by Ray Takeyh
Despite its multiplicity of attacks around the globe, Israel has been Hezbollah’s favorite target. Hezbollah’s forces waged a long and costly guerrilla war against Israel, eventually contributing to its decision to withdraw from southern Lebanon in 2000. Israel’s departure has not lessened Hezbollah’s animosity; the Lebanese group trains Hamas activists and periodically shells Israeli settlements across the border. In the summer of 2006, Hezbollah took the provocative step of abducting and killing Israeli soldiers, provoking a massive Israeli counterattack. Nevertheless, the Hezbollah paradigm of confronting superior military power with suicide bombings and a low-intensity guerrilla campaign has now been embraced by the region’s militants as their preferred model of waging war. The case of Iraq demonstrates that even its Sunni insurgents are willing to learn from their Shiite counterparts, as U.S. troops are now subject to the same deadly tactics that facilitated the eviction of Israel from its security perimeter in Lebanon.
Iran’s motivations for supporting Hezbollah thus stem from an interlocking set of ideological and strategic calculations. As we have seen, the “revolution without borders” sought to refashion regional norms and spread its message throughout the Middle East. In practice, Iran’s appeal proved limited to beleaguered Shiite minorities in states such as Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Lebanon. The fact that most of these Shiite communities eventually traded in Iranian support for accommodation with the ruling elite limited the Islamic Republic’s reach to perennially fractious Lebanon. In a real sense, Hezbollah remains the only palpable success of Iran’s largely self-defeating attempt to export its revolution. On the strategic front, Hezbollah allowed Iran to project its influence to the Arab world at minimal cost. However, the events of 2006 demonstrated that relying on a terrorist organization whose rash conduct can potentially spark a regional war can entangle the Islamic Republic in difficulties it may not have anticipated.
Hezbollah has always been burdened by its dual identity. It is at once a political party seeking integration in Lebanon’s multi-confessional society, yet it is also an Islamist vanguard force dedicated to confronting Israel. For a long time, such duality seemed easily reconcilable, as Hezbollah’s successful eviction of Israeli troops from southern Lebanon measurably enhanced its prestige and enabled it to assume a commanding position in Lebanese politics.24 Iran could claim credit for a Hezbollah that was both a model for Islamists as well as a political force in the Levant. The rising stature of its protégé allowed Iran a voice in deliberations well beyond its actual military capabilities.
Yet even politically astute organizations are capable of grave misjudgments. In the heady days of the summer of 2006, when the Palestinian fires were burning, Hezbollah decided to join the fray. In this sense, the Shiite party misjudged both Israeli reticence and the temper of the Lebanese people. At a time when Lebanon had finally reclaimed its autonomy (with the departure of Syrian forces) and was focused on economic development, Hezbollah failed to appreciate that its relevance could not be predicated on its dedication to armed struggle against Israel. As Lebanon once more plunged into violence and disorder, Hezbollah’s vaunted military capability was degraded and its judgment questioned by its once-ardent constituents. Hezbollah’s patrons in Tehran, who were undoubtedly informed of its plans, must have experienced a degree of buyer’s remorse. Their most esteemed protégé stands in an uncharacteristically beleaguered position, distrusted by contending sectarian groups in Lebanon as well as by many Arab leaders. It may be difficult for Hezbollah to remain a significant instrument of Iranian policy in this charged atmosphere.
The Islamic Republic may be an ardent supporter of terrorism, but it is also a cautious power. Despite its depiction of Israel as a threat to the cohesion of the Islamic bloc, Iran has avoided direct military confrontation with the Israeli military machine. In essence, Iran has always found itself in a peculiar position, as it seems caught between its incendiary rhetoric and an unwillingness to commit forces to the actual struggle against the Jewish state. Successive Iranian regimes have sought to escape this conundrum by subsidizing terrorist organizations that share its determination to obstruct diplomatic efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. Yet it is apparent to many in the region that Iran’s strident opposition to Israel has had a degree of convenience; the Islamic Republic has insisted on perpetuation of hostilities while avoiding direct engagement in the conflict.
