by Mark Simmons
Sansonetti made his way to the torpedo tubes: ‘The crews were at their posts and asking for orders. I told them not to worry and prepare for firing.’ They were soon in action against the British destroyers.
‘The ship was heeling over quite a bit to starboard and the enemy destroyer passed not more than 200 metres away.’ Sansonetti managed to fire some of the torpedoes but because Alfieri was listing badly had little hope of hitting anything. ‘The torpedo men remained at their posts and carried out all orders with discipline and calm, although shells were falling all around and fragments had killed and wounded many of them.’ Soon the captain ordered abandon ship, and after he had seen his men were away Sansonetti jumped over the side. The Alfieri was the only Italian ship to offer any resistance, sinking about 23:30.4
About 23:00 Captain Waller of the destroyer Stuart had lost touch with the Italians.
I had also lost touch with the Havock and was feeling somewhat alone. I worked round to the north-east. At 11.30am a cruiser [destroyer] was sighted to the NNE and engaged. A feeble fire was returned. We got several hits on this cruiser and started a fire on board her. She ceased fire and I continued retirement to the north-east.5
Havock was not far away, moving about the burning and sinking Italian ships, on which she used her remaining torpedoes. She then turned north to comply with Cunningham’s signal, firing star shells to finally check the area. To her commander’s surprise they revealed a large ship which appeared undamaged and was stopped. They thought it a battleship, but it was the ship that had caused the night action, the ill-fated Pola.
Continuing northeast putting on speed Havock opened fire on the ship with little effect and sent a signal that she had engaged a Vittorio Veneto class battleship at about 23:45. Shortly after midnight the commander of Havock, Lieutenant G.R.G. Watkins, corrected his first signal. Having now identified the ship as an 8-inch gun cruiser, and given its position, he advised that he was turning about to shadow the vessel, and that he had no more torpedoes.
Since 21:00 the eight destroyers under Captain Mack in the Jervis had been heading westward at full speed in pursuit of the enemy fleet, which unknown to him had altered course to the northwest and increased speed. About 23:00 he thought he might be ten miles to the northwest having overtaken the enemy. However at that time he was 25 miles south of, and behind, the main group of Italian ships. At 00:30 Mack intercepted Havock’s signal about finding a battleship; he immediately turned back with both flotillas, only to hear later that it was a heavy cruiser. Mack decided to continue on his course to the firm sighting rather than chasing shadows, and at 02:00 he saw searchlights ahead.6
Cunningham wrote in his official report:
The mistake in the Havock’s signal did not actually bring about any ill effect, since the flotillas had by then missed the Vittorio Veneto and did useful work in polishing off the damaged cruiser.7
Greyhound and Griffin were also complying with Cunningham’s order, when they picked up Havock’s signal and they turned back to the south. At 00:40 Greyhound signalled that she had found Pola stopped on an even keel but low in the water; her guns were lying fore and aft, and her ensign was still flying.
On Pola they had been spectators to the night’s events swirling around them but powerless to do anything. The cruiser had no power to use her guns or to move. Any minute they had expected British ships to come in and attack them, so her commander Captain M. De Pisa reluctantly ordered the sea valves opened and the crew to abandon ship.
British ships passed them several times but seemed unaware of their presence. It was not until after midnight that Havock sighted her and then pulled away. About 01:10 destroyers came back, fired a few shells and pulled away again.
Pola was sinking slowly and because of the cold her crew started to get back on board. De Pisa stopped the scuttling to give his men somewhere to wait for rescue. About 03:00, several British destroyers turned up (Mack’s Command); by now the water was up to Pola’s decks.
