The Battle of Matapan 1941

by Mark Simmons

  At Matapan, Cunningham commanded the first fleet action involving air power – both carrier-and land-based. Admiral Iachino was amazed that the British could co-ordinate torpedo and bomber attacks so well. Indeed Cunningham was the architect of this and pulled it off to a degree, in some ways more by luck than judgement, but nevertheless it was his aim and it came off resulting in the damage to Vittorio Veneto.

  The damage to the heavy cruiser Pola must be as much to the credit of Lieutenant Torrens-Spence and 815 Squadron Fleet Air Arm, with the aircraft that had served on Illustrious, who flew from Greece and Crete with great skill just to get into the battle.

  In the night action, Cunningham used his battleships more like destroyers with devastating effect, realising he could not risk waiting until daylight when they would be closer to Italy and enemy air power. Luck was on his side, as his battle fleet arrived at the same time as the Italian 1st Cruiser Division looking for Pola, and he had the all-seeing eye of radar, although Valiant’s radar set picked up the Pola but not the other cruisers. Cunningham wanted to bring on a pell-mell battle but admits himself that in such an action,

  Instant and momentous decisions have to be made in a matter of seconds. With fast-moving ships at close quarters and the roar of heavy gunfire in night action at sea, clear thinking is not easy. In no other circumstances than in night action at sea does the fog of war so completely descend to blind one to a true realisation of what is happening.9

  Cunningham admits his order of 23:00 for ‘all forces not engaged to withdraw to the north eastward’ was ill-considered, as it meant Vice-Admiral Pridham-Wippell gave up the chase of Vittorio Veneto when his cruisers were the closest British ships, whereas Captain Mack and his eight destroyers were the only ships ordered not to withdraw until they attacked. However, unknown to Cunningham and Mack the latter had already missed Vittorio Veneto and the first Havock signal brought Mack back to the cruisers thinking they had found a battleship as well. Neither Cunningham nor Captain Philip Mack can really be criticised for either action.10

  Admiral Cunningham’s battles are often compared to Horatio Nelson’s victories. The first date for the raid on Taranto was to have been 21 October, Trafalgar Day; however as we know for various reasons Operation Judgement was postponed until the night of 11 November 1940. Taranto is often compared to Nelson’s battles at the Nile and Copenhagen, where he attacked enemy fleets in their own anchorages. The Nile battle against the French fleet of 1 August 1798 at Aboukir Bay, started at dusk and continued into darkness. The Battle of Copenhagen on 2 April 1801 is perhaps a better comparison, when Nelson sent his frigates into the harbour. Although it took place in daylight, the anchorage has similarities to Taranto, and the Danish fleet had persistently refused to put to sea to face the Royal Navy. There the similarities end, other than for Cunningham’s determination, like Nelson’s ‘to get at the enemy’.11

  The comparison between Matapan and Trafalgar is rather stronger. Both Admirals wanted to bring on a pell-mell battle, Nelson from the very beginning; Cunningham came to that conclusion by charging after the enemy with his battleships. Both used innovative tactics, although Cunningham’s were rather newer to him than were Nelson’s. The result of both battles crippled enemy sea power for many months, years in the case of Nelson.

  General Eisenhower saw Cunningham as

  … the Nelsonian type who believed ships went to sea in order to find and destroy the enemy. The degree of affection in which he was held by all, both British and American, was nothing short of remarkable.12

  Admiral Iachino felt Cunningham was a ‘generous’ and ‘chivalrous opponent,’ particularly in his actions to try and save as many Italian sailors as possible on 29 March.13 However there is another school of thought that saw him as an ‘intolerant dinosaur’, with no real grasp of air power and rather dismissive of other technical advances. Many feel he should have opposed the defence of Crete more vigorously, which caused heavy losses to the Mediterranean Fleet. In his own papers he wrote:

  The Greek odyssey was but a prologue to the Navy’s greatest trial and tragedy in the Mediterranean, the battle for Crete, which took place three weeks after the final evacuation from Greece. If the Greek expedition was an unavoidable moral and diplomatic commitment, the decision to hold Crete was essentially a military one.14

  Cunningham did not seem to have grasped his misuse of Illustrious earlier in the war, for again he sent a vulnerable carrier with an exhausted air group into the thick of the battle.

