by Mark Simmons
There are mixed views on his temperament. General Sir Richard O’Conner thought him at his best, ‘commanding the fleet in the Mediterranean’ and he was ‘the greatest sailor since Nelson.’ Air Marshal A.W. Tedder first met him in January 1941 and thought him quite athletic for his age with a lot of ‘kick in the old boy yet.’ However a year later he referred to him as ‘the old man of the sea’ and being ‘rather a trial’.6
Ashore in Alexandria, Cunningham played tennis and golf when possible to keep fit. Many found him quite grumpy in harbour; Philip Vian, then a captain thought that ‘the C-in-C ought to be put in a refrigerator as soon as we get back to harbour and not allowed out until we go to sea again.’ Cunningham was a stickler for correct uniforms and a smart turn out. Wilfred Woods, then commanding a submarine, was picked up as his boat moved about the harbour of Alexandria because his crew looked like ‘a lot of bloody pirates’, although they were wearing the correct working rig for submarines.7
By noon on the 27th Cunningham knew, both from information gathered through visual sighting by the Sunderland flying boat of No 230 Squadron and codes via Ultra, that the Italian fleet was at sea. He resolved to take the fleet to sea under cover of darkness.
I myself was inclined to think that the Italians would not dare to try anything. Later on we noticed some unusual Italian wireless activity, which finally decided us to go to sea after dark and place the battle fleet between the enemy and where we supposed our convoys must be. At the same time I bet Commander Power [Later Captain Manley L. Power] the staff officer, operations, the sum of ten shillings that we would see nothing of the enemy.8
Alexandria at that time was a hotbed of spies and informers. John Eppler had instigated a direct line from Egyptian nationalist groups like the Muslim Brotherhood, Ahmed Hussein’s Young Egypt and members of Aziz El Masri’s ‘Ring of Iron’ group in the Egyptian Army who aimed to rid Egypt of foreign rule, to the German Secret Service, which provided a steady stream of information; an unusual alliance indeed, but just one of several groups.9
Eppler was born in Germany shortly before the First World War. He was still a boy when his mother moved to Alexandria, and later married an Egyptian, Salah Gafaar. Gafaar adopted Eppler, made the boy a Muslim, and gave him the name Hussein Gafaar; he was sent to school in Europe, and approached by the Abwehr in 1937 and trained in Germany.10
British counter intelligence in Alexandria suspected the Japanese consul was responsible for reporting fleet movements to his interested allies. So Cunningham and his men
… decided to bluff this gentleman, so [I] went ashore to play golf carrying an obvious suit-case as though I intended to spend the night ashore. The Japanese Consul spent most of his afternoons on the golf links. He was unmistakable, indeed a remarkable sight, short, squat, with a southern aspect of such vast and elephantine proportions.11
Awnings were put out on the battleships, invitations to dinner on board made to aid the deception of the fleet staying in harbour. During the day several enemy reconnaissance aircraft were seen flying over Alexandria.
Cunningham was back on board by 19:00; there is a story of an Australian destroyer’s motor boat giving a mysterious civilian-suited man a lift out to Warspite. The coxswain of the motor boat apparently agreed to the lift, but told the man whom he believed to be Warspite’s canteen manager, that he would have to jump for the ladder as they passed Warspite’s gangway; clutch trouble preventing him going astern. The passenger nimbly jumped as the boat passed the flagship’s middle gangway. On reaching his own ship a signal arrived thanking him for the lift from the C-in-C. One wonders was this the evening of the 27th?12
About midday, the Vice-Admiral Light Forces (VALF), Vice-Admiral Pridham-Wippell, flying his flag in the cruiser Orion had left Piraeus after refuelling, with his cruisers and two destroyers Hereward and Vendetta. The other two destroyers Ilex and Hasty were at Suda Bay; they were ordered to leave there in time to rendezvous with the rest of the force on 28 March off the island of Gavdos. The day before, the cruiser Gloucester had run a bearing in a shaft which was replaced at Piraeus, but the divers found excessive slackness around an ‘A’ bracket which effectively reduced the ship’s speed to 24 knots.