Jervis came alongside and took off 258 survivors, the last being De Pisa. After fifteen minutes Jervis cast off from the stricken cruiser and fired a torpedo into her and she settled slowly. Nubian fired another torpedo and Pola blew up and sank at 04:03, the final act of destruction in the Battle of Matapan.8
According to Cunningham, when the British destroyers Havock, Greyhound, Griffin and Captain Mack’s flotillas arrived, the Pola was
… in a state of indescribable confusion. Panic stricken men were leaping over the side. On the crowded quarterdeck, littered with clothing, personal belongings and bottles, many of the sailors were drunk. There was no order or discipline of any sort, and the officers were powerless to enforce it.9
Commander Bragadin was convinced that this did not happen. ‘The version put out at the time by the British propaganda service, and repeated also by Admiral Cunningham, about the “panic and confusion” on board the Pola is entirely without foundation.’10
Commander Walter Scott of the Jervis was an eyewitness to events. ‘The 257 Italian ratings filed on board in an orderly fashion over a brow hastily put out, and were followed by the commander and captain of Pola.’
At this time a boarding party went on the cruiser and came back with
… a story of chaos on board. The officers’ cabins had been looted by the ship’s company of the Pola, and empty Chianti bottles lay everywhere. Verification of this came when a number of prisoners showed unmistakable signs of inebriation.11
The British destroyers continued to pick up survivors prior to the regrouping of the fleet.
Notes
1 Ufficio Storcio Marina Militare. G.Parodi narrative
2 Navy Records Society, The Cunningham Papers Vol.1 p.239
3 Seth, Ronald, Two Fleets Surprised: The Battle of Cape Matapan p.150
4 Ufficio Storcio Marina Militare. V. Sansonetti narrative
5 PRO, Captain Waller Narrative HMAS Stuart
6 Playfair, Major-General I.S.O. The Mediterranean and Middle East Volume II p.68
7 Naval Records Society p.312
8 Bragadin, M.A. The Italian Navy in World War II p.94–95
9 Cunningham, A. B. A Sailor’s Odyssey p.333–334
10 Bragadin, p.95
11 Pack, S.W.C. The Battle of Matapan p.134
18
29 March
At 04:30 Formidable flew off four aircraft to conduct searches; only a small number of rafts and survivors were seen. There was no sign of the battleship Vittorio Veneto or any Italian ships.
The British fleet assembled at 07:00. Except for one Swordfish missing from Formidable, none had casualties or damage. Admiral Cunningham was glad of this as he had been convinced Warspite had sunk one of his own destroyers in the melee. ‘[W]e eagerly counted them. To our inexpressible relief all twelve destroyers were present.’1
It was a fine morning as the fleet steamed back to the scene of the battle on a mercy mission. The area was covered by a film of oil and dotted with boats, rafts, and wreckage and floating corpses. In all, including the men taken off Pola during the night, 900 were rescued although some died later. A further 110 were picked up by a Greek destroyer flotilla, which had failed to join in the action owing to a mistake in the ciphering of orders.2
However the fleet soon drew the attention of some German JU 88 bombers who attacked the ships; they were barely 100 miles west of Crete and 50 miles southwest of Cape Matapan. The fleet was compelled to withdraw eastwards leaving hundreds of men still in the water. An aircraft was flown off Formidable with a message it took to Suda Bay for transmission to Malta where it was to be broadcast to the Chief of the Italian naval staff. It gave the position of the survivors still in the water. The Italian hospital ship Gradisca picked up a further 160 men over two days. Overall the Italians had suffered some 2,400 casualties.
On the return to Alexandria, Formidable kept her fighter flying patrols above the fleet. They were able to deal with twelve JU 88s who attacked the fleet at 15:30. Four near miss
es shook Formidable– as always the carrier was the first target – but there was no damage. Two of the JU 88s were shot down. Pack saw one
… come lower and lower, until with a great white splash he crashed into the sea to port, and instantly disappeared. The bombing from the first six had been alarmingly accurate. The last four of the formation, however, had been forced to drop their bombs hurriedly, when attacked by Formidable’s fighters.3
The fleet arrived at Alexandria at 17:30 on a pleasant spring evening.
Surgeon-Commander Sorley wrote home from Alexandria on 30 March 1941 with obvious elation.
