by Ray Takeyh
The tragedy of the current impasse in U.S.–Iranian relations is that despite half a century of intrigue and acrimony, the Iranian people still admire American values, ingenuity, and industrial prowess. Americans with firsthand knowledge of Iran have similarly come to appreciate the generosity of the Persian culture and the many lures of this ancient land. In yet another paradox, the hostile relations between the two powers often conceals the extent to which their strategic objectives coincide in the region. From the stabilization of Afghanistan and the volatile Persian Gulf region to diminishing Sunni militancy, the two antagonists at times find themselves uneasily on the same side. Should the diplomats and politicians ever manage to dismantle the “wall of mistrust” separating these two nations, they can take an important step toward creating a new Middle East.
MOSSADEQ AND THE POLITICS OF INTERVENTION
In August 2005, Iranian newspapers reported yet another gathering of historians to discuss the ramifications of the 1953 coup that overthrew the nationalist prime minister Muhammad Mossadeq.1 The specific theme to be explored was whether the coup retarded the development of democracy in Iran. The fact that a meeting of historians dealing with an event that took place five decades ago would garner such prominent news coverage may seem incomprehensible to an American audience, with its limited historical memory. For Iranians, however, history is a living enterprise, and no event has been more repeatedly assessed than the American complicity in the demise of Mossadeq’s government. The 1953 coup stands as a formative event, as myth and history have combined to concoct a narrative that continues to bedevil U.S.–Iranian relations.
In the years following World War II, Iran was a devastated country, barely recovering from famine and starvation and subsisting on meager American handouts.2 Ironically, Iran was also a wealthy country, with ample oil reserves that were fueling the engines of the British Empire. Much of Iran’s oil was controlled by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), whose majority shareholder was the British government. By 1950, the AIOC’s annual profits from Iranian oil amounted to 200 million pounds while Iran’s share of the revenues was a mere 16 million.3 The AIOC’s oil concessions had been negotiated in the early twentieth century, when the British lion imperiously roamed the Middle East, coaxing local monarchs and princes to acquiesce to its whims. In the early 1950s, when assertive nationalism was sweeping the emerging Third World, such anachronistic colonial arrangements seemed not only iniquitous but undignified.4
Iran’s original demands were modest and focused on a more generous profit-sharing arrangement and better working conditions for Iranian laborers living in squalid conditions. At a time when the American oil firms were offering 50-50 profit-sharing deals to the governments of Saudi Arabia and Venezuela, Iran perceived that it could demand no less.5 Accustomed to their profits and fearing that such concessions would establish an improper precedent for their global holdings, the AIOC and the British government demurred. The best that Iran could get was an additional four million pounds per year and further pledges for improvement of working conditions. Before World War II, Britain could have dictated terms like this with impunity, but the problem in the early 1950s was that nationalism was now the defining ideology of the developing world, a fact the British failed to recognize in dealing with Iran. This failure to acquiesce to the prevailing winds of change would embroil Britain in a crisis that a more imaginative policy may have averted.
The oil controversy inevitably provoked a political crisis inside Iran. The young Shah, eager to consolidate his rule and perennially in search of Western benefactors, was inclined to accept the British proposal. An array of conservative forces, ranging from large landlords to court politicians on the British payroll, similarly seemed amenable, giving AIOC’s executives the illusion of control. This was a grave misreading of the popular and parliamentary mood, as Iran was about to enter one of the most acute crises in its history.
