
1On this matter, General Patton called for an opinion from his Staff. Their answer is embodied in the following letter:
26 December, 1944
Memorandum:
For: The Army Commander
1. It is our belief that the Third Army should continue the offensive and carry the fight to the enemy, and destroy him without delay. The following factors are bases for this recommendation:
a. That all the known German striking power in the west is now concentrated in a well-defined area.
b. Other enemy offensives, as far as can be estimated at this time, would be of limited objective, and, unless armor has been moved from other fronts, it would lack the thrust and speed of armor.
c. At present the Third Army composes seven (7) strong infantry divisions and three (3) armored divisions. These forces are supported by 108 battalions of artillery. In addition, four potential divisions exist (94th, 87th, 17th AB, and 11th Armored). This would later be augmented by the 28th Infantry and the 9th Armored, plus the 101st Airborne when refitted. The Third Army service installations are exceptionally well situated at the present time to support continuation of the attack. Our stores in these installations are being improved daily. Our rail net in this area is excellent. The present supply situation within the Army is good. It has been geared to support the attack and if the Communications Zone can continue to put supplies within reach of Army, we can continue. Presently we have a strong Signal Communication Network, well placed and in operation.
d. Allied troops appear to be available to extend the north flank to the Meuse; thus, by using this river as an obstacle and with the troops enumerated above, Third Army can seal off the south flank of the German salient. It is suggested here that the present holding force on the Meuse River in the Third Army zone of responsibility move to the Semois River and there establish a containing line.
e. Third Army’s continued attack is a constant threat to communications within the salient. A general withdrawal permits the enemy to effect reconstruction of forces, later permitting him the initiative. Time is his strategic objective now.
f. Our air effort will have a well-defined area of operations for a major effort in a restricted area such as the area indicated above. The Air is now based on fields capable of supporting the present offensive. They are wealthy in pilots and planes and have more than they have had at any other time during the operation.
g. The American (soldier and public) psychology must be considered. Although it cannot be evaluated, it would probably be seriously affected by a voluntary withdrawal. The American soldier has tried with all of his skill and heart to gain the ground now in our hands. To give it up might be catastrophic both from a psychologic and a military point of view. Third Army troops know and understand the attack. They do not know or understand the retreat or general withdrawal.
2. It is the consensus of opinion that the present Saar positions can be held. A withdrawal on the extreme flank from along the Rhine River to the Saar-Vosges Mountain line would perhaps at most yield two American divisions. Initially these two divisions could support an attack to clear out the present triangle now held by the enemy in the XX Corps zone between the Saar and Moselle Rivers. This, in itself, would cause the enemy some concern. Giving up the Vosges area would yield little to the enemy from a supply, air, or strategic point of view. Withdrawal to the Moselle is not considered advantageous in any way.
Conclusions:
a. That the main defensive line on the Meuse River between the flanks of the First and Third United States Armies extend to that river.
b. Continue the offensive operation now undertaken by Third United States Army.
Paul D. Harkins H. G. Maddox Oscar W. Koch
Colonel, G.S.C. Brig. Gen., G.S.C. Colonel, G.S.C.
Deputy Chief of Staff G-3 G-2
Until 1400 on the twenty-sixth, the situation looked bad. We had been unable to break through to Bastogne and had received continuous counter-attacks. The 5th Infantry Division had, however, closed up on the Sauer River and the night of December 25-26 we had used the new proximity fuse on a number of Germans near Echtemach and actually killed seven hundred of them.
The Combat Command (Colonel T. L. Harrold) of the 9th Armored Division, working with the XII Corps, was sent to join the 4th Armored in the III Corps, to extend still further the left of that unit. Also, a fragment of the 28th Infantry Division, which had come into the lines of the XII Corps, was sent to the VIII Corps. The 35th Division started to move into the line prepared to attack on the twenty-seventh, while two-thirds of the 6th Armored Division had closed north of Luxembourg. I believed then that this movement of the 6th Armored Division was premature. I should have waited longer and would then have found that it was better to engage it on the left flank, because the corridor north from Diekirch, which was my favorite line of attack, was supposed to be too narrow for armor. From later observation I think this was a mistake and that armor could have gone up the corridor. One never knows.