  On 26 May, Pridham-Wippell led a force including Formidable into the Aegean to attack the Scarpanto aerodrome on Rhodes. One of the most dangerous of enemy airfields, it lay beyond the range of any land-based British fighters. Formidable had only a few serviceable aircraft left; just two Fulmars and six Albacores were able to attack Scarpanto, doing minimal damage. On the return the carrier was attacked by 25 JU 88s, escorted by ME 110s. Four Fulmars put up a valiant defence but Formidable was hit twice and damaged by near misses. Like Illustrious she would spend months in the US being repaired.

  The Cunningham papers state: ‘The decision to employ the carrier on this mission when it was known that both her striking force and, more particularly, her fighter squadrons were so weak is beyond comprehension.’

  Formidable should have been kept well clear of the battle. Cunningham may have been distracted by the battle for Crete, overly influenced perhaps by Fleet Air Arm advisors, but surely the Illustrious experience must have resonated with him.

  He must have been aware that, as Pound [Admiral Sir Dudley Pound] pointed out the cupboard was virtually bare. One senses a note of reproach in Pound’s comment that to send him another carrier ‘would be a sheer waste’.15

  Churchill and the War Cabinet wanted Crete defended. The British Army felt if the Germans could be restricted to an air assault then they could hold Crete. So Cunningham and his hard working fleet were put on the spot.

  After Matapan the Mediterranean Fleet had a busy period. On 18 April it bombarded the biggest Italian air base at Tripoli in North Africa. The fleet returned from that operation to begin the evacuation of the army from the shores of Greece. After that was done it was back into the central Mediterranean within easy reach of the Luftwaffe, to escort the ‘Tiger’ convoy bearing much needed weapons and munitions for the British Army and RAF. Losses were small: one merchant ship sunk, but 238 tanks and 43 cased Hurricane fighters were brought safely to Egypt. Good work by British fighters, both land- and carrier-based and heavy anti-aircraft fire from warships did much to protect the convoy. The weather, thick and cloudy, was on the British side. The fleet also received reinforcements coming through with this convoy in the shape of the modernised battleship Queen Elizabeth and the cruisers Naiad and Fiji. The Admiralty felt it was a ‘memorable achievement’.16

  Cunningham at this point does not seem to have been over confident:

  Unfortunately the apparent ease with which the convoy was brought through from end to end of the Mediterranean caused many false conclusions to be drawn at home, and I think made some people think that we were exaggerating the dangers and difficulties of running convoys and operations of any sort in the face of the vigorous action of the Luftwaffe. Before long the dismal truth was painfully to be brought home to them.17

  Churchill had no doubts Crete should be held, as he informed the Army C-in-C General Sir Archibold Wavell on 17 April.

  Crete must be held … and you should provide for this in the redistribution of your forces … It is important that strong elements of the Greek Army should establish themselves in Crete together with the King and Government.

  He was quick to interfere with the Admiralty, questioning Cunningham on the wisdom of defending Crete.

  You are giving him the strongest lead to abandon Crete. I thought our view was that Crete should be held at all reasonable cost.

  General Wavell sent General ‘Jumbo’ Wilson to Crete to assess the situation, the latter reaching the island on 27 April. He soon reported
that, unless all three services were ‘prepared to face the strain of maintaining adequate forces up to strength, the holding of the island was a dangerous commitment, and a decision on the matter must be taken at once.’ This was really pointed at the RAF, who had far too few fighter aircraft available for the island’s defence, having lost over 200 fighter aircraft in the defence of Greece that could not be rapidly replaced. However Churchill insisted ‘The Island must be stubbornly defended.’18

  Cunningham wrote:

  It was the general opinion that the island could be held against air borne only. However it was expected that the enemy might also attempt a seaborne landing in support.

  The repulse of this latter assault stood out as the Navy’s main function and it was with this end in view that we made our dispositions.

