Within the group, innovation was prized. Insurgents designed new explosive devices using a clever array of, at first, remote manual detonators and later, automatic detonators to make their bombs more precise and targeted.54 The group also developed its own take on already-existing weapons, including the improvised projected grenade (IPG) and the projected recoilless improvised grenade (PRIG).55 By developing precision-guided weapons, the PIRA sought to maximize COIN force casualties while reducing harm to civilians, thus helping the group to enjoy what it deemed as acceptable levels of popular support in Northern Ireland.
The PIRA maintained numerous weapons caches in both Northern Ireland and the ROI. As part of the group’s “long war doctrine,” which committed members to a lifetime of conflict, the insurgents stockpiled weapons, hoarded explosives, and relentlessly searched for ways to acquire the most modern and lethal technology. Acquiring and amassing weapons remained a top priority of the PIRA until the very end. Invariably throughout the conflict, British COIN forces and ROI police (Gardaí) intercepted large weapons shipments and successfully executed several high-profile arms recovery operations, yielding substantial amounts of weaponry. Despite setbacks, however, the PIRA always remained active. The insurgents maintained at least five bomb-making factories in the Republic at all times. Most of these facilities were extremely secure and in some cases were constructed as fortified bunkers.56 It was also not uncommon for the PIRA to use the home of widows and single mothers to hide their weapons. This particular demographic drew less attention from the police and was able to earn some extra money by providing the PIRA with a critical service, while also contributing to the insurgents’ cause.
Intelligence
As the organization evolved and matured, the insurgents became more specialized. Select insurgents were schooled in bomb-making while others were groomed as snipers, logisticians, or intelligence experts.57 Intelligence, along with the following departments—Quartermaster, Security, Operations, Foreign Operations, Finance, Training, Engineering, Education, and Publicity—was one of the GHQ’s designated priorities.58 The focus on intelligence became more intense following the switch to a cellular structure in late 1970s, where the intent was to treat intelligence at the local level as a specialized function.59
Developing and maintaining an extensive network of sources was one of the PIRA’s top priorities. Members specializing in intelligence were tasked with a range of activities, from collection, collation, storage, and dissemination to surveillance and reconnaissance. Since operational security was the sine qua non of successful operations, the PIRA needed to ensure that those conducting attacks remained safe, but also that collateral damage (especially civilian casualties) remained low. Intelligence was also critical to monitoring the movements of high-value targets, including high-ranking members of the security forces and paramilitary groups. The PIRA actively sought intelligence to help facilitate targeting priorities and much of this intelligence came from the local community.
Sanctuary, Safe Haven, and Operational Space
In an insurgency, establishing a sanctuary is integral to success. For the majority of its terror campaign, the PIRA took advantage of safe havens around Northern Ireland, as well as sanctuaries in both the Republic of Ireland and the United States, although each country was used for different purposes at different times. The United States was mostly a place for insurgents to raise funds, evade capture, and coalesce political support; the ROI served as a “rear base” from which insurgents could hold important meetings, plan attacks, conduct weapons training, and amass their arsenal. During the 1980s, many PIRA fighters spent time in Libyan training camps at the invitation of Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Qaddafi.
From safe houses located south of the border, PIRA insurgents could hide out after conducting an attack in the North. Safe houses provided insurgents with a place to lay low and a change of clothes to discard any evidence from an attack, including blood and gunpowder residue. The most important function of safe havens south of the border, however, was the ability of the PIRA’s most senior members to gather in one location without being detected or arrested by the authorities. Clandestine movements need to avoid detection, and depending on group cohesion and organizational structure, the loss of an insurgent group’s top leadership can deliver a potentially fatal blow to the organization. The General Army Convention (GAC), a meeting of the PIRA’s senior leadership, was held at various locations throughout the ROI. This allowed the group to debate high-level decisions regarding the organization, including its military strategy, the role of politics, leadership composition, and the future direction of the organization.
Long an under-researched aspect of insurgent organizations, the amount of money needed to successfully execute lethal operations against COIN forces “extends far beyond the purchase of a gun and bullets which culminate in an attack.”60 The planning and preparation for operations included, but were not limited to: transport costs, the maintenance of weapons storage sites, the support of safe houses, vehicles used to transport arms, and the purchase of radio equipment. Transport costs included the price of petrol used in transporting the operatives to and from the scene of the attack or the purchase of train, bus, or airplane tickets for international operations.
