War as I Knew It

by George S. Patton

  The VII and III Corps were given orders to resume their offensive along the axis Bastogne—St. Vith on the twenty-first.

  The XII Corps attack across the Sure River jumped off at 0330 on the morning of the eighteenth without an artillery preparation, and secured a complete tactical surprise.

  General Eddy and I visited the 4th and 5th Infantry Divisions. The 4th Division was somewhat apathetic and General Eddy had to direct the division commander to get across the river himself and also see that his battalion commanders did. The 5th Division was in fine spirits. We visited an Observation Post from which we could look down on the Germans about six hundred feet below us in the river valley. Our men had on snow suits, some captured and some which General Eddy had had made in Luxembourg.

  We had to dispatch the 101st Airborne, an AA unit, and some tank destroyer units to the Sixth Army Group, for an attack which had started by someone saying they could reduce the Colmar Pocket with one division, and ended up by requiring about five additional units.

  Walker called up to know if he could make a serious attack in the Saar—Moselle Triangle with the 94th Division and a combat team of the 8th Armored. He got the green light.

  The delay in the attack of the VIII and III Corps until the twenty-first might possibly bring a few extra troops formerly facing those two corps into combat with the XII Corps. However, the XII Corps was fresher and had a shorter distance to go.

  On the nineteenth, the condition of the roads, due to sleet and ice, was so bad we could not move either the 101st or the 76th Division.

  The 94th Division ran into elements of the 11th Panzer Division (General Lieutenant Weitershein) on this date.

  In spite of terrible weather on the twentieth, the XII Corps advanced several kilometers, while the 95th Division at Saarlautem met the counter-attack of four hundred Germans and repulsed it—partly due to the German’s own efforts. Because their counter-attack jumped off too soon, they were caught in their own barrage and then in ours. Only forty prisoners were taken. General Schmidt of the 76th Division reported one of his combat teams would close in the VIII Corps that day.

  On the twenty-first, the XII Corps was practically on its initial objective and caught a large German concentration at the bridge near Vianden, where they had good artillery observation, and kept it under continuous artillery fire, using proximity fuse.

  While visiting the VIII Corps on this date, I ran across two instructive incidents. In one place, elements of the 17th Airborne Division were stuck on a slippery hill, and yet the officers did not have enough sense to have the men dismount and push the trucks. When this was done, the sticking completely ended. The other was that the ice and sleet had made the Germans’ and also the Americans’ mines inoperative, as they filled with ice right under the spider so that no pressure was sufficient to detonate the mine. It was evident that we would have many casualties when the thaw came, as troops would use the roads, which were apparently de-mined; and suddenly find a mine that had become operative. We used detectors to the maximum.

  General Van Fleet was Commander of a Corps then forming in England and later commanded the III Corps when General Millikin got into trouble at the Remagen Bridge in March. After canvassing the available brigadiers in the Third Army, we picked General Earnest to take Van Fleet’s place with the 90th Division. However, that same evening General Eisenhower ordered me to take Major General L. W. Rooks as temporary commander of the division in order that he might familiarize himself with conditions at the front, prior to being placed on Staff duty under General Eisenhower.

  The attack of the VIII and III Corps continued satisfactorily with nothing but weather and small-arms fire stopping them. The VIII Corps was practically pinched out1 by the twenty-second. The 80th Division, XII Corps, was progressing very satisfactorily north of the Wiltz River, so I told General Eddy not to halt on his final objective, but to continue north, and, if necessary, use elements of the 4th Armored Division to cover his right flank.

  I called General Bradley on this date, January 22, and urged that all armies attack whether they were fatigued and had losses or not, as I was sure, in view of the Russian offensive,11 12 that that was the time to strike. It was.

