by Norman Ohler
110. Ibid., letter from the Hamma Company to the pharmacist Jost, October 29, 1942.
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111. BArch-Koblenz N1348, letter from Morell to his wife, May 16, 1940.
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112. BArch-Freiburg R43, letter from the Hamma Company to the SS leadership headquarters/medical office, August 26, 1941.
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113. The SS also used Morell’s Vitamultin in the Russian war—see Himmler’s confirmation of January 12, 1942 (IfZArch, MA 617, Roll 2): “The Führer has ordered that the Waffen-SS units on the Eastern Front be issued with suitable vitamin preparations. The company HAMMA GmbH, Hamburg, has been commissioned to produce these vitamin preparations. You are requested to support this company in every way with supplies of the necessary raw material and other forms of assistance, so that this order from the Führer can be put into effect within the due date. The Reichsführer—SS.”
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114. BArch-Koblenz N1348, letter from Morell to his wife, May 16, 1940.
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115. Letter from Theo Morell to Göring concerning Hippke, Records of Private Individuals (Captured German Records), Dr. Theo Morell, National Archives Microfilm Publication T253, Roll 35, National Archives, College Park, MD.
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116. BArch-Freiburg ZA 3/801, Richard Suchenwirth, “Hermann Göring,” unpublished study, pp. 42ff.
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117. Anthony Aldgate and Jeffrey Richards, Britain Can Take It: The British Cinema in the Second World War (2nd ed.), London, 2007, p. 120.
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118. Horst Freiherr von Luttitz, quoted in Schlaflos im Krieg, documentary film by Pieken, Gorch, and Sönke el Bitar, Arte, 2010.
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119. From Johannes Steinhoff, Die Strasse von Messina, Berlin, 1995, pp. 177ff. Steinhoff, who reflects on his deployment in the Second World War, was in the 1950s one of those chiefly responsible for the construction of the Luftwaffe of the Bundeswehr. Later he became chair of the NATO Military Committee, before moving to the arms industry in the mid-1970s. This account of the use of methamphetamine, dating from 1943, reads as if Steinhoff, who also took part in the Battle of Britain in 1940, is here describing his first and only use of the stimulant.
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120. Ibid.
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121. Ibid.
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122. Theo Osterkamp, Durch Höhen und Tiefen jagt ein Herz, Heidelberg, 1952, p. 245. See also Speer, Erinnerungen, p. 272.
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123. Wolfgang Falck, Falkenjahre: Erinnerungen, 1903–2003, Moosburg, 2003, p. 230.
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124. Richard, J. Overy, “German Aircraft Production, 1939–1942,” in A Study of the German War Economy, Ph.D. thesis, Queens College, Cambridge, 1977, p. 97.
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125. BArch-Freiburg ZA 3/842, Göring to Lieutenant Colonel Klosinski, Commodore of K Unit 4, in autumn 1944, quoted from the record of the Suchenwirth’s interview with Klosinski on February 1, 1957; see hss.ulb.uni-bonn.de/2005/0581/0581.pdf.
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126. In the First World War not an unusual way of overcoming fatigue. In his lecture on stimulants, February 1940, not delivered (BArch-Freiburg, RH 12–23/1882), Ranke also goes into this issue but rejects it for his own time: “Stimulants are highly effective medications. Cocaine . . . is unsuitable for military use because of the addiction that arises, leading to severe physical and psychological damage.”
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127. BArch-Freiburg ZA 3/326, typed report about the discussion with the Reich Marshal on October 7, 1943, “Re: Home Defense Program.”
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128. Heinz Linge, Bis zum Untergang, Munich, 1980, p. 219.
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129. Reproduced from “Udet Ernst, Spasspilot, Kriegsverbrecher und komischer Zeichner,” in Christian Meurer, Wunderwaffe Witzkanone: Heldentum von Hess bis Hendrix, Münster, 2005, essay 9, pp. 73ff.
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130. German Information Office Berlin, November 18, 1941. Quoted in Ernst Udet, Mein Fliegerleben, Berlin, 1942.
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131. Thomas Menzel, “Ernst Udet—Des Teufels General,” 2013, https://www.bundesarchiv.de/oeffentlichkeitsarbeit/bilder_dokumente/01075/index-31.html.de.
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132. See also BArch-Freiburg ZA 3/805, Richard Suchenwirth, Ernst Udet: Generalluftzeugmeister der deutschen Luftwaffe, unpublished study.
