by Ray Takeyh
For eight years, Saddam’s regime imposed a massive war of aggression against my people. It employed the most heinous weapons of mass destruction including chemical weapons against Iranians and Iraqis alike. Who, in fact, armed Saddam with those weapons? What was the reaction of those who claim to fight against WMDs regarding the use of chemical weapons then?20
The international indifference to Saddam’s war crimes and Tehran’s lack of an effective response have led Iran’s war-veteran president to perceive that the security of his country cannot be predicated on global opinion and treaties.
At the core, all disarmament agreements call upon a state to forgo a certain degree of sovereignty in exchange for enhanced security. Once a state renounces its weapons of mass destruction programs it can be assured of support from the international community should it be threatened by another state possessing such arms. This implied tradeoff has no value for Iran’s hard-liners. Once more, the prolonged war with Iraq conditions their worldview and behavior. Iraq’s use of chemical weapons against Iran—with impunity, if not the tacit acceptance of Western powers—has reinforced Iran’s suspicions of the international order. Jomhuri-ye Islami observed, “As a rule, it is futile to enter any deal with the West over issues related to the country’s independence and national security.”21 For many of the Islamic Republic’s reactionary leaders, the only way to safeguard Iran’s interests is to develop an independent nuclear deterrent.
Beyond the legacy of the war, America’s demands that Iran relinquish its fuel cycle rights under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has aroused the leadership’s nationalistic impulses. As a country that has historically been the subject of foreign intervention and the imposition of various capitulation treaties, Iran is inordinately sensitive to its national prerogatives and sovereign rights. The rulers of Iran perceive that they are being challenged not because of their provocations and previous treaty violations, but because of superpower bullying. In a peculiar manner, the nuclear program and Iran’s national identity have become fused in the imagination of the hard-liners. To stand against America on this issue is to validate one’s revolutionary ardor and sense of nationalism. Ali Hussein-Tash, deputy secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, stressed this point, saying, “A nation that does not engage in risks and difficult challenges, and a nation which does not stand up for itself, can never be a proud nation.”22 Thus, the notion of compromise and acquiescence has limited utility to Iran’s aggrieved nationalists.
After decades of tension, Iranian reactionaries perceive that conflict with the United States is inevitable and the only means of tempering America’s ambitions is through the possession of the bomb. Although today the United States may seem entangled in an Iraq quagmire, for Iranian hawks it is still an aggressive state whose power cannot be discounted and whose intentions must not be trusted. The arch-conservative Keyhan newspaper pointedly advised the regime “to plan for acquiring the knowledge and ability to make nuclear weapons, which is necessary in preparation for the next phase in the future battlefield.”23
Despite their bitterness and cynicism, the theocratic hard-liners are eternal optimists when it comes to their assessment of how the international community will respond to Iran’s nuclear breakout. Many influential conservative voices insist that Iran will follow the model of India and Pakistan, with the initial international outcry soon followed by an acceptance of Iran’s new status. Thus, Tehran would regain its commercial contracts and keep its nuclear weapons. The former Iranian foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati noted this theme, stressing, “Whenever we stand firm and defend our righteous stands resolutely, they are forced to retreat and have no alternatives.”24 The Right thus rejects the notion that Iran’s mischievous past and its tense relations with the United States will militate against the international community’s accepting Iran’s nuclear status.
Should their anticipations prove misguided, however, and Iran become the subject of sanctions, it is a price the hard-liners are willing to pay for an important national prerogative. Ahmadinejad has pointedly noted that even if sanctions were to be imposed, “the Iranian nation would still have its rights.”25 In a similar vein, Ayatollah Jannati has stated, “We do not welcome sanctions, but if we are threatened by sanctions, we will not give in.”26 The notion of the need to sacrifice and struggle on behalf of the revolution and resist imperious international demands is an essential tenet of the hard-liners’ ideological perspective.
In the Islamic Republic’s informal governing structure, the national security decisions are subject to input by many figures, even those not necessarily with a portfolio. For instance, the former prime minister Mir Hussein Mussavi, who has been out of power for nearly twenty years but is greatly respected due to his service during the war with Iraq, is consulted intimately about Iran’s nuclear course. It appears that despite Western perceptions that the nuclear issue is decided by a narrow band of conservatives, Ayatollah Khamenei has broaden the parameters of the debate to include relevant elites from across the political spectrum in the nuclear deliberations. Thus, reformers out of power, moderate conservatives struggling against their reactionary brethren, as well as professionals from key bureaucracies are allowed to stress their points of view. Given the provocative nature of the nuclear program, Khamenei seems to be hoping that the burden of any ensuing international confrontation would be assumed by all political factions, as opposed to being the responsibility of only the conservatives. The systematic consolidation of power by the conservatives over the state does not necessarily mean that voices of restraint have been excised from the decision-making process.
