by Mark Simmons
Force D would sail from Alexandria, comprising the battleship Ramillies, cruisers Newcastle and Berwick supported by the anti-aircraft cruiser Coventry and five destroyers to join Force H. Meanwhile Manchester and Southampton passed to the east where Coventry and her destroyers would join them.
The rest of the Mediterranean Fleet was engaged in support of Greece. Aircraft from Illustrious attacked the seaplane base at Leros, while Eagle’s aircraft attacked Tripoli. Much of the surface fleet was covering convoys south and east of Malta.
Supermarina, informed that Force H and the convoy had put to sea from Gibraltar, ordered the Italian fleet to sea on 26 November, consisting of the Vittorio Veneto and Cesare with six heavy cruisers and fourteen destroyers commanded by Admiral Campioni. The Sicilian channel was covered by torpedo boats and destroyers.
At dawn the next day Force H was about 100 miles to the south west of Cape Spartivento. The Manchester and Southampton with the merchant ships were 25 mile swest-south-west. Reconnaissance from Malta had not picked up the Italian ships. Spotter aircraft from Ark Royal also initially found nothing until 09:00 when they raised the alarm, having spotted cruisers and destroyers south of Cape Spartivento steering southwest.
At first Admiral Somerville thought the aircraft report might have identified Force D coming from the east. By 10:15 they were confirmed as enemy ships. However Force D had been confirmed approaching from the southeast;Somerville now concentrated his ships. Within 30 minutes the two British fleets were within sight of each other.
The convoy was directed to steer well to the south inside Galita Island with destroyers and the old cruiser Despatch. Ark Royal prepared strike aircraft. The cruisers Sheffield, Southampton, Newcastle, Manchester and Berwick steered north toward the enemy, taking up the vanguard with five destroyers.Ramillies and Renown followed the cruisers at their best speeds. Renown was down to 27 knots because of a hot bearing in one shaft, but soon overtook Ramillies that was making her best speed of 20.7 knots.1
Captain A.W. Grey of Renown, in his official report indicated ‘The temperature of the bearing continued to fluctuate.’ although they ran the starboard inner shaft at slower revs ‘it was essential to keep the ship in action at the highest possible speed.’2
About 11:15 it was reported the enemy had turned away to the east. Somerville was still unsure of what he faced but knew it was vital to remain between the enemy and the convoy and ‘it was essential to show a bold front and attack the enemy as soon as possible.’3
Admiral Campioni, at about 10:15, received a report from a cruiser’s catapult aircraft that one battleship, two cruisers and four destroyers were 135 miles southwest of Cape Spartivento steering east. They had spotted Renown, although she was 30 miles closer, but they had failed to spot Ark Royal.
Campioni turned his force to the southeast at about 11:20. He was expecting a clash with Renown but wanting it to take place closer to Sicily. Around noon he received another report telling him of the junction between Force H and D, and the presence of an aircraft carrier. Another inaccurate report came in stating there were three British battleships. With the critical situation of the Italian fleet after the Taranto raid, Campioni’s orders were to ‘Seek battle only when in decisively superior force.’ Thus Campioni had the signal hoisted, ‘Do not join action’, and the fleet turned away to the east to return to Naples. In fact, apart from Ark Royal, the two sides were about equal in strength.
However the cruisers had already joined action. From Renown smoke had been sighted to the north at 12:15; minutes later the Italian cruisers opened fire. The British cruisers and Renown replied; even Ramillies fired two salvoes. All shots from the capital ships fell short.
On board Renown all knew when the main armament was firing. Stoker Petty Officer Bill Cain recalled ‘I was down below during the action and the sensation of having those 15-inch guns firing was terrific. One had the sensation of standing still for a second then leaping forward again after the concussion.’4 Leading Steward Ted Smith felt that the ship ‘literally shook in such conditions and dust rose and loose cork [antidrip-condensation] dropped from the deck-heads in great showers.’5
A running fight developed between the cruisers on an east-northeast course as both sides strained at their highest speeds, but the faster Italian ships began pulling away. From one of the first enemy salvoes the Berwick’s after turret was put out of action, and fifteen minutes later she was hit again.
