War as I Knew It

by George S. Patton

XIX

  During the attack on Troina, I drove to the Headquarters of General Bradley, who was conducting the attack, accompanied by General Lucas. Just before we got there, I saw a field hospital in a valley and stopped to inspect it. There were some three hundred and fifty badly wounded men in the hospital, all of whom were very heroic under their sufferings, and all of whom were interested in the success of the operation.

  Just as I was leaving the hospital, I saw a soldier sitting on a box near the dressing station. I stopped and said to him, “What is the matter with you, boy?” He said, “Nothing; I just can’t take it.” I asked what he meant. He said, “I just can’t take being shot at.” I said, “You mean that you are malingering here?” He burst into tears and I immediately saw that he was an hysterical case. I, therefore, slapped him across the face with my glove and told him to get up, join his unit, and make a man of himself, which he did. Actually, at the time he was absent without leave.

  I am convinced that my action in this case was entirely correct, and that, had other officers had the courage to do likewise, the shameful use of “battle fatigue” as an excuse for cowardice would have been infinitely reduced.

  XX

  On the twenty-eighth of July, 1944, General Bradley informed me that the Third Army would become operational at noon on August 1, but that in the interim I was to take over control of the VIII and XV Corps—this without becoming officially connected with the operations. On the afternoon of the twenty-ninth, south of Coutances, I found an armored division halted on the road while the Headquarters was having a map study as to the possibility of crossing the Sienne River with a view to advancing along the coast road toward Granville. Taking a glance at the map, I saw that the river was within a few miles, so went down and reconnoitered it. I found it was only about two feet deep and, so far as I could tell, defended by one machine gun which missed me by a good deal. Fortified with this information, I went back to the Commanding General and asked him why he didn’t get across the river. He said he didn’t know whether the tide was in or out, and that he understood the river was strongly defended. I told him in very strong language what I had just done and to get a move on himself, which he did. From that time on, this division was one of the boldest in the Third Army, but since this was its initiation to battle, it needed just that sort of a kick to get it started.

  XXI

  After supper on July 31, 1944, General Galley, Colonel Harkins, and I drove to the Headquarters of the VIII Corps. I told General Middleton, who was commanding the corps, that I was taking over in the morning. He said he was glad I had arrived because he had obtained his objective, which was the Selune River. I asked him if he was across and he said, “No.” I told him that throughout history, many campaigns had been lost by stopping on the wrong side of a river, and directed him to go across at once. He said that the bridge below Avranches was out. While we were discussing ways and means of getting across, a telephone message came in that the bridge, while damaged, was usable—further, that the 4th Armored Division had captured a dam to the east of Avranches, across which troops could move. I directed that the VIII Corps start across that night, which it did. This is no criticism of General Middleton, who is an outstanding soldier, but it shows that a little extra push at a critical moment is sometimes useful. Had we failed to secure a bridgehead that night, our whole operation would have been jeopardized.

  XXII

  The passage of the Third Army through the corridor at Avranches was an impossible operation. Two roads entered Avranches; only one left it over the bridge. We passed through this corridor two infantry and two armored divisions in less than twenty-four hours. There was no plan, because it was impossible to make a plan. I simply put the Corps and Division Commanders at critical points and sent units through as they arrived. It was a hazardous operation, because the troops were jammed head to tail for miles, but there was no other way of attaining the necessary speed. The operation was made successful by the driving power of the General Officers—particularly Middleton, Wood, Haislip, Gaffey, and Gay—by the superlative ability of the Staff of the Third Army to improvise under pressure, and by the help of God.

  XXIII

  During the course of the advance of the Third Army from Avranches to the Moselle, many instances occurred where it was necessary to use considerable persuasion to permit the uninterrupted progress of the Third Army, and naturally to assume considerable risk should the spectacular advance fail.

  One of the more important hazards encountered was that of leaving the right flank of the Third Army completely open from St. Nazaire to a point near Troyes. This decision was based on my belief that the Germans, while they had ample force, did not have sufficient mobility to strike fast, and that the ever-efficient XIX Tactical Air Command would spot any force large enough to hurt us and be able to hold it down long enough to permit the greatly superior mobility of the American troops to intervene. The soundness of the decision was indicated by the result.

  XXIV

  About the fifth of September, it became apparent that we would run out of gasoline. I directed the two corps, the XX and XII, to continue the advance until the tanks ran out of gas, and then to go on foot. This was actually done, and the bridgehead across the Moselle River was secured as a result. There was considerable resistance on the part of the Corps Commanders to what appeared to them an unnecessarily dangerous operation. Its success again proved that it was not dangerous.

  XXV

  On the thirtieth of September, 1944, I visited the Headquarters of the XII Corps at Nancy, and was informed that two combat teams of the 35th Division were being violently attacked on a hill east of the Moselle River. I had given orders that no ground would be given up and directed the Corps Commander to use his last remaining reserves, which consisted of part of the 6th Armored Division, to insure that the hill was held. Next day General Gaffey, the then Chief of Staff, was sent by me to see how things were going on. At 1400 he called up to state that orders had just been issued for two combat teams of the 35th Division to fall back. I told him to countermand the order and to have the Corps Commander and the Division Commanders of the 35th and 6th Armored Divisions present at the Command Post of the 6th Armored Division, where I would arrive by air at once.

