by Ray Takeyh
Toward this end, Khomeini would strike out not only at the West but also at the regional powers who cooperated with the United States. He derisively condemned the Gulf states, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and other American allies as mini-Satans who served to accommodate the transgressions of the “Great Satan.” He had no compunction about calling on the local populace to emulate Iran’s revolutionary model and would actively plot to overthrow the princes and the presidents that ruled sovereign states. “Cut off the roots of those who betray Islam and the Islamic countries,” he implored.25 The division of the region between the oppressed masses and the oppressive rulers serving as agents of American imperialism was the vision that would define Iran’s international orientation. The ideological challenge to the ruling order would be complemented by an aggressive strategy of assisting opposition groups, militant forces, and a wide range of terrorist organizations.
Khomeini’s revolution would thus be a curious mixture of dogmatic objectives and ideological flexibility, relentless determination and tactical retreats. A coalition that featured bearded mullahs, westernized intellectuals, defiant students, middle-class professionals, and traditional merchants would be held together by a cleric who came to personify Iran’s struggles and tribulations. Khomeini offered something to everyone: he was a religious leader who would redeem the prophetic quest for construction of a pious order; a Third Worldist with a determination to emancipate his state from America’s encroaching capitalist empire; a modernist with an appreciation of democratic ideals, a defender of women and the oppressed; and, always, a Persian nationalist seeking to restore Iran to its rightful place. Far from being a monolithic platform, Khomeini’s message was an opportunistic one that concealed his essential objectives in order to broaden his coalition.
On that crisp February day in 1979 when Khomeini returned to Tehran on the heels of one of the most populist revolutions in history, he brought with him a set of beliefs that he was determined to imprint on Iran. The early period of the revolution would prove formative, as Khomeini sought to consolidate his rule, dispense with his allies of convenience, and ensure that clerical hegemony of power would persist long after he disappeared from the scene. The same dexterity and skill that had brought him to the pinnacle of power would now be used to ensure the institutionalization of his vision: the adroit use of foreign crises to generate a radical momentum sweeping away moderate forces; the gradual introduction of a constitutional order that made the clerical hijacking of power seem legal; and, of course, the use of terror and violence to intimidate the opposition were all legitimate strategies for an aging cleric determined to foster a new epoch.
CONSOLIDATION OF GOD’S WILL
At times in history there are watersheds, where a spectacular event alters existing norms, political perceptions, and fundamentals of state power. The year 1941 was the time America’s foreign policy changed; in the aftermath of the Pearl Harbor bombings, the notion of splendid isolation was eclipsed by the imperative of international engagement. America became a global superpower that year, as successive Democratic and Republican administrations insisted that events abroad have an immeasurable impact on America’s domestic security. The years 1979–81 were Iran’s defining moment. During this pivotal period Khomeini and his cohort imposed changes on Iran’s institutions and political culture that imprinted the notion of theocratic rule on Iran’s national identity. The theocracy would change, redefine itself, at times becoming more reactionary and at times less intrusive, but a certain governing arrangement was implanted that is likely to endure. The American politicians who argue that economic sanctions, international ostracism, and threats can somehow dislodge the Islamic Republic ignore the deep roots that this most peculiar of regimes has cultivated.
Was it inevitable that Iran’s revolution would degenerate into a theocratic autocracy, commanded by clerics in the name of a seventh-century faith? The revolution gave rise to a variety of political movements, ranging from reactionary to liberal, fundamentalist to secular, Marxist to capitalist. Khomeini was the leader, but by no means the only actor in one of the momentous revolutions in modern Middle Eastern history. The pathway to consolidation of clerical power came through the creation of a constitutional order that made secular and liberal inroads impossible. By creating nonelected institutions such as the Guardian Council that had the power to veto parliamentary legislation and presidential determinations, Khomeini ensured that the decisions of the elected branches of government would not effect the essential demarcations of power. Iran would always feature elections and plebiscites, but so long as nonelected clerics held the reins of power, the popular clamor for change would be contained, even negated.