Pridham-Wippell was ordered to be 30 miles south of Gavdos Island by 06:30 with his four cruisers and four destroyers. Three additional destroyers at Piraeus were to remain there on standby. Greek naval forces were also on a high state of alert. The RAF promised maximum air reconnaissance over the southern Ionian and Aegean seas, and the sea south of Crete. Thirty bombers of 84, 113, and 211 Squadrons were on standby in Greece.
At Alexandria the battle fleet consisted of the battleships Warspite (flagship),Barham and Valiant, the latter fitted with radar, the new aircraft carrier Formidable also with radar and nine destroyers; 37 aircraft of the Fleet Air Arm were available.
Thirteen Fulmar fighters of 803 and 806 Squadrons and ten Albacores and four Swordfish of 826 and 829 Squadrons were embarked in Formidable; this was to be the carrier’s first operation with the fleet. There were also five catapult aircraft with ships of the fleet. Five Swordfish of 815 Squadron, which had been with Illustrious, were now at Maleme in Crete.13
S.W.C. Pack was meteorological officer on board Formidable on Thursday 27 March.
At 15:30 Formidable sailed, and about an hour later we turned into the wind to fly on the squadrons from Dekheila air-field. This was always an inspiring sight. It was a lovely spring afternoon, typical of the eastern Mediterranean at this time of the year. The sky was almost clear blue, except for a little tell-tale cirrus here and there, the wind was light. We were faced with few meteorological worries and no immediate flying difficulties.14
The fleet left Alexandria harbour at nightfall. Warspite, a ship with an already eventful history, chose that night to have another mishap. She sailed too close to a mud bank and stirred up the mud, contaminating her condensers. This reduced her speed and that of the battle fleet to 20 knots, which was later to cause some difficulty.
The fleet steered a north-westerly course at 20 knots and passed an uneventful night.
Notes
1 BBC World War II archives. Surgeon-Commander E.R. Sorley
2 Playfair, Major-General I.S.O. The Mediterranean & Middle East Volume II p.53
3 Pack, S.W.C. Cunningham: The Commander p.23
4 Ibid p.52
5 Ballantyne, Iain, Rodney p.61
6 Tedder, A.W. Tedder with Prejudice p.216
7 Pack, p.127–129
8 Cunningham, A. B. A Sailor’s Odyssey p.326
9 Eppler, John, Operation Condor: Rommel’s Spy p.40
10 Cooper, Artemis, Cairo in the War 1939–1945 p.202–204
11 Cunningham, p.326
12 Pack, p.8
13 Playfair, p.62
14 Pack, S.W.C. The Battle of Matapan p.20
12
Daybreak, 28 March
On the afternoon of 27 March Admiral Iachino remained in something of a quandary because no further signals were intercepted from the Sunderland flying boat of 230 Squadron. Signals did come in from the British Naval Headquarters at Alexandria asking the Sunderland for further information but nothing further was heard from the crew, and he hoped that the crew had radio problems. However, at about 18:00 another signal from the Sunderland was intercepted, merely stating they had arrived at Corinth, had nothing further to report because of bad visibility, and they had maintained radio silence.
About the same time Vittorio Veneto received a signal from Supermarina reporting to the fleet commander they had intercepted the earlier message from the Sunderland. It was just as well Iachino had the foresight to have his own cipher staff on the flagship, and did not have to wait six hours for Supermarina to forward messages. It also contained the wrong information referring to the number of destroyers.
What caused Iachino even more concern was further information from the Naval High Command stating that because of weather conditions over Alexandria the afternoon air reco
nnaissance would not take place. Yet on board his radio intercepted a message from Aegean Air Command stating reconnaissance had been carried out over Alexandria at 14:00 and 14:45 confirming all the major units of the British Mediterranean Fleet were in harbour. It gave him no confidence in naval-air cooperation.1
By early evening Iachino was convinced that the British would withdraw all their convoys. They had intercepted several more British signals of the ‘Immediate’ category, which his cipher men had been unable to break. But it was plain to him and his staff that the British had issued a general alarm, but, perhaps, did not believe the threat required serious counter measures. The Admiral hoped Supermarina would be able to decode these signals, and would recall the fleet if they thought it in danger. However, this was extremely unlikely as Commander Bragadin explains.