At 1400 on December 26, General Gaffey called me and asked if I would authorize his taking a big risk with Combat Command “R” under Colonel Blanchard for a break-through to Bastogne. I told him to go ahead. At 1845 they had made contact and Bastogne was liberated, but the corridor was only three hundred yards wide. During a German air raid on the night of the twenty-sixth, one hundred German prisoners rushed our guards. Many were shot; none escaped.
At this time I was doing my utmost through General Bradley to secure one or all of the 11th Armored, 17th Airborne, and 87th Infantry Divisions, which were sitting around Reims in SHAEF Reserve. I felt that, with our entry into Bastogne, the German was licked, and that it was not necessary to hold a reserve, but to attack with everything we had.
&
nbsp; On the morning of the twenty-seventh, Bradley went to see Eisenhower and Montgomery. Bradley and I were very hopeful that Eisenhower would put him back in command of the First and Ninth Armies, because we felt Montgomery would never attack. I also asked him to suggest that the 11th Armored and 17th Airborne be moved from Reims to a switch position along the Semois River, from which location they could cover the left flank of the Third Army and be just as well placed to protect the rest of the American forces as they were on the line of the Meuse.
After a meeting with Middleton and Millikin at At-Ion, it was decided that the III Corps should keep operational control of the VIII Corps troops in Bastogne until the situation clarified. We also planned an attack with one armored division reinforced by an infantry combat team on Houffalize on the thirtieth, and an attack with one armored division and two infantry divisions on St. Vith on the thirty-first. For the operation the VIII Corps was to resume command of the 101st Airborne and attached troops, and cover the left flank. I felt at that time if I could get three more divisions the situation would end very promptly.
On Bradley’s return, he and I discussed, and actually planned, with General Anderson1 of the 8th Air Force, an attack across the Sauer River at Echternach up the corridor to Bonn. We proposed an air blitz to be preceded by an attack on Saarburg by the XX Corps in order to pull the enemy to the south. The possibilities of such an attack were very alluring, but in order to make it a success, at least three more divisions were necessary; that is, three more in addition to the 11th Armored and 87th Infantry which Bradley had succeeded in getting released to me. Troops were not available, so the show fell through.
1Brigadier General, later Major General, O. A. Anderson, Deputy Commander for Operations Headquarters, 8th Air Force.
I sent General Grow and Colonel Harkins to Bastogne to arrange to move the 6th Armored Division to that vicinity, under cover of darkness, for use in our projected attack on St. Vith, so they would come in as a complete surprise. The 11th Armored and 87th Infantry were to close southwest of Bastogne at 2400 on the twenty-ninth and to attack in the direction of Houffalize in the morning, passing through the left elements of the 101st Airborne. The situation on the front of the XII and XX Corps remained static.
On the thirtieth, the 11th Armored and 87th Infantry jumped off, the 87th on the left. They immediately ran into the flank of a large German counter-attack, consisting of the 130th Panzer Lehr Division and 26th Volksgrenadier Division. This meeting engagement upset both attacks, but was very fortuitous, so far as we were concerned, because had we not hit the flank of the Germans, they might have again closed the corridor into Bastogne. All the generals concerned in this particular attack were in favor of my postponing it twenty-four hours; had I done so, it would have permitted the Germans to drive home their attack.
This same day the Germans also put in a two-division attack, consisting of the 1st SS (Brigadier E. Wisch, SS Oberst Mohmke) and 167th Regulars (General Lieutenant Hocker) from the northeast against the 35th and 26th, and a third attack against the northern face of Bastogne. This was probably the biggest co-ordinated counterattack that troops under my command have ever experienced. We were successful at all points.
On this day four Germans in one of our jeeps, dressed in American uniforms, were killed, and another group of seventeen, also in American uniforms, were reported by the 35th Division as follows:
“One sentinel, reinforced, saw seventeen Germans in American uniforms. Fifteen were killed and two died suddenly.”
I drove to Bastogne through the corridor, passing quite close to the Germans. Luckily they were not firing. On reaching the town, I decorated with the Distinguished Service Cross Brigadier General McAuliffe, who commanded the 101st during the fight, and Lieutenant Colonel S. A. Chappuis, who commanded the 502d Airborne Infantry. We then drove around so the soldiers could see us, and they were quite delighted. On the twenty-fifth, the Germans had sent a white flag demanding that McAuliffe surrender, to which he replied with' the famous word, “Nuts.”