In contrast to the hard-liners, the pragmatic elements within the Islamic Republic insist that Iran’s integration into the international order and the global economy mandates accepting certain restrictions on its nuclear program. Although it is tempting to see this issue as divided between reactionaries and reformers, the coalition pressing for reticence features both pragmatists, such as Rafsanjani, who is currently the head of the Expediency Council, and Hasan Rowhani, former secretary for the Supreme Council on National Security—officials within the ministries and important elements of Iran’s national security establishment who retain their status irrespective of who is president. The proponents of this strategy do not call for the dismantling of Iran’s nuclear edifice but for the development of an advanced capacity within the flexible guidelines of the NPT. Given Iran’s long-term commitment to the NPT and the prevailing international scrutiny, a provocative policy could invite multilateral sanctions and lead Iran’s valuable commercial partners, such as the European Union, to embrace the U.S. policy of isolating and pressuring Iran. Thus, for this constituency, a hedging strategy can sustain Iran’s nuclear program while maintaining its international ties.
Over the winter of 2005–2006, as Iran’s reckless diplomacy generated a series of IAEA resolutions condemning its conduct and referring it to the UN Security Council, the members of this group called for restraint, and even for suspension of various nuclear activities. Rafsanjani took the lead in admonishing President Ahmadinejad: “We have reached a sensitive point. There is need for prudence on both sides.”27 The reformers went still further; in March 2006, Muhammad Reza Khatami, the head of the Islamic Participation Front, insisted, “We have written numerous letters to Leader Khamenei to explain that insisting on enriching uranium is not in the country’s interest; that in this way we lose all the benefits gained over the past sixteen years; and that the only proper position is suspension of uranium-enriching activities and negotiations with the aim of fostering trust and having international oversight.”28 The more moderate elements see the nuclear program in a wider context of Iran’s international relations. Given that Iran’s pursuit of its nuclear ambitions damages other aspects of its foreign policy, this group favors compromise and even a potential suspension of the program.
Beyond the fears of sanctions and isolation, some proponents of nuclear restraint argue that such weapo
ns do not necessarily serve Iran’s strategic interests. Should Iran cross the nuclear threshold, the Gulf states and the newly independent Iraq are likely to gravitate further toward the American security umbrella. Indeed, under the auspices of the United States, a Persian Gulf security architecture may evolve with the purpose of containing and isolating the Islamic Republic. As Iran’s former representative to the IAEA, Ali Akbar Salehi, emphasized in June 2004, “We cannot buy security by having nuclear weapons which only invite more threats against ourselves.”29
Unlike their reactionary brethren, the more pragmatic elements appreciate that given Iran’s “exceptional” nature and the eagerness of the United States to publicize all of its infractions as a means of multilateralizing its coercive policy, a defiant posture may not serve it well. The influential moderate politician Mohsen Mirdamadi stipulated, “The reality is that our recent achievement in the area of nuclear technology has been part of our strength and created new opportunities for us in the international arena, but we should not turn this into a new threat. We should be careful not to bring the U.S. and Europe together.”30 To be sure, other states have surreptitiously developed nuclear weapons, but they did so with superpower acceptance—even complicity—and in an international environment that was not suspicious of their intent. Iran does not enjoy such advantages, since its revolutionary past and its continued engagement with terrorist organizations make many states wary of its motives. Tehran simply does not have the luxury granted to Israel or India. All this does not imply a propensity to renounce a weapons capability but a recognition of the need for restraint and the importance of the international community and its opinion.
Iran’s pragmatists have increasingly been drawn to the North Korean model, as Pyongyang has adroitly managed to employ its nuclear defiance to extract concessions from the international community. Through a similar posture of restraint and defiance, threats, and blandishments, perhaps Tehran can also play the nuclear card to renegotiate a more rational relationship with its leading nemesis, the United States. The conservative publication Farda, with its ties to the hard-line community, put forward such a proposition: “The credibility that these weapons have had and continue to have at the global level, their importance, is in the support they give to bargaining in international negotiations and advancement of the country’s national interests.” The influential conservative politician Muhammad Javad Larijani echoed this theme: “If our national interests dictate, we can go to the bowels of hell to negotiate with the devil.”31
Hovering over this debate, once more, stands Ayatollah Khamenei. As mentioned, the Supreme Leader’s instincts would be to support the reactionary elements in their call for defiance and pursuit of the nuclear option. But in his role as the guardian of the state, he must consider the nuclear program in the context of Iran’s larger international relations. Thus far, he has opted for compromise and appeasement of all the factions involved in the debate. On the one hand, Khamenei has endorsed the acceleration of Iran’s program and construction of an advanced nuclear infrastructure. Yet, he has also conceded the need for negotiations with the international community and has pressed the state toward a degree of restraint. All this may change, since Iran needs to make critical decisions regarding its nuclear program, with many of those decisions conditioned by the conduct of external actors, particularly the United States.
In assessing a state’s nuclear path, it is important to note that its motivations cannot be exclusively examined within the context of its national interests and security considerations. Whatever strategic benefits such weapons offer a state, they are certainly a source of national prestige and parochial benefits to various bureaucracies and politicians. As such constituencies emerge, a state can cross the nuclear threshold even if the initial strategic factors that provoked the program are no longer salient. The emergence of bureaucracies and nationalistic pressures in Iran is generating its own proliferation momentum, empowering those seeking a nuclear breakout. As time passes, the pragmatic voices calling for hedging are likely to be marginalized and lose their influence within the regime.