Supermarina was later criticised because with the element of surprise gone it did not call off the operation. But it must be remembered that this occasion was not born of a real tactical opportunity. Rather it was the result of a plan conceived under a press of considerations that were predominately political.2
The Fleet Commander only had a nominal command of his ships which were still controlled even at sea by Supermarina until contact was made with the enemy. He also had no control over the aircraft that were supposed to be supporting the fleet. In contrast Cunningham had complete command of his fleet and many air elements from the RAF as well.
The two Italian groups sailed on the evening of 27 March, the 1st and 8th Divisions proceeding toward the Aegean while Vittorio Veneto and the 3rd Division headed toward the south coast of Crete. However, at 22:00 Supermarina ordered the 1st and 8th Divisions to reverse course and join the flagship group the following morning. They had reached the same conclusion as Iachino: there was little chance of intercepting any convoys, and in view of this it was better to concentrate their forces.
Back on board the carrier Formidable some members of the crew were up before dawn to launch a weather balloon at 04:15 noting ‘the sky was overcast but there was no rain.’ The carrier needed an early weather report for flying operations and a weather map for the coming day. Much of the ship was still sleeping. ‘Apart from the look-outs there were few on deck on this particular Friday morning, for it was still two hours to dawn.’3 At 05:30 the air crews made their way to the carrier’s island to enter the briefing room; it was still dark, with a hint of the coming light.
By 05:55 the fleet was 150 miles south of the eastern end of Crete. Light was growing from the east. Formidable turned into the wind to launch her dawn search aircraft. Roaring along the flight deck passing the bridge the pilots gave the thumbs up as their heavily fuelled aircraft lumbered into the air. Day was breaking, the clouds lifting and visibility was about fifteen miles.
At 06:00, Admiral Iachino gave orders for his catapult RO43 plane to be launched and to carry out reconnaissance. The rectangular area to be covered was 20 miles wide from the island of Gavdos and 100 miles toward Alexandria. The RO43 was not an ideal aircraft for the job, being slow and with a low endurance of five hours, and it could not be recovered from the sea by the mother ship, so had to fly on to land bases. In this case after the mission the aircraft would fly on to Leros.4
At this time Vittorio Veneto was sailing toward the target area. The 3rd Cruiser Division was off her port bow ten miles distant, the 1st and 8th Divisions were about fifteen miles behind to the port.
By 06:30 all the cruiser squadrons were visible from the flagship. Iachino ordered Admiral Cattaneo’s 1st Cruiser Division to take up station ten miles to the north of Vittorio Veneto and all ships to increase speed to 25 knots.
Admiral Iachino patiently pacing the bridge of his flagship decided if nothing was seen by 07:00 the fleet would return to base. However at 06:35, Vittorio Veneto’s RO43 reported a force of four cruisers and four destroyers sailing at 18 knots southeast about 50 miles from the fleet. He ordered the 3rd Division – his most advanced force – to make contact while he would support them with the flagship.
At 07:22 aircraft from Formidable also reported four cruisers and four destroyers; they had sighted the 1st and 8th Divisions, some 35 miles northeast of VALF. Another Formidable aircraft shortly after this reported three cruisers and six destroyers 25 miles southeast from the first sighting; this was the 3rd Division. Both Cunningham and Pridham-Wippell at first thought these reports related to the latter’s ships and were therefore friendly forces.
Admiral Iachino had cancelled orders to return to base. He even briefly had renewed hopes of finding a convoy. Vittorio Veneto increased speed to 28 knots to support the 3rd Cruiser Division that was heading south at 31 knots, while Admiral Cattaneo’s force also increased speed.
At 07:58 the 3rd Division sighted VALF’s group. About 08:30 Pridham-Wippell reported three enemy cruisers and destroyers to the north of his position. Cunningham had lost his bet. ‘This made it clear that the enemy fleet was at sea, so I cheerfully paid up my ten shillings.’5
The British battle fleet was about 90 miles southeast of VALF’s force steaming toward them at 20 knots. ‘Admiral Sansonetti continued to follow the British ships at high speed, and at 08:12, from a range of about 25,000 metres, he opened fire. Thus began the encounter of Gavdos.’6
Notes
1 Bragadin, M.A. The Italian Navy in World War II p.85
2 Ibid p.86
3 Pack, S.W.C. The Battle of Matapan p.38
4 Bragadin, p.86
5 Cunningham, A. B. A Sailor’s Odyssey p.327
6 Bragadin, M.A. p.86–87
13
Morning, 28 March
At 07:34 Vittorio Veneto signalled Admiral Sansonetti aboard Trieste. ‘After sighting enemy retire towards me.’ The destroyers escorting the battleship were ordered to move from their starboard station to port to clear Vittorio Veneto’s field of fire. At 07:43 action stations were sounded.