At 12:44 eleven aircraft from Ark Royal attacked the Italian battleships; they concentrated on Vittorio Veneto but no hits were made and all aircraft returned safely. In the heat of battle the pilots mistakenly thought they had hit the battleships, and the anti-aircraft gunners thought some of the aircraft had been shot down.
The cruiser action continued, but no further damage was inflicted on either side. The only loss to the Italian fleet was the destroyer Lanciere, which was damaged and left dead in the water.
About 13:00 the British cruisers sighted the enemy battleships and soon came under a rain of heavy calibre shells. They turned away to the southeast under a smokescreen hoping the Italians would follow them toward Renown. However the Italians continued moving away east. The British cruisers took up the chase again, but could not close the gap and at 13:18 the action ceased.6
Also at 13:15 Admiral Somerville had decided to give up the chase and return to cover the convoy’s movement to the east and Malta. The fleet commanders came under criticism from both their political and military masters. Admiral Somerville on the return to Gibraltar found he was to face a board of enquiry; Churchill was all for replacing him. The board sat from 3–5 December and on the 6th announced their findings. These were that the original orders for the operations by Admiral Somerville were clear and concise; that the action was conducted in a correct and spirited manner conducive to the safety of the convoy and its timely arrival at its destination in the face of a superior enemy; and that the decision to abandon the chase at 13:10, although slightly early, was the correct one.
The Admiralty grudgingly accepted the report, reminding Somerville that his main objective was to ‘destroy the enemy’, but Churchill had failed in his bid to have Somerville removed from command.7 The First Sea Lord mentioned the board in a letter to Cunningham, who was quick to voice his opinion in reply.
You ask me if I was surprised at the board of enquiry on Force H’s action south of Sardinia. You will wish me to speak out quite frankly and say that I was very sorry for the decision, more especially as the board was set up before Force H had returned to harbour.
The action was an unsatisfactory one. When one is burdened with a convoy one’s hands are always tied to a certain extent. [This desired freedom of action from convoy responsibility would benefit Cunningham at Matapan.]
At the time I thought it intolerable that a Flag officer, doing his utmost in difficult circumstances should be continuously under the threat of findings of a board of enquiry waiting for him on his return to harbour if his action failed to commend themselves to those at home who knew little or nothing of the real facts of the case.8
The encounter off Cape Teulada, as the Italians called the Cape Spartivento action, was far from satisfactory from their point of view as well.
The British had achieved their main aim of passing the convoy through unscathed. Again inaccurate reconnaissance had dogged Admiral Campioni leading him to the wrong conclusions. The complete lack of effective air support was another factor, leaving the fleet open to carrier born attacks, although the fleet was close to Sardinian airfields. Requests for air support had to go via Supermarina, which in turn had to forward the request to Air Force High Command, which then went back down the chain of command to the regional airfields, an antiquated system. It was hardly surprising therefore that the Regia Aeronautica usually turned up late or not at all.
The war in Greece and Albania had gone from bad to worse, sparking a crisis in the Italian High Command, as noted in Ciano’s diary.
26 Novem
ber
Badoglio, after a conference with the Duce, has handed in his resignation.
28 November
Bad news from Albania Greek pressure continues, but above all our resistance is weakening.
5 December
The Duce intends to replace Admiral Cavagnari with Admiral Riccardi. My father’s opinion of the latter was not very high.9
In this reshuffle Admiral Campioni became Deputy Chief of Staff, effectively a desk job. He was replaced as fleet commander by Admiral Angelo Iachino, who had certainly shown a degree of aggression while commanding the 1st Cruiser Division.
Toward the end of 1940 it had become apparent to Admiral Cunningham that the Italian fleet now posed more of a threat in the western basin of the Mediterranean. In view of this he proposed sending the battleship Malaya to reinforce Force H. Once more it was done with the passage of a westbound convoy.
Warspite made her first visit to Malta in 1940 at this time. The island’s population and defenders were in good heart. The air attacks, which had started with such severity in June, had dwindled to virtually nothing, although air defence on the island was still a problem. Even the dockyard was practically back to normal as regards repair work.