  At 1530, General Weyland called up and said there was a great deal of German armor moving in several directions north of Diekirch; that, in fact, his pilots reported it the biggest concentration they had seen since the Falaise Gap, and that all his groups were attacking.13

  On the twenty-third, everything was going well except that one battalion of the 94th Division lost forty men killed and wounded and four hundred missing in action. I directed General Walker to investigate.

  In spite of strong remonstrances by General Bradley and myself, SHAEF ordered the 35th Division, less one combat team, which was in action with the 6th Armored, to join the Sixth Army Group. The 35th had been in actual combat with the enemy every day except five since the sixth of July, and I had only just succeeded in getting it out of the line.

  The VI Corps of the Seventh Army was driven back a few miles.

  The plan for the continuation of the Twelfth Army Group attack envisioned two corps of the First Army attacking the Siegfried Line north of the VIII Corps (Third Army with this corps), attacking parallel with them. The III, XII, and XX Corps were to hold defensively. If this plan failed to get results, it would possibly be necessary for Bradley to give Montgomery twelve divisions, so we were all very anxious to succeed.

  When the question of attacking with a corps along my northern flank in conjunction with the attack of the First Army was broached, I thought of putting General Walker there, as he was less fatigued than the other Corps Commanders and also because I considered him a very aggressive soldier. However, after considering the fact that Middleton had already fought over this ground and, further, was in command of the northern VIII Corps, I determined to let him continue in that command and carry out the attack, for although he was tired, I knew him to be a very accomplished leader.

  The plan for building his corps up to strength was complicated and worked out as follows: The 76th Division, a new division, in the VIII Corps was to relieve the 87th Division in the XII Corps; the 87th then going to Middleton. The 17th Airborne Division of the III Corps was to relieve the 26th Division in the III Corps, and the 26th Division, in turn, would join the XX Corps and relieve the 95th Division, which would go to Middleton. The 90th Division of the III Corps and the 4th Division of the XII Corps would also go to Middleton. Therefore, he would have the 11th Armored and four infantry divisions, which made a very powerful attack. These plans were arranged at my house at dinner with the Corps Commanders on the night of the twenty-third.

  On the twenty-fourth, General Hodges came to lunch with Bradley and myself. After lunch the staffs of the First and Third Armies had a discussion of boundaries between the armies. We arranged a very satisfactory boundary. Just as everyone was happy, General Whitely,1 G-3 at SHAEF, called up and told General Bradley that he wished to withdraw a Corps Headquarters from the Twelfth Army Group to help the Sixth Army Group. This was the only time, to my knowledge, that Bradley lost his temper. He told Whitely that if he wanted to destroy the whole operation he could do so and be damned, and take not only one Corps Headquarters but all the corps and divisions. General Bull, Whitely’s assistant, then came on the wire and Bradley repeated his statement, adding that much more than a tactical operation was involved in that the prestige of the American Army was at stake. We were all extremely pleased with his attitude and told him so. General Hodges said he would be able to jump off on Sunday, the twenty-eighth, so I immediately decided to jump off on Saturday, the twenty-seventh.

  Bradley, Hodges, and I were unanimous that wasting troops on the Colmar Pocket was a very foolish thing, and, furthermore, it was the third time in our knowledge that such a diversion of effort had been made. We were personally determined to carry out our attack, no matter how much we were reduced.14 15

  At that time I was convinced that th
e Germans were pulling out, probably as far as the Rhine. It is interesting to note that, in the reports of German officers which I have since read, that is what the German High Command wanted to do, but Hitler would not let them.

  On the twenty-fifth of January, Codman, Stiller, and I visited the 4th, 5th, and 80th Infantry Divisions. We also took a look at Diekirch, Eittelbrück, and Wiltz. All of them had been very well “liberated.” In freezing weather, and at this time the weather was always below freezing, the destruction of the doors and windows from bombardment resulted in the freezing and breaking of the water systems so that none of the large houses were habitable, since neither the sewer nor heating arrangements would work.