Sighting the British force, Sansonetti found they turned away at high speed, so he gave chase opening fire at a range of thirteen miles.
Vice-Admiral Pridham-Wippell soon realised he was outgunned, and that the Italian cruisers were as fast, if not faster than his own ships. He was hoping to lure the enemy toward his own supporting battle fleet. Admiral Sansonetti’s ships were steaming near top speed at 31 knots, whereas the VALF’s squadron speed was 23 knots; the range was closing.
The Italians concentrated their fire on the last ship of the British line, Gloucester, which began to zigzag. After fifteen minutes she opened fire with her 6-inch guns; all salvoes up to this point had fallen short. Gloucester also flew off her aircraft for observation, but the pilot was using the wrong radio frequency and his signals were not received by the Orion, Pridham-Wippell’s flagship.1
The Italians continued to fire while moving out of range of Gloucester’s guns. The cruiser had overcome her engine troubles and the British cruisers had worked up to 28 knots, but about this time the destroyer Vendetta developed engine trouble and began lagging behind. Pridham-Wippell ordered her to steer to the south away from the action and then return to Alexandria. The destroyers, the all-duty workhorses of the fleet, were in short supply and essential to everything. Lack of destroyers hampered Cunningham’s operations, as noted by John Lee-Barber of the Griffin.
As usual ABC had to scrape the bucket for destroyers to go to sea and Griffin, having been holed in all the forward oil fuel tanks by a bomb in Malta some days previously, went on the operation [Matapan] with oil fuel only in the after tanks, the forward ones being open to the sea.2
J.E. MacDonnell of HMAS Stuart:
The day before the victory at Matapan HMAS Stuart was lying up in Alexandria waiting to be docked. A near miss off Benghazi had blown half her rudder off. Then a string of flags was hauled up Warspite’s foremast. It was a general signal from Admiral Cunningham, and it read; ‘Raise steam for full speed with all dispatch.’3
The Italians suffered as much as the British in this regard. Their destroyers were probably, on the whol
e, not so hardworking but tended often to be older to start with.
Admiral Sansonetti’s ships continued to steam parallel to the British, keeping up their fire until 08:55, when they turned away to port breaking off the action. Admiral Iachino had ordered the 3rd Division to reverse course and the whole fleet would return to base. ‘It seemed, all in all, a useless risk to continue this vain firefight, particularly since the Italian ships had already gone far beyond Gavdos, and were almost half way to Tobruk.’4
Iachino was puzzled by the British tactics, and the fact that the action was being drawn farther south, when in his experience his enemy did not usually avoid battle in an action where the odds were not that great, for it seemed from the radio traffic that they were unaware of Vittorio Veneto. He believed they were trying to draw them into an area for attack by British aircraft, while no friendly air cover had turned up.
The destroyer Pessagno was experiencing boiler trouble and had to reduce speed to 25 knots. About this time Admiral Iachino ordered the fleet to concentrate on the flagship and set course on 300° to the west.
About 08:54 the VALF received news from Formidable aircraft that 50 minutes earlier they had sighted a force of three battleships steering southwest at 20 knots. Pridham-Wippell found this hard to believe. He had been very near the position reported and must have seen these ships. Rear Admiral Boyd (Air) on Formidable agreed with him that the aircraft had mistakenly identified cruisers as battleships, however warning he could not completely reject the possibility of Italian heavy units being at sea nearby. When Admiral Sansonetti broke off the action steering northwest with his 3rd Division, the VALF turned about, shadowing the Italian ships.
At 10:35 Admiral Iachino changed his mind again. As no British ships or aircraft seemed aware of Vittorio Veneto he reversed the battleship’s course. He hoped to catch the British cruisers between the flagship and the 3rd Division. At 10:50 Vittorio Veneto sighted the VALF ships; Iachino ordered the 3rd Division to reverse course while at 10:56, at 25,000 metres, the battleship’s 15-inch guns opened fire.