In the 1990s, the contradictions in Iran’s posture became more glaring, as a seemingly successful peace process launched by the Clinton administration confronted the theocratic regime with the difficult balancing act of sustaining its absolutist opposition to Israel while mending fences with leading regional powers inclined to accept a political settlement. Although in the past Iran’s strategic requirements and ideological determinations easily coincided, the unfolding Oslo peace process forced Tehran toward an important modification of its anti-Israeli posture. As with many constructive developments that took place in the Islamic Republic during the late 1990s, the harbinger of that positive change was Muhammad Khatami.
FROM KHATAMI TO AHMADINEJAD
Khatami’s presidency ushered in important changes in Iran’s international orientation. The new president and his reformist allies recognized that Iran’s divisive diplomacy and inflammatory rhetoric had led to a debilitating isolation damaging its international standing and economic requirements. In order to reclaim its place in the global society and revitalize its economy, Iran had to join the march of modernity and accommodate itself to some basic realities. As Iran was awaking from its Islamist torpor, it confronted a changing regional landscape. Throughout the 1990s, prominent Arab leaders—including such implacable foes of Israel as Yasser Arafat—journeyed to the White House to sign peace compacts with Israel. In 2002, even the Arab League, under the prodding of the Saudis, contemplated its own plans for ending the Arab-Israeli conflict. The era of anti-Zionist confrontations seemed finally to be coming to a close as the Palestinian recognition of Israel provided justification for the reigning Arab regimes to abandon a costly struggle that had resulted only in military defeat and political anguish. An Iran seeking integration in the regional political order and reconciliation with the leading Arab powers could not be seen as engaging in conduct detrimental to their interests.
Beyond such strategic calculations, the reformist leadership whose power was predicated on electoral consent recognized how Iran’s stance against Israel had alienated its own citizens. In the 1960s Iranian youth with their Third Worldist pretensions and anticolonial shibboleths had found the Palestinian cause a worthy struggle, but their postrevolutionary offspring demonstrated scant interest in Palestine’s liberation. Beset by persistent unemployment and a suffocating cultural milieu, Iran’s youthful populace is well aware that the ideological hubris of their parents resulted only in economic stagnation and a tarnished international reputation. The reality of Iran today is that after decades of propagating anti-Israeli sermons, the theocratic oligarchs have failed to convince their constituents why a country that shares no borders with Israel and has no Palestinian refugee problem should continue with its dogmatic policy. The irony of the Islamic Republic is that its anti-Israeli antagonism is largely a privilege of its narrowly defined elite. Reformist politicians seeking not just to empower the citizenry but to craft a government responsible to the masses had to take account of these widespread popular sentiments.
The most thunderous denunciation of Iran’s policy came from an unlikely source, a former minister of interior who emerged as one of the most admired reformist politicians, Abdollah Nuri. Given his popularity and stature, Nuri was one of the first victims of the conservative crackdown, when in 1999 he was convicted on spurious charges and imprisoned for five years. Nuri’s trial was broadcast daily by the state media and proved to be riveting television, as Iranians across the country gathered around their sets to hear the unthinkable. In a pointed rebuke to the hard-liners, Nuri proclaimed, “What do Iranians gain from this attitu
de except being blamed for supporting terrorism?” The former interior minister stipulated, “The current conditions are not ideal, but we must come to terms with realities and avoid being a bowl warmer than the soup.”25 In light of Iran’s self-defeating policy, Nuri invoked the heretical proposition that it was time not only to reassess but to discard Khomeini’s views on Israel.