On the thirty-first, the Germans made seventeen counterattacks against us, all of which were repulsed. We failed to gain much ground except that the 6th Armored Division, attacking by surprise along the road to St. Vith, advanced four kilometers.
There had been rumors for a number of days that Germans, flying captured P-47’s, were strafing our troops. Of course, such rumors were very bad. Generals Spaatz, Doolittle, and Vandenberg came in, and we discussed ways and means of stopping the rumors, and finally decided that for the first of the year no P-47 would fly in the area of either XII or XX Corps, so that if any attacks came they would be definitely recognized as German planes. We succeeded also in getting the 17th Airborne turned over to the Third Army in exchange for the 28th Infantry Division.
P-47
The following Order expresses briefly and to the best of my ability the occurrences of 1944:
General Orders
1 January, 1945
Number 1
TO THE OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE THIRD ARMY
AND
TO OUR COMRADES OF THE XIX TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
From the bloody corridor at Avranches, to Brest, thence across France to the Saar, over the Saar into Germany, and now on to Bastogne, your record has been one of continuous victory.
Not only have you invariably defeated a cunning and ruthless enemy, but also you have overcome by your indomitable fortitude every aspect of terrain and weather. Neither heat nor dust nor floods nor snow have stayed your progress.
The speed and brilliancy of your achievements are unsurpassed in military history.
Recently I had the honor of receiving at the hands of the Twelfth Army Group Commander, Lieutenant General Omar N. Bradley, a second Oak Leaf Cluster to the DSM. This award was bestowed on me, not for what I have done, but because of what you have achieved. From the bottom of my heart I thank you.
My New Year wish and sure conviction for you is that, under the protection of Almighty God and the inspired leadership of our President and the High Command, you will continue your victorious course to the end that tyranny and vice shall be eliminated, our dead comrades avenged, and peace restored to a war-weary world.
In closing, I can find no fitter expression for my feelings than to apply to you the immortal
words spoken by General Scott at Chapultepec when he said: “Brave rifles, veterans, you have been baptized in fire and blood and have come out steel.”
G. S. Patton, Jr.,
Lieut. General, U. S. Army, Commanding
Around the first of the year, the Germans began bombarding Luxembourg city with a peculiar weapon.1 At first we thought it was a rocket, then a long-distance shell, and several rumors were started as to what it consisted of, until recently when the gun which fired it was captured. The projectile was about six feet long and four inches in diameter, but it had a forward collar six inches in diameter, and on the rear, an inverted cone with long trailing fins. The initial powder charge expanded the cone, producing a gas lock, and the missile started forward through an unrifled tube one hundred and ninety-five feet long, with about twenty-five joints bolted together with flanges. At every fourth section there were two short tubes coming in at an angle of forty-five degrees, each containing a booster charge. When the projectile left the muzzle, the forward collar fell off, and it was stabilized through the fins. Its probable range was thirty-five miles. The bursting charge was very small, but one unfortunate shot struck a hotel just as the Commanding Officer of Headquarters Company, Third Army, Captain John Dementi, stepped out, and killed him.
Our progress on New Year’s Day was not outstanding, except in the case of the 6th Armored Division, which did fairly well; we had nothing to worry about. All the troops in the Third Army were exactly where they were supposed to be, so that if they lost, they would lose due to better fighting qualities on the part of the enemy, and not through any mistakes which I had made in deploying the soldiers.
1The German H.D.P. (Hoc
hdruckpumpe, or high pressure pump). General Patton’s figure of 195 feet for the length of the tube may have been conservative, as installations have since been found having tube lengths from 189 to 394 feet. This is explained by the fact that there are provided flanged sections of fifteen-centimeter tubing, three meters in length, for assembly of the weapons. The boosters are designed to be fitted to the tube at any of the joints.
The 11th Armored Division fought fairly well in its opening gambit, but lost an unnecessarily large number of tanks. I did not believe that the command of that division was what it should have been. Later, under a new commander, this became a very fine division.
War as I Knew It Page 20