Payments were made to those individuals who allowed their homes or property to be used as weapons storage sites as well as to those whose homes were used to hide prisoners, many times for extended periods, in order to avoid detection by security forces following a PIRA operation. While these may seem like banal details, they are essential to executing a successful attack. Besides a reputation for brutality, PIRA insurgents were meticulous planners. Finally, the PIRA purchased between six and eight cars to transport arms from storage sites to border areas, as well as radio equipment for monitoring the movement of security forces prior to and following an attack.61
Training
Considered one of the most lethal insurgent groups of the modern era, it is essential to examine the tactics, techniques, and procedures that proved so critical to the success of the PIRA. The PIRA believed that if it ever had a chance to defeat the British militarily, its own fighters would have to hold themselves to the same rigorous training standards endured by elite units like the British Special Air Service (SAS). By placing an emphasis on training, the leadership was able to identify highly capable recruits who took pride in honing their craft, whether it was bomb-making, sniping, or reconnaissance.
A shared culture and history, geographical proximity, and a lingering resentment of the British made the ROI the most logical safe haven for PIRA members and new recruits who were instructed in small arms handling, target practice, demolition techniques, and general field craft.62 The long border was hard to defend and in some cases PIRA members owned property that straddled both sides of the border. Northern Command included not just the six counties of Northern Ireland, but also the five border counties of Louth, Cavan, Monaghan, Donegal, and Leitrim.63 Besides geography, the Republic was a model sanctuary because it had a relatively sympathetic population, limited internal security force activities, and vast rural areas where the insurgents could disguise their activities from the authorities.64
To allow for diversification without diluting an acquired specialization, “units used rotation or ‘apprenticeship’ processes to spread specific types of knowledge or expertise.”65 Specialization afforded the insurgents a degree of tactical and operational flexibility. Attacks were tailored to the abilities of different units in different areas of operation. Units operating in more rural areas like South Armagh typically experienced a slower learning curve and were given the opportunity to immerse themselves into a specialization slowly and with the deliberate oversight of battle-tested mentors. In contrast, units that operated in Belfast and other urban areas known for a high operations tempo were thrown “in at the deep end quickly,” which led to more mistakes and a greater chance that something could go awry with an operation.66
Certain cel
ls within the explosive unit were tasked with institutionalizing the production of the bombs’ electronic components.67 This effort was a defensive countermeasure, aimed at ensuring that PIRA bombs would not be prematurely detonated by the security forces or explode inadvertently, killing PIRA members or innocent bystanders. To avoid complacency, the PIRA trained not only its own members, but also traveled abroad to develop a network with other terrorist and insurgent groups that would allow it to hone its skills and learn new techniques and guerilla tactics. The Provos exchanged training tips and tactics with myriad terrorist groups including FARC, the PLO, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and Fatah.68 In July 1973, PIRA insurgents attended a meeting in Libya with members from the German Baader-Mainhof gang, the Japanese United Revolutionary Army, the Liberation Front of Iran, the Turkish People’s Liberation Army, and the Uruguayan Tupamaros.69
Organizational Capabilities
The leadership of the PIRA was responsible for taking the group’s vast resources, as described above, and translating them into effective action. This had to be accomplished while maintaining group cohesion, a difficult task considering COIN force infiltration of the PIRA. The organization sought to achieve this through five main components—command and control (to include organizational structure), group composition, ideology, popular support, and public relations/propaganda. Each of these elements played a crucial role in determining the insurgency’s trajectory, as each individual component affected the organization’s strategic decision-making. Moreover, during the course of the 30-year conflict, each element changed considerably, altering the PIRA’s path along the way from violence to power sharing.
Leadership
As Sinn Fein became more prominent—both within Ulster politics and in relation to the PIRA overall—the financial resources needed to cover the group’s ever evolving infrastructure inevitably grew too. In addition to the organization’s headquarters in West Belfast, Sinn Fein established offices throughout the Republic of Ireland, held many public meetings and gatherings in hotels and pubs, and incurred substantial costs to remain competitive in local elections.70 Adams noted that British officials estimated that the expenses to operate Sinn Fein were three times what it cost to operate the PIRA as a militant group alone. When asked where Sinn Fein got the funds to run electoral campaigns, Gerry Adams sardonically replied, “We run cake fairs and things.”71
For a group like the PIRA, with a constantly evolving political wing in Sinn Fein, financing was even more important than for pure militant groups. “Finance is one of the most important long-term, fundamental, limiting factors for the development of a terrorist group and its political wing,” notes Horgan.72 Finance became seamlessly integrated into Sinn Fein more broadly, as its “advice centers” doubled as centers of illegal economic distribution, record-keeping, and personnel who could be tasked to partake in a range of economic rackets.73 When the decision was made to turn away from armed robbery as a financing mechanism, the leadership began to emphasize local donations from collections throughout Ireland (both north and south), especially from the Gaelic Athletic Association and Republican Clubs.74
Ideology
The PIRA was born of an ideological split in 1969, with staunch Marxists led by Cathal Goulding forming the Official IRA and Sean MacStiofain leading what would become the PIRA. At the core of the dispute was the Provisionals’ commitment to violence as both a means of protection and of achieving political goals. For the new guard, older members’ ideological fervor obfuscated the IRA’s traditional focus on militarism.75 A young Gerry Adams had no illusions about the utility of militarism. “There are those who tell us that the British Government will not be moved by armed struggle… [Yet] the history of Ireland and of colonial involvement throughout the world tells us that they will not be moved by anything else.”76
The PIRA is typically referred to as an ethno-nationalist group. However, this description hardly does justice to explaining the intricacies of the group’s ideology. Combined with a strict adherence to armed resistance against what it viewed as oppressive British imperialist policies, the PIRA’s political thought could most aptly be described as an amalgamation of “socialist politics and violent aggression.”77 Over the course of its lifespan, the organization espoused affinity for groups in Cuba, South Africa, Palestine, Vietnam, Nicaragua, and El Salvador. Many Irish Republicans were convinced that the British presence in Northern Ireland was motivated by economic gain, not cultural affinity, and certainly not for providing governance beyond Loyalist communities (even though Catholics were eligible for, and many did receive, welfare benefits from the British state).