  It appears that the Ultra decodes, so vital in the victory at Matapan, may have made the British over-confident in the defence of Crete. On 6 May the Bletchley Park code breakers identified the probable date of completion of German preparations as 17 May and had the complete final operation orders for the execution of the assault. Churchill was cock-ahoop about this, considering the information priceless.

  The German invasion was given the codename ‘Scorcher’ by the British, and Crete became ‘Colorado’. The German codename for the invasion was Operation Mercury.

  The Chiefs of Staff certainly did discuss the Ultra Enigma evidence. All would have been well aware of the part Ultra had played in Cunningham’s victory at Matapan, but things were not so clear cut with regards to Crete. There were also concerns about Iraq, Cyprus and Syria.

  Churchill felt this gave them a winning hand. They would be able to trap the German paratroops on Crete, cutting them off from the sea with no hope of retreat or reinforcement, forcing them to surrender. It was this vision that encouraged Churchill’s deep personal interest in the defence of Crete.

  After the loss of Crete, in a seemingly rapid twelve days a ‘searching investigation’ at the time could not take place because it would inevitably have breached security by revealing the role of Ultra.19 Cunningham wrote in a dispatch:

  That the fleet suffered disastrously in this encounter with the unhampered German Air Force is evident, but it has to be remembered on the credit side that the Navy’s duty was achieved and no enemy ship, whether warship or transport, succeeded in reaching Crete or intervening in the battle during those critical days. Nor should the losses sustained blind one to the magnificent courage and endurance that was displayed throughout. I have never felt prouder of the Mediterranean Fleet than at the close of these particular operations, except perhaps, at the fashion in which it faced up to the even greater strain which was so soon to be imposed upon it.20

  The Royal Navy’s success failed to tip the balance in Crete. The official history observed:

  It is perhaps fairer to conclude that, whereas the Germans had the strength to off-set bad intelligence, the British, whether from weakness or for other reasons, were not in a position to make better use of the intelligence service that was at last getting into its stride.21

  The loss of Crete was down to the lack of British air cover, anti-aircraft guns, transport and poor communications on the ground. The troops, tired from the retreat from Greece, fought well. General Freyberg made mistakes; Brigadier Keith Stewart believed that Freyberg made ‘a balls’ of the defence. But he faced impossible conditions; Callum MacDonald says in his history of the battle that ‘It is doubtful if any other general could have done better.’22

  At Matapan, Cunningham had the advantage of Ultra intelligence plus the Fleet Air Arm, radar, and the technical ability of his fleet to fight at night. There was little he could do about the decision to defend Crete which was driven by Winston’s Churchill’s belief they could not lose with Ultra intelligence.23

  At Matapan, Cunningham did well in co-ordinating air strikes and deciding to pursue the enemy fleet at night, against the advice of some of his staff. There is some truth in the accusation that he did not fully understand the use of carriers or air matters, but that was true of several commanders in other fleets. Above all, Cunningham was a lucky commander. As Napoleon is reputed to have said, ‘give me a lucky general every time.’

  Notes

  1 Navy Records Society, The Cunningham Papers Volume I p.313

  2 Bragadin, M.A. The Italian Navy in World War II p.96–97

  3 Iachino, Admiral Angelo, Gaudo and Matapan p.163–165

  4 Bragadin, p.97

  5 Iachino, p.166

  6 Bragadin, p.99

  7 Navy Records Society, The Cunningham Papers Volume I p.313

  8 Wragg, David, Swordfish: The Story of the Taranto Raid p.82

  9 Cunningham, A. B. A Sailor’s Odyssey p.336

  10 Ibid p.333

  11 Oman, Carola, Nelson p.389

  12 Pack, S.W.C. Cunningham:The Commander p.285

  13 Seth, Ronald, Two Fleets Surprised: The Battle of Matapan, Introduction

  14 Navy Records Society, The Cunningham Papers Volume I p.244

  15 Ibid p.250

  16 Playfair, Major-General I.S.O. The Mediterranean and Middle East Volume II p.118–119

  17 Cunningham, p.363

  18 MacDonald, Callum, The Lost Battle: Crete 1941 p.134–135

  19 Ibid p.300

  20 Cunningham, p.379

  21 Hinsley F.H. British Intelligence in the Second World War Volume I p.421

  22 MacDonald, p.300

  23 Daily Telegraph 28/5/1991

  20

  Intelligence

  Almost as soon as the Italian fleet returned to its home bases after Matapan, questions began to be asked about how the British had seemed to know their every move. According to Commander Bragadin in the official history,