Nor was Nuri an isolated voice; increasingly, such sentiments were openly expressed in the reformist circles. An influential reformist daily, Bonyan, dared to cross the redlines of the Islamic Republic by pointing to the international opprobrium that had resulted from Iran’s support for terrorist organizations. In an important 2002 editorial, Bonyan suggested that “Iran’s interests have been jeopardized by this allegation on numerous occasions.”26 In a similar vein, Mohsen Mirdamadi, a leading liberal politician and the head of the reformist parliament’s foreign affairs committee, stated:
We have certain ideals about Palestine, but we also face certain limitations. Can we be more Palestinian than Palestinians? I don’t believe that this should be the case. But if we insist on our posture, no one in the Islamic world is going to support us and we will be an isolated and forsaken country.27
Beyond such assertions, many reformers contested Iran’s policy as impractical, given the gap between its declared objectives and actual commitment. The reformers mocked the hard-liners as indulging in belligerent declarations while confining themselves to provision of modest aid to radical Palestinian groups that had no chance of threatening Israel’s actual existence. Such an illogical policy had no prospect of redeeming the pledge of “wiping Israel off the map,” and its only success was in triggering economic sanctions on Iran’s fledgling economy.
It was here that Khomeini’s legacy created a reality that the Islamic Republic found difficult to escape. For the hard-liners committed to guarding the dogma of the state, opposition to Israel was an indication of ideological reliability and revolutionary valor. In a curious manner, the fact that Iran’s policy had no chance of realizing its stated purpose of destroying Israel mattered little, since expressed hostility was seen as an indication of loyalty to the pillars of the revolution. Even the more moderate elements, struggling with so many aspects of the theocracy’s self-defeating ideology, appeared restrained by this legacy and unwilling to pay the political price for a fundamental revision of a crucial aspect of Khomeini’s vision. The fact was that for Khatami and the reformers, Iran’s approach toward Israel was not the foremost area of concern, as domestic political reforms and more critical foreign policy issues such as potentially seeking a different relationship with America limited their incentive to struggle against a well-entrenched policy. This is not to suggest that no change occurred, however, as once more behind the scenes Khatami forged an important consensus for a more pragmatic approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
While on the surface Iran’s animosities appeared intact, Khatami quickly changed the tone of the regime’s rhetoric. As part of his “Dialogue of Civilizations” advocacy, the reformist president left the door ajar to participation by Jewish scholars. Departing from the norms of Iran’s discourse, Khatami pointedly rejected anti-Semitism as a Western phenomenon without precedent in the Islamic civilization. “In the East we have had despotism and dictatorship, but never fascism and Nazism,” he declared.28 While Khomeini had often edged toward an anti-Semitic depiction of Jews, and his hard-line followers had insisted on castigating Arab politicians who entered peace treaties with Israel, Khatami offered a fundamentally different approach.
In his influential CNN interview of January 1998, Khatami unveiled Iran’s more nuanced policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. Much of the coverage of Khatami’s broadcast interview focused on his offering of an olive branch to the United States and his denunciation of the peace process as flawed and unjust. But Khatami also took the occasion to stress, “We don’t intend to impose our views on others or stand in their way.”29 Foreign ministry spokesman Hamid Asefi reiterated this position, noting that Iran “will in no way interfere with the decisions of the Palestinian groups. We respect all decisions taken by the majority of the Palestinians.”30 In essence, the theocratic regime implied that it was prepared to acquiesce to a peace treaty acceptable to the Palestinian authorities and the leading Arab states. This was a subtle yet perceptible change from Khomeini’s unrelenting hostility to Israel.
The most important test of Iran’s new policy came at the 2002 Arab League meeting that endorsed Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah’s peace resolution calling for the collective Arab recognition of Israel should it pull out of the occupied territories. In the past, this would be an occasion for Iranian fulminations against Arab pusillanimity and commencement of conferences featuring militant Palestinian groups vilifying the proposal. However, this time, Khatami took the lead: “We will honor what the Palestinian people accept.”31 Foreign minister Kamal Kharrazi similarly characterized the communiqué of the Arab League meeting as the “most generous peace initiative by Arab states and, in its most optimistic sense, this plan is the repetition of the UN resolutions.”32 After decades of struggle against any measure calling for acknowledgment of Israel’s rights, the Iranian regime appeared to grudgingly accept certain inevitable realities.