The whole episode is very heartening and yesterday morning when the total enemy damage was announced to us by the C-in-C, the sense of jubilation amongst our officers and men was good to see. One felt one had been privileged to be in a force that had struck a great blow at the enemies of the King and one was flushed with the knowledge of our naval power and courage. For remember that the whole Italian force was numerically superior to ours, but as we expected, their ships preferred to run away; but not before we could inflict terrible blows. If their force had stayed to fight, this would have been another Trafalgar; as it is, we doubt if the Italian fleet will dare to challenge us again.4
On the Italian side, there was appprehension and then terrible confirmation. Admiral Iachino on the bridge of Vittorio Veneto, had seen the Very lights astern thinking Admiral Cattaneo must be in action about 22:30. The distance was 40 miles. He signalled Zara but there was no reply. Then vivid flashes began lighting the sky to the southeast and they could hear the boom of guns. He knew they could not be Italian 8-inch guns. He felt Cattaneo must have come across the British cruisers.5
The flagship tried signalling all the ships of Cattaneo’s command, even the destroyers, but no reply came in. With Vittorio Veneto damaged, Iachino did not even consider turning back into the unknown.
Then at 05:00 a signal came in from the destroyer Gioberti which said; ‘Disengaged from 1st Naval Squadron, ships of flotilla do not reply. Having searched again for enemy have reached the limit of my endurance’ and was proceeding to Augusta. This of course did little to allay Iachino’s anxiety but there was little he could do but steam on toward Taranto.
At 06:00 five JU 88s arrived over the fleet from Sicily and took station. An hour later the destroyer Oriani signalled that British fire had damaged one of her engines and she was heading for Augusta. Two hours later she signalled again; speed reduced she was limping asking for a tow. Admiral Iachino sent the destroyers Maestrale and Libeccio to bring in Oriani; he asked Supermarina to arrange air cover for them.
Vittorio Veneto reached Taranto at 15:00 on 29 March without further incident; the disastrous Operation Gaudo was over.
Notes
1 Cunningham, A. B. A Sailor’s Odyssey p.334
2 Ibid p.334
3 Pack, S.W.C. The Battle of Matapan p.141
4 BBC World War II archives. Surgeon–Commander E.R. Sorley
5 Bragadin, M.A. The Italian Navy in World War II p.96
Part Three
Conclusions
There is little doubt that the rough handling given the enemy on this occasion served us in good stead during the subsequent evacuations of Greece and Crete. Much of these later operations may be said to have been conducted under the cover of the Battle of Matapan.1
Admiral Cunningham
19
Effects of Matapan
Commander Bragadin:
Let us pass now to some conclusions about this affair. The whole operation hinged entirely upon three prerequisites which failed to materialise. From the moment when the Sunderland sighted the 3rd Division off Sicily, surprise was lacking. The political motive which made it impossible to call off the operation has already been noted. There was no effective air reconnaissance. The scarce and inaccurate reports which were received did not permit those at Italian headquarters to form a really clear picture of the situation at sea, nor did reconnaissance ever reveal the vital information that the entire Mediterranean Fleet out of Alexandria was but a short distance away from the Italian formation. The ineffectiveness of this air reconnaissance was further aggravated by errors in the use of radio frequencies on the part of Italian air crews, with the result that some reports came through very late.2
A few days after the battle, Admiral Iachino was summoned to appear before Mussolini in Rome; the C-in-C fleet had already received a cool reception from the Naval High Command. It must have been with the trepidation of a sacrificial lamb that he arrived at the Palazzo Venezia. Built for the Venetian Pope Paul II in the mid-fifteenth century and for many years the embassy of the Venetian Republic, in 1941 it was the seat of the Fascist Government. Mussolini’s offices were in the vast Sala del Moppamondo, and he made many of his most famous speeches from the small balcony facing onto the piazza proper.
Iachino was accompanied by the Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral Riccardi. He was made to wait in an anteroom while the C-N-S saw Mussolini, which must have done little for Iachino’s nerves.
Presently the fleet C-in-C was ushered into the vast room. Mussolini had his marble desk at the far end, thus the visitor had a long walk under his gaze. Il Duce felt it gave him the advantage over any guest. General Guzzoni, Vice-Chief of the General Staff and Admiral Riccardi were there. Mussolini was stood in the centre behind the desk dressed in civilian clothes.