The naval outlook in the Mediterranean at the end of 1940 for the British was good. They had a fair degree of control throughout the sea’s length, but things were about to change, as foreshadowed in Ciano’s diary:
6 December:
Conference with Marshal Milch, [Field Marshal Erhard Von Milch, and Hitler’s Secretary of State for Air] who has come to Rome to settle the question of the Stukas in the Mediterranean. He was calm and optimistic about the situation in general, including the Greek Question.10
Notes
1 Ciano, G. Ciano’s Diary 1937–1943 p.395
2 Playfair, Major-General I.S.O. The Mediterranean & Middle East Volume I p.302
3 Smith, Peter C. Hit First Hit Hard: HMS Renown 1916–1948 p.157
4 Ibid p.159
5 Ibid p.165
6 Playfair, p.305
7 Ibid p.306–307
8 Cunningham, A. B. A Sailor’s Odyssey p.293–294
9 Ciano, p.399–401
10 Ibid p402
8
Enter the Luftwaffe
A letter from Adolf Hitler to Mussolini on 20 November 1940 was largely a lecture on the deplorable consequences of Italy’s premature action against Greece. Mussolini was heard to comment on reading it: ‘He has really smacked my fingers.’ In the letter the Führer continued his proposal made to Count Ciano on his visit to the Berghof a few days before, part of which was to transfer German air units to Italy.1
On 10 December orders were issued for Fliegerkorps X from Norway – a unit that had specialised in attacks on shipping – to move to airfields in southern Italy. By 8 January, 96 bombers were established on Sicilian airfields; by mid-January the figure had risen to 186 aircraft of all types. The best aircraft for ship attacks was the JU 87 Stuka dive-bomber.
The Luftwaffe had ostensibly come to support the Regia Aeronautica but was soon calling the shots. The first priority was to attack British shipping, with the carrier Illustrious high on the list of targets. Next was to neutralise Malta. Later the mining of the Suez Canal and Alexandria was a consideration but this would really need the occupation of Crete, as most Luftwaffe aircraft were short range.
On 8 January the Regia Marina was bombed by Malta-based RAF Wellingtons at Naples. They managed to damage the Cesare, which resulted in Supermarina moving the capital ships further north.2
On 10 January the entire Mediterranean Fleet was at sea to take over escorting the eastbound convoy from Gibraltar, Operation Excess. Force H would cover the convoy as far as Sicily and then Cunningham would take over. Italian Savoia-Marchetti SM79s bombed the convoy with no success and lost two aircraft to Ark Royal’s Fulmars.
Charles Lamb on Illustrious recalled relaxing that fateful day in the early morning sunshine; he was gazing astern watching the destroyer HMS Gallant trying to catch up to her station on the carrier’s port quarter having carried out another task at full speed.
‘As we stood looking at the destroyer she broke into two pieces and the focsle sank at once, leaving the bulk of the ship wallowing on the surface like an open-ended tin box.’
This was quickly followed by the sound of the explosion. Gallant had hit a mine. What remained of the destroyer was towed into Malta, though she was never repaired.3
There was a certain amount of discontent on board Illustrious at the time over whether the carrier should have been taken so close into danger. Admiral Lyster and the ship’s Captain Denis Boyd pointed out to Cunningham that 806 Squadron only had a handful of serviceable fighter aircraft, and the carrier could still supply a degree of cover while out of range of enemy aircraft.
Cunningham replied that Illustrious was ‘to remain on station.’4 However it would have been difficult to supply an escort for the carrier alone. As usual Cunningham was short of destroyers; he had seven with the fleet, then six with the loss of Gallant.
The Stukas and JU 88s soon found the fleet and concentrated on Illustrious which flew off more fighters to join what she had in the air. ‘At times she became almost completely hidden in a forest of great splashes’, wrote Cunningham as the enemy attacked Illustrious,
I saw her hit early on just before the bridge, and in all, in something like ten minutes, she was hit by six 1,000lb bombs, to leave the line badly on fire, her steering gear crippled, her lifts out of action, and with heavy casualties.5
Stoker Albert Jones of Illustrious:
Things then began to happen so fast and changed to near chaos as the Germans began to score hits on us. With each successive explosion and the gunfire up top, a horrendous cacophony could be heard.