It is inconceivable that Khatami’s regime could have taken such positions without the consent and approval of the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Although it is difficult to decipher the opaque backroom politics of the theocratic regime, it is not unreasonable to suggest that Khatami once more managed to press a reluctant Supreme Leader to accept another important revision of the revolution’s bombastic claims. Iran continued to offer material assistance to Palestinian militant groups and Hezbollah, but Tehran stipulated the conditions for a potential end of the conflict. Whatever its ideological dispositions, the clerical state recognized that its interests in the Middle East and its relations with key Arab states outweighed a lonely struggle against a peace process that was buttressed by a regional consensus. The critical question remained whether this hard-won position would survive the rise of a reactionary politician seeking to revive the “roots of the revolution.”
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad came into office in 2005 determined to rekindle the revolutionary fires that seemed long extinguished. As part of an austere generation of war veterans that bemoaned society’s indifference to Khomeini’s legacy and the sacrifices of the revolution, Iran’s new president persistently advocated turning back the clock. Ahmadinejad’s vision for Iran constitutes an anachronistic mixture of statist economic policies, reimposition of Islamic cultural strictures, and reversal of the limited political freedoms that Iranians had come to enjoy during the reformist interlude. It would be on the international stage, however, that Ahmadinejad would garner the greatest attention—and cause considerable alarm and anxiety among both his countrymen and his larger global audience.
During one of the peculiar conclaves of radicals, reactionaries, and militants from across the Middle East that is all too familiar to observers of the Islamic Republic, Ahmadinejad issued his infamous call for the eradication of Israel. Far from being chastened by the international outcry, he followed up his outrageous remarks by denying the Holocaust as a “myth.” For a politician who had advocated revitalizing the pan-Islamic dimension of Khomeini’s revolution, the flagrant attack on Israel was a natural, even routine affair. After all, one of the core pillars of Khomeini’s vision was the notion that Israel was an illegitimate entity and an imperial infringement on the Islamic realm.
Beyond the glare of publicity and international condemnations, however, what was missed about Ahmadinejad’s speech was his attempt to reverse the “Khatami compromise”: “Anybody who takes a step toward Israel will burn in the fire of the Islamic nation’s fury,” declared the new president.33 In essence, Ahmadinejad was suggesting that the Islamic Republic would no longer be prepared to accept a peace treaty that was endorsed by the Palestinian officials and the Arab states. Indeed, Iran would not m
erely continue its assistance to radical Palestinian groups determined to scuttle any peace treaty but potentially would renew its earlier policy of seeking to subvert Arab regimes that normalized ties with the Jewish state. At a time when the Middle East peace process appeared in shatters, Ahmadinejad may have perceived a unique opportunity to exploit the Palestinian cause to assert his influence on the larger regional deliberations. But in Iran all politics are local. By embracing an inflammatory posture toward Israel, Ahmadinejad sought to press the theocratic regime, with its increasing penchant toward diplomacy rather than confrontation, toward a more defiant international outlook. He proved mistaken on both accounts.
The notion that Iran can project its influence in a significant manner in the Middle East on the platform of anti-Zionism and calls for extinction of Israel is illusory. Although Ahmadinejad’s speech may have played well on the Arab street, it did not impress the incumbent regimes still inclined to deal with Israel in the framework of negotiations. Indeed, Ahmadinejad’s statements caused considerable unease in Riyadh, Cairo, and other regional capitals, where the rulers once more feared the return of the 1980s when a mischievous Iran continually interfered in their domestic politics. Ironically, a speech designed to extend Iran’s influence may have served the cause of its further isolation.
A more subtle backlash also occurred within the Islamic Republic itself, where the “Khatami compromise” appeared to survive its most determined challenge. The foreign ministry was the first to issue its rebuke of Ahmadinejad: “The Islamic Republic of Iran adheres to the UN Charter and has never used or threatened the use of force against any country.”34 The powerful head of the Supreme National Security Council, Ali Larijani, followed suit: “The situation of Iran with respect to Palestine is the same as the past. This is a decision of Palestinians about how to reclaim their rights.”35 Given Iran’s power structure, such statements would not have been invoked without the approval of Khamenei and the regime’s essential power brokers. Despite the usual Western recriminations against the so-called hapless Khatami, one of his more enduring accomplishments is a sturdy consensus for a more tempered approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict, which not even the rise of a new generation of reactionaries could disrupt.