  Reviewing the events of the last part of March also gave rise to a suspicion that perhaps Italian plans were known to the enemy. As a matter of fact, after the war, and through documents published by the British, it was confirmed that they ‘expected’ an Italian move against the supply route to Crete. Beyond this, it appeared very probable that they knew that the Italian fleet had begun the above-described operation, or at least they knew the date which had been set, even before the Sunderland [flying boat] had sighted the 3rd Division.1

  Bragadin wrote his history in 1957 long before Ultra had been declassified, but he is perceptive in his conclusions, for the British were simply too good in their movements for it to have been a matter of chance.

  All these preparations, so precise and definite, give a very firm basis for the belief that Cunningham had some specific information at hand, and that it came to him through espionage channels or through his signal intelligence service.2

  However he notes the disastrous outcome of the night battle ‘resulted from completely accidental circumstances on the part of both adversaries.’3 Again Bragadin’s perception is quite accurate:

  In the Italian navy preliminary orders regarding ships and convoys were never sent by radio … This cannot be said, however, for the ciphers of the Italian Air Force, and particularly not for those of the Luftwaffe, which were notoriously easy to decipher.

  The Regia Marina could not avoid from time to time warning Superaereo (air force command) and X Cat of operations; he rightly felt that here was the weak link in the Italian chain of communications. Also in general terms it was impossible to keep complex naval operations entirely secret.

  For example, the details concerning a convoy had to be communicated by Supermarina to dozens of naval, air, and army authorities, not only Italian but also German in advance of the operation. Furthermore, this work had to be done through six different and dissimilar communications and information networks.4

  The Germans always assumed the security break must lie with their Italian allies and they had betrayed their own fleet. The code breaker Mavis Batey commented on this:

  The Germans had always accused the Italians of having traitors in their midst, which was made worse when, in 1966, H. Montgomery H
yde published the story of the beautiful spy, Cynthia, who had seduced Admiral Lais, the naval attaché in the Italian Embassy in Washington, and obtained the codebook from him which resulted in the Italian defeat at Matapan.5

  Hyde’s book was a biography of the British spy Amy Elizabeth Thorpe Pack Brousse, codenamed Cynthia. Betty Pack, as she was known, was a beautiful American married to a British diplomat. She was recruited by British Intelligence in 1938 and was able to move in the aristocratic world of international diplomatic society. ‘Cynthia’ left war-torn Madrid during the Spanish Civil War, to besieged Warsaw and occupied Paris and later Washington. She certainly had an effect in uncovering enemy secrets; however she had little to do with Matapan.6

  As one reviewer observed, ‘treason in bed and death at sea made a libretto which sold well’ and the Admiral’s [Lais’s] family felt obliged to take out a libel action, such a course being permitted in Italy on behalf of the dead. Montgomery Hyde was found guilty but the real evidence was not available.

  However there was a glaring mistake about Matapan in Hyde’s book, as its states that when Lais told Cynthia where to find the codebook, the lovers were bidding each other farewell on the ship that was to take Lais back to Italy. That departure recorded in the New York Times took place on 26 April 1941, almost a month after Cunningham was supposed to have used Lais’s codebooks at Matapan. Also the Admiral’s son was serving in the Mediterranean and it was unlikely he would ever have given up codebooks, and indeed it is extremely doubtful he had access to the Italian fleet’s codebooks in the US anyway.7

  When Ultra was declassified in 1974 and its secrets published in Winterbotham’s book, The Ultra Secret, it exonerated the Italians and put the Germans in the frame as the culprits. However in 1978 when the records were released there was evidence that it was decoded Italian messages that gave the game away, albeit the Luftwaffe pointed the direction in which to look. The Cynthia story has been rehashed in various books continuing the myth of codebooks obtained by seduction.