(12) We are too slow in putting out minefields and in wiring positions for all-around defense. More training time should be devoted to mine-laying and mine-removal.
(13) A battalion of 4.2 chemical mortars, when available, should be attached to an infantry division. An infantry regiment in combat should have a 4.2 chemical company attached.
c. General Training
(1) More emphasis will be placed on the hardening of men and officers. All soldiers and officers should be able to run a mile with combat pack in ten minutes and march eight miles in two hours. When soldiers are in actual contact with the enemy, it is almost impossible to maintain physical condition, but if the physical condition is high before they gain contact, it will not fall off sufficiently during contact to be detrimental.
(2) Much time is wasted in mounting and dismounting mortars and machine guns. Standing gun drill will be practiced so
that the operation will be automatic and can be accomplished in the dark. The ladder method of ranging with mortars is recommended.
(3) Our ability to fight at night, as opposed to moving into position at night for a dawn attack, is pitiably bad. We must learn to execute the attack in the dark.
(4) Sharpen axes, pickaxes, and shovels now, and keep them sharp.
(5) Battles are fought by platoons and squads. Place emphasis on small unit combat instruction so that it is conducted with the same precision as close-order drill. A good solution applied with vigor now is better than a perfect solution ten minutes later.
(6) In instruction from the squad to the regiment, sand tables should be used, and the officer or non-com being instructed should give the actual orders he will give in combat. Sand tables need not be complicated. A piece of ground in the lee of a building is just as good and much simpler.
(7) Officers and men must know their equipment. They must train with the equipment they intend to use in battle. Equipment must be in the best operational condition when taken to the Theater of Operations.
d. Guides for Officers
(1) Officers must possess self-confidence and the confidence of their men. Two of the best ways of producing this is meticulously conducted close-order drill, conducted by officers, and platoon marches of forty-eight to sixty hours, during which the platoon is wholly on its own.
(2) In the first actions, new troops must receive aggressive leadership by all grades, including general officers, who must be seen in the front line during action.
(3) The Adjutant General or Secretary to
General Staff must keep for the immediate information of the Commanding General a list showing casualties, materiel losses, prisoners of war, captured materiel, and replacements of both men and materiel received. Two lists are necessary. The first one based on rumor, the second corrected by data. The first one will be found surprisingly close to the second one.
(4) Note the time of your requests for, and the time of arrival of, all artillery and air support missions called for. If support fails to arrive, so note.
(5) There is a universal failure to repeat oral orders back. This failure is certain to result in grave errors.
(6) Messages and orders must use concise military verbiage.
(7) Push wire communications to the limit. A wire phone is worth three radios for both speed and security.
(8) Battalion and company commanders fail to use runners and walkie-talkie radios. They frequently fail to have runners with or near them.
(9) Military police at road junctions must have a map or diagram showing the points to which various roads lead and the units to be found on them.
(10) Don’t place large radio sets near CP’s if the CP is to be in position more than six hours. If radios must be used for longer periods, put them well away, scatter them, and use remote control.
e. Prisoners
German prisoners over forty talk more easily than the younger ones. They must be examined separately and not returned to the cage where the young ones are. Prisoners other than German usually talk freely and inaccurately. They, too, should be examined out of the hearing of, and later separated from the young Nazis.
/. Needless Firing
The needless firing of artillery will be checked by the senior artillery officer.
g. Needless Requirements
There is a tendency for the chain of command to overload junior officers by excessive requirements in the way of training and reports. You will alleviate this burden by eliminating nonessential demands.
2. Infantry
a. Infantry must move in order to close with the enemy. It must shoot in order to move. When physical targets are not visible, the fire of all infantry weapons must search the area occupied by enemy. Use marching fire. It reduces the accuracy of his fire and increases our confidence. Shoot short. Ricochets make nastier sounds and wounds. To halt under fire is folly. To halt under fire and not fire back is suicide. Move forward out of fire. Officers must set the example.
b. The heavy weapons set the pace. In the battalion the heavy weapons company paces the battalion. In the regiment the cannon company paces the regiment, but it is the function of the rifles and the light machine guns to see that the heavy weapons have a chance to move. In other words, the rifles and machine guns move the heavy weapons in to do the killing.
c. Mortars use great quantities of ammunition. The 81-mm. will fire 800 rounds and a 60-mm. 500 rounds in 24 hours. To provide this ammunition, transportation of all kinds must be utilized, and infantry riflemen in the vicinity of the mortars should each carry one round which they can dump at a predestined spot on going into the fire fight. When not on the move, all mortars, machine guns, and anti-tank guns of the infantry must be emplaced to fire.
d. Anti-tank guns should be placed where they cannot see or be seen beyond their lethal antitank range unless they are being used in the role of light artillery.
e. Few men are killed by the bayonet; many are scared by it. Bayonets should be fixed when the fire fight starts. Bayonets must be sharpened by the individual soldier. The German hates the bayonet and is inferior to our men with it. Our men should know this.