The provocative and callous British conduct only managed to unite the differing strands of Iranian opposition into a remarkable coalition, the National Front.6 The National Front was essentially composed of liberal reformers, the intelligentsia, elements of the clerical class, socialist activists, and middle-class professionals. It is important to appreciate that the demands of the National Front soon transcended the oil issue as the party pressed for a more representative government with constitutional demarcations of power. The National Front government that emerged sought to improve public education and establish an accessible health system. Its proposed judicial reforms were designed to ensure equality before the law, while its efforts to broaden the prerogatives of the local governments were intended to decentralize power. This was not just a movement to reclaim Iran’s resources, but a new progressive alliance seeking to revamp Iranian society and government.7
The politician who emerged at the heart of this movement was the prominent parliamentarian Muhammad Mossadeq. Born into an aristocratic family and educated in Switzerland, Mossadeq belonged to a narrow class of Iranian elite that considered high government office its patrimony. Respectful of the monarchy and the traditions of its class, this cohort would constitute the cabinets, parliaments, and civil service that ruled Iran. An ardent nationalist, Mossadeq was dubious of foreign control and came to articulate the concept of “negative equilibrium,” under which Iran would preserve its autonomy by playing off one empire against another. A man prone to the histrionics of Persian politics, he would weep while making speeches, feign illness, and play the part of a fragile old man. To Iranians such theatrics were comprehensible, but to an international audience accustomed to a more stoic class of politicians, Mossadeq appeared eccentric, even bizarre. All this should not discount the fact that Mossadeq was a genuine patriot seeking to emancipate his country from the clutches of the British Empire.8
The continued British obstinacy further antagonized Iranian nationalistic feelings, eroding the consensus behind the 50-50 profit-sharing arrangement. The minority position in the parliament, led by Mossadeq, had been pressing for outright nationalization of the oil industry, and now it gained strength. On April 30, 1951, the Iranian parliament passed the nationalization bill, defying the monarch and propelling Mossadeq to the post of the prime minister. Had Britain been more imaginative in its recognition that it was impossible to rebuff Iran’s demands—particularly in light of the arrangements that the United States was offering to countries where it operated its oil industry—and embarked on a more generous package, the crisis might have been averted. But the imperial arrogance of the British government and the rapacious nature of the AIOC had inexorably radicalized Iranian politics.
In terms of dealing with Mossadeq’s challenge, the British contemplated a policy of what we would now call “regime change.” Britain imposed a stringent embargo on Iran’s oil, depriving Tehran of much of its revenues. The AIOC’s announcement that it would take legal action against anyone seeking to purchase Iran’s oil proved a sufficient deterrent to many international oil firms, who were already wary of Tehran’s nationalization act. In the meantime, the departure of British technicians essentially crippled the Iranian oil industry. It was hoped in Whitehall that by undermining Iran’s fragile economy and depriving it of its oil revenues, sufficient popular pressure could be generated, leading in due course to Mossadeq’s overthrow. For good measure, the British intelligence services also began covert planning and mobilizing their ample assets in Iran.
The notion of a malevolent America plotting against Iran conceals much about the actual course of events in the Mossadeq crisis. The Truman administration appreciated the shortcomings of the British strategy and pressed London to accept Iran’s legitimate demands. As for Iran, successive American diplomats led by the indefatigable Averell Harriman sought to similarly adjust Mossadeq’s positions and make the prime minister realize that a dogmatic assertion of Iran’s rights was unlikely to resolve the dispute. In the initial stages, America played the role of mediator, pressing both sides toward accommodation and compromise. The Tru
man administration sustained its assistance to Iran, which helped ease the pain of British economic sanctions, and it was instrumental in dissuading Britain from precipitous military action, seeking instead to craft a negotiated solution somehow acceptable to both parties.9 The United States has much to account for in its later behavior during the nationalization crisis, but Truman’s efforts on behalf of Iran should also be acknowledged.