The other aspect of Khomeini’s ingenuity was his creation of a new political elite composed of both clerics and religiously devout laymen. The Islamic Republic is different from its revolutionary counterparts, as the ideology of the state is its religion. To be sure, this is a politicized and radicalized variation of Shiite Islam, but nonetheless religion is the official dogma. A dedicated core of supporters would remain loyal to this ideology, determined to perpetuate it long after Khomeini himself disappeared from the scene. Revolutionary regimes have usually collapsed when their once-ardent supporters grow disillusioned and abandon their faith. It is, after all, easy to be an ex-Marxist, as this is merely a sign of intellectual maturity. But how easy is it to be an ex-Shiite? In one case, renouncing the prevailing ideology is mere political defection; in the other case, it is apostasy. Although the Islamic Republic has grown extremely unpopular over the years, for a small but fervent segment of the population it is still an important experiment in realizing God’s will on earth. And it is this sector of the society that continues to produce leaders such as Ahmadinejad, who are determined to return to the “roots of the revolution.”
Despite the clerical determination to assume power, a look back at Iran in 1979 actually reveals the influence of the secular forces. The first postrevolution prime minister of Iran was Mehdi Bazargan, who despite his revolutionary disposition was a true democrat. The liberal movement led by the venerable National Front with its strong nationalist credentials commanded substantial support among the middle class and was strongly represented in the new provisional government. Even the radical Left still had a growing audience, particularly among the youth and industrial workers. The discursive message of the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK), with its mixture of Marxism and Islam, still lured many university students. The Fadayan-e Khalq could still mobilize hundreds of thousands for their demonstrations, and their newspaper enjoyed widespread circulation. Even the Communist Party, the Tudeh, with its long history of struggle against the monarchy and claims of economic justice, proved tantalizing to an intelligentsia attuned to the cause of Third World liberation.26 The forces of secularism also garnered support from senior traditionalist clerics such as Ayatollah Kazem Shariatmadari, who were urging their fellow mullahs to retreat from the political sphere and concentrate on their priestly duties.
The original draft of the Islamic Republic’s constitution was a further rebuke to Khomeini’s vision of theocratic absolutism. Modeled along the lines of the French constitution, the Iranian document encompassed compassed provisions for a strong presidency, an elected assembly, and individual rights. The notion of clerical monopoly of power and the subordination of the popular will to the dictates of a Supreme Leader were markedly absent. Despite vague assertions of Islam’s importance to the nation, the document was not just progressive but reflected the influence of the secular parties and leftist forces.27 The critical question remains: How did Khomeini and his disciples manage to silence such an impressive array of actors?
Unlike the divided secular opposition and the quietist ayatollahs, Khomeini and his supporters had long honed their organizational skills through decades of exile and oppositional activities. Through the effective use of mosques (Iran’s only nationwide network), the creation of shadowy organizations with their own militias and effective manipula
tion of external crises, Khomeini gradually managed to displace his challengers. At every step of the way, he and his supporters proved more ardent in their faith, more manipulative in their conduct, and more merciless in their retaliations. The aged cleric who had waited decades to impose his mandate from heaven had limited inhibitions about abandoning erstwhile supporters and ignoring his pledges of an inclusive polity.
Soon after returning to Iran, Khomeini implored his allies to be vigilant and aggressive in their efforts to establish the theocratic order. “They want to make a Western country for you in which you will be free, you will be independent, but in which there is no God. This will lead to our destruction,” he warned.28 Through domination of the revolutionary committees overseeing local affairs, appropriation of the defunct regime’s wealth, and mobilization of their zealous supporters, Khomeini and his allies fashioned a parallel regime with more authority than the tentative and moderate provisional government. While the government continued to issue orders, the secretive Council of the Revolution, manned by Khomeini loyalists such as Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Ali Khamenei, and Muhammad Beheshti, was busy countermanding its decisions. However, to truly consolidate their power, the revolutionaries still needed a crisis that would effectively radicalize the population and discredit their foes. And the American embassy proved a tantalizing target.