Iachino came to a halt before the desk at attention, saluted and waited. Mussolini seemed anything but grim to him. When he spoke he was calm and asked Iachino to tell him what had happened during Operation Gaudo. The Admiral knew Il Duce must already know in detail what had happened, so he kept his report short. Mussolini questioned the wisdom of sending the 1st Cruiser Division back to aid the Pola, asking that surely two destroyers would have been enough; obviously this point had been raised with Riccardi beforehand. The C-in-C gave his reply that two destroyers could have only sunk the Pola, whereas he was trying to save the ship. At first Mussolini seemed unconvinced by the answer, but appeared to change his mind on pressing the point further. He began to pace up and down behind his desk, and after a short while began to speak.
Iachino, he said, had carried out a necessary operation mainly for political reasons, a thankless task. However he believed it would have a good effect on morale taking the fight to the British in the eastern Mediterranean, a sphere they called their own. It had begun under favourable conditions, and had failed mainly through a complete lack of co-operation from the air forces. All the aircraft in the air in the main area of operations had belonged to the enemy.
Your ships were like a blind giant who is suddenly attacked by a number of men with good eyesight and armed with dangerous weapons. It is a serious matter, and imposes on us the solution of a problem of the utmost urgency.3
Mussolini’s analysis was entirely correct, although it was unfortunate for the Regia Marina that he had not come to this conclusion earlier, rather than continually swallowing the Regia Aeronautica’s line. However, it should be noted that ‘the tactical success of Admiral Cunningham was due mainly to the use of radar, something still unknown to the Italians.’ Also added to this should be the paralysis that gripped Admiral Cattaneo’s command in regard to night fighting.4
Mussolini stopped pacing, and declared naval operations should not be conducted in future in enemy waters without air reconnaissance and fighter cover. Fighter aircraft had limited endurance, therefore,
It is necessary, in short, for naval forces at sea to be always accompanied by at least one carrier. The problem is already being studied. I have given orders to my Chief of General Staff to make arrangements immediately for the construction of a carrier, and I am sure that we shall have it soon, probably within a year.
In the meantime naval operations would be confined to western waters controlled by Italian aircraft.
Leaving the Palazzo Venezia, Iachino was naturally pleased his actions had been largely vindicated, but doubtful the navy would ever receive ca
rriers. In this he was to be proved right.5
With Mussolini’s backing,
… it was immediately decided to transform the transatlantic liner Roma into an aircraft carrier, which would be called the Aquila. Following this decision, a similar conversion was initiated on the transatlantic liner Augustus which was to become the aircraft carrier Sparviero.
However the work went slowly; by the armistice of September 1943 Aquila was virtually finished but had no aircraft. The Sparviero still needed months of work.6
Admiral Iachino remained C-in-C of the Italian battle fleet until 1942 when he took up a post in the Ministry of Marine.
In his report on Matapan Cunningham wrote:
The results of the action cannot be viewed with entire satisfaction, since the damaged Vittorio Veneto was allowed to escape. The failure of the cruisers and destroyers to make contact with her during the night was unlucky and is much to be regretted.7
Admiral Cunningham is rightly credited with the victories at Taranto and Matapan. However the first at Taranto, although he gave the green light and encouraged those involved, was the result of planning by many officers of the Fleet Air Arm, going back to the carrier Glorious in 1935 and the commander-in-chief at the time Admiral Sir William Wordsworth Fisher. It also owed much to the time spent by the fleet air arm pilots practising and perfecting night flying techniques. It must also be remembered that Cunningham was the product of the ‘big gun’ era and came to a grudging recognition of the part fliers were to play, which matured over the years.
Cunningham had a natural grasp of new ideas, even if he hankered after a great fleet action. It was he who had stopped the carrier falling out of line for landing and takeoff of aircraft, which had become a habit for some flag officers, who resented the whole fleet having to change direction just for flying operations. Cunningham felt the carriers were vulnerable and needed the anti-aircraft support of heavy units, thus the entire fleet took part in the carrier’s manoeuvre, both parts lending support to one another. This became standard practice especially in the Pacific, where in one action, when battleships and cruisers were busy supplying bombardment support for landings, the Allied carrier fleet suffered in a heavy Kamikaze attack.8