Despite ample efforts, the American mediation diplomacy was increasingly frustrated by the political ferment that was sweeping Iran. As Mossadeq proceeded to galvanize the public, the prospects of a compromise vanished. The prime minister’s absolutist rhetoric and his pledges to end British influence created political conditions militating against a judicious resolution of the crisis. The reality was that the British had the capacity to shut down Iran’s oil industry, depriving the country of its essential source of revenue.10 Unlike today, the Iranian oil was not critical to the global petroleum market, making the British sanctions policy more tolerable for the international community. At any rate, Mossadeq had a great capacity for mobilizing diverse national forces, but only a limited ability for crafting a negotiating position that could be acceptable to his powerful and increasingly unyielding adversary. Both parties in the conflict proved inflexible in their views, parochial in defining their interests, and overly sensitive to the political ramifications of any deal. For Britain, Iran’s nationalization act remained an illegal expropriation of private property, while for Iran it was a legitimate reclamation of a natural resource long exploited by a greedy foreign company. As both sides became entrenched in their principles, the prospect of mutual agreement seemed far-fetched. The only difference was that the British could better afford their intransigence than a poverty-stricken country deprived of its indispensable source of subsistence.
As the crisis enveloping Iran intensified, Mossadeq behaved in an increasingly autocratic manner, extending his powers through contrived referendums, dispensing with the parliament, seeking the assumption of the war ministry, and usurping the prerogatives of the monarchy. At his core, Mossadeq was a principled politician with deep reverence for Iran’s institutions and constitutional arrangements. But the pressure of governing at a time of deepening crisis accentuated the more troubling aspects of his character. Suddenly the champion of democratic reform and accountable government seemed to indulge in a type of arbitrary behavior that he had spent much of his political career condemning.
Iran’s escalating economic crisis also began to fracture the National Front coalition. The middle-class elements, concerned about their declining economic fortunes, gradually began to abandon Mossadeq. In the meantime, the intelligentsia and the professional classes were also increasingly wary of the prime minister’s autocratic tendencies and looked for an alternative leadership. A number of smaller political parties that had been associated with Mossadeq’s movement were also contemplating their own exit. Even more ominous, the armed forces that had stayed quiet despite Mossadeq’s periodic purges of the senior officer corps now grew vocal and began to participate in political intrigues.
Among Mossadeq’s coalition partners, the clergy would play the most curious role. As with most historical events, the Islamic Republic has been conveniently selective in its recapitulation of this episode and has neglected the role that the clerical community played in Mossadeq’s demise. The senior clerics’ approach toward the enveloping nationalist struggle was always one of disengagement.11 The clergy were traditionally uneasy about the modernizing penchants of secular politicians such as Mossadeq and their quests for republican rule and liberalization of the existing institutions. The mullahs preferred the deference of a conservative and uncertain monarch than the secular enterprise of Mossadeq and the National Front. However, given the popularity of the nationalist cause, they recoiled from outright opposition, remaining diffident. To be sure, not all clerical leaders would accept such quietism, as Khomeini chafed under such restrictions, but still acceded to the determinations of the senior clergy. The banner of clerical opposition would be led by the opportunistic Ayatollah Abdolqasem Kashani, who sensed a chance for self-aggrandizement. In due course, Kashani would switch his allegiances and prove instrumental in Mossadeq’s downfall. The Islamic Republic’s perennial demand for an American apology over its complicity in the 1953 coup ought not to obscure the fact that the clerical community was either indifferent or actively conspired against Mossadeq.
As Mossadeq increasingly stood isolated, in yet another miscalculation he invoked the Communist threat as a means of extracting American concessions. In a dramatic note to the United States, Mossadeq implored, “If prompt and effective aid is not given this country now, any steps that might be taken tomorrow to compensate for negligence of today might well be too late.”12 The premier perceived that as Iran’s economy suffered and fears of Communist takeover gripped Washington, the United States would abandon Britain and rescue him from his predicament. Perversely, he now brandished the Communist threat as a means of compelling assistance from the United States. Mossadeq failed to appreciate that Communist subversion would only lead the United States to embrace Britain, its intimate Cold War ally, and oppose Iran’s nationalistic intransigence. For Mossadeq, as for many of his countrymen, Iran was the center of the universe, and he assumed that the great powers would gladly accede to his country’s demands. Indeed, such a distorted sense of Iran was not limited to Mossadeq but is an enduring Persian conceit.