/. The M-l rifle is the most deadly rifle in the world. If you cannot see the enemy, you can at least shoot at the place where he is apt to be.
g. Flat trajectory fire against machine guns must be delivered near and parallel to the axis of enemy fire. This pins him down until the grenadiers with bomb and bayonet can kill him from behind.
h. Fire distribution is practically non-existent in our Army, with the result that those portions of the enemy who are visible receive all the fire, while those portions who are not visible fire on our men with perfect impunity. This defect will be corrected.
i. The infantry battalion is the smallest unit which can be sent on a separate mission. When so used, it is always desirable to reinforce it with artillery, anti-tank guns, AA guns, and, if possible, tanks and engineers.
/. Armored infantry should not attack mounted. It should use its vehicles to deploy mounted and also to assemble from deployed formation.
k. Night attacks mean attacks during darkness or by moonlight. On moonless nights the attack should start 2Vi hours before dawn twilight; on moonlight nights, with the moon. Night attack must be preceded by careful day reconnaissance and ample warning. Limited objectives must be sought and must be easily recognizable in the dark. Attack formation is in column or in line of columns. Distances and intervals are reduced Depth is necessary.
l. Supporting fires must be arranged, first, to attack the enemy after our infantry has been discovered, second, to destroy counter-attacks at dawn. Assaulting columns are preceded by a
security detachment which in turn is preceded by a patrol. The security detachment and patrol are absorbed when contact is made. In addition to the assaulting columns, a reserve should be available for exploitation after daylight. Countersign and challenge and identification marks on sleeve or helmet are necessary. Offensive grenades should be used. When discovered, open rapid fire and m
ake as much noise as possible, while rushing in to use the bayonet.
m. The defense will consist of mutually supporting small groups arranged in depth and completely wired in. Mines will be placed.
n. All infantry officers must be able to observe and direct artillery fire.
3. Artillery
a. Sixty-five to seventy-five per cent of all artillery targets are provided by forward observers. The same percentage of tactical information originates with these observers, but much of the information of both characters the observers get comes from the infantry. Therefore, the forward observer must be in intimate association with the infantry. He must be under the control of the artillery liaison officer with the battalion. Artillery officers with infantry do not return to their batteries at night.
b. As soon as a position is captured, the forward observer must report through the liaison officer which of the possible channels of hostile counter-attack he is in a position to cover with observed fire. This information must go to the infantry battalion commander.
c. Observers must be able to operate both by day and night. Use any caliber of gun at any time to hit any target of opportunity. For this reason forward observers of large calibers must be up.
d. Artillery observers on their own initiative will bring fire on enemy weapons firing on our infantry. Infantry officers are equally responsible to call for such fire.
e. Machine guns giving local protection to artillery must be sufficiently far out to prevent small-arms fire bothering the firing battery.
f. Construct dummy batteries. In choosing sites for them, avoid places where fire directed at them will adversely affect other arms.
g. Tank attacks can be stopped by artillery concentration of white phosphorus and high explosive.
h. Artillery will be emplaced as far forward as possible and will move forward at every opportunity.
4. Armor
a. The primary mission of armored units is the attacking of infantry and artillery. The enemy’s rear is the happy hunting ground for armor. Use every means to get it there.
b. The tactical and technical training of our armored units is correct. Added emphasis should be put on tank crew training with a view to hitting the enemy first.
c. Against counter-attacks, the offensive use of armor striking the flank is decisive. Hence a deep penetration by infantry, whose rear is protected by armor, is feasible and safe.
IV.
d. There is no such thing as “tank country” in a restrictive sense. Some types of country are better than others, but tanks have and can operate anywhere.
e. The integrity of armored divisions should be preserved through the use of GHQ tank battalions for special, close supporting missions with infantry. On such missions, the tanks should advance by bounds, from cover to cover in rear of the infantry. They will only be exposed when the situation demands their intervention. In such cases they will attack in close association with the infantry.
5. Reconnaissance
a. Reconnaissance, particularly on the part of the infantry, must be stressed, especially at night. It is necessary to secure information every night through the capture of prisoners and the observation of hostile actions. Good men must lead those patrols. Mechanized observation units should not be employed for security except in cases of dire emergency.
b. Junior officers of reconnaissance units must be very inquisitive. Their reports must be accurate and factual. Negative information is as important as positive information. Information must be transmitted in the clear by radio and at once. The location of the unit giving the information should, where possible, be in a modified code. The enemy should be located by a magnetic azimuth and range from the point of observation. All members of a reconnaissance unit should know what they are trying to do. The results of all reconnaissance obtained in front of one division must be transmitted to adjacent units.
c. Reconnaissance must not lose contact. At night, when not in contact, listening posts should be at least six miles in front of our lines. Day reconnaissance must be pushed until contact is made. The use of light tanks in night reconnaissance usually induces the enemy to fire and display his position.