  On this date also all the units of the VIII, III, and XII Army Corps, except the left regiment of the 80th Division, were on their final objective, namely, the hill mass east of the Diekirch—St. Vith road. The 76th and 87th Infantry Divisions were effecting their change of place.

  The attack of the XII Corps in the operation was exceptionally good, being well planned, rapidly executed, and cheap.

  On the twenty-fourth, the 5th Infantry Division found elements of five German divisions in one group of one hundred prisoners, while on the same date the 6th Armored Division, in a group of one hundred and fifty prisoners, found elements of ten German divisions. This indicated a bad state of disorganization among the Germans. Unfortunately, we did not realize how bad it was at that time. All during this period Higher Headquarters were very pessimistic and kept warning us not to have a reverse. This was a bad attitude.

  By dark on the twenty-sixth, it was evident that all the shifts in troops would be accomplished on time and that the attack could start on the twenty-eighth. Had anyone proposed such a troop movement at Leavenworth, people would have gone crazy, but here it was being done. However, the difference between this operation and a problem at Leavenworth was that here we had an old and experienced staff of extremely capable men, while at Leavenworth one could have nothing but students more or less bemused with formulas.

  On the twenty-eighth, I visited Middleton at Bastogne and found him very offensive-minded. His plan for the attack was to begin with the 87th on the left, the 90th on the right, followed respectively by the 95th and 4th Infantry. After a certain advance, the 90th Infantry was to form a defensive flank to the right and the 4th was to pass through it and do the same farther to the east. The 95th was to pass through the 87th when the latter became tired and would continue the attack along the axis of the corps. It was not necessary to form a defensive flank on the left because the First Army was guarding us there. The 11th Armored was to close in behind the 90th and be prepared for exploitation.

  I stopped at Martelange, Headquarters of the III Corps, and told them to prepare to widen the base of the salient south of the 90th Division; that is, to cross through the hole made by the 90th and then attack southeast. To do this effectively, I had to get another division for the III Corps, which at that time had only the 17th Airborne, one combat team of the 35th Infantry, and the 6th Armored Division.

  When I got to Headquarters, Eddy was there with a proposition to attack north and join up with the 4th Infantry Division. I was very much pleased with the idea and told him to go ahead with it. We also secured from the First Army a road running west from Houffalize. The road net in the area of the VIII Corps was extremely bad and was to get much worse.

  On the twenty-eighth, we decided not to attack until the twenty-ninth, so, as usual before a battle, the twenty-eighth was a nerve-racking day. However, the replacement system was working better than it had ever done before and we were practically up to strength. All the transfer of divisions had been completed in spite of snow, ice, and sleet.

  The situation as to truck maintenance was pretty bad because of the heavy toll taken of trucks by the glassy roads, and also because between the nineteenth of December and the sixteenth of January we had moved seventeen divisions an average distance of one hundred miles. Added to this, we were now moving eight divisions about the same distance. The ice, which stuck to the running gear of the trucks and froze the drivers, resulted in considerable laxity as to first echelon maintenance. Also, we were very short of Ordnance personnel to do this type of maintenance.

  So ended the campaign of the Bulge which had cost us 50,630 men.

  During this operation the Third Army moved farther and faster and engaged more divisions in less time than any other army in the history of the United States—possibly in the history of the world. The results attained were made possible only by the superlative quality of American officers, American men, and American equipment. No country can stand against such an army.

  Casualties for January 29 were:

  5 THE EIFEL TO THE RHINE AND THE CAPTURE OF TRIER

  29 January to 12 March, 1945

  On the twenty-ninth of January, 1945, the thirteen divisions of the four corps of the Third Army were abreast the Moselle, Sauer, and Our Rivers, ready to crack the Siegfried Line from Saarlautern, north to St. Vith.

  The VIII Corps opened the new offensive on this date, followed by the HI Corps immediately to its south. The XII Corps jumped forward on the sixth and seventh of February, the XX Corps on the nineteenth.