What the conflict was not about was religion. “There is not one IRA statement that would cite the Bible or Catholic doctrine in support of, or as justification for, any of its actions.”78 On many issues, the leadership of the Roman Catholic Church in Ireland and the PIRA’s leadership were at odds.
The conflict in Northern Ireland involved an ethnic dimension, but at its core, the insurgency was, like all insurgencies, about politics. Though the differences were more substantive, on the face of things Catholic simply meant Nationalist, or Republican; Protestant was interchangeable with Unionist, or Loyalist. Throughout its lifespan, the PIRA, or at least the most influential among its leadership, came to recognize that violence was no longer an effective means of realizing its political aspirations. Violence did advance short-term objectives, especially when paired with “armed propaganda.”79 But longer-term goals, including the PIRA’s stated aim to remove any semblance of a British presence from the North, came to be seen as political problems with political solutions.
Human Resources and Recruitment
Upon being sworn into the group, newly-minted PIRA members pledged an oath to uphold the values of the Óglaigh na hÉireann and were anointed as “Volunteers of the Provisional Irish Republican Army.”80 And just as in a volunteer army, volunteers chose to enter service, but did not work for free and were given regular pay. Sometimes referred to as the human resources dimension of insurgency, fighters still need to be remunerated for their services. This compensation took the form of cash payments, so insurgents could take care of the needs of their families and maintain a reserve of money for ordinary activities like food and shelter, when it was not provided directly by the group. Some members held down regular jobs in addition to their PIRA activity while others were considered too valuable and central to the organization to focus their energy anywhere other than on the organization itself. These individuals were considered “full-time staff,” and were likely known to the security services. More often than not, this meant they needed to take care to conceal their activities and movements and lead an extremely clandestine existence.81
Although the figures are still a matter of debate, reports indicate that up until 1994, ASU members received £30–£40 per week, depending on their actual role in the organization as well as the geographical location from which they operated (think of it in terms of destination-based per diem). Taking into account the PIRA’s 400–500 estimated members, weekly payouts totaled £12,000 or more.82 Conventional wisdom holds that when individuals receive a regular salary, they are less likely to supplement their incomes by engaging in illegal criminal activities, which bring unwanted attention on the group and expose members to arrest, prosecution, and the possibility of being “flipped,” or turned into an informer, or “tout,” against the group.83
The PIRA was keenly aware of the importance of community support in executing a successful guerilla strategy. In the Handbook for Volunteers of the Irish Republican Army, or the Green Book as it sometimes referred to, the PIRA laid out clear guidelines for collaboration with the local population.84 According to Cronin, “terrorist groups generally cannot survive without either active or passive support from surrounding populations.”85 The PIRA collected “donations,” from the Catholics in Northern Ireland who viewed its existence as crucial to their own survival and would therefore do
anything necessary to ensure its continuation.86
Media, PR, Propaganda, and Publicity
The use of public relations and propaganda in modern day insurgency is considered “a given.” With the ubiquity of social media and the low cost of communication technology, news that the Taliban use the social media site Twitter to report attacks (many of them fictitious or prone to hyperbole) is met with a yawn. When the PIRA was beginning its campaign of terror against the British state in the early 1970s, media was considered a fairly unique innovation. The PIRA developed its own newspaper, Dublin-based An Phoblacht, the first edition of which appeared in early 1970.87 In June 1970 the Provos resurrected The Republican News, which would become the most widely read newspaper in the North. The PIRA used its newspapers for three main reasons.
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