THE POLITICS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
As Iran’s nuclear program matures and becomes the subject of international scrutiny, another dynamic is entering the debate: public opinion. Far from being a source of restraint, the emerging public sentiment is that Iran, as a great civilization with a long history, has a right to acquire a nuclear capability. The recent disclosures of the sophisticated nature of Iran’s nuclear program have been a source of pride for a citizenry accustomed to the revolution’s failures and setbacks. Rafsanjani, one of the Islamic Republic’s most astute politicians, acknowledged this trend when he said, “No official would dare allow himself to defy the people on such an issue.”32 In March 2005, the Islamic Republic even issued a postage stamp celebrating the achievements of its nuclear energy program.33 Washington’s incendiary rhetoric and its designation of Iran as part of an “axis of evil” that should not have access to such technologies has only inflamed a highly nationalistic population. In the popular discourse, the notions of sovereign rights and national dignity are increasingly displacing calls for adherence to treaty commitments.
Iran’s experience during the past quarter-century with war, sanctions, and estrangement from the international community has fostered a population that is somewhat unresponsive to external pressures. Among the themes consistently propounded in the press is the notion of American hypocrisy over the application of the NPT. The fact that Israel has escaped criticism from Washington has been cleverly exploited by conservative politicians to arouse nationalistic backing for Iran’s acquisition of nuclear capabilities. Moreover, the attempt by the United States to restrict membership in the exclusive nuclear club has always irked the Iranian leaders and masses alike. America is thus routinely condemned by Iranian writers, academics, and politicians as arrogant and self-serving. The leading conservative thinker, Amir Mohebian, pointedly criticized the U.S. posture: “The Americans say in order to preserve the peace for their children, they should have nuclear weapons and we should not.” In a strange note of agreement, one of the foremost reformist activists, Mostafa Tajzadeh, noted, “It’s basically a matter of equilibrium: if I don’t have a nuclear bomb, I don’t have security.”34
Among the most vociferous critics of any accommodation on the nuclear issue are student organizations. Iranian students are seen by many analysts as a reliable barometer of public opinion, as they often play a vanguard political role in significant movements in Iranian history. It is customary for Western audiences to identify Iranian students with progressive causes, as they have been the most vocal advocates of greater democratization and reform of the Islamic Republic. On the nuclear issue, however, Iran’s educated youth seem to view disarmament agreements as an abridgment of national rights and have warned their elders against capitulating to external pressures. Upon Iran’s acceptance of the Additional Protocol, which called for more intrusive inspections of its nuclear plants in October 2003, Iran’s universities were rocked with demonstrations against the agreement. In the prestigious Sharif Technical University, students passed a resolution equating the accords with “treason.” In a meeting of university students from across the country in Bushehr (the site of Iran’s nuclear reactor), an easily passed resolution proclaimed, “We, the Iranian students, consider access to nuclear energy as the legitimate right of the Iranian nation. We will never bow to oppression and hegemonic policies.”35 In 2004 yet another open letter signed by 1,700 students from across the country stated, “The nation will never accept any negligence or justifications from the officials with respect to the application of nuclear technology.”36 As public opinion becomes a factor in the nuclear deliberations, it is likely to further press the clerical elite in the direction of enhanced nuclear capabilities that can be transformed for military purposes.
Alongside this popular sentiment is the emergence of a bureaucratic and scientific establishment with its own parochial co
nsiderations. Under the auspices of the Revolutionary Guards, an entire array of organizations such as the Defense Industries Organization, university laboratories, and a plethora of companies (many of them owned by hard-line clerics) have provided the impetus for Iran’s expanding and lucrative nuclear efforts. As with the students, Tehran’s acceptance of the Additional Protocol in 2003 brought forth protest from these corners, with 250 of Iran’s leading scientists signing an open letter, warning, “We the signers of this letter urge the government of the Islamic Republic to, under no circumstances, sign any letter which would create an impediment to our legitimate right to acquire knowledge and technology.”37 The continued Iranian negotiations with the European states and the suspension of its program brought forth another rebuke by 1,375 professors who signed a letter calling for resumption of activities, which are, after all, legal under the provisions of the NPT.38
In an even more ominous manner, the Revolutionary Guard leadership has been dubious about the utility of treaties in terms of safeguarding Iran’s security interests. In a remarkable outburst, the commander of the Revolutionary Guards, Yahya Rahim Safavi, pointedly asked, “Can we withstand America’s threats and domineering attitude with a policy of détente? Will we be able to protect the Islamic Republic from international Zionism by signing conventions banning the proliferation of chemical and nuclear weapons?”39 Although most members of the scientific community tend to at least limit their public declarations to calls for development of Iran’s nuclear industry under the confines of the NPT, the more militant Revolutionary Guard leadership seems to be pressing for outright construction of the bomb. Disturbingly, the operational management of Iran’s nuclear program rests in the hands of the hard-line elements who have scant respect for international treaties and obligations. The prestige and profits generated by this mission reinforce the strategic arguments for the prolongation of the nuclear program.