  By the end of the month, all corps had breached the Siegfried Line, famous umonument to the stupidity of man ” and, for the Germans, March came in as anything but a lamb. The fury of the attack never ceased; Trier fell on the second of March to the XX Corps; on the fifth the 4th Armored Division broke loose, to reach the Rhine on the eighth. On the thirteenth, the Third Army controlled the Moselle from the Saar River to Coblentz, and the Rhine from Coblentz north to Andernach.

  The Eifel, impossible of fast going according to the prophets, had been dominated in twelve days. Trier, key city of the Saar Triangle, fell to the XX Corps. (See Map, page 221.)

  During this time nothing new happened on the Twenty-First Army Group front. In the Sixth Army Group, American and French troops cleared the Colmar Pocket and again advanced to the Rhine. The Russians reached the Baltic between Stettin and Danzig, and were

  within forty miles of Berlin on the Oder River. There was nothing new in Italy. The First American Army broke through the Siegfried Line, secured a bridgehead over the Rhine at Remagen, and pushed three divisions across.

  In the Pacific, Iwo Jima was giving trouble,

  P.H.D.

  Many Rivers and Passive Defense

  The VIII Corps jumped off as per schedule, January 29, one battalion of the 4th Infantry Division getting over the Our River. The 90th Division was to cross the same river that night farther to the north. The 87th Division, which, owing to the configuration of the ground, was farther from the river, was closing up to start its attack.

  I had General Eddy in to discuss his forthcoming attack north against Bitburg. We both realized that this would be with inadequate strength, but we still had hopes that it would work.

  Since my plan envisaged the XX Corps being relieved in the Saar Triangle by the Seventh Army, I had Walker come up and discuss with Eddy and myself how he would take over the right portion of the XII Corps zone when the attack started. It was thought at this time that the XX Corps would be relieved as soon as Colmar was taken.

  We also got information that the 35th Division was going to the Ninth Army instead of coming back to us. It will be remembered we had loaned it to the Seventh Army. This division was one of the oldest in the Third Army and had always done well.

  From a sentimental and morale standpoint it is unquestionably a mistake to move divisions from one army corps to the next. Similarly, it is a greater mistake to move army corps from one army to the next. However, our ability to do those two things was probably responsible for a great deal of our success.

  At this period, January—February, 1945, the supply situation, as well as the replacement situation, was the best it had ever been.

  On the thirtieth, I drove to Bastogne, where I picked up General Middleton, and we went to St. Vith. This town
was the most completely destroyed I had seen since the First World War. The British, the Americans, and the Germans were all responsible for its destruction.

  On the way we passed the scene of the tank battle during the initial German break-through. I counted over a hundred American armored fighting vehicles along the road, and, as a result, issued an order, subsequently carried out, that every tank should be examined and the direction, caliber, and type of hit which put it out made of record, so that we would have data from which to construct a better tank. These data are now in the hands of the Ordnance Department.

  St. Vith had been so completely destroyed that it was impossible to move through the town, so the VIII Corps had to build a road around it. So long as the ground remained frozen, as it was at that time, the by-pass was excellent. Later it became impassable. However, by then the Engineers had cut a road through the obliterated center of the town.

  On the way back we visited the 87th Division, which had done well, and on its northern flank had gained seven miles. The 4th Infantry Division, which we visited next, had not gone so far. Every precaution had been taken with both these divisions to prevent frozen and trench feet. At the time I was very fearful that we would have a great many of these cases on account of crossing the wet ground and rivers. As a matter of fact, the incidence of non-battle casualties went up only very slightly during all this period of extremely bad weather.

  American soldiers are most ingenious. When they could not capture a town to sleep in, they would roll three large snowballs or snow rolls, place one on each side and the third on the windward end, and, lining them with pine-tree branches, they slept in groups of three or four. How human beings could endure this continuous fighting at sub-zero temperatures is still beyond my comprehension.