IV. AA and Anti-Tanks
1. AA
a. At least one, preferably self-propelled, AA weapon should be attached to each company or battery of artillery, infantry, or tanks. There should be two at Headquarters from the Division up. The 155 and larger guns should have at least two AA mounts per battery. Owing to our air superiority, AA should never open fire until attacked. AA is also good for anti-tank.
2. Anti-Tanks
a. Towed anti-tank guns should be well to the front and located to cover likely avenues of enemy tank approach. They must be emplaced so that they cannot see or be seen beyond their lethal anti-tank range. Self-propelled anti-tank weapons should be held in reserve to intervene
against enemy armored attacks. They should locate routes to and firing positions from probable sites of future activities. All anti-tank guns should be trained to fire as artillery and be provided with a large proportion of high-explosive shell.
V. Maintenance
1. Weapons will be kept in perfect order.
2. Preventive maintenance will be enforced. Particular attention should be given to tire pressure, lubrication, battery, voltage, water in radiators. Vehicles will be serviced and made operational before their crews rest. Vehicles will be marked in accordance with paragraph 6-14, A-R 850-5.
VI. Care of Men
1. Officers are responsible, not only for the conduct of their men in battle, but also for their health and contentment when not fighting. An officer must be the last man to take shelter from fire, and the first to move forward. Similarly, he must be the last man to look after his own comfort at the close of a march. He must see that his men are cared for. The officer must constantly interest himself in the rations of the men. He should know his men so well that any sign of sickness or nervous strain will be apparent to him, and he can take such action as may be necessary.
2. He must look after his men’s feet, see that they have properly fitting shoes in good condition. That their socks fit—loose or tight socks make sore feet. He must anticipate change of weather and see that proper clothing and footgear is asked for and obtained.
3. Field and evacuation hospitals must be kept as close to the front as enemy fire permits. The shorter a haul of a wounded man to the hospital, the better his chances of recovery.
4. Hospitals should be placed in the open and clearly marked. Do not permit liaison planes or groups of vehicles to park near them. Such action gives the enemy an excuse for attacking.
5. The successful soldier wins his battles cheaply so far as his own casualties are concerned, but he must
remember that violent attacks, although costly at the time, save lives in the end. He must remember that replacements need special attention and see that they get acclimatized to their new units as quickly and harmoniously as possible.
/s/ G. S. Patton, Jr.
G. S. Patton, Jr.
Lt. General U.S. Army, Commanding SECRET
Headquarters Third United States Army APO 403
25 September, 1944
Subject: Letter of Instruction Number 4 To : Corps Commanders and the Commanding General XIX Tactical Air Command
1. The acute supply situation confronting us has caused the Supreme Commander to direct that, until further orders, the Third Army, with its supporting troops, and those elements of the Ninth Army placed in the line, will assume the defensive.
2. It is evident that the successful accomplishment of this mission will require particular concentration upon two points:
a. First, this change in attitude on our part must be completely concealed from the enemy, who, should he learn of it, would certainly move troops from our front to oppose other Allied Armies.
b. Second, we must be in possession of a suitable line of departure so that we can move rapidly when the Supreme Commander directs us to resume t
he offensive.
3. In order to carry out the requirements of paragraph 2a, above, we will not dig in, wire, or mine, but will utilize a thin outpost zone backed at suitable places by powerful mobile reserves. We will further insure that all possible avenues of tank attacks are registered in by all batteries—Division, Corps, and Armies—whose guns can bear. Under the supervision of the Army Artillery Officer these zones of concentration will be numbered from north
to south and recorded on a uniform map to be distributed to the units concerned, so that fire may instantly be opened in any zone. Further, a copy of this map will be placed in the possession of the Commanding General of the XIX Tactical Air Command so that he may co-ordinate the concentration of planes upon any critical area in the most expeditious manner. Counter-attacks by our mobile reserves should be planned and executed to secure a double envelopment of the hostile effort with the purpose of not only defeating it but destroying it.
4. To insure our possessing a suitable line of departure for the future offensive, we shall secure the dotted line shown on the attached overlay by means of limited operations in consonance with our reduced scale of supply. To provide the necessary means for such limited operations, the utmost parsimony will be used in the expenditure of gasoline and ammunition consistent with the economy of the lives of our troops.
5. Wherever circumstances admit, troops not in the immediate presence of the enemy will be billeted. As soon as the troops so billeted have rested and been equipped, they will be given constant practice in offensive tactics.
6. The defensive instructions contained in this letter will not be circulated below the grade of General Officer.
7. In closing, I desire to again compliment all of you on the magnificent dash and skill which you have shown in the operation to date. We only await the signal to resume our career of conquest.
/s/ G. S. Patton, Jr.
G. S. Patton, Jr.
War as I Knew It Page 39