On Sunday, November 4, 1979, a group of Iranian students took over the U.S. embassy in Tehran, beginning a crisis that would last 444 days. The ostensible purpose of the hostage taking was the students’ alarm that the admission of the ailing Shah to the United States for medical treatment was an attempt by Washington to orchestrate a coup against Iran’s nascent revolution. For a generation of Americans, the seizure of the embassy is seen as an egregious violation of international law by a contemptible regime. For Khomeini, it was the occasion where his vision of Islamic society would be transformed into a ruling ideology free from the constraint of coalition politics and democratic dissent. More than the pressing international issues or the entanglements of U.S.–Iranian relations, it would be the domestic political imperatives that would determine Tehran’s approach to the American hostages.29
As the images of blindfolded Americans dominated the airwaves, a gratified Khomeini blessed the conduct of the students as ushering in the “second revolution,” whose assault against the “Great Satan” made it an even nobler act than the original revolution.30 Iran’s media soon praised the event, proclaiming, “The true Iranian revolutionaries will remain in the U.S. embassy and they will not give up this fortress cheaply.”31 The hapless hostages proved to have remarkable utility for Iran’s domestic politics, and Khomeini exploited them as a means of radicalizing the populace, claiming that the revolution was in danger from the manipulations of America and its internal accomplices. The issue, as framed by Khomeini, was now a contest between a rapacious, satanic United States and the sublime theocracy. The revision of the constitution and the demise of Bazargan’s prime ministership were now sanctioned by the struggle against America. To be for pluralism and democratic rule was to support American aggression against Iran.
In the midst of the enveloping turmoil, Iran held elections for parliament and for the Assembly of Experts, which was to evaluate the draft constitution. In the atmosphere of fear and uncertainty, the clerical hard-liners and their political party, the Islamic Republican Party (IRP), came to dominate the new parliament, further buttressing their encroaching institutional dominance. In a similar vein, the Islamist forces captured the majority of seats in the Assembly of Experts, ensuring them a commanding voice in the revision of the constitution. Khomeini blessed the new assembly, insisting that the “constitution must be 100 percent Islamic.”32
The Islamic state as envisioned by Khomeini during his prolonged exile was now gradually coming to the surface. The new constitution created the unprecedented theory of velayat-e faqih whereby a religious leader would oversee all national affairs. This office, designed for Khomeini himself, had virtually unlimited responsibilities and was empowered to command the armed forces and the newly created Revolutionary Guards, dismiss any elected official, countermand parliamentary legislation, and declare war and peace. The new office was subject neither to elections nor to the scrutiny of the elected institutions and the larger public. Islamic law was to displace the existing legal codes, circumscribing individual rights and prerogatives. A Guardian Council, composed mainly of clerics, was to vet all legislation, ensuring their conformity with Islamic strictures.33 The constitutional arrangement guaranteed that Khomeini’s reinterpretation of Shiism would remain the ideology of the state and that only those devoted to his vision would command critical institutions.
On December 3, 1979, the new constitution, with its antidemocratic provisions, was duly ratified by a frenzied public in a national referendum. The foundations of the theocratic regime were thus born on the heels of anti-Americanism and the notion of resisting foreign intervention. As the spiritual leader of the students, Muhammad Musavi-Khoeniha, recalled, “We reaped all the fruit of our undertaking—we defeated attempts by liberals to take control of the machinery of the state. We forced Bazargan’s government to resign. The tree of the revolution has grown and garnered strength.”34 But for the tree to continue to prosper, the revolutionaries now had to dispense with the remaining secular and clerical competitors and complete their monopolization of power.