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133. Methamphetamine is both distinctly more powerful than amphetamine and demonstrably neurotoxic if used improperly (too high a dose, excessively frequent use). It reduces the formation and availability of serotonin and dopamine in the central nervous system, and can permanently change the neurochemistry of the body.
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134. BArch-Freiburg RH 12–23/1884, letter from Conti, December 20, 1940.
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135. BArch-Freiburg RH 12–23/1884, letter from Handloser, January 20 and 29, 1941.
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136. Speer, “Das Pervitinproblem,” p. 18.
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137. Holzer, Die Geburt der Drogenpolitik, pp. 242ff.
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138. These are the official figures. But we must assume that the Temmler Works, without the knowledge of the Reich Health Office (RGA), which was attempting to collect data, was also delivering directly to the Wehrmacht. This might explain the discrepancy of 49.8 pounds of Pervitin substances between the official figures of the Opium Office in the RGA and Temmler’s 1943 sales statistics. Holzer, Die Geburt der Drogenpolitik, pp. 245ff.
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139. BArch-Berlin NS 20–139–6/Rundschreiben Vg. 9/41, NSDAP, Hauptamt für Volksgesundheit, February 3, 1941, Conti. Quoted in Holzer, Die Geburt der Drogenpolitik, p. 244.
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140. RGBl.I, June 12, 1941, p. 328: “6. Verordnung über Unterstellung weitererStoffe unter die Bestimmungen des Opiumgesetzes.”
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141. Experienced medical officers such as Army Medical Inspector Anton Waldmann had already warned early on: “The people are nervous, irritable. Stress levels elevated due to their extraordinarily heightened performance—but herein also lies the danger of a total sudden collapse, if we do not ease off and allow rest, sleep, recovery, and success.” Waldmann, unpublished diary, entry for November 1, 1940, “Wehrgeschichtliche Lehrsammlung des Sanitätsdienstes der Bundeswehr.”
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142. Confirmation from the Reich Chemistry Office, May 7, 1941, to the Temmler Company: “In accordance with the decree from the Reich Defense Secretary, the prime minister, Reich Marshal Göring, about the urgency of the Wehrmacht manufacturing programs,” Landesarchiv Berlin, A Rep. 250–02–09 Temmler.
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3. High Hitler: Patient A and His Personal Physician (1941–1944)
1. IfZArch, MA 617, Roll 2, text of a speech by Theo Morell, p. 4. Very much a child of his time, here he brings together two quotations assuming a classic paternalistic assignment of roles between doctor and patient: “The relationship of trust . . .” comes from the book by the West Prussian doctor and medical writer Erwin Liek (1878–1935), Der Arzt und seine Sendung (1925); the last sentence quoted here is from Bismarck’s personal physician, Emil Schweninger.
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2. Joachim C. Fest, Hitler: Eine Biographie, Berlin, 1973, p. 535.
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3. Ibid., p. 992.
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4. Der Spiegel, 42/1973, p. 201.
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5. Hans Bernd Gisevius, Adolf Hitler: Versuch einer Deutung, Munich, 1963, p. 523.
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6. Ian Kershaw, Hitler, 1936–45: Nemesis, London, 2000, p. 612. Elsewhere, too, Kershaw is dismissive of Morell’s importance: “At any rate, Morell and his medicines were neither a major nor even a minor part of the explanation of Germany’s plight in the autumn of 1944” (p. 728).
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7. Hans-Joachim Neumann and Henrik Eberle, War Hitler krank?—Ein abschlie
ßender Befund, Cologne, 2009, pp. 97 and 100.
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8. BArch-Koblenz N1348, Morell entry, November 8, 1944.
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9. From the “File on Professor Morell,” Camp Sibert, January 15, 1946, Entry ZZ-5, in IRR–Personal Name Files, RG NO. 319, Stack Area 230, Row 86, Box 11, National Archives, College Park, MD.
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10. Ibid.