By 1953, as the oil crisis entered its third year, a combination of events would lead the United States to contemplate Mossadeq’s overthrow. A new president, Dwight D. Eisenhower, came to power with a determination to wage a more aggressive Cold War, and his administration displayed a marked suspicion of Third World neutralism.13 Eisenhower and his hawkish secretary of state John Foster Dulles proved more sensitive to the British assertion that only a change in the Iranian regime could resolve the impasse.14 This claim seemed even more compelling as the economic situation deteriorated, which seemed to empower the Communist Tudeh Party that the prime minister was both brandishing as a threat and increasingly relying on as a coalition partner. In retrospect, Tudeh had little capacity to dislodge Mossadeq, since its radicalism remained unacceptable to many parts of Iranian society.15 But in America’s zero-sum Cold War rivalry with the Soviet Union, Third World nationalist struggles were too often subsumed in the framework of the containment policy. Mossadeq became just one more victim of the stark Cold War duality—that every government was either “with us or against us.”
The drama of CIA officers clandestinely plotting the coup against Mossadeq has been breathlessly told many times, and further repetition is not needed here. The cast of characters is indeed bewildering: Kermit Roosevelt, the scion of America’s foremost political family, paying street thugs to agitate against the hapless Mossadeq; American operatives shoring up an indecisive monarch to return to Tehran from his exile in Rome and reclaim his throne; Communist agitators and clerical firebrands struggling under the same banner and participating in demonstrations financed by the United States and Britain. As Iran veered from crisis to crisis, the armed forces finally stepped in and ended Mossadeq’s brief but momentous tenure. The famed Operation Ajax would stand as one of the most effective of CIA’s covert enterprises, leading Washington to perceive that it could easily replicate its success elsewhere.16
As with most political narratives, there exists a gap between the historical figure of Mossadeq and the evolved myth. Mossadeq was indeed a principled politician, yet the temptations of power at times led him to electoral manipulations. He was a determined nationalist whose quest for popular acclaim blinded him to a compromised solution that might have resolved the stalemate with Britain and sustained Iran’s economy. Mossadeq was certainly toppled due to American machinations, yet by 1953 his coalition had so frayed that it was hard to see how he could maintain his hold on power. As with most politicians, he was a complex, contradictory figure who was shaped by historical force
s not all his choosing. However, in the contemporary Iranian political imagination he remains a promising democrat, subverted by a malicious America. Iranians continue to believe that their country may have forged a nationalist path, reclaimed its resources from foreign exploitation, and escaped the tentacles of a despotic monarchy had it not been for American manipulations. Such claims are not entirely fanciful, as an expeditious resolution of the oil crisis may have averted the coup and even propelled Iran toward a more progressive political path. It is impossible to say with certainty how history would have evolved, yet such certainty is the mainstay of the Iranian memory of 1953.
In a sense, the coup of 1953 made the Islamic Revolution of 1979 possible, even predictable. Having survived a pronounced threat to his rule, the Shah proceeded to create a rigid authoritarian state, relying on an extensive secret police apparatus to maintain order. The coup essentially destroyed the delicate internal balance of power, with the monarchy coexisting with assertive parliaments and prime ministers. The National Front that was the main engine of the modern middle class’s aspirations was effectively crushed when the monarchy proved relentlessly hostile to leftist and moderate political parties. As the secular opposition was repressed and its leaders and politicians imprisoned, the clerical establishment emerged as the main venue of opposition politics. As we have seen, the clerical community largely stayed out of the 1953 nationalization crisis, while at critical junctures it even assisted the restoration of the monarchy. However, by the 1960s more militant mullahs such as Khomeini were coming to the forefront and mobilizing the impressive clerical network against the regime. Given the fact that the secular forces were largely decimated, the mullahs with their privileged mosque sanctuaries managed to appropriate the leadership of the evolving anti-Shah opposition and finally the revolution itself.