At this point, Iran still had an elected president, Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, as well as a critical intelligentsia, defiant student organizations, leftist paramilitary forces led by the MEK, and secular parties disinclined to accede to the emerging clerical despotism. At every step of the way, the clerical militants had exploited external crises to accelerate the pace of the revolution and purge the regime of undesirable elements. On September 22, 1980, yet another international conflict convulsed the republic and paved the way for the complete control of the state by Khomeini and his narrow collection of disciples—Iraq’s invasion of Iran. The Iraqi invasion was intended to destroy the theocratic regime, but it ended up buttressing the revolution and subverting the remaining moderates within the republic. Saddam had miscalculated, not for the last time.
The war transformed the internal debates and the nature of the Iranian political landscape. “I am certain that there exists a relationship between Saddam, America, and the internal opposition,” exclaimed Rafsanjani, then serving as the speaker of the parliament.35 The Friday prayer leaders who routinely used the religious occasion to indoctrinate the masses now alluded to similar conspiracies. The state broadcasting service took up this theme, noting, “In order to solve his domestic problems, Saddam is ready to be subservient to the two superpowers, and he is directly strengthening internal counterrevolutionaries.”36 The issue was no longer freedom versus autocracy, but loyalty to the revolution, national sovereignty, and resistance to Iraq and its imperial benefactor, America. A bewildered nation looked to its spiritual leader to manage the turbulent waters of the enveloping conflict. For the fundamentalists the war turned out to be, as Khomeini noted, “a blessing.”
The persistent emasculation of the office of president, the negation of Bani-Sadr’s authority by the parliament and its chosen prime minister, and the orchestrated propaganda campaign accusing the president of being a client of the West finally culminated in a crisis in 1981. The parliament suddenly began impeachment proceedings, stressing the president’s insubordination to revolutionary organs and poor management of the war. In a similar vein, 130 judges and prosecutors of the Islamic Republic wrote an open letter to Khomeini, asking him to deal with the president, as he was creating national disunity. Khomeini granted his approbation to these efforts, warning Bani-Sadr and his supporters to “go back to Europe, to the United States, or wherever else you want.”37 Seeing the writing on the wall, the Islamic Republic’s first elected president went into hiding and subsequent exile to France.
The masters of the Republic of Virtue were not just contemptuous of their se
cular detractors, they were equally dismissive of senior clergy. Iran’s most esteemed clerics such as Ayatollah Shariatmadari, Muhammad Reza Golpayegani, and Shahabeddin Mar’ashi-Najafi still embraced the quietist Shiite tradition and insisted on the importance of political disengagement. The tensions between the Supreme Leader and the senior clerics, which had been evident for decades, now burst to the surface. Khomeini, who was always contemptuous of the clergy who abjured politics, warned the “turbaned deceivers” who were “infiltrating the clergy and engaging in sabotage.” In an even sterner rebuke, he declared, “I warn the clergy. I tell them all that I dislodge myself of my final responsibility to repulse all these mullahs.”38 One of the many paradoxes of the Islamic Republic is that theocracy has been far more effective at persecuting the religious class than all of its monarchical predecessors. A special court for the clergy was established, and hundreds of Iran’s most learned and distinguished clerics were defrocked and imprisoned.
Having dismissed the elected president and silenced their clerical detractors, Khomeini and his followers unleashed a reign of terror that was to disenfranchise the remaining secular opposition forces—the old elite had to be forcefully removed before the new one could ensure its political hegemony. Mass arrests, brutal suppression of demonstrations, and summary executions were the order of the day. A cursory reading of newspapers of the time reveals the scope of the regime’s brutality, as every issue proudly noted the tally of the previous day’s executions. The liberal National Front politicians, the radical MEK supporters, landlords, writers, intellectuals, and journalists were dismissed, imprisoned, and on occasion executed. The vengeance of God was swift and categorical. The violence of this period gave rise to the so-called Second Republic, a regime that consolidated its power through terror. This was essentially the end of the revolutionary promise of a progressive, inclusive society that embraced pluralism while remaining loyal to its religious traditions.