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11. Special Report 53 identifies as experts Professor Dr. Felix Haffner, director of the Pharmacological Institute at Tübingen University; Professor Dr. Konrad Ernst, also of Tübingen University; and Dr. Theodor Benzinger von Krebsstein: “On 23 April 1947, these three scientists signed a written statement to the effect that from the existing files of information nothing could be found to point to the possibility that Hitler had often received narcotics.” Professor Dr. Heubner from the Pharmacological Institute of Berlin University was also contacted, as well as Professor Dr. Linz, director of the Opium Office in the Reich Health Office. Both denied that Hitler might have received narcotics in larger quantities. But there were also other voices: the criminal investigator Jungnickel of the drug squad in Berlin as well as Jost, owner of the Engel pharmacy in Berlin-Mitte, and Professor Müller-Hess, director of the Institute of Legal Medicine and Criminology at Berlin University, stated that it was very possible that Hitler had been supplied with opiates by his personal physician—but were unable or unwilling to provide information about quantities and possible effects. In IRR–Impersonal Files, RG No. 319, Stack Area 770, Entry 134A, Box 7, “Hitler, Poisoning Rumors,” XE 198119, National Archives, College Park, MD.
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12. “In order to provide further material for the debunking of numerous Hitler myths.” Ibid.
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13. BArch-Koblenz N1118, Goebbels, posthumous papers, letter to Hitler, Christmas 1943.
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14. Percy Ernst Schramm, “Adolf Hitler: Anatomie eines Dikators” (5th and last installment), Der Spiegel, 10/1964.
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15. Quoted in Ernst Günther Schenck, Dr. Morell: Hitlers Leibarzt und seine Medikamente, Schnellbach, 1998, p. 110.
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16. BArch-Koblenz N1348, Morell’s medical diary, August 18, 1941.
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17. BArch-Koblenz N1348, Morell entry, August 9, 1943.
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18. BArch-Freiburg RH 12–23/1884. See also Tilmann Holzer, Die Geburt der Drogenpolitik aus dem Geist der Rassehygiene: Deutsche Drogenpolitik von 1933 bis 1972, inaugural dissertation, Mannheim, 2006, p. 247.
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19. BArch-Koblenz N1348, Morell entry, August 8, 1941.
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20. Ibid. On the composition of glyconorm see Morell’s posthumous papers, in this instance his letter of December 2, 1944.
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21. BArch-Koblenz N1348, Morell entry, August 8, 1941.
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22. Morell even used leeches, a traditional domestic remedy that was supposed to hinder blood clotting and act as bloodletting on a small scale. Hitler himself tapped them out of the jar, and Morell used his fingers to put them under his patient’s ear, as they kept slipping out of his tweezers. “The one at the front sucked faster, the one at the back only very slowly,” he noted conscientiously. “The one at the front fell off at first, let go at the bottom, and dangled freely. The one at the back sucked for half an hour longer, then it too let go at the bottom, and I had to pull it off at the top. The bleeding then went on for about two hours. Because of the two bandage strips the Führer did not go to dinner.” Ibid., August 11, 1941.
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23. Philipp Keller, Die Behandlung der Haut- und Geschlechtskrankheiten in der Sprechstunde, Heidelberg, 1952.
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24. BArch-Koblenz N1348, Morell entry, August 27, 1941.
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25. An overview with explanations about the individual medications that Hitler took can be found at www.jkris.dk/jkris/Histomed/hitlermed/hitlermed.htm.
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26. Quoted in Ottmar Katz, Prof. Dr. Med. Theo Morell: Hitlers Leibarzt, Bayreuth, 1982, p. 219.
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27. Percy E. Schramm (ed.), Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht, 1940–1941, vol. 2, 1982, p. 673.
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28. Ibid., entry for October 21, 1941, p. 716.
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29. BArch-Freiburg RH 12–23/1882, Dr. Otto Guther, “Erfahrungen mit Pervitin,” January 27, 1942.