The second attack brought more hits.
Suddenly there was a tremendous explosion and the ship shuddered from stem to stern under the impact as if some unknown force had struck us with a gigantic sledgehammer.6
By 13:30 Illustrious was severely damaged. Bombs had wrecked the flight deck twisting it into grotesque shapes, destroyed nine aircraft, put half her guns out of action, and set the ship on fire fore and aft. Captain Boyd was ordered to make for Malta. For three hours the crew struggled to regain control; her steering gear had been disabled and she turned in circles. Control was finally regained by using the main engines to steer. About 16:00 she was attacked again but only hit once.
An hour later the battleships were attacked by fourteen aircraft but no hits were made. In an earlier attack Warspite had been hit once but the bomb had burst against the starboard bower anchor causing no great damage. On Valiant one man was killed and two wounded by splinters from a near miss. The enemy were chased off by Fulmars from Illustrious which had landed on Malta; refuelled and rearmed they had returned to aid the fleet.
By this time Illustrious was close to the southern shore of Malta. The fleet remained close at hand trying to lend her anti-aircraft fire support, but they parted company about 17:30. Finally, an hour after sunset with the stricken carrier five miles from the entrance to Valletta harbour, she was attacked by torpedo bombers. They were driven off by gunfire and at about 21:00 Illustrious limped into Valletta. Her crew had suffered 126 killed and 91 wounded.
With Illustrious seriously damaged and seemingly trapped at Malta, although if she managed to get away she would require months in a dockyard, the fleet had lost its vital air support. The Admiralty acted speedily on 12 January – before the Mediterranean Fleet had even arrived back in Alexandria – by ordering the carrier Formidable, which had been due to replace Ark Royal in Force H, to join Cunningham’s fleet instead. She was seen as so valuable that her passage to Alexandria would be via the long Cape route. When Formidable arrived the old Eagle would leave the fleet for major repairs.
The cruisers Gloucester and Southampton were sent to support the eastbound convoy M.E.6. At 12:00 on 11 January they were about 30 miles astern of the convoy when
they were attacked by a dozen dive bombers; neither ship was fitted with radar so they were taken by surprise. Two or three bombs hit Southampton causing serious damage. One hit was made on Gloucester but the bomb penetrated five decks without exploding. For an hour the crew struggled to save the ship, but loss of water for her boilers brought her to a stop at 16:40. Fires on board could not be brought under control so at 22:00 the order was given to abandon ship; 80 of her crew had been killed and 87 wounded. The light cruiser Orion sank her with three torpedos.7
RAF Wellingtons from Malta hit the Luftwaffe airfields at Catania in Sicily on the night of 12 January. Buildings were hit and some 30 aircraft were destroyed on the ground. However they were unable to stem the rising tide as more German aircraft arrived. On 16 January the first attacks by the Fliegerkorps X began on the harbours of Malta and on Illustrious, as her crew and the dockyard workers struggled to make her ready for sea. The dockyard was damaged and there were some 100 civilian casualties. Illustrious was hit again but suffered only minor damage.
After this raid it was decided to move most of the carrier’s crew ashore leaving only a skeleton crew on board while the engineers worked around the clock to repair the steering gear. Even the ship’s anti-aircraft gunners went ashore as half their guns were out of action. Anti-aircraft defence was left to the army’s batteries around the harbour, augmented by the old monitor, Terror, and the Australian cruiser Perth, however the latter was badly damaged by a near miss.
Joseph Caruana watched the plight of Illustrious.
The aircraft carrier was across the creek from Senglea, and my town was well within the target area. The noise and commotion was fantastic and my memories are a kaleidoscope of terror. The whining war cry of the diving Stukas, the loud and incessant firing of the AA guns; the terrifying shaking of the ground and house with each bomb explosion … After the raid I remember people staring, dazed and awed, at the destruction while others worked with frantic haste to rescue people buried under the demolished houses … while that area of the town abreast the moorings of Illustrious was pulverised into a carpet of rubble. Illustrious was still afloat and apparently undamaged.8