  On reaching this point, I found that all three commanders were somewhat overanxious and had contemplated and issued the orders for the withdrawal. I directed that these orders be countermanded at once and that the 6th Armored Division be put into action in the morning. It was objected that the 6th Armored Division was all we had left. I stated that it could do no good being left, that it was there to fight.

  Next day the attack by the 6th Armored and the 35th Infantry was renewed with complete success, and over eight hundred dead Germans were counted in one field. The officers concerned were all of the highest caliber, but were all very fatigued, and, as I have stated before, fatigue produces pessimism.

  XXVI

  During the fighting west of the Moselle and west of Metz in October, General Walker, commanding the XX Corps, suggested that we attempt to take Fort Driant. The attack was started and, in spite of an initial success, it was evident that, if continued, it would prove unduly expensive. It was then necessary to go against my strongly held opinion that one should never fall back and order that the attack be-suspended. This was done. It was a very difficult decision. As a result of this decision, we saved a great many lives and took Metz on November 25, with comparatively little loss.

  XXVII

  By November 1, the Third Army had secured enough gasoline, ammunition, and replacements to make it possible to renew the attack with a view to breaking the Siegfried Line and establishing the bridgehead over the Rhine River, in the vicinity of Mainz. The attack was to take place at 0430 on the morning of November 8. The weather was extremely bad and the flood condition of the river was appalling. At 2000 on the evening of the seventh, a corps and a division commander came to my house and stated that in their opinion they would be unable to
attack in the morning. The moral effect of discontinuing an attack is very bad for the troops, and at such a late hour was almost physically impossible of accomplishment, due to difficulty of communications. I therefore asked the officers whom they recommended as their replacements in command of their respective units, because, I stated, I would keep on relieving until I got somebody who would lead the attack. They stated that if I felt that way they would continue the attack.

  The attack next morning, in spite of atrocious weather, was entirely successful. Of course, it is pertinent to remember that Corps and Division Commanders suffer from greater physical fatigue and danger than does an Army Commander, and hence it is the duty of the Army Commander to supply the necessary punch when fatigue starts sapping the energy of the other officers.

  XXVIII

  On December 19, 1944, General Eisenhower had a meeting at Verdun with General Bradley, General Devers, and myself and the members of his Staff present. The decision was made for the Third Army to attack the southern flank of the Bulge. I was asked when I could make the attack. I stated that I could do so with three divisions on the morning of the twenty-third of December. I had made this estimate before going to Verdun, and had taken exactly eighteen minutes to make it. General Eisenhower stated that I should wait until I got at least six divisions. I told him that, in my opinion, a prompt attack with three was better than waiting for six—particularly when I did not know where I could get the other three. Actually the attack of the III Corps with the 80th, 26th, and 4th Armored Divisions jumped off on the morning of December 22, one day ahead of the time predicted.

  In making this attack we were wholly ignorant of what was ahead of us, but were determined to strike through to Bastogne, which we did on the twenty-sixth. I am sure that this early attack was of material assistance in producing our victory.

  XXIX

  On the twenty-seventh of December, the 87th Infantry Division and the 11th Armored Division were supposed to join the VIII Corps in the vicinity of Neuf-chateau by midnight of the twenty-eighth, to attack at 0900 on the morning of the twenty-ninth. Owing to road difficulties, these divisions did not reach the rendezvous point until near daylight on the twenty-ninth, and General Middleton requested a delay of one day in the attack. I demanded that he attack anyway that morning, because my sixth sense told me it was vital. The attack jumped off, and ran directly into the flank of a German counter-attack consisting of two and a half divisions. Had my divisions delayed one day, the German counter-attack might well have cut off the tenuous corridor we had been able to establish from Arlon to Bastogne.

  XXX

  All during the battle of the Bulge, I had been very anxious to start an attack north along the Ridge Road from Echternach. Finally, on February 6, the XII Corps forced a crossing over the Our and Sauer Rivers, using, from left to right, the 80th Division, the 5th Division, and one combat command of the 76th Division. In my opinion the audacity of this operation was its chief virtue, because, to look at it, no human being could possibly have envisaged a successful crossing. The credit goes to the XII Corps and to the divisions which made the crossings. The only claim I have is my insistence that it be made at the time it was made.

  XXXI

  On February 19, General Walker called me on the telephone and stated that he felt that if I could get an armored division from SHAEF Reserve he could, with it and the 94th Division, clear up the Saar Triangle and take Saarburg. I succeeded in getting the loan of the 10th Armored Division for that specific operation, which was a success in two days. Thereafter, by continued persuasion and with the assistance of General Bradley, who shut his eyes and ears to certain rumors, we were able to keep the 10th Armored Division and eventually take Trier. I believe this is the only time in history when it was necessary to beg, borrow, and even steal troops in order to win a victory. The taking of Trier was the key to the start of the Palatinate Campaign.

  XXXII

  In March, 1945, the First and Third Armies were supposed to attack in echelon from the left; that is, the First Army, and then the Third Army, with the idea of getting up to the Rhine from Coblentz to Cologne. I was told to wait until the First Army had closed on the Rhine. However, after we crossed the Kyll River, I started to break the 4th Armored Division loose and, fearing that I might be ordered to stop it, I sent in no reports for twenty-four hours until it was so committed it could not be ordered to halt. It reached the Rhine River without difficulty. Again, the danger was more apparent than real, but, personally, I am not sure that I deserve much credit for the decision except that it was a decision.

  XXXIII

  About the eighteenth of March, we became aware that if the Third Army did not secure a bridgehead over the Rhine prior to the crossing of the British on the left wing of the groups of armies, we might lose troops to them and have to resume a defensive role. This was not at all to our liking. Therefore, I told General Eddy that he must cross the Rhine before the twenty-third. The epic crossing of the Rhine by the 5th Division of the XII Corps was a magnificent feat of arms for which General Eddy, Corps Commander, and General Irwin, Division Commander, deserve all credit. My sole virtue was having the idea. As a matter of fact, Eddy got across twenty-four hours earlier than I thought he could.

  XXXIV

  The Press Conference of September 22, 1945

  This conference cost me the command of the Third Army, or rather, of a group of soldiers, mostly recruits, who then rejoiced in that historic name, but I was intentionally direct, because I believed that it was then time for people to know what was going on. My language was not particularly politic, but I have yet to find where politic language produces successful government.

  The one thing which I could not say then, and cannot yet say, is that my chief interest in establishing order in Germany was to prevent Germany from going communistic. I am afraid that our foolish and utterly stupid policy in regard to Germany will certainly cause them to join the Russians and thereby insure a communistic state throughout Western Europe.

  It is rather sad to me to think that my last opportunity for earning my pay has passed. At least, I have done my best as God gave me the chance.

  Appendix A OPERATION “TORCH”

  Headquarters Western Task Force

  Commanding General: Major George S. Patton, Jr.

  Deputy Commanding General: Major General Geoffrey Keyes

  Chief of Staff: Colonel Hobart R. Gay1 Deputy Chief of Staff: Lieutenant Colonel Paul D. Harkins1

  G-l (Personnel): Colonel Hugh Fitzgerald

  G-2 (Intelligence): Colonel Percy Black

  G-3 (Plans and Training): Colonel Kent C. Lambert

  G-4 (Supply): Colonel Walter J. Muller1

  Adjutant General: Colonel R. E. Cummings1

  Artillery: Colonel J. J. B. Williams

  Engineers: Colonel John Conklin2

  Ordinance: Colonel Thomas H. Nixon1

  Signal Officer: Colonel Elton H. Hammond1

  Medical Officer: Colonel Albert Kenner

  Northern Landing Force, Major General Lucien K. Truscott

  60th Infantry Regiment, 9th Infantry Division, Colonel F. J. de Rohan

  Armored Task Force from 2nd Armored Division, Colonel Harry H. Semmes3 Supporting troops

  With General Patton throughout the war.

  Went to United States in 1943; returned with the Third Army. Wearer of three Distinguished Service Crosses; served with General Patton in two World Wars.

  Central Landing Force, Major General Jonathan W. Anderson

  3d Infantry Division, General Anderson Armored Task Force from 2d Armored Division, Lieutenant Colonel Richard Nelson Supporting troops

  Southern Landing Force, Major General Ernest A. Harmon, commanding 2d Armored Division

  COMPOSITION OF II CORPS

  The II Corps of Tunisia was composed of three Inantry and one Armored Division. The Corps was supported by the 13th Field Artillery Brigade and the available lumber of supporting units; such as, Signal, Ordnance, Medical, En
gineers, etc.

  Corps Composition Headquarters and Headquarters Company, II Corps:

  1st Armored Division:

  1st Infantry Division: Maj. Gen. Terry de la M. Allen

  Maj. Gen. Orlando Ward,

  34th Infantry Division: 9th Infantry Division: 13th Field Artillery Brigade:

  Maj. Gen. Ernest A. Harmon Maj. Gen. Charles W. Ryder Maj. Gen. Manton C. Eddy

  Brig. Gen. John A. Crane

  Appendix C OPERATION “HUSKY”

  Headquarters I Armored Corps and Seventh Army

  Headquarters and Headquarters Company, I Armored Corps, later redesignated as Headquarters and Head quarters Company, Seventh Army Headquarters II Corps: Major General O. N. Bradley Headquarters Provisional Corps (formed after the land^w ing was made, and commanded by the Deputy Arm;^° Commander, Major General Keyes)

  1st Infantry Division: Major Gen. Terry de la M. Alle

  45th Infantry Division: 3d Infantry Division: 2d Armored Division: 9th Infantry Division: 82d Airborne Division: 3 Ranger Battalions:

  Major Gen. Troy Middleton Major Gen. Lucien K. Truscott Major Gen. Hugh A. Gaffey Major Gen. Manton C. Eddy Major Gen. Matthew Ridgeway Colonel William Darby

  The normal complement of supporting units

  II

  LETTERS OF INSTRUCTION