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30. This also applied to the navy; see the escape of the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen from Brest Harbor. There the warship had repeatedly been exposed to British bomb attacks. To prevent it from being sunk, with the concomitant loss of prestige, Hitler ordered a retreat, along with the equally affected battleships Gneisenau and Scharnhorst. The problem lay in the fact that they had to pass through the English Channel in order to reach the German Bight, almost a two-day journey away. In previous centuries no enemy fleet had managed to pass the British coast, over three hundred miles long, unharmed. So the senior naval commander several times contradicted the order on the grounds that “it was impossible to obey.” But when, on the night of February 11, 1942, Brest Harbor was in dense fog and the crew of the British submarine that was watching the German base went to sleep because they did not expect the fleet to leave at that time of day, the ships weighed anchor. This was followed by a forty-eight-hour flight on full alert, during which no one was allowed to sleep. All the men were permanently on their stations: in the gun towers, in the engine room, in the control room, on deck. “In view of the fact that . . . a loss of concentration and performance on the part of any member of the crew could have had a damaging effect on the successful outcome of the enterprise, an order was issued to distribute Schokakola (1 pack per head) and Pervitin in tablets,” according to the medical log of the ship’s doctor of the Prinz Eugen for February 12. “Three tablets per head of fighting unit were issued.” At around midday the convoy passed Dover. Meanwhile the British had noticed what was happening right in front of their eyes. The coast artillery fired full blast, over 240 British bombers took off but were held in check by 280 German fighter planes. All hands were deployed on the ships, on heavy guns, on anti-aircraft weapons. An amphetamine sea battle: “The powerful stimulant effect of Pervitin on the central nervous system dispelled the need for sleep and the feeling of fatigue that were gradually making themselves felt,” Naval Senior Physician Witte reported. On the evening of February 13 the ships reached Wilhelmshaven. In England the penetration of the channel was received as one of the greatest marine humiliations in the history of Great Britain. The successful operation brought the Germans one thing in particular: the summary of the medical report states that “the supply of Pervitin to ships on operation was considered necessary. With a crew of 1,500 men a provision of about 10,000 tablets is required.” BArch-Freiburg RM 92-5221/Bl. 58–60, wartime log of the cruiser Prinz Eugen, January 1, 1942–January 31, 1943, vol. 2: “Secret Command Matter—Medical Report on the Cruiser Prinz Eugen’s Breakthrough from the English Channel to the German Bight, Between 11 February 1942 and 13 February 1942.”
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31. The rule of thumb: methamphetamine intolerance appears after three doses of 10 milligrams (three to four Pervitin pills) after only two to three days in succession. Nonetheless, each individual has a different tolerance threshold. Some need more even after the second application to achieve the initial effect; for others, a steady dosage can carry on for days without any noticeable decline in effect. Generally speaking, methamphetamine drowns out the natural limits of performance—warning signals from the body—through the artificial stimulation that it unleashes in the brain’s nerve cells. Limits of both psychical and physical working capacity are no longer perceived, but extended further and further, even if rest has been required for some time. So the drug’s profile fits the entire German action in Russia in exemplary fashion.
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32. BArch-Freiburg Rh 12–23/1384, Army Directive 1942, part B, no. 424, p. 276, “Combating the Abuse of Narcotics.” See also Holzer, Die Geburt der Drogenpolitik, pp. 289ff.
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33. Franz Halder, Kriegstagebuch: Tägliche Aufzeichnungen des Chefs des Generalstabes des Heeres, 1939–1942, vol. 3, Stuttgart, 1964, p. 311.
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34. Gisevius, Adolf Hitler: Versuch einer Deutung, p. 471. Quoted in Fest, Hitler, p. 647.
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35. BArch-Koblenz N1348, letter from Morell to the cardiac specialist Professor Weber, December 2, 1944: “Going for a walk had become quite an alien concept, as a daily period of a quarter of an hour in fresh air became the norm for many months.”
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36. Quoted in Ernst Günther Schenck, Patient Hitler, Augsburg, 2000, p. 389.
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37. IfZArch, MA 617, Roll 3. From a letter from Nissle, the inventor of Mutaflor, to Morell, March 1, 1943.
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38. Albert Speer, Erinnerungen, Frankfurt am Main, 1969, p. 592.
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39. IfZArch, MA 617, Roll 1, security measures for FHQ Werwolf, February 20, 1943.
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40. Speer, Erinnerungen, pp. 256ff.
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41. Quoted in Fest, Hitler, p. 660.
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42. Speer, Erinnerungen, pp. 358 and 368.
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43. Schramm, Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht, 1940–1941, entry for December 21, 1942.
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44. BArch-Koblenz N1348, Morell entry, August 18, 1942.
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45. Haffner, “Hitler, Poisoning Rumors,” p. 110.
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46. Fest, Hitler, p. 673.
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47. Speer, Erinnerungen, pp. 345, 342, and 472.
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48. Letter from the Engel-Apotheke to Theo Morell, August 29, 1942, National Archives Microfilm Publication T253/45.
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49. BArch-Koblenz N1348, Morell entry, December 9, 1942.
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50. Ibid., Morell entry, December 17, 1942.
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51. Quoted in Werner Pieper, Nazis on Speed: Drogen im 3. Reich, Birkenau-Löhrbach, 2002, p. 174.
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52. IfZArch